Does the Sahel need NATO?

Introduction

For the last two decades, the Sahel – meaning the area including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – has been progressively discussed, narrated and approached as a region ‘in crisis’. Starting with the 2002 US-led Pan-Sahel initiative, the massive interest and concern of the international community produced an unprecedented ‘patchwork’ of different forms of intervention in the area, from a UN peace-keeping operation (MINUSMA), four Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions by the European Union (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUTM Mali, EUMPM Niger), to two French-led military operations (Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane), plus a myriad of counter-terrorism and security-related projects. By developing its interest in the European Southern border, NATO has also progressively focused on the implications of the different forms of instabilities for European security – political, socio-economic, and security – in the Sahel. Mauritania, for instance, has been a long-standing NATO partner, and new programmes have been developed between Allied Special Operations Forces Command (SOFCOM) and Mauritanian Special Forces since 2021. Yet, despite such massive economic, political, and military engagement, the Sahelian countries that were more invested in international and European projects are now taking the distance from the old allies.  

In March 2024, Niger announced the withdrawal of the security and defence cooperation with the US, a few months after breaking diplomatic and military ties with France. This decision represents the (temporary) peak of a process which has seen Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger loosening or even breaking their diplomatic and security ties with most of the (Western) actors that have defined and implemented international interventions in the Sahel during the last decade. These countries have all experienced coups d’état in the last four years, leading to authoritarian regimes ruled by militaries. In parallel, these elites seem to be changing their international positioning, becoming closer to the Russian sphere of influence, with a larger presence of the Wagner Group (now the Africa Corps) and, in general, of Russian political interests.  

Other than changes in the geopolitical decisions of some Sahelian countries, today we see a highly militarised region, with increased intensity, frequency and extension of violence and force used not only among different – always evolving – armed groups and terrorist organisations, such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Sahel or the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), but also increasingly by regular armed forces. Transnational forms of violence are now spreading towards the Gulf of Guinea, particularly in Togo, Benin, and Ivory Coast. This contributes to an increase in the number of potential victims among the civilian population. 

Given this peculiar scenario, where transnational asymmetrical security challenges overlap with the limited capacities of states that are now detaching themselves from European and, more generally, Western politics, should NATO be interested in expanding its engagement at all? If so, what could be NATO’s added value in the region and what can NATO gain from it? 

NATO in the Sahel? 

When discussing potential future engagement of NATO in the Sahel, we should first consider today’s specific challenges in the region. The abovementioned militarisation of the area has significantly increased the level of diffused violence, and a more visible – even indirect – military engagement from NATO might encounter the risk of rising tensions with local actors. This could polarise the international debate on the region, making it a space of confrontation between international powers. Finally, any potential further NATO presence should take into account the sentiments of local populations that can easily mobilise against external actors. The Sahel should mostly be approached as a space for humanitarian support, reinforcing the institutions built to provide services other than security. Overall, Sahelian countries should be supported in becoming representative of national and local necessities, independent from external influence and accountable via democratic processes.  

Yet, as a military-based political organisation, NATO could have specific responsibilities and a role to play in the area. We believe that existing research can contribute significantly to policy decisions by highlighting key lessons learned from the past.  

Learning from the Past 

There are three main insights – or better risks – that we have learned from past experiences of European countries and institutions, such as the European Union, which we believe are crucial to consider when discussing NATO’s possibilities in the area. These are the risks of a ‘race to the bottom’ with Russia and other ‘competitors’; the risks of the ‘good pupil approach’; and the risks of ‘internal fragmentation’.  

One of the main factors behind the worsening of the crisis in the Sahel has been the vicious circle of bad governance and military abuses by local regimes under the counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency umbrella, which has not been intercepted or modified by international partners. Not only has this generated and reinforced frustration among civil society, political oppositions, and citizens, but it has also led to local regimes exploiting international competition for their purposes. Although NATO’s policies are the result of consensus-based decisions by member states, NATO could offer a forum to support member states involved in the area in setting specific and high standards for intervention and security cooperation, avoiding a ‘race to the bottom’ with Russia or other international competitors. With their agency largely underestimated and reinforced by the projected interests of international and European actors, local regimes have used the different available political alliances and economic and military agreements to their advantage, shopping for the most convenient ones. In this way, Russia found its way into the Sahel by becoming one of the primary arms deliverers for local armies. NATO could only provide a credible alternative if its political and material engagement is consistent with local requests and necessities. While doing so, it should not renounce to define a (limited) set of conditionalities to ensure and promote political  accountability of Sahelian actors.  

