Links between Terrorism and Migration:
An Exploration

This Research Paper explores and questions some assumed causal links between terrorism on the one hand and (forced and irregular) migration on the other. The paper delves into the role that state and non-state terrorism might have in causing migration as well as analysing if and how refugees’ camps and the diaspora community might be a target for radicalisation. One of the findings of the paper is how migration control for the control of terrorism is a widely used instrument however, it might hurt bona fide migrants and legal foreign residents more than mala fide terrorists. Finally, this Research Paper offers recommendations that can go some way towards disentangling the issues of (refugee) migration and terrorism.

DOI: 10.19165/2016.1.04
ISSN: 2468-0656
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About ICCT

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism. ICCT’s work focuses on themes at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human rights related aspects of counter-terrorism. The major project areas concern countering violent extremism, rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims’ voices. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism.
Executive Summary

This Research Paper explores and questions some assumed causal links between terrorism on the one hand and (forced and irregular) migration on the other:

A. State terrorism as main cause of migration?
B. State failure as cause of terrorism and migration?
C. Non-state terrorism as cause of migration?
D. (Civil) War as major cause of terrorism and migration?
E. Refugee camps and diasporas as causes (and targets) of terrorism?
F. Migrants as terrorists? Terrorists as migrants?
G. Counter-Terrorist operations as cause of forced migration?

Twenty findings emerged from the study:

1. The study of terrorism and the study of migration have been two separate fields. While there is a huge literature on both, migration and on terrorism, there are no in-depth studies on the intersection of the two phenomena.

2. International migration is driven not just by political violence, armed conflict and state repression but just as much by economic and environmental factors. This type of migration is likely to grow enormously in the years to come due to climate change and loss of employment opportunities due to globalisation.

3. There are multiple causal relations between (forced/irregular) migration and terrorism - but these are generally complex.

4. While it is, in concrete situations, difficult to isolate specific factors as being responsible for migration, a major driver of forced migration is severe state repression involving attacks on civilian populations that, in cases of (civil) war, often also amount to war crimes or war-time terrorism.

5. Terrorism by non-state actors with deliberate attacks on civilians is also a major driver of forced migration; such displacements are sometimes unintended by-products of insurgent terrorism, and sometimes a deliberate policy.

6. The more incidents of terrorism and the higher their lethality, the more out-migration from an affected country has be observed.

7. Data from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria – and to a lesser extent Pakistan - show that the number of first-time asylum seekers in Europe is correlated to the number of deaths from terrorism in the countries of origin.

8. The Islamic State (IS) claims that migration (hijra) to the Caliphate is an individual obligation for all Muslims. On the other hand, its Caliph considers those who leave its territory for other countries as ‘infidels’. There are some indications that IS seeks
to tax these emigrants in cooperation with criminal smugglers and also uses the refugee stream for the infiltration of (returning) foreign fighters into Europe.

9. The Assad regime in Syria has deliberately targeted civilians as an instrument of warfare in order to deprive the insurgents of a supportive environment. More internal and external displacement has been caused by the regime than by the IS.

10. The large majority of refugees in the world – 86 percent according to one count – are to be found in developing countries. Refugee camps are sometimes used by terrorists for radicalisation and recruitment and as bases from which to launch attacks. This has been true for Palestinian terrorism as well as for attacks emanating from refugee camps in places like Pakistan.

11. Refugee camps and asylum centres in developing countries as well as in Europe have also become targets of terrorist attacks. The arson attacks we have seen on asylum centres, for instance in Germany or Sweden, clearly serve a communicative purpose and there is no good reason not to call such attacks also acts of terrorism.

12. Diasporas of people from countries experiencing repression, civil war or terrorism at home can become places of conspiracy and plotting of terrorist attacks. In the 1990s, London became a crucial hub for jihadist terrorists which made some French security officials to call it “Londonistan” for its terrorist plotting. More recently, Molenbeek in Belgium serves as such a hub.

13. Some children of immigrants to Western diasporas, insufficiently integrated into the host society and being caught between two cultures, have, in a search for identity and meaning, looked at jihadists as role models and thousands of them have migrated to Syria to become foreign fighters.

14. Migrants can be terrorists and terrorists can be migrants in a number of ways:
   a. migration to the Caliphate is portrayed as an individual Muslim obligation and has attracted thousands of young Muslims in Western diasporas;
   b. some jihadists who cannot return to their country of origin without being arrested migrate from one jihadist theatre of war to the next (Afghanistan – Bosnia – Chechnya – Somalia – Syria – Libya);
   c. some economic migrants are abducted and forced by terrorists to join their ranks – a practice they also use for captured children and women, e.g. by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria;
   d. a few foreign fighters have engaged in acts of terrorism, including suicide terrorism, upon migrating back to their home countries as part of refugee streams.

15. The arrival of large refugee populations, when not properly handled, increases the risk of attacks in the recipient country by both domestic and transnational terrorists.

16. Historically, the number of criminals and terrorists in mass migration movements has been low - but terrorists often have a criminal background to begin with.

17. Not only terrorism can cause refugee flows and internal displacement but also counter-terrorist operations can cause large displacements of people.
18. Migration control for the control of terrorism is a widely used instrument. However, it might hurt *bona fide* migrants and legal foreign residents more than *mala fide* terrorists. It fosters xenophobia and deprives host countries, where and when it has the effect of reducing migration and hospitality to foreigners, of the many positive contributions (some types of) migrants can make to a society. There is the additional danger that instruments of migration control for counter-terrorism are, further down the line, also used for controlling native citizens.

19. While migrants and refugees have occasionally been instrumentalised by governments, the thesis that the current migration stream to Europe is a Russian plot to destabilise Europe is far-fetched and not supported by empirical evidence.

20. The interface between terrorism and migration is a rich field for research that deserves all the attention it can get so that well- and ill-founded concerns can be separated and policies can be built on solid evidence. This exploratory study has sketched some avenues for further research but cannot provide definitive answers.

The Research Paper concludes with two policy recommendations that can go some way towards disentangling the issues of (refugee) migration and terrorism. One of them refers to committing migrants to respect the political culture and values of European countries while the second refers to an obligation of migrants to inform the authorities on security issues related to terrorism and radicalisation.
1. Introduction

The present age has, with some exaggeration, been called the Age of Terrorism. With less hyperbole, it might be called the Age of Migration. We tend to think of migration only in terms of people crossing international borders but if we look at intra-state migration as well, the sheer extent of contemporary human mobility – free and forced, regular and irregular - becomes evident. About one in seven persons – almost one billion people – are migrants in this extended sense: 740 million of them are internal migrants and 215 million international migrants – not counting tourists. These travelling people are driven by economic, environmental, political and other push and pull factors. Their number is likely to increase greatly in the years to come, with bad harvests due to climate change, rising sea levels and political instability and insecurity being major factors.

