Syria Embarks on a Transitional Justice Project

Since the toppling of Assad and his regime in December 2024, Syrians have expressed a thirst for justice from a legacy of organised repression, marked by enforced disappearances, torture, and large-scale killing imposed by the Assad dynasty. Perpetrators of atrocity crimes, however, were not limited to the Syrian government, as a myriad of armed groups took part in the thirteen-year conflict. These include state actors such as Russia, Iran, Israel and the US-led coalition against ISIS. They also include numerous groups that are designated as terrorist organisations, including ISIS, Hezbollah, and Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS). Syria’s new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, is keenly aware that there must be justice to move past over a decade of turmoil, leaving hundreds of thousands of victims. But there are numerous obstacles that will require him to walk a tight rope of interests. What is clear is that any transitional justice process in Syria must be comprehensive and bring to justice those most responsible in order to turn the page of history following Syria’s conflict.

Background on the Syrian War

Bashar al-Assad came into power in July 2000, succeeding his father, Hafez al-Assad, who had served as President since 1971. Initially, there were hopes that the younger Assad, who was educated in London as a doctor, would be a moderating influence and would put an end to the worst excesses of the elder Assad’s rule. But those hopes were soon exposed as naïve, as Assad set upon a campaign of repression, torture, and eventually war crimes as popular calls for reform in 2011 led to the outbreak of conflict. Through the conflict that lasted from 2011 until Assad was forced to flee to Russia – his prime international benefactor since 2015 – numerous militias formed in the country to fight against the Syrian Arab Army. One of these groups was Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (aka Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), which eventually led a charge, along with a motley crew of armed groups, to Damascus to unseat President Assad. Assad’s departure left a legacy of tens of thousands of disappeared and tortured inside a network of detention facilities, a web of intelligence branches used to track, arrest and repress the Syrian population, as well as decimated infrastructure, as nothing was spared, including hospitals, schools, and civilian homes. 

Numerous listed terrorist groups also committed war crimes and other human rights violations throughout the war. ISIS was involved from the beginning of the conflict and eventually came to control a large portion of the country, particularly in the northeast. Its rule within the so-called caliphate (in 2014) was characterised by brutal repression and public beheadings of those running afoul of its strict interpretation of Sharia. Tens of thousands remain missing by ISIS. Turkish-backed militias eventually took control of the northern parts of the country, including Afrin, wherein they violated numerous human rights. With the territorial defeat of the ISIS caliphate in 2019, the predominantly Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the US and Europe, took control of northeast Syria. They have also been accused of human rights abuses, including the recruitment of child soldiers. 

HTS, for its part, came to rule parts of Idlib in the northwest, where it committed human rights abuses. HTS’s precursor organisation, Jabhat al-Nusra, was formed in 2011 and was initially affiliated with al-Qaeda within the opposition to the Assad government. In July 2016, however, Jabhat al-Nusra was dissolved, and Ahmed Al-Sharaa created a new group that eventually became HTS. Though there was some speculation that HTS maintained connections with al-Qaida, a recent report from the UN al-Qaida Sanctions Committee concluded that there were “no active ties between Al-Qaida and HTS.” The US had sanctioned HTS since 2018, but in June 2025, President Trump ordered that HTS and a number of other Syrian government entities be removed from the list, recognising “the positive actions taken by the new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa.” HTS is still listed by the UN and the EU.

HTS retains its power in partial reliance on foreign fighters, including a contingent of Uighurs from China. In more recent years, HTS sought to modernise and moderate its public image. HTS is reportedly more focused on building a national government than on continued fighting, but a recent UN monitoring team report reportedly concludes that “Many tactical-level individuals [within HTS] hold more extreme views than … [al-Sharaa] and Interior Minister Anas Khattab, who are generally regarded as more pragmatic than ideological.” 

In sum, there is a history of massive criminality by multiple actors, most of whom have escaped with impunity.

Post-Assad Violence

Although Syria was initially enveloped by a post-Assad euphoria marked by a period of stability, violent sectarian divisions have arisen in recent months. In March of this year, in response to an uprising of former Assad forces, a dozen factions nominally controlled by the new Syrian government targeted and killed up to 1,500 predominantly Alawite civilians. In June, a church in Damascus was attacked, leaving 25 dead and 63 injured. The previously unknown Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the attack, which the government said was operating as part of ISIS. Then in July, the Druze majority in As-Suwayda were attacked by Bedouin tribes. Government troops responded to quell the violence but reportedly ended up backing the tribes. 