The second main issue concerns the way Western actors have generally addressed the Sahel, i.e. through the ‘good pupil approach’. As the cases of Mali and, more recently, Niger demonstrate, the focus on one key country in the area as a local hub and gatekeeper of force and resource deployment for the whole region is highly risky. Indeed, European actors have generally invested their political efforts in key interlocutors, such as President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Mali, arrested and dismissed with the coup d’état in 2020, or the Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum, also arrested following the military coup in Niger in July 2023. The decision to direct efforts toward one country that has proven ‘more stable’ than others and that is to be used as a local base for the engagement in the entire region can easily generate a series of unintended consequences. First, there is the problem of dependency and entrapment with local partner regimes that are dependent on external approval and, therefore, often limited in the decision-making process. Second, such external validation and support are likely to generate destabilising effects on the very same governments and can be used by its opposition as a delegitimising tool. Finally, such an approach significantly increases costs due to the necessity to look for alternatives when collaboration is compromised. NATO has now approved a Defence Security Capacity Building Package for Mauritania, probably the only country in the Sahel which still remains (more or less) firmly in the Western camp. While doing so, it is crucial to calculate and differentiate risks vis-à-vis local partners and correctly evaluate the implications of such an investment in one country.  

Finally, for a long time, the Sahel has been a space of potential tensions and incoherence among European allies and within NATO, which increases the risks of ‘internal fragmentation’. While the core of the political crisis with Sahelian countries has, so far, concerned France and the United States, which have completely interrupted their cooperation with Mali or Niger, other members such as Italy, Germany, and Turkey are still in, with different and potentially contrasting agendas. If the Sahel is kept at the top of the security agenda of European members of NATO, political coordination is fundamental to building consensus. Duplication and dispersion of institutional efforts have been largely observed in the case of the EU’s action, so NATO could work on reinforcing cooperation among members that are currently active in the area, not only as a way to reinforce unilateral actions but also to regain influence and legitimacy among local actors.  

The Way Forward: NATO’s Added Value 

NATO in the Sahel today should avoid the mistakes mentioned above made by international actors who operated in the area in the past decade. The temptation of physical and material presence should be avoided in favour of key strategies that could still respond to NATO’s members’ interests and generate larger gains.  

One of the most pressing needs is to reframe the way Sahelian countries and populations perceive Western presence, including some of NATO’s member states. This approach would prove useful also for contrasting the mediatic campaigns developed by Russia. The Kremlin’s messages and rising influence are mostly connected to a fading Western image in the region, something that predates Russian campaigns, and has been driven by a perceived paternalistic posture of Western initiatives. In this sense, developing sector-specific and technically-oriented partnerships would open new opportunities for rebuilding trust and regaining ground as valuable partners, first to governments and then to civil society.  

While the operative space in the Sahel should focus on humanitarian, social, and economic support, it is important to design and implement preventive security strategies working with coastal West African states in the security and counter-terrorism domains. In fact, this area could still benefit from preventive measures, as it is increasingly experiencing security dynamics similar to the ones we have observed across the Sahel. As part of NATO’s capacity-building efforts within potential future partnerships, there could be space to support original, context-sensitive, and flexible security sector reform that is fundamental to avoid repetition of the mechanisms that we have observed in the Sahel. Coastal states could be supported in elaborating a common strategic and tactical vision and interpretation of the kind of issues at stake, elaborating interventions where the role of militaries remains clear, limited, accountable, and professionalised. Reforms of the security sector must be implemented before the beginning of a vast-scale security crisis; political and institutional interventions of conflict management must be put at the forefront. In a medium-long term perspective, attention for the judiciary sector and direct engagement with communities that are exposed to armed groups’ presence and propaganda are at least as important as security-focused initiatives. 

Finally, while the invitation to avoid institutional overlapping and duplication stands, we believe that supporting and engaging with regional organisations (ECOWAS and/or Accra Initiative) in the creation of a common framework of action and common instruments could be an important asset that NATO could contribute to. Yet, we find it particularly crucial to emphasise the need for more equal, balanced, and fair political and empirical equality among partners.  

Conclusion 

The Sahel, as well as the whole of West Africa, are today characterised by unprecedented geopolitical competition, while they remain a regional complex whose (in)security dynamics can potentially affect security and stability on the European continent. Indeed, stabilising the Sahel remains key for many of NATO’s member states, and current political, security, and diplomatic impasses increase the pressure for Western interveners to rethink their approach to the region.  

Given this situation, NATO is facing two main strategic options. On the one hand, the organisation could decide to maintain a very limited engagement and footprint in the area, mostly turning to monitoring activities aiming at intercepting potential security spillovers towards North Africa and the Mediterranean. The difficulties encountered by NATO’s member states in stabilising the region during the last decade, coupled with the temptation to wait and see Russian security intervention “failing” in the same way as European states did, would indeed make this option a rational one. On the other hand, NATO’s political and material engagement could potentially represent an added value for its member states and the region. Rather than competing with Russia, the real challenge in this part of the African continent is to prevent the destabilisation of West African coastal states and to support humanitarian and monitoring efforts in the Sahel. As a military-based political alliance, NATO has the potential to play an important role in both issues under the condition of learning from past experiences and correcting previous mistakes.