Our main focus here is on forced migration. It is a rapidly growing phenomenon: in just three years the worldwide displacement of people from their homes rose by 40 percent - from 42.5 million to 59.5 million. Most of the displaced lead a precarious life, especially those 86 percent of all refugees who remain in developing countries. The potential for increased migration is high as 1.6 billion people – one fifth of the world

Millions of people have fled the territory controlled by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Migratory flows have increased both away from and towards the conflict zones, involving those seeking safety and those lured into the conflict as foreign terrorist fighters, further destabilizing the regions concerned.

UN Report, 24 December 2015

5 Migration pressure from the African continent where currently 15 percent of the world population (1.200,000,000 people) live but where population is expected to grow in the coming decades, according to a UN projection, to 40 percent of global population, is likely to affect Europe most. – Figures quoted from P. Brill “Migrantenstrom 2.0 ligt in het verschiet”, De Volkskrant, 27 February 2016, p.18. Basing himself on Frontex data, Frans Timmermans, the Vice-President of the European Commission, suggested that 60 percent of those coming to Europe to apply for asylum were in fact economic migrants and not political refugees in the sense of the 1951 Refugee Convention. – E. Kossen. “Timmermans: 60 procent van migranten is geen vluchteling”, Elsevier, 25 January 2016, http://www.elsevier.nl/buitenland/article/2016/01/timmermans-60-procent-van-migranten-is-geen-vluchteling-2751592W/.
population – are, according to a World Bank estimate, threatened by insecurity in various forms.  

What are the main causes of forced migration? Civil war, government repression, state failure, or (also) something else? How many of the nearly sixty million refugees and internally displaced persons in the world were driven from their homes by terrorism? Are the countries most badly affected by terrorism the same countries that also produce major refugee flows? Are countries receiving large numbers of refugees more prone to be exposed to terrorist attacks? These are some of the questions which will be explored in the following pages.

In 2015 the member states of the European Union received 1.9 million new applications for asylum – nearly half a million of them from Syrians and another half a million from Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Nigerians.  

The names of these countries of origin already suggest a causal link to terrorism. However, there is also a more sinister explanation. Some argue that refugee flows – consisting these days often of mainly young male Muslims - are deliberately used as a kind of “Trojan horse”, being part of an “organised invasion” of Muslims into the West. Not just some right-wing xenophobic conspiracy theorists think so; even NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, recently made such a claim, suggesting that refugees are 'weaponised' by Russia against Europe.  

One thing is certain: both migration and terrorism are potential drivers of international conflict. Nevertheless, there is, as Yilmaz Simsek noted, “a scarcity of migration literature directly related to terrorism”. Given the paucity of data, this Research Paper can only have an exploratory character.

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12 In a hearing of the US Senate’s Armed Services Committee, held on March 1, 2016, NATO’s Supreme Commander Philip Breedlove talked about the ‘weaponization” of migrants. The Deutsche Welle quoted him as saying: “Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve...” (…) “These indiscriminate weapons used by both Bashar al-Assad, and the non-precision use of weapons by the Russian forces - I can’t find any other reason for them other than to cause refugees to be on the move and make them someone else’s problem”. - “NATO Commander: Russia uses Syrian refugees as Weapon” against the West’. Deutsche Welle, 2 March 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/nato-commander-russia-uses-syrian-refugees-as-weapon-against-west/a-19088285. For a historical account of real instances of weaponisation of migration, see Kelly Greenhill, who coined the term ‘weapon of mass migration’ in 2010. She describes it in this way: “coercive engineered migration can be usefully conceived as a two-level, generally asymmetric, coercion by punishment strategy, in which challengers on the international level seek to influence the behaviour of their targets by exploiting the existence of competing domestic interests within the target state(s) and by manipulating the costs or risks imposed on their civilian population(s). In traditional coercion, these costs are inflicted through the threat and use of military force to achieve political goals “on the cheap”. In coercive engineered migration, by contrast, costs are inflicted through the threat and use of human demographic bombs to achieve political goals that would be utterly unattainable through military means”. – K. M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration. Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 3.  
In the following pages the current wave of migration is placed in context and then, briefly, the same is done with regards to terrorism. Subsequently, the links between the two phenomena and the causal factors held responsible for them are explored.

2. Refugee Migration Pressure

In early 2015 the “Islamic State” (ISIS) threatened at one moment to flood Europe with half a million refugees through Libya.14 It also claimed that 4,000 jihadists fighters would be sent to Europe via Turkey.15 By December 2015 between one and two million people from Syria, Iraq and other countries affected by armed conflict and other adversities had fled to Western Europe through Libya and Turkey – a sharp increase over the previous two years when 435,000 people had applied for refugee status in Europe in 2013 and 626,000 in 2014.16 The stream continues: in the first ten weeks of 2016 another 150,000 people crossed the Mediterranean: 140,000 from Turkey to Greece; some 10,000 from Libya to Italy.17 Given the ongoing crisis situation in the Middle East, the outlook is, as Yehuda Bauer put it, that “....one has to face the prospect of a mass migration of up to five million people into Europe within the next few years”.18 In an internal report, the German government made the “technical assumption” that by 2020 3.6 million people would arrive in Germany alone.19 If little more than one million people already put the Schengen zone countries with their more than 420 million people in a state of crisis - what would five million refugees do to the cohesion of the European Union?20 Given the multiple crises in parts of Africa and the Middle East, migration pressure towards Europe is bound to rise.

