Surveillance and Protection – Insights from the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia

Protection systems in Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) are different from the Dutch system. They are older and initially, i.e., pre-World War II, were built to counter the threat of politically motivated violence. Post-1989, it changed to threats from organised crime, and since the 2010s, it is changing again towards countering politically motivated acts.

Each of the three systems had its own turning points – be it 2010/2018 or 2024. These energised the systems and spurred them into action, but often this is happening in a “we should have seen it coming” fashion. The most obvious case of this is Slovakia in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Prime Minister (PM) Robert Fico, with the head of Úrad pre ochranu ústavných činiteľov a diplomatických misií MV SR – (Ministry of Interior’s) Department for the protection of “constitutional authorities” and diplomatic missions (UOUC) now admitting they failed to imagine something like this happening and failed to train for this eventuality. This now leads to a hyperactive approach from the unit and the tightening of standards.

Each system is seemingly available throughout the whole country and groups protected persons (PPs) into three categories: VIPs, witnesses and crown witnesses, and harmed or threatened persons. There is also the military option for the ministers of defence – these are protected by the military gendarmerie, and there have been instances of given ministers using such units too eagerly, while, for example, attending their sports facilities or even sending them to shop for them.

Two of the three systems (Czech and Slovak) are run by the unified, hierarchical police forces. In Poland, there is also the SOP (Sluzba Ochrony Panstwa or State Protection Service), which protects VIPs. Nonetheless, the organisational flowcharts are very clear and similar across the three case studies.

The first group of PPs is the most visible, with ample literature available on it. The second is surrounded by a proverbial wall of silence and for the right reasons. Indeed, recent literature coming out on the topic is sometimes written by the former crown witnesses who undermine the integrity of the system as they overstress the system’s shortcomings and failures. The third layer seems most neglected – some police forces almost habitually refuse to work on this layer of the protection system, others are more zealous in this regard. Herein, however, lies the biggest difference between the three case studies – the Slovak system encourages a victim to report a crime and the police will then go after the criminal, the Polish system has seen a boom in the number of “harmed/threatened persons,” the Czech system finds itself in between the two.

The command and control of the systems is centralised and hierarchical and almost totally in the hands of the police – the only exception being the Polish VIP protection unit, SOP. Hardly any other institution features in the system at all, except the prosecutor’s office, if there is a complaint against a person allegedly being the source of a given threat, or the military police, if protection is about the Minister of Defence or the chief of the general staff. State resources are also used to protect the buildings and some of the personnel from “state assets,” i.e., nationalised companies running, for example, electricity, water, gas, etc. These develop their own protection services and obtain them using, effectively, state funds, but shop for these on the proverbial market.

The systems have not undergone any devolution – even in the light of threats and attacks against local figures. One might be working with the local police or its elements to counter these locally, but the command and control is very much in the hands of, at least, regional commands of the police force and the proverbial buck always stops with the police president/police commander and, subsequently, the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister. Moreover, if local figures are to be protected (as in the aftermath of the Adamowicz assassination in Poland), this is still ordered “from on high” and then sent down the chain of command. Again, one size fits all is more evident here with police units across the countries working from a centrally ordained script. Local variations are possible and available, but there is an attempt to synchronise options and protection packages.

The police forces rely on tested modalities, but allow for a degree of flexibility, depending on the situation and the resources at hand in all three sub-elements of the systems. There is a tendency to start low and upgrade if need be – the case of Lucia Plavakova in Slovakia is telling in that regard. Police forces will not share the rules and regulations governing the packages offered to a given protected person.

There is a tendency to legislate for each type of PPs separately and/or enshrine the regulations governing the protection systems in, for example, police bills.

Police forces suffer from recruitment issues all around the region. Its protective departments belong to the most overworked, but this is also due to the fact that some have focused on recruiting members close to retirement and not individuals keen on moving up the proverbial ladder of a given police force. As a result of this, relatively few policemen want to join these and consequently, they are understaffed. More elite units within the protection systems, for example, focusing on the protection of crown witnesses or within regional commands and working towards the protection of harmed persons, remain relatively unknown, which prevents them from leaking information but also disrupts their recruitment efforts as fellow policemen often do not know about them or their work and are thus unlikely to join them.