Assessing Mobilisation Dynamics of Violent Extremist Organisations Through a Gender Lens

This analysis provides key insights into the gendered aspects of recruitment and radicalisation processes. This research was conducted as part of a broader review of the literature and practice on gender and radicalisation, the findings of which are presented in two complimentary reports available here and here. Together, these three publications emphasise the gaps and needs in this field while showcasing opportunities to better integrate gender-based analysis into research and practice. 

Gender expectations are key in shaping mobilisation experiences associated with violent extremism. This is true for both men and women, and it includes assumptions on what individuals should achieve, how they should achieve it, and to the benefit of whom they should do so. This is a fact understood also by extremists, who have an awareness of gender dynamics and strategically play on them. Specifically, violent groups and organisations manipulate gender assumptions in order to attract vulnerable individuals affected by them to their ranks and lure them into inflicting harm or consolidating harmful practices.

This ICCT analysis was written in conjunction with two research reports[1] based on a literature review looking at over one hundred expert pieces and policy documents focused on gender aspects of radicalisation, mobilisation, and disengagement dynamics at large. Together with the literature review, all of these research projects included expert interviews conducted with practitioners in the field across Europe and North America. This was done with the aim of achieving a better grasp of the extent to which gender-based analysis is understood and features in the work of practitioners. As a whole, the above-mentioned reports and this analysis hope to collectively shed light upon discussions on the need to incorporate a gender lens into the safety and security field, specifically the study of radicalisation and engagement processes associated with extremist and violent groups, including terrorist organisations.

Key findings of the present analysis include that gender as a social construct can effectively be used as a mobilising tool by extremist groups, specifically in recruitment and operational or targeting practices; and that, among other gaps, existing literature focused on gender and extremism tends to overly focus on male-based case studies, causing our knowledge base for prevention and intervention practices to be flawed and insufficient to properly inform preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts. It concludes that scholars and practitioners alike are affected by gender blindness, resulting in the specific needs and risks of women and other gender minorities in particular being largely neglected.

Recruitment

Generally, existing research identifies recruitment variables or narratives (pull factors) that do not differ thematically when recruiting men or women. These include the need to achieve a sense of belonging, purpose, control, and empowerment. Such themes, however, differ in form and content depending on the audience they are trying to attract, as it is particularly well illustrated in existing research contributions. For both men and women, the desire to belong to a group is central in their radicalisation processes and frequently related to a missing parental figure, experiences of bullying, and an overall lack of social contacts in their biographies. Across ideologies, it seems that men’s duty to protect (women) and fight for their community is prevalent, as is to have the chance to acquire a particular status within a group’s hierarchy.[2] This particular narrative is closely linked to the need to overcome a sense of shame for not fulfilling male-related expectations around the responsibility to provide security for their family and group, and to ensure that they are well defended in order to thrive. It is also associated with a sense of male "entitlement” that seems to automatically come from fulfilling the above, that is,” that seems to automatically come from fulfilling the above, that is, having a submissive wife and children, and the respect of the community, for example. In other words, men are attracted by narratives that will retain their power in the small family unit.[3] Finally, joining an extremist group provides them with a chance to acquire status within that group’s hierarchy.[4]

For women, community matters too, especially the notion of “sisterhood” in Islamist extremism. In terms of recruitment narratives, for women, these are often based on fear, including fear of rape, of men, of migrants, and of the unknown.[5] The notion of family and safety is crucial in that regard, where women look for a provider in a man or the larger group, as well as the wish to care for someone and be cared for particularly when unacceptance and societal changes create insecurities.[6] Illustratively, Islamist actors rely on and manipulate gendered constructs in the recruitment of women by using “promises of marriage with Islamist fighters, [and] recognition of family responsibilities”. Gaining a sense of empowerment by taking action, even if this is deciding to become compliant, is also important. It is worth noting that not just traditional gender-based expectations determine pull factors and how effective they can be. Other gender expectations around women, especially the need to be a “good” mother while having a successful career, may also cause a lot of pressure and trigger feelings of resentment, frustration, and/or unfulfillment that can feed into radicalisation.

Radicalisation

Gendered expectations and assumptions are not only crucial when directing propaganda to women and men as target groups, but also to demonise “the enemy”, which fuels radicalisation. Illustratively, right-wing extremist movements portray Islam as a threat, especially to European women, by claiming that Muslim men are prone to rape or by arguing that Islam subjugates women. Similarly, Islamist movements portray the West as incompatible with alleged Islamic values, foremost due to the alleged (sexual) exploitation of Muslim women.[7] Precisely, it is the combination of effective exploitation of gendered views together with the successful tapping of emotions that shapes the outcome of recruitment strategies. These include frustration and resentment with the larger society, as above-mentioned, but also anger towards out-groups, which need to be perceived as (actively) hostile in order for violence to be legitimised. This is important because, while all the literature reviewed acknowledges that gendered narratives are useful in recruitment strategies, only Kiriloi M. Ingram explains that these are also effective in helping mobilise fighting capabilities, which means that the flow and the number of gendered narratives may increase or decrease depending on a given group’s progress and developments.

The demonisation of an out-group can also boost push factors towards radicalisation, including economic mobility, social isolation, societal alienation, or the inability to find a partner, as seen in the research by Joshua Roose, Michael Flood and Mark Alfano. For men, such feelings can be amplified if personal setbacks and frustration contradict men’s self-perception of being breadwinners and providers. Thus, belonging to an extremist group that propagates a strict subordination of (and violence against) women can provide a mechanism for restoring “wounded masculinity”, for example. For women, and in the context of Islamist extremism, the literature highlights the role that Western societies can play in preventing radicalisation by not enforcing regulations around religious symbols, more specifically, the hijab. Annemette Jacobsen, for instance, argues that extremist and terrorist organisations use this form of discrimination to tailor propaganda directed to women, to whom they promise a sense of acceptance and empowerment. Based on this, the idea that women might be more prone to radicalisation because of racism as a push factor is presented as crucial in radicalisation processes in the West. Although social alienation is equally present for women and men, men seem to have reported discrimination on the basis of economic mobility more often than racism when compared to women.