The Schengen border control system de facto broke down in 2015 when Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy were unable to maintain an orderly vetting system of those arriving from Turkey and Libya.21 This allowed hundreds of thousands of people - asylum seekers, economic migrants, as well as others - to proceed towards Austria, Germany, and Sweden, the countries receiving most asylum seekers on a per capita basis.22 In many cases the true identities and motives of the migrants were not clear. At one moment in 2015, only 25 to 30 percent of the refugees arriving in Germany were in possession of passports or other valid travel documents. The German police was

14 H. Roberts, “ISIS threatens to send 500,000 migrants to Europe as a ‘psychological weapon’ in chilling echo of Gaddafi’s prophecy that the Mediterranean ‘will become a sea of chaos”, Daily Mail (UK), 18 February 2015, www.dailymail.co.uk/news-article-295817/The-Mediterranean-sea-isis-Gaddafis-prophecy-interview-ISIS-threatens-send-500-000-migrants-Europe-psychological-weapon-bombed.html. – The information was said to be based on transcripts of US telephone intercepts published in Italy, possibly as a ploy to deter Western intervention against ISIS in Libya; S. Mullins, “Terrorism and Migration”, Per Concordiam, April 2016, p. 24.
21 Officially the Schengen system has been ‘suspended’ for a period of six month but it looks as if that might be prolonged. – Volkskrant, 3 March 2016.
22 RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network), Impact of the refugee crisis on the risk of radicalisation and consequences for prevention policies (Vienna: RAN, 14 April 2016), p.38.
able to obtain fingerprints from only a fraction - about 10 percent - of the migrants. This could have allowed police check on their identity against the Schengen Information System and other databases.\(^23\) In many cases Syrian passports were false or stolen – according to one source the Islamic State got hold of up to 250,000 of blank Iraqi passports and equipment to produce individualised originals.\(^24\)

The ongoing instability in Northern Africa following the Arab Spring has led to hundreds of thousands of people trying to escape to Europe. Such a trend was already visible before the Arab Spring – with dire consequences for many of these irregular migrants. According to the anti-racist organisation United, 15,551 migrants died between 1988 and April 2011 on that journey, either in the Sahara desert or while trying to cross the Mediterranean.\(^25\) Several thousands more have since then met the same fate. Yet more than one million others were lucky and made it into what some have termed not so long ago – erroneously as it now turns out - “Fortress Europe”. Once there, very few of the asylum seekers and economic migrants have in past years been returned to their country of origin after their asylum claims were rejected.\(^26\) Many of those arriving in Europe are not weak young women and children but strong young men who paid thousands of euros to smugglers to bring them to Europe, leaving behind family members who might have been more in need of safety and security than those men.

Paul Collier, an expert on the economics of migration, has argued that Europe is admitting the wrong sort of people.\(^27\) Many of them are fortune seekers who invested up to 6,000 Euros to smugglers to get them into Europe.\(^28\) Those without that kind of money are generally more in need of protection. The ill-controlled influx of people from North Africa, the Middle East and countries as far away as Afghanistan has created widespread apprehension, with some panicky people comparing the present situation even to the 5th century “barbarian invasions” (also termed “migration of the nations”) - large scale population movements of Goths, Vandals and other “barbarians”, pushed west- and southwards by Mongolian Huns since 375 A.D. This eventually led to repeated sackings of Rome by Goths and Vandals and the ultimate fall of the (West-) Roman empire in 476 A.D.\(^29\) Some populist leaders have reminded national publics that Islam had been advancing towards Europe three times between the 8th and the 17th century and suggest that it is trying to do it again, this time by other means than military campaigns. The Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, speaking to parliament on 21

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\(^23\) N. Sennels, “German police: Only 10% of migrants are checked with terror databases”, Jihad Watch, 25 December 2015.

\(^24\) https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/Migration+and+Terrorism/151cedb5c35f7e92; the high figure for the number of stolen passports was mentioned by the representative of an international organisation at a workshop where the author was present.


\(^26\) The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees promises protection and assistance to a person who “...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality or being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. – Art.1A (2); cit. UNHCR, Information Paper (Geneva: UNHCR, March 1993). In other words: the 1951 Convention was meant for those escaping from persecution and war, not for mass exodus from refugee camps in third countries. The 1951 Convention does not cover Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) – individuals or groups who have been forced or obliged to flee their homes as a result of, or in order to, avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence or violations of human rights.


\(^28\) Figure suggested by Rob Wainwright, Director Europol. Cit. C. McDonald-Gibson, “Refugee Crisis: human traffickers ‘netted up to BP 4 billion last year’”, The Independent, 6 January 2016.

September 2015, took on the mantle of a defender of Christian-European civilisation, reminding his audience “that it is Hungary’s historic and moral obligation to protect the borders of Hungary, that, in turn, is also protecting Europe”.30 The war in Syria has internally and externally displaced some 12 million people - half of the country’s population - while the war in Iraq had sent some four million people abroad – more than 10 percent of its population.31 While more than seven million people in Syria have been displaced internally (i.e. moved from an unsafe part of the country to a more safe part within the nations’ borders), some four million are waiting for a better future abroad, the majority of them in refugee camps in Turkey (2,620,553 refugees), Lebanon (1,069,111 refugees), Iraq (245,533 refugees), Jordan (637,859) and Egypt (118,512).32 The size of this displacement is, in this part of the world, unlike any other since the end of the Second World War when more than eleven million Germans sought to escape from the advancing Soviet Red Army or the Communist regimes set up by Stalin in Eastern Europe.33 However, sizeable mass displacements surpassing one million people have been a regular occurrence since the Second World War: by 1994 the Bosnian war produced close to 1,5 million war refugees and the one in Kosovo in 1998-1999 made 900,000 persons flee. More than one million people became refugees in Bangladesh when Pakistan split up in the early 1970s; more than one million fled Ethiopia in 1979, Afghanistan in 1980, Mozambique in 1989 and Iraq (mostly Kurds) in 1990. The Vietnam war produced about two million refugees and the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala each about one million.34 The separation of India and Pakistan in 1947/48 surpassed all of this: it displaced more than 15 million people while more than one million were killed.35 More recently conflicts in Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria have turned more than one million people into refugees (see Box 1).

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Growing Terrorism Pressure

At the time of the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Al-Qaeda numbered about 300 mujahideen in Afghanistan, supported by the Taliban regime. Fifteen years of “war on terror” have made the situation worse rather than better. One of Al-Qaeda’s successor organisations, the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) alone numbers tens of thousands of jihadists, with some 30,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries having joined the fight in Syria. At the time of 9/11 Al-Qaeda controlled a few training camps in Afghanistan. Now IS controls an area the size of Belgium, with 6 to 8 million people and claims to have provinces (wilayats) in more than half a dozen countries from Nigeria to Afghanistan and the Philippines. In 2014, according to figures recently released by START, more than 16,800 terrorist attacks took place, causing more than 43,500 deaths and more than 40,900 wounded, while more than 11,800 other people were taken hostage. All told, in the last 15 years, more than 140,000 people have been killed in more than 61,000 terrorist incidents. The year 2014 has been particularly bad: acts of terrorism worldwide led to 80 percent more deaths compared to the year before. More than half of them were the “work”

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Box 1: Ten Countries with Large Numbers of Refugees (mid-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,632,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4,194,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,105,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>744,102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>640,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>535,323</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>470,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>458,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>383,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>377,747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR. Mid-Year Trends 2015. Geneva: UNHCR, 2015, pp. 4-6 & Annex Table 1, pp. 21-24’ http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html. – Not listed here is the case of the Palestinian people; originally up to 700,000 became refugees in 1948/49; currently more than 5 million of them as well as of their descendants live abroad. For partly political reasons 2nd and 3rd generation Palestinians who have settled permanently in third countries are still counted as “refugees” in the Arab world where, in many cases, they have not been allowed to integrate and obtain citizenship.

