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Analysis

Sovereign Citizen Groups in the Netherlands are Arming Themselves: Cause for Concern?

16 Jul 2024
Short Read by Menso Hartgers

On 9 July 2024,  the first court hearing of a Dutch citizen who attempted to illegally acquire firearms and his arms dealer began. The suspect is part of the so-called Common Law Netherlands Earth (in Dutch Common Law Nederland Earth), a sovereign citizen group that rejects the democratic rule of law in the Netherlands, believing that they are not subject to government authority. Instead, they argue to be bound only by their interpretation of natural law and selective historical legal principles. The Public Prosecutor asserts that the group attempted to illegally acquire firearms to instigate a revolution. This case is indicative of a possible trend of sovereign citizens and anti-government extremists who not only espouse anti-democratic ideas but are also attempting to seize the means to realise their ideations. In a March 2024 report, ICCT already encountered online incitements for violence by Common Law Netherlands Earth, which advocated for “civil arrest” to “fight back” against government and law enforcement. This rhetoric is clearly a call to arms against the democratic rule of law. The ongoing trial evidences that the group’s adherents are heeding these calls, quite literally arming themselves. This short analysis aims to further shed light on the group, reflecting on developments of sovereign citizen movements abroad, and outlining possible challenges ahead.  

 

Sovereign Citizens and Common Law Netherlands Earth 

Anti-government extremism (AGE) encompasses movements, networks, and individuals that reject government legitimacy and undermine the democratic legal order, often rooted in conspiracy narratives, particularly surrounding the existence of an ‘evil elite’ that supposedly runs the world from behind the scenes. Sovereign citizens are a subset of anti-government extremists. Their beliefs in an evil elite are often centred around the notion that man-made, government mandated laws and statutes are ways to oppress ‘the people’ and strip them of their individual rights and sovereignty. They position themselves outside of this ‘oppressive’ legal regime by advocating for the establishment of their own courts and parallel societies instead. 

Common Law Netherlands Earth is part of an international genre of sovereign citizen collectives that is notably found in the UK and ‘British Heritage countries’ (i.e., former British colonies that have adopted and continue to use particular legislative or judiciary structures like courts inspired  by British colonialism) such as the US, Canada, and Australia. The existence of these various ‘Common Law’ groups is predicated on a shared narrative of an aspired supersession of natural laws over existing legal structures and democratic norms. In the case of Common Law Netherlands Earth, it must further be noted that, based on limited open-source intelligence, the group may have changed its name or split off under a different nomenclature. 

ICCT’s early investigations into the Dutch anti-government and sovereign citizen extremist scene revealed that the group is (or was) comparatively well organised. Its official website, which is currently defunct, neatly listed several Telegram channels through which it could share sovereign citizen content and messages, while also linking to international affiliate organisations like the Australian People of the Commonwealth, the Republic of Kanata in Canada, and the People of Krystal City in Spain. Visitors of the website could also be directed to toolkits and documents, including procedural guidelines detailing the establishment of Common Law people’s tribunals. In the eyes of groups that adopt Common Law views, these people’s tribunals serve as Common Law alternatives to Dutch courts. 

Perhaps more worryingly are the ‘sheriffs’ training materials that the group distributes through its website and various Telegram channels. In Common Law speak, sheriffs, are those individuals empowered to execute the verdicts of people’s tribunals. According to the group’s doctrine, Common Law sheriffs are authorised to arrest, detain, and use force against transgressors. A training manual that was examined by ICCT mentions that “sheriffs and their deputies must be qualified and trained in the expert use of force, to arrest and detain suspects, convicted criminals, and enemies of the republic.” (NB: the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy, not a republic. This reference could allude to a different type of State that sovereigns envision). Moreover, the document states that “all sheriffs must be armed and equipped with protective gear.” 