President al-Sharaa’s response has been that the government has not targeted minorities and that those responsible for the violence will be held accountable. A Syrian government report on the coastal violence found that there were 298 suspects (37 arrested) who have been referred for prosecution, but claimed that there was no evidence that Syria’s military leadership ordered the attacks. Rather, it was found that factions had violated military orders by committing violations against civilians. The president likewise stated that those responsible for the As-Suwayda violence would be prosecuted. Some Syrians and international NGOs have cast doubt on these findings and promises.

First Efforts at Transitional Justice

Transitional Justice (TJ) is the process by which a society comes to terms with a legacy of large-scale conflict in an effort to achieve accountability and reconciliation. It aims to provide recognition to victims, build trust in State institutions, and promote the rule of law. Syria’s new caretaker government took the first steps in its Constitutional Declaration in March 2025, noting that a TJ commission shall be established that is victim-centred and with the purpose of obtaining truth and justice for victims and survivors. It did, however, foreshadow some limitations, indicating that “the state criminalises the glorification of the former Assad regime.” [emphasis added]. 

Therefore, it was not surprising when President al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 20 in May 2025 for the creation of a National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ), responsible for “uncovering the truth about grave violations caused by the defunct regime.”[emphasis added]. Crimes committed by other groups, including ISIS, HTS, and Turkish-backed militias, not to mention those committed by other states, appear to be outside of the NCTJ’s mandate. The Decree appoints Mr. Abdul Basit Abdul Latif as the head and tasks him with creating a working group and internal regulations within 30 days. Mr. Abdul Latif has since commented that the NCTJ will raise awareness of the concept of TJ and create an electronic platform for registering complaints, and has created a Facebook page.

Also in May, the president issued Decree No. 19, which established a National Commission for the Missing (NCM) with a mandate to research and reveal the fate of the missing and forcibly disappeared. Unlike the NCTJ, the NCM has already announced an advisory board. The NCM’s mandate was not limited to those rendered missing by Assad. However, it does not have jurisdiction to pursue criminal accountability. 

There has been some disruption to regulate criminal trials since the transition, as the author was informed by a criminal lawyer in Damascus. Trials have begun to function again, including for felony crimes. However, military courts remain suspended. The terrorism courts, a notoriously unfair system established under Assad, have been abolished. Trials are proceeding under the Syrian code of criminal procedure, and defendants who cannot afford an attorney must be afforded one under the Syrian Constitution. But it is not clear whether this is fully respected in practice. Further, time in pre-trial detention has regularly exceeded the permissible duration due to a lack of sufficient detention space and an increased number of detainees. There have been efforts to initiate a transitional justice process. In particular, 83 former terrorism judges, military judges, and military prosecutors have been prosecuted. Few details on these trials are available to the public. In addition, the government announced that it would try four high-level accused and published a video of the initial steps before an investigating judge. It remains to be seen whether fair trial rights will be fully respected.

Given the pace and limitations of the NCTJ and the Syrian criminal courts’ limitations, other mechanisms will need to bring justice to victims of atrocity crimes, at least in the near term.

Universal Jurisdiction

At present, criminal trials in Europe and elsewhere are based on the principle of Universal Jurisdiction (UJ) or the active nationality principle, which is the only means for Syrians to seek meaningful justice for mass atrocities during the Assad era, including those committed by terrorist groups. 

UJ recognises the universality of human rights and the principle that certain crimes are so abhorrent that they must be prosecuted, no matter where they occurred. Several European states, including Germany, France, and the Netherlands, have laws that allow for the prosecution of war crimes occurring in another state, including Syria. There have been over 350 Syria-related cases brought worldwide to date [not including material-support cases that did not directly impact Syrian victims]. Such cases can be effective at bringing to justice Assad’s intelligence branch officials, ISIS fighters, and Jabhat al-Nusra militia members, among many others. 

European jurisdictions have well-developed legal systems and fundamental due process guarantees ensuring that trials are fair and providing some assurances that the truth is being uncovered in such cases. UJ (or, active nationality principle) is particularly well-suited to prosecuting foreign fighters who travelled to Syria to join ISIS or other groups. The new Syrian government could assist in these prosecutions by extraditing foreign fighters and sharing evidence pursuant to mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests. Even if a domestic Syrian tribunal is created, the NCTJ’s limitation to Assad government crimes could mean that the best opportunity to prosecute ISIS crimes will remain in Europe.