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36 A. P. Schmid, “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters: a European Perspective”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, December 2015. - The number of IS fighters has since gone down due to high casualty rates, desertions and returnees heading for their countries of origin. Monthly recruitment of new foreign fighters is said to be down by 90 percent as of April 2016, according to US military sources.


of the Islamic State and terrorist fighters in its provinces abroad. In recent years, much of the killing has been concentrated in four Muslim majority countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and one where the Muslim population constitutes half of the total population – Nigeria. Most recently, the highest number of victims of terrorism were counted in Nigeria where Boko Haram killed some 20,000 people in Borno state during the last seven years. These five countries accounted together for more than 70 percent of all deaths through acts of terrorism in 2014 (the last one for which full data are available). Six more countries with more than 500 fatalities each in 2014 are Somalia, Yemen, Central African Republic, and three countries with non-Muslim majorities: Cameroon, South Sudan and the Ukraine. In total, acts of terrorism took place in 93 countries in 2014. While the United States has been most active in the war on terrorism, the countries of the democratic West (North America, Australia and the European countries) themselves have, with the exception of the attacks of 11 September 2001, suffered only 0.5 per cent of all fatalities from terrorism in the last 15 years. The majority of countries suffering most from terrorism are Muslim countries and both perpetrators and victims are mostly Muslims (see Box 2). In general, the strategy of counter-terrorism laid out since 2001 by the United States has been counter-productive and, in most conflict zones, increased rather than decreased the threat of terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 2: Ten Countries Suffering Highest Numbers of Terrorist Fatalities (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Worldwide Fatalities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: 100% (32,685 fatalities)


43 For a critique along these lines from an insider in the global war on terror, see: David Kilcullen. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror (London: Hurst & Company, 2016).
4. How is Migration Linked to Terrorism?

In recent public discussions, there has been much loose talk of terrorists hiding in large numbers in refugee streams. This has made many people apprehensive about offering asylum seekers the assistance they are entitled to from countries which have signed and ratified the 1951 Convention and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.44

The relationship between terrorism and various forms of migration is a complex one.45 In one sense, it falls under the even broader theme of globalisation. Jamal Al Jassar has discussed that particular relationship in metaphorical terms as *migration of dreams* and *migration of nightmares*. These migrations he sees as “the merging points of both globalisation and terrorism”. Writing from a Palestinian perspective, he claims that:

> [G]lobalisation contributes to dreams among those who are poor or oppressed. Dreams enlarge the gap between expectations and achievements. The gap contributes to violence that often migrates to the lands of the rich and powerful. It is this cycle of dreams and nightmares that characterizes our globalised world today. [...] [T]he globalization of violent conflicts has led to unprecedented levels of human suffering. Terrorism has constituted a necessary component in such conflicts. While the migration of dreams stems from cultural and technological globalisation, a different process called the migration of nightmares is a direct result of global violence and terrorism. As history has shown, the terrorism of empires as well as regional powers has been the main force driving the phenomenon. The powerful often terrorize the weak and bring nightmares into the lives of the helpless. On occasion, the weak and oppressed carry their struggle into the heartland of their oppressors, bringing nightmares to those who live there.46

While this interpretation can be challenged on several accounts (e.g. poverty per se is not the cause of terrorism47 and current levels of human suffering are not unprecedented),48 what is important to note is that some people, especially in developing countries, believe it to be true - which has consequences of its own for the real situation - as is also the case with other conspiracy theories.49

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44 There has also been concern that crime levels will rise with the often uncontrolled inflow of young men who might have been brutalised by the experiences they had gone through in zones of conflict. This aspect will not be discussed here. In general, crime levels among first generation immigrants are not higher, and often lower, than those of the indigenous population. – For a discussion, see: A. P. Schmid & I. Melup (Eds.), *Migration and Crime* (Milan: ISPAC, 1998).
45 In this Research Paper ‘migrant’ is an umbrella term, covering those involved in both internal and external migration. Forced migration refers to those who had to flee out of fear for their lives due to war, ethnic cleansing or terrorism. Irregular migration refers to various forms of illegal migration, including for economic or ecological reasons, but also covers others who cannot rightfully claim asylum, e.g. criminals and terrorists who try to escape another country’s efforts to bring them to court.
49 This is in line with the so-called Thomas theorem which postulates: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”, – W.I. Thomas and D.S. Thomas, *The Child in America: Behavior problems and programs* (New York: Knopf, 1938), pp. 571-572.
In the following pages the reader will find an exploration of some assumed connections where terrorism is said to “cause” migration or where migration is said to “cause” terrorism or where the two phenomena appear together, “caused” by a third element such as war. Before we proceed, it is necessary to define the two key terms of our Research Paper (Box 3).

Box 3: Definitions of Migration and Terrorism

**Migration** refers to the in-[immigration] or out-movement [emigration] of (groups of) people from one place to a usually distant other location, with the intention to settle at the destination, temporarily or permanently. This process can be voluntary or forced, regular (legal) or irregular (illegal), within one country or across international borders. Refugees are a sub-group of international migrants who seek asylum or have obtained protection abroad under the terms of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951.  

**Terrorism** refers to a political communication strategy for psychological mass manipulation whereby unarmed civilians (and non-combatants such as prisoners) are deliberately victimised in order to impress third parties (e.g. intimidate, coerce or otherwise influence a government or a section of society or international public opinion), with the help of portrayals of demonstrative violence in front of audiences and/or for coverage in mass or social media. Terrorism from non-state actors is often a strategy of provocation aiming at societal polarisation and conflict escalation while state- or regime terrorism serves the purpose of repression and social control. Terrorism as psychological warfare is also an irregular and illegal tactic in armed conflict where it can be used by one or both sides.  


The causal chains between terrorism and migration to be explored here are these:

A. State terrorism as main cause of migration?

B. State failure as cause of terrorism and migration?

C. Non-state terrorism as cause of migration?

D. (Civil) War as major cause of terrorism and migration?
E. Refugee camps and diasporas as causes (and targets) of terrorism?
F. Migrants as terrorists? Terrorists as migrants?
G. Counter-terrorist operations as cause of forced migration?

