Counter-Terrorism Targeted Killing of Hassan Nasrallah. Is Hezbollah Weaker?

On 28 September 2024, Hezbollah (and Iran) confirmed the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed by Israeli strikes on Beirut. This confirmed that it had been an extraordinarily terrible ten days for the terrorist group. On 18 September the pagers of many Hezbollah members exploded. The next day, on 19 September handheld radios used by Hezbollah members exploded, including at the funerals of victims from the previous day. On 20 September, a top Hezbollah commander, Ibrahim Aqil, was killed by an Israeli Defense Force targeted strike. At least one other high-ranking terrorist was also killed - Aqil was wanted by the United States for orchestrating terrorist attack bombings in Beirut in 1983 targeting the US embassy and Marine barracks. As of 1 October, the Israeli counter-terrorism onslaught against Hezbollah continued with additional airstrikes in Beirut and military incursions in southern Lebanon. 

In Israel, Syria, and elsewhere, celebrations erupted following the news of the targeted strike against Nasrallah (and at that point, his likely death). The scenes were reminiscent of celebrations throughout the United States following President Obama’s announcement of Osama bin Laden’s death in a special forces operation. However, the death of a terrorist group leader is not the same as the demise or death of a terrorist group. The latter would be worth celebrating. Research suggests that celebrating the former is likely premature because terrorist groups routinely adapt to targeted killings and leadership decapitation strikes and continue to mount attacks and remain a capable and significant threat. For example, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leaders were repeatedly killed in counter-terrorism operations, only for new leaders to take over, often with limited impact on ISIS’s ability to commit terrorist acts. In 2024, thirteen years after bin Laden was killed, several of the most active, violent, and lethal terrorist groups in the world remain affiliated with al-Qaeda, according to the Global Terrorism Index.  

This is not the first time Israel has targeted high-level Hezbollah operatives and leaders. In 2024 alone, at least 25 high-level Hezbollah fighters or commanders were killed in Israeli counter-terrorism operations and targeted strikes before September. And Nasrallah’s predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi, was killed in an Israeli decapitation strike in 1992. 

The core rationale for targeted killing or decapitation strikes is that by eliminating a central leader or high-value targets or leaders, organisational management and decision-making are disrupted. This hinges on the resulting loss of personnel or assets degrading the terrorist group’s capability to operate and attack. Daniel Milton and Bryan Price find that successful decapitation strikes against terrorist group leaders – using a measure indicating whether the leader was captured or killed – lead to a 373 per cent increase in the probability the terrorist group eventually dies. But, just like any organisation, company, or political party, terrorist groups can take measures to insulate themselves and significantly reduce the likelihood they die from targeted strikes.  

This analysis looks beyond the short-term and discusses the potential effectiveness of targeted strikes in defeating Hezbollah. It first describes targeted strikes as a counter-terrorism tool, then why hierarchical and horizontal organisational structures impact a terrorist group’s ability to survive targeted strikes. It also considers how four important terrorist group characteristics – age, size, ideology, and network – can help terrorist groups survive. Ultimately, based on the characteristics of Hezbollah described above, the group is likely to survive despite Israel’s recent campaign of targeted killings and decapitation strike on Nasrallah. 

Targeted Strikes 

There are many forms of targeted strikes. They include arresting or killing high-value targets such as group leaders, operational commanders, high-skill individuals such as bomb makers, and mid-management level members. Decapitation strikes are a specific type of targeted strike intended to remove senior leadership – either capture or kill. Killing senior leadership and high-value targets is thought to decrease human capital, including skilled commanders, strategists and operatives, decrease stockpiles of material resources, and “deter potential fighters and supporters” by increasing the risks of participating in terrorism.  

Targeted strikes do not have to be against human targets. They can also eliminate terrorist group resources. For example, the US conducted airstrikes on 11 January 2016 against an Iraqi central bank branch that ISIS captured blowing up the paper currency held in the bank. Airstrike campaigns against al-Shabaab military assets in Somalia are another example. The rationale for targeting material resources and assets is the same as for targeting fighters and leaders. Eliminating any type of resource is thought to decrease a terrorist group’s capabilities. Targeted strikes ultimately aim to “disrupt, destroy, or defeat a terrorist organisation through targeting its core functions that can include recruitment, fundraising, logistics, and attack wings.” 

A Terrorist Group’s Organisational Structure 

One way to think about organisational or institutional structure is the leader’s placement or role in the organisation. In hierarchical organisations, both people inside and outside the organisation can clearly identify the leader. They are more visible, tend to have more and stronger social ties with mid-level management members and fighters, and play a central role in operational decision-making. While a hierarchical structure makes a leader more vulnerable to targeted killing, it can enable the terrorist group to survive because there are often “clear lines of succession.”  

In decentralised or horizontal organisations, the key terrorist actors function as hubs within a communication network. This challenges the ability of those countering a terrorist group to identify important actors or leaders within an organisation. It also risks making the group vulnerable to targeted killing because eliminating a hub can disrupt organisational decision-making and operational management. As noted by Marc Sageman, “If enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, non-communicating islands of nodes.” But if there is a clear separation between hubs and leaders, then decapitation strikes are likely to be ineffective in weakening an organisation because operational planning is already diffused amongst the hubs of mid-level management and fighters. 