Analytical gaps

Given the above, the search for identity is unlikely to have a more pronounced impact among Muslim women with a lower degree of integration in the West when compared to men, as opposed to what Jacobsen’s research suggests. In fact, more comprehensive studies show that both male and female recruits into Islamist extremism are predominantly from second- or third-generation immigrant families. Given this, a deeper look into what role different generational understandings of identity may play in radicalisation processes would be useful. This might also help better understand if and how integration policies are preventing radicalisation and mobilisation, or triggering these. But even when common push factors such as discrimination, alienation and socioeconomic concerns affect both men and women, the impact or effects of such factors, when effectively exploited by extremists, are also highly gendered, shaping the threat landscape accordingly. This is an aspect of the radicalisation process that has not been the focus of the literature analysed here, even though it is imperative to design proportionate intervention and deradicalisation processes. That is because only by knowing how gender expectations affect involvement in terrorism can we collect the right data to demonstrate active engagement in all aspects of extremism. Given that most data on terrorism is collected around men’s activities based on the assumption that women are held back in passive roles, it is thus crucial to challenge our research methodologies by stressing that the experience of terrorism is tightly shaped by how gendered propaganda is embraced, and so how it impacts the individual.

Precisely, part of the reason why data on radicalised women is less present in research is that our understanding of the threat landscape relies on studies that have defined ‘extremism’ based on reactions of the criminal justice system towards men, as explained by a radicalisation specialist within the judiciary service.[8] Above all, this creates an echo chamber where researchers (including women) speak to each other, relying on the same type of data rather than challenging it to improve the discourse. This problem is reflected in the selected literature for this paper, as the vast majority of the authors use secondary literature exclusively to inform their research. This is especially concerning where the aim of such contributions is to stress the role of women as active agents in radicalisation processes. It might be that, as stressed by an expert analyst,[9] gender-based research with primary data is underdeveloped because information on the gender of both recruiters and receivers of extremist information is often unavailable, not systematically collected, or not compliant with GDPR. Research on the gender of recruiters is particularly rare. Indeed, only Sykes and Hopner’s work on tradwives asks whether the gender of the recruiter matters in the production and reception of gendered content/propaganda. An alternative is to conduct research based on interviews with individuals with direct radicalisation experience and professionals working with them, as done by Elizabeth Pearson. This is despite the fact that Pearson herself, together with Emily Winterbotham, have argued that women and girls are recruited and radicalised online more often than men, implying that the online monitoring of female users is particularly important.

Conclusion

This analysis has highlighted that gender assumptions and constructs are used by extremist and terrorist groups to attract, recruit, and mobilise men and women. In particular, it stressed that both men and women often respond to the same thematical concerns, which shape extremist propaganda relying on gender stereotypes, even if the narratives slightly differ depending on the vulnerable target. Additionally, it demonstrated that such stereotypes are useful to channel hatred and create outgroups or enemy groups around which extremist ideology hangs. Finally, while existing research understands how crucial the importance of gender-based approaches to the study of radicalisation is, this analysis pointed to a few gaps. Firstly, generational divergence between vulnerable groups (for example, immigrant communities) is not considered when assessing mobilisation dynamics in extremism. Secondly, our research knowledge on gender is mostly based on male-based case studies, causing both a theoretical and an empirical gap that affects our P/CVE practices to the detriment of women and other gender minority groups in particular. Thirdly, while the online sphere is crucial, regulation around data protection can make the ethical observation of radicalising processes in this space and the gender role in them challenging. Because of these gaps, there is, in fact, little evidence-based data informing a nuanced and gender-sensitive understanding of the threat landscape, which, as a result, suggests that our P/CVE efforts are at best biased and at worst ineffective. Future research will benefit from relying on primary data about women and other gender minorities to contribute to the building of a more comprehensive body of expert research and, ultimately, to inform better practice.

The overall results based on the culminating research both here and in the other two respective reports indicate that, overall, gender-based analysis remains a significant gap in P/CVE research and practice. Above all, the need to go beyond dichotomies and normative assumptions about gender is indicated by the lack of sufficient knowledge regarding gender and radicalisation. This remains the case despite the growing body of work on the topic in the last ten years. More research is thus needed to understand this phenomenon better, as well as to understand the ways to bridge theory to practice.

Footnotes

[1] Joana Cook, Eva Herschinger, Seran de Leede, and Anna-Maria Andreeva, “Radicalisation and Gender – what do we know?”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Report, 2024; Anna-Maria Andreeva, Annika von Berg, Bibi van Ginkel, Elisabeth Hell, Shams Jouve, Alexandra Korn, Bàrbara Molas, Maximilian Ruf, and Sophie Scheuble, “Assessing gender perspectives in preventing and countering violent extremism practices”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Report, 2024.

[2] Interview with EXP09, 6 June 2024.

[3] Interview with EXP01, 27 June 2024.

[4] Interview with EXP09, 6 June 2024.

[5] Interview with EXP01, 27 June 2024.

[6] Interview with EXP09, 6 June 2024.

[7] Interview with EXP09, 6 June 2024.

[8] Interview with EXP04, 19 June 2024.

[9] Interview with EXP03, 11 July 2024.