Against the backdrop of the group’s public advocacy for arming its members, the currently ongoing trial of a Common Law sovereign citizen—who the Public Prosecutor alleges is a ‘sheriff’—attempting to acquire firearms is alarming. It shows that sovereign groups are earnest in their attempts to arm themselves. Coupled with their democratic state rejectionist ideology, the likelihood of an escalation of violence against state and democratic institutions increases. Moreover, as ICCT’s report indicates, efforts are made to actively recruit members with a military or law enforcement background. This is corroborated by previous convictions of Dutch Common Law sovereign citizens on weapon charges. In September 2023, a veteran was sentenced to eighteen months jail (twelve of which are probationary) for attempting to purchase firearms. The Public Prosecutor alleged that the man had intended to disseminate these firearms to other veterans, although the court did not rule this sufficiently evidenced. Nevertheless, this case, along with other cases of active-duty and veteran sovereign citizens in neighbouring countries such as Germany raises concerns about the tactical experience, technical expertise, and operational capabilities of Common Law and other sovereign citizen groups to handle firearms.  

 

An escalation of violence? 

The overall number of sovereign citizens has sharply increased over the last few years, with estimates by Dutch intelligence and security services putting that figure at several tens of thousands. While the anti-government extremist scene is generally considered to be non-violent in the Netherlands, the sovereign citizen movement has now shown itself to be more readily accepting of potential premeditated application of force. Examples abroad already evidence that sovereign citizen violence is not necessarily uncommon. In the US, a man beheaded his own father who worked for the federal government, declaring himself a leader of ‘the resistance’ and calling on others to take up arms. In Germany, a flourishing Reichsbürgerbewegung—a diverse sovereign citizen movement that rejects the legitimacy of the German state and broadly argues for a return to the time of the German Empire—was connected to an attempted coup comprising (former) members of the military, judges, and an aristocrat. In Belgium, a self-declared sovereign and ‘prepper’—someone who is preparing for the end times or the collapse of society by stockpiling food, drink, medicine and, occasionally, firearms—was killed during a house search by police. The search was part of a larger federal counter-terrorist operation in which multiple suspects were arrested on gun charges. In France, a similar coup to the one in Germany, though significantly smaller in scope, was also attempted. 

The normalisation of armed resistance against the state as advocated by Common Law groups could bear long-term security implications. As such groups become more entrenched, they could inspire other sovereign citizens, including ethno-separatist groups (e.g., the Indigenous Germanite People, a group active in both Germany and the northern parts of the Netherlands and of which German intelligence services already took notice in their 2023 trend report) to acquire firearms, creating a fragmented security landscape. 

Nevertheless, stringent gun control makes it unlikely that groups would arm themselves en masse in the Netherlands. The violent threat emanating from sovereign citizens and anti-government extremism writ large remains, for the time, non-terrorist—that is, not involving premeditated mass violence—in nature. Instead, the violence potential that underpins these movements is more likely to manifest in other ways. According to intelligence and security services, this may include harassment and intimidation of public officials, journalists, and healthcare professionals. Additionally, there can be incidents of violence against these individuals, incitement to broader violence, or acts of violence carried out by lone actors. Still, countries with similarly restrictive firearm regulations like Germany are facing challenges regarding weapon ownership. Some 1,500 right-wing extremists and 500 Reichsbürgers own guns, with German intelligence services denoting an “affinity for weapons” among sovereign citizens, and the German Ministry of Interior declaring a de-armament of right-wing extremists as part of its official federal policy to combat right-wing extremism. International developments must therefore be tracked to ensure similar dynamics do not develop in the Netherlands.  

 

What’s next? 

The sovereign citizen movement and groups like Common Law Netherlands Earth, its offshoots, and its affiliates will continue to pose challenges for security services. Breeding grounds for conspiracy theories and rallying calls for sovereigns and anti-government extremists writ large can be complex and are rooted in systemic social issues and grievances. Political scandals, lacking accountability and redress in the wake of bad government policy, long-term psychosocial ramifications of social isolation following the COVID-19 pandemic, and an increasingly complicated and unstable world are all factors that may contribute to the rise of conspiratorial anti-government extremism. Trust in government must be restored through fair policy that aims to close socioeconomic disparities – not widen them. Policies must be transparently and strategically communicated to constituents, leaving as little room for ambiguity as possible. At the same time, more capacity must be invested in prevention, while securitisation of anti-government extremism is avoided. A single repertoire of solutions does not exist. In the meantime, however, intelligence and security services must remain vigilant of a potential maturation of the scene into violence.