In addition to these insulating measures, there are four main group characteristics that are critical indicators of the potential strategic and tactical success of Israel’s decapitation strike against Nasrallah and Hezbollah. As Jenna Jordan,i Patrick B. Johnston,ii Audrey Cronin,iii and Bryan Price,iv among others, have described, terrorist groups’ size, age, ideology, and network of connections to other terrorist groups all influence the group’s ability to survive targeted killings and decapitation strikes. The timing of the decapitation strike against Nasrallah, and the series of previous targeted strikes, amidst Hezbollah’s increased violence and missile launches against Israel since the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack by Hamas and Israel’s military response in Gaza create significant layers of complexity, urgency, and unknown consequences in this particular terrorism-counter-terrorism power struggle. However, we can apply research-based analyses and findings to explore the potential fallout for Hezbollah beyond any immediate retaliatory violence and short-term impacts on tactical and strategic planning and operations. 

Group Size 

Larger groups are more likely, on average, to survive targeted killings and decapitation strikes than smaller groups. We should think about group size in terms of both people and material resources. The larger a stockpile of resources (human or material) that can be tapped into following the counter-terrorism strike the better able a terrorist group is to replace fighters and leaders and recruit or mobilise new supporters and fighters. Large groups are better able to develop cohorts of fighters with specialised skills and thus can replace losses faster and more efficiently. This stockpile functions as a reserve to overcome the immediate shock and extinguish the organisational fallout from the counter-terrorism strike.  

In 2021, Nasrallah claimed there were 100,000 trained fighters in Hezbollah. Even if this claim was overly exaggerated, analysis of intelligence reports and news articles indicates Hezbollah had 25,000-30,000 fighters and reservists by 2018. Either measure clearly means Hezbollah is a large group, even if we account for the recent losses from pager and hand-held radio explosions and airstrikes, and thus likely to survive a decapitation strike. 

Group Age 

Older organisations are more likely to survive targeted strikes. This is about more than age though. Older groups tend to have more complex institutional structures and thus have the organisational capacity and capability to withstand targeted strikes and/or have bureaucratic structures that insulate the organisation from the shock of targeted strikes, like established succession protocol, backup or emergency plans, and multiple layers of operational units and policies. 

Hezbollah was officially founded in 1985 but was initially created as an armed resistance to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982. Either founding year makes Hezbollah a very old group in the world of terrorism and thus more likely to survive a decapitation strike. 

Group Ideology 

A foggier picture of counter-terrorism success and group collapse emerges when accounting for a group’s ideology. Religious and separatist groups are more likely to survive following a targeted strike than groups seeking to overthrow political systems, as religious and separatist groups can rely on strong social bonds to survive targeted strikes. Religious groups also benefit from supporters’ and members’ commitment to higher beliefs to sustain the group in times of crisis. Terrorist groups engaged in political ideological battles have a greater risk of collapsing when the targeted government ‘flexes’ its muscles using targeted killings or decapitation strikes. 

However, placing terrorist groups within well-defined, clean, and crisp ideological boxes is not always possible. Hezbollah exemplifies this. The organisation identifies as a resistance movement and Islamist group, and participates in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah is a separatist and religious terrorist group. It has adapted and morphed into a multi-dimensional and ideological organisation. Hezbollah’s history of adapting to new opportunities and political environments will be an asset in countering Nasrallah’s death.  

A Terrorist Group’s Network 

Terrorist groups communicate, cooperate, and organise with one another. External relationships can insulate terrorist groups from collapse following a targeted strike. For terrorist groups, the ‘quality’ of friends is more important than the quantity of friends. High-quality friends can provide knowledge and experience in overcoming targeted killings and decapitation strikes. They can provide well-trained mercenaries to retaliate or restore order and morale among the targeted group’s fighters and supporters. And, just like any professional or business executive, a new leader can rely on their network for “on-the-job training and personal and professional development.”  

Hezbollah has a ‘high quality’ and a high quantity of friends. Over the past decades, Hezbollah has supported and aligned with terrorist groups fighting secular Muslim governments throughout the Middle East and attacking Israel. More recently, in Syria, Hezbollah supported Assad and fought against rebel factions in the country. And, most importantly, Hezbollah relies on state sponsorship and unbridled support from Iran. The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for five days of mourning, condemned the targeted strike and while not publicly announcing Iranian retaliation, he has called on Hezbollah to determine “the fate of this region.” Hezbollah’s widespread, diffuse, deep, and multi-layered network will likely enable the terrorist group to survive Nasrallah’s killing. 

Conclusion 

The targeted killing of Hassan Nasrallah and a series of other counter-terrorism attacks and airstrikes have raised many questions about Israel’s intentions and strategic plan for the ongoing conflict with Hezbollah. The operations risk further heightening violence and potentially full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.  

Perhaps Israel sought to alter the conflict’s trajectory by demonstrating their ultimate superior force by eliminating Hezbollah’s leader and deterring the next leader from continuing a path of escalatory violence. What is likely is that nobody in the Israeli intelligence and military communities foresaw targeting Nasrallah as a means of defeating Hezbollah. Research and analyses tell us this would be a misguided plan. Targeted strikes are often better at fulfilling tactical goals rather than providing overall strategic victories. Older, larger, and well-networked terrorist groups can withstand and survive targeted killings and decapitation strikes.  

Hezbollah is old, large, and well-networked and should withstand Nasrallah’s killing. This is not the first time Hezbollah’s leader was killed by Israel, nor is it likely to be the last because Hezbollah will probably survive. Only time will tell how Hezbollah adapts under a new leader and in the current high-pressure, high-tension, increasingly violent conflict along the Israeli border and continued war in Gaza.   

Funded by the European Union (ERC, TERGAP, 101116436). Views and opinions expressed are, however, those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.