However, trial monitoring has shown some weaknesses in this approach. For example, the full trial process is not generally well-publicised, with reporters only attending a few sessions, leaving Syrians to guess as the information is disclosed in court. Translation issues have plagued these sessions, with challenges in providing adequate, impartial interpretation both for the Accused and the general public. European judges are left to discern a foreign culture and to interpret the contextual facts, often with the assistance of European and a few Syrian experts. Furthermore, the magnitude of criminality over the last thirteen years in Syria is overwhelming. While other international tribunals have prosecuted several hundred suspects before closing, a more expansive effort by the Gacaca local tribunals in Rwanda reportedly prosecuted 2 million cases. This should make it clear that UJ is not suited to bringing about comprehensive justice for Syrians.

International Court of Justice Case

In the near term, an international case brought against the Syrian government for state-sponsored torture at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, could also be a unique opportunity for transitional justice. In June 2023, the Dutch and Canadian governments brought the case against Syria for violations of the UN Convention Against Torture. They assert that Syria’s use of torture has been a hallmark of the conflict, from brutally suppressing demonstrations to mistreating detainees, and organised by the state’s intelligence apparatus. In November of 2023, the ICJ imposed provisional measures on Syria, ordering it to take measures to prevent acts of torture and to preserve evidence relevant to the case. It further ordered a briefing schedule, which was prolonged after the fall of Assad to allow Syria’s representative, or agent, time to obtain further directions. The Netherlands and Canada have since submitted their memorial in the case (June 8), and the Syrian response is now due in October.

When the case was initiated in 2023, Assad remained in power, and his hold on the country appeared stronger than ever. The case was an opportunity to bring to light ongoing violations, to shame the Assad government and further isolate it within the international community. President Assad initially requested a continuance of the case and then boycotted the first hearings. 

With Assad’s departure, the case has the potential to take on a new dynamic. President al-Sharaa has an opportunity to cooperate and engage with the case. His government could actively share evidence from newly opened intelligence archives that shed light on the full extent of torture under the Assad government. By doing so, the new Syrian government could help to expose the policies of mistreatment and signify its further efforts to turn the page on Syrian history. With a transitional justice effort in Syria likely years in the making, the ICJ case could prove an important opportunity for a credible transitional justice process that would contribute to future justice efforts in Syria.

Documentation

Documentation will be the bedrock of any future transitional justice process in Syria as it allows for fact-finding that will be essential for truth-telling, prosecution, reparations, and reconciliation. The government has yet to involve itself in a systematised process of documenting past violence. However, a number of non-governmental organisations have made efforts to collect and preserve the millions of documents left by the Assad government bureaucracy. The most important of these documents originates from intelligence branches where lists of prisoners and deceased, as well as orders from leadership, were recorded. Some obstacles remain as the Syrian government is guarding the intelligence branches and has largely closed them off to archiving efforts at this time. Further, it is reappointing former prisons to allow for the detention of new arrestees. This will potentially destroy evidence of prior abuses. 

Role of International Organisations

Several UN entities have been established to document war crimes in Syria, to prepare for the prosecution of such crimes and to identify missing persons. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) was established in 2016 to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those most responsible for serious crimes in Syria since 2011. The IIIM has assisted prosecutions in Europe by serving as a clearinghouse of evidence from Syrian organisations and by providing impartial analytical products in such cases. The IIIM has also reached out to the Syrian government, but has not yet been able to establish an office in Damascus since the fall of Assad.

The Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP) was established in 2023 to determine the fate and whereabouts of all missing persons in Syria. On June 30, the IIMP met with the NCM in Damascus, which expressed a willingness to work together. However, the NCM has not established a presence in Damascus to date. 

International organisations could be helpful in establishing a domestic TJ mechanism in Syria, or perhaps a hybrid model with domestic and international personnel. However, Syria’s new government has not been receptive to outside ideas, having rejected efforts to reconcile different regions in Syria with proposals for federalism. At present, it remains unclear the extent to which the new Syrian government will entertain support from international organisations. 

Conclusion

Syria’s nascent efforts at transitional justice have many obstacles to overcome. Continued violence and sectarianism in the country present the most immediate cause for concern. However, the lack of a coherent and inclusive transitional justice process contributes to the feeling of injustice, which itself leads to future cycles of violence. In the near term, extraterritorial proceedings are the best hope for a measure of justice as Syria attempts to build a more inclusive mechanism.

This article represents the views of the author(s) solely. ICCT is an independent foundation, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy unless clearly stated otherwise.

Photocredit: Mohammad Bash/Shutterstock