While there are many more or less broad general “causes” of migration (see Box 4), the various likely drivers behind migration and terrorism have yet to be explored in greater

**Box 4: Ten Causes of Migration Pressure in the Post-Cold War Period**

1. A global wealth imbalance, with the richest 1 percent of the world population possessing as much of the global wealth as the rest;

2. A demographic explosion coupled with economic stagnation in many countries, with population increasing faster than the economy, especially in parts of Africa and the Middle East;

3. Massive global unemployment (currently 200,000,000 people, according to ILO estimates) and even more massive underemployment and “working poor”;

4. Environmental destruction (inundations, desertification, deforestation, water shortage) on a grand scale, leading to resource conflicts in countries of origin of migrants;

5. Changing tactics of warfare which have made the civilian population the main target, creating major internal displacements and refugee flows;

6. The re-emergence of exclusive nationalism and the growth of religious intolerance, leading to ethnic and religious cleansing;

7. A revolution in transportation, enabling long-distance mass migration;

8. The discovery of smuggling and trafficking in people as a high-yield, low-risk business by organised crime which provides false papers, transport, entry and exploitative employment to those willing and able to pay;

9. The presence of ethnic diasporas in ‘global cities’ abroad that form bridgeheads for voluntary legal migration (e.g. through family reunion) and irregular migration (e.g. through trafficking and work as illegal aliens);

10. Worldwide satellite television and the Internet-transmitted images of affluence and luxury to poor countries, creating a desire among young people to migrate to the promising shores of wealth and stability.

detail. This is what we shall try to do in the following pages. Subsequently, we will also raise the issue whether migration control should be used for countering terrorism.

From the list in Box 4, factors 7, 8, 9 and 10 appear to be especially relevant for our discussion. Yet an even more important driver is probably the one listed as number 5 relating to the widespread disregard for the laws of war. Not on the list in Box 4 is another major driver: regime or state terrorism. The discourse on contemporary terrorism focuses mainly on non-state actors as source of terrorism. However, many authoritarian governments have used and some still use the instrument of terrorism as well, despite the fact that states possess a broader repertoire for social control short of intimidating and illegal shows of force. However, theory formation about terrorism has focused mainly on the causes of terrorism by non-state groups (see Box 5).

Box 5: Ten Causes and Objectives of (Non-State) Terrorism as Suggested in the Academic Literature

1. To awaken the (alleged) revolutionary spirit of the masses;
2. To gain free access to the world news system as public violence is always reported;
3. Revenge for injustice, real or perceived, suffered by group with which terrorists identify;
4. Resistance against repressive authoritarian regimes where political change by other than violent means appears to be blocked;
5. Protest against foreign policy (intervention/occupation/support for local dictators);
6. Provocation of repression against a segment of society to gain recruits from it;
7. Alienation, marginalisation and humiliation;
8. Reaction to suppression of minority group or majority group in minority position;
9. To conduct a deniable proxy war against adversary;
10. To influence the behaviour of the target group (not victims themselves) in ways deemed favourable to the terrorist organisation.


The reasons given in Box 5 are just some of the motives suggested by researchers. They do not show much overlap with the causes of migration from Box 4. In the following, we will look at some aspects of terrorism that appear most closely linked to migration.

At the highest level of abstraction, there are three main reactions to exposure to one or a series of shocking terrorist attacks: (i) fight; (ii) flight and (iii) hide. The first reaction is generally not possible for the victims themselves since, by most definitions, terrorism involves attacks on unarmed civilians (or the threat thereof). The second reaction is the most likely where it is feasible: flee more or less in panic from the danger zone and migrate to a safer place. However, terrorism can not only mobilise people to leave (which might just be what, for instance, terrorists aiming at ethnic cleansing are after).
Shocking acts of terrorism can also immobilise people - they are “frozen by fear” and “stiff with terror” and the best they can do is hide and/or obey. While single acts of terrorism might only lead to temporary shock, whole campaigns of terrorism by militant organisations are a different matter, creating chronic anxiety. However, it is when terrorism becomes a criminal instrument of statecraft, that the effects can be truly dramatic and traumatic with subjugation into obedience (“hide” – internal exile) and flight (“migration”) as main responses.53

A. State Terrorism as Main Cause of Migration?

States claim a monopoly on the use of force but that monopoly has been frequently challenged in revolts. However, revolts more often than not do not lead to full-scale successful revolutions but, on the contrary, more often lead to enhanced state repression, sometimes bordering on regime terrorism. While at the end of the Cold War many hoped that democracy would become the “new normal”, that hope has been shattered, especially after the world economic crisis of 2008 and the demise of the Arab Spring following an initial wave of seemingly successful uprisings in 2011. A recent survey by the German Bertelsmann Foundation of political systems in 129 developing countries and countries in transition from Communism revealed that 74 of them were to varying degrees democratic but 55 others were autocratically ruled; of these, 40 governments are “hard” dictatorships.54 The general trend worldwide is no longer towards more democracy and even in established democracies the rise of populist authoritarianism is a real danger.

While there are many databases that collect information on armed non-state actors engaging in campaigns of terrorism,55 state or regime terrorism, while usually larger in scale and more deadly, has received insufficient attention.56 Yet it is arguably one of the leading drivers behind the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, which uses the large GTD database of START (University of Maryland), “[a]round 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries where violent political terror was widespread”. 57 The reference to “political terror” in this quote is to one of the very few databases on state terrorism, the “Political Terror Scale”, originally developed in the early 1980s by Michael Stohl at Purdue University and continued in recent years by Marc Gibney, professor at the University of North Carolina in Ashville, USA.58 Gibney and his colleagues code the annual reports of Amnesty International59 and Human Rights

Watch as well as the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the US State Department. They translate the qualitative assessments of these monitoring efforts into a quantitative scale that distinguishes between five levels of human rights observance/disregard, ranging from level 1 (no political repression) to 5 (generalised political repression). For our purposes, levels 4 and 5 can be considered as approximations for state (or regime) terrorism:

**Box 6: Political [State] Terror Scale Levels**

**Level I:** Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

**Level II:** There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

**Level III:** There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

**Level IV:** Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

**Level V:** Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.


Gibney et al, coding the Amnesty International yearbook for 2014, established that 12 countries fall under level IV: DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russian Federation, South Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Uganda. Three fall under the even worse category V: Afghanistan, Colombia and Iraq, with one country, Sudan, falling between these two categories.

There is some overlap in Gibney's monitoring with the one of Freedom House (Box 7) which recorded for ten consecutive years a decline of freedom (civil and political rights) in the world. Over the last decade, a total of 105 countries registered a decline in freedoms, while only 61 experienced a net improvement. The most significant reversals were freedom of expression and the rule of law. Ratings for the Middle East and North Africa were among the worst in the world in 2015. Only 40 percent of the world's people (currently 7,315,804,000 persons) are “free”, 24 percent are only “partly free” and 36
percent of the global population are “not free”. Given this state of affairs, and the absence of rule of law for some four billion people, it is no wonder that we can expect in many countries continuing revolts and repression, accompanied by terrorism and migration, at home and abroad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 7: Ten Least Free Countries in the World (2015) and numbers of those who fled them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Refugees (2015)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where governments engage in state terrorism or other forms of violence we can expect refugees. Strange as it may seem at first sight, the arguably worst regime on earth, the one of Kim Jong-un ruling over 25 million people in North Korea, due to total state control over both borders and society, produces nearly no refugees. Some other highly repressive regimes also show relatively low refugee levels for a variety of reasons. In a number of cases (e.g. Colombia), displacement was more internal than external (more than six million internally displaced while nearly 400,000 people ended up as refugees). However, some major refugee producing countries that are a source of European concern, are on Freedom House's non-free list and/or on Gibney's Political Terror list - for instance, Eritrea (up to 10,000 internally displaced; more than 350,000 refugees), Iraq (3,120,000 internally displaced; 377,747 refugees), and Syria (6,600,000 internally displaced; 4,180,920 refugees).

Of particular interest here is the case of Syria. While Western news media focus mainly on the atrocities of the so-called Islamic State, it should not been forgotten that the regime of Bashar al-Assad killed, tortured and expelled many more Syrians than IS. Benedetta Berti, an Italian political scientist, noted with regard to the regime's policies:

65 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
[F]orced migration is more than a natural byproduct of the violence; indeed, displacement is occurring by design. A key part of the Assad regime’s military strategy has been to incapacitate rebel-held areas by targeting the civilian population, destroying the civilian infrastructure, and withholding access to basic public goods. This strategy has been employed from early on in the conflict as a counterinsurgency tool to separate the civilian population from the rebel factions opposing the regime, resulting in mass displacement. As a result, schools, hospitals, markets, and even refugee camps are some of the most dangerous places within Syria. Civilians have been deliberately attacked. The displacement of people within Syria should be regarded as a deliberate instrument of war. In this context, refugees and internally displaced people should be regarded as two manifestations of the same phenomena: the purposeful targeting of civilians in the context of war.\(^{70}\)

While terrorism in the form of irregular warfare and state terrorism are difficult to separate when the enemy is internal, and while some forms of political violence and armed conflict are better subsumed under other labels than terrorism (e.g. crime against humanity; war crimes, gross human rights violations), it nevertheless can be said that state terrorism has been a major and perhaps even the main cause of forced migration in the case of Syria. By mid-2015, some twelve million people - half of the population of Syria - had been displaced by the atrocities; about two thirds of them within the country and one third had fled abroad, mainly to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.\(^{71}\)

The blind eye of many governments to state terrorism of allied regimes, combined with the general state fixation on non-state terrorist actors, has contributed to overlooking one of the most powerful drivers of forced migration – regime or state terrorism. Partly this has to do with the fact that countries experiencing state terrorism are also experiencing terrorism by non-state actors. In such cases cause and effect, action and reaction, are difficult to separate the longer the spiral of tit-for-tat violence continues, with false flag operations complicating matters further.

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, “92 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries where the Political Terror Scale was very high. Fifteen of the countries with the highest level of terrorism in 2014 also had very poor Political Terror Scale scores in 2002”.\(^{72}\)

Most of these countries are also producing major internal and external migration (see Box 8).


\(^{72}\) Institute for Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2015”, 2015, p.70.
The exact chain of causation leading to migration is difficult to establish when both state and non-state terrorism are involved simultaneously, with other factors like foreign military intervention also being present. However, somewhat paradoxically, the absence of a strong state – state failure - can also be a possible cause of both terrorism and migration, as we shall see in the following section.

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**Box 8: Internal Displacement and Refugee Migration 2014 for Countries Scoring 4-5 on Political Terrorism Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internally Displaced Persons</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (5)</td>
<td>at least 847,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (5)</td>
<td>6,044,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (5)</td>
<td>at least 3,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (4.5)</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC (4)</td>
<td>at least 2,857,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea (4)</td>
<td>up to 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (4)</td>
<td>413,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (4)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (4)</td>
<td>up to 662,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea (4)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (4)</td>
<td>at least 1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation (4)</td>
<td>at least 25,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan (4)</td>
<td>at least 1,690,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria (4)</td>
<td>at least 6,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (4)</td>
<td>at least 954,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (4)</td>
<td>29,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Displacement Monitoring Centre. Data for 2014; see: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures/](http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures/). More recent IDCM figures available from 11 May 2016 onwards; "UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database", United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 05/05/2016, [www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase](http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase). The reader will note some differences in the figures in Boxes 8 and 9. These are generally due to different moments in time when estimates were made or different focuses, e.g. on flow of refugees vs. stock of refugees.
B. State Failure as Cause of Terrorism and Migration?

Fragile, weak or failing states have been associated with terrorism for some time. 73 The idea that the absence of a strong central authority that enjoys a high degree of legitimacy with major sections of society and a government that is unable to maintain law and order allows terrorist organisations to nestle in un- or under-governed territories and set up their own state-like structures is, on the face of it, a very plausible assumption. The general decline of the state's monopoly of violence (which was never complete) also tends to give rise to vigilantism by private armed militias - groups which seek to impose order without necessarily having the law on their side. Such vigilante policies often take recourse to terrorist tactics, including ethnic cleansing, which can lead to both internal as well as external displacements of people.

Since the end of the Cold War period, but already before, there have been several cases where central governments have collapsed, leaving territories ungoverned. The prime example has been Somalia which, since the ousting of Mohamed Siad Barre (who had been Somalia's dictator from 1969 to 1991), has drifted from one crisis to the next. The country, formerly colonised by Italy and Great Britain, broke up into several parts (Puntland, Somaliiland, Jubaland and the Federal Republic of Somalia) and has seen the rise of al-Shabaab which, in addition to the “work” already done by various warlords, further devastated the country. After a futile intervention of Ethiopia in 2006, the terrorist organisation al-Shabaab came out on top and produced further large refugee outflows, especially in the direction of Kenya where Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the world (in fact a complex of three camps, with, as of 2016 330,000 refugees down from half a million) was in existence since 1991. Despite the presence of UN and AU troops, al-Shabaab has not been defeated. Other states associated with various degrees of state failure have been Afghanistan (after 1992) and Iraq (after 2003). Both Iraq and Afghanistan experience terrorism and other types of armed conflict on a grand scale and have also produced large refugee flows.

The number of post-colonial states experiencing a (temporary) governance meltdown of sorts for economic, political or other reasons has been quite large and includes, for instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Sudan and South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, Yemen and the Central African Republic (CAR) and, most recently, Venezuela. 75 Sometimes, it is only one part of a country that becomes lawless as the control by the central government has weakened or becomes totally absent. A relevant example is Uganda where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has terrorised the north but also neighbouring regions for decades. Numbering, at various times, between 300 and 3,000 “fighters”, it nevertheless managed to displace during its

73 A. Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories. Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (St. Monica: RAND, 2007); The literature on state involvement in terrorism has - after an earlier focus on fascist and communist regimes - in recent years concentrated more on state-sponsored (proxy) terrorism abroad, than on indiscriminate domestic repression by non-democratic regimes. Some authors make a distinction between “terror” (when used by a state) and “terrorism” (when used by non-state actors). Yet when the modus operandi and the rationale behind state- and non-state violence are the same, it makes no sense using different terms. However, similar distinctions (co-)exist, e.g. between “violence” (for non-state actors) and “force” (for state actors).
existence hundreds of thousands of people across South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR. At the height of its atrocity campaign, in 2006, some 1,700,000 people in northern Uganda sought refuge in camps for internally displaced people.

Another well-known case is Pakistan with its tribal areas FATA where Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban found or were granted shelter in Waziristan.

Yet on the other hand, there are numerous fragile, weak or failing states that have seen little or no terrorism and therefore no terrorism-induced migration (economic migration, however, has often been substantial, e.g. in the case of Zimbabwe where, in 2014, 2,200,000 people were threatened by hunger and remittances of political and economic emigrants are keeping many of the 14 million inhabitants alive).

In his article “Weak States, State Failure and Terrorism”, Edward Newman looked at the presence or absence of terrorist groups on the territory of fragile states and found that the relationship between state strength and the presence of non-state terrorist groups was not that clear-cut. While he could establish that terrorist organisations (also) operated in weak and failed states, he found that it was not necessarily that fragile condition of the state that explained their presence. He conceded that there is significant anecdotal evidence concerning state weakness and terrorism but also noted that a significant number of states which perform poorly on all indicators of state capacity do not play host to terrorist organisations. He further noted that

Sometimes, the decisive factor is the hospitality – or support, or acquiescence – of the local 'authorities', rather than the absence of state structures. Thus, whilst a group may be able to work fairly independently, a positive relationship with the host government – or ‘powers that be’ – is important. Weak or failed statehood could never be a satisfactory explanatory variable in isolation from other factors.

Failing states generally cannot provide security and essential services to their citizens which, in turn, tends to favour emigration. If we look at the Fragile State Index, issued annually by The Fund for Peace, an independent, nonpartisan organisation which focuses on the problems of weak and failing states, we find indeed many countries with strong population outflow among the most fragile states. In its 2015 report, The Fund for Peace ranked 178 countries in terms of their levels of stability, using a dozen political, social and economic indicators and many more additional sub-indicators. As indicated in Box 8, countries of concern like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria which currently produce most refugees, are among the top ten of the worst cases. Box 9 lists 19 fragile states scoring high on the Fragile States Index. The middle column is taken from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index which, inter alia, measures on a scale from 1 (bad) to 10 (good) a government's effective power to govern. The last column lists external

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80 Ibid., p. 467.
81 Ibid., p. 483.
refugees while the first one indexes the severity of terrorism (10 is very bad; 0 is good, that is, absence of terrorism).

**Box 9: Comparison of Indices for 19 Countries Scoring High on Fragile State Index with Refugees (2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Terrorism Index</th>
<th>FSI Index</th>
<th>BTI Index</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>6.712</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,746,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>616,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6.686</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>659,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6.662</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>103,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo DR</td>
<td>6.487</td>
<td>109.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>516,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2.142</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>7.642</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>8.108</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,865,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9.233</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,593,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>369,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>233,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9.065</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>315,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9.213</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>3.141</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>71,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>237,636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of refugees in 19 fragile/weak states: 11,094,872


A comparison of state weakness with the severity of terrorism and refugee numbers produces no conclusive results – some weak states score low on the terrorism index and have few refugees (e.g. Haiti and Chad) while some countries that score high on the Terrorism Index and the two state failure indices, score low on refugees (e.g. Yemen or Libya). However, there is often a time lag between deterioration of a country’s situation and decisions to leave the country. This might, for instance, apply to Libya and Yemen (where some people have fled to Somalia).82

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82 Information obtained on 29 April 2016 from high-level international civil servant who recently returned from Somalia.
A similar inconclusive picture emerges if we look at a country’s net-migration rate (comparing the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving a country or territory during the year per 1,000 persons, based on mid-year population). can, however, reveal something about the propensity to emigrate. In 2015, no fewer than 112 out of 224 countries and territories experienced equal or more emigration than and immigration (Box 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>net-migration rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>8.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some countries on the list in Box 10 have weak states with low growth rates (e.g. Venezuela) while others have strong states (like Eritrea) with high economic growth rates. This makes migration balance or imbalance in itself not a conclusive indicator for measuring state strength or weakness. 83

State failure is often but not always a strong factor in migration but not necessarily one where terrorism is the main driver behind migration. Terrorists too need functioning infrastructures to operate. If they cannot create a (proto-) state of their own (as the Islamic Caliphate managed to do in parts of Syria and Iraq), they prefer a state that is at least supportive of their cause, as was the case with the Afghan Taliban (1996-2001) and Al Qaeda. Sometimes a state might not be supportive but tolerates terrorist groups out of weakness, as is the case in Lebanon with Hezbollah (1982-2016) or, in Libya, where both Al-Qaeda and IS have a presence since the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011.

83 An additional complication is that weak states also have weak statistics. The figure for Syria where almost 20 percent of the population have left the country is hard to square with a rate of under 20 per 1,000 – 200 per 1,000 would be more realistic.
C. Non-State Terrorism as Cause of Migration?

Terrorist campaigns of blind, indiscriminate violence make many people fear for their lives and they tend to move away from the source of danger. This might also be exactly what some perpetrators of acts of terrorism had in mind to begin with. When the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared itself to be a Caliphate of an imaginary “Islamic State“ (IS) in mid-2014 in Iraq’s second largest city Mosul, the majority of people fled and population declined from 2.5 million to 1 million. Many of those in other territories taken by IS also fled. As Maya Yahya pointed out:

The sweep of the Islamic State into Iraqi territory in June 2014 has further intensified this process of identity-based displacement and the recasting of territories on a sectarian and ethnic basis. [...] In the year that followed, 2.57 million people fled as the group targeted entire communities that had lived on the plains of Iraq for centuries. The Christians of Mosul forcibly left their ancestral homes, but they fared better than the Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandaeanas, Shia, and Turkomans, many of whom were hunted down and killed. Fleeing populations scattered to more than 2,000 locations across the country and beyond Iraq’s borders, adding to the number of Iraqis displaced by previous conflicts.  

Here then we can see one of the most direct links between terrorism and internal displacement and external migration. Another case where the link between non-state terrorist incidents and displacement has been studied in detail is Turkey in the early 1990s where the state and the Kurdish insurgents clashed. Yilmaz Simsek explored the link between terrorism and migration patterns for the years 1992 to 1995 in eastern Turkey and tested three hypotheses which he all found supported by the evidence (see Box 11)

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1</strong>: net-migration is higher in areas with high terrorist incidents than those with low terrorist incidents: <strong>Supported</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2</strong>: the higher the terrorist incident rate, the higher the net-migration: <strong>Supported</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 3</strong>: the higher the number of deaths causes by terrorism, the higher the net migration: <strong>Supported</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When we look at the countries most affected by terrorism in recent years - Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria - we see a direct link between high levels of terrorist deaths and migration to Europe in three of the four countries (Pakistan being a partial exception):

![Box 12: Correlations between Number of 1st Time Asylum Seeker Applications to Europe vs. Deaths from Terrorism in Home Country](image)

When people flee from a terrorist group that takes over their village or town, their belongings can be plundered – another source of wealth for terrorists grabbing territory. However, they can profit also in another way: as people flee from zones of terrorist attacks or conflict, their escape is often dangerous and difficult; they have to seek the assistance of facilitators, in most cases criminal smugglers, to pass or by-pass roadblocks in conflict zones and cross international borders. By setting up roadblocks terrorist groups often directly check and tax those who wish to leave or they force smugglers to share the profits with them.

In the case of Libya, the Islamic State controls a stretch of nearly 260 kilometres of Mediterranean costs around Sirte. There is evidence indicating that smugglers of people have to share their profits with terrorist organisations, including the Islamic State. The kind of money that can be made with smuggling and trafficking of people is said to be second only to proceeds that can be made from the smuggling of drugs. More than nine out of ten migrants who want to enter the European Union irregularly

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from North Africa or Western Turkey make use of facilitators - usually criminal smugglers. According to a recent Europol report, migrant smugglers in Benghazi, Misrata and Tripoli in Libya, Izmir and Istanbul in Turkey, Amman in Jordan, Cairo in Egypt and Casablanca in Morocco, Algiers and Oran in Algeria as well as other criminal hotspots have made, by bringing asylum seekers and economic migrants to Europe, between 3 and 6 billion dollars in ill-gotten gain.\(^{87}\) In its report on smuggling operations, Europol expressed concern “that terrorist organisations rely on migrant smuggling as source of funding”, but did not provide details.\(^{88}\) Even a small percentage of criminal gains from smuggling people would be a bonanza for a terrorist organisation if we look at some figures:

In the year 2014, 219,000 people crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe via Libya; in 2015 there were 322,000 people in the first eight months. More than 2,500 drowned in the attempt to do so as they were put on sea in unsafe boats by criminal elements.\(^{89}\) One smuggler advertised on his social media page the costs of the sea journey from Libya to Italy as US $ 1,000 per adult. For a package involving also a flight from Turkey to Libya it amounted US $ 3,700, with children costing US $ 500.\(^{90}\) Assuming that the smugglers of people in Libya had to share their profit with terrorists on the coast of Libya from where many boats depart and assuming that one third has to be paid to the terrorists, that would have left the terrorist organisation with more than US $ 100 million in 2015 alone – a conservative estimate. That kind of money goes a long way to recruit new members for IS and pay for arms, explosives, false travel documents, safe houses, bribes and whatever else is needed to finance terrorism. Currently 800,000 more migrants are reportedly waiting in Libya for a passage to Italy, since the route via Turkey and Greece has been made more difficult.\(^{91}\)

While the fact that people vote with their feet against staying in territories controlled by the Islamic State ought to be an embarrassment to those who claim to create a just, sharia-based society in the resurrected Caliphate, the mass exodus from the terrorist dystopia can nevertheless be turned into an additional source of income which can be utilised to strengthen the economy of the terrorist Islamic State. At the same time the Islamic State tries to engage in damage control by showing videos of desperate refugees drowning while portraying life under the Caliphate as harmonious and orderly.\(^{92}\)

In sum: terrorist tactics make people fear for their lives which tends to cause avoidance and emigration. Such migration, in turn, allows, if taxed, the financing of more terrorism. These impressionistic findings cited above are supported by more solid ones

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90 Europol, *Migrant smuggling in the EU*, p. 10.


from a quantitative analysis by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The chairman of IEP, Steve Killelea, presenting the Institute's Global Terrorism Index 2015 noted: “Ten of the eleven countries most affected by terrorism also have the highest rates of refugees and internal displacement. This highlights the strong inter-connectedness between the current refugee crisis, terrorism and conflict.”

D. (Civil) War as Major Cause of Terrorism and Migration?

In the period 1946-2016 there have been 259 distinct armed conflicts. De-colonisation wars and inter-state wars have declined. However, internal civil wars, often accompanied by foreign interventions, have proliferated. While the number of armed conflicts declined for more than a decade starting in 1992, that hopeful post-Cold War downward trend broke in 2003. Since then we have seen between 30 and 50 ongoing conflicts in any given year. The Armed Conflict Survey 2015 lists 37 high, medium and low-intensity conflicts with 167,000 fatalities – half of them in the Middle East and a third of them in Syria. The year before, there had been 42 active conflicts with 180,000 fatalities.

The conflict in Syria – the deadliest since the end of the Cold War - has, since 2012, produced more than half (53 percent) of the war casualties worldwide, followed by Iraq (12 percent) and Afghanistan (12 percent). In 2014, nearly 80 percent of the 104,000 battle fatalities occurred in these three countries. All three wars - Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria - have been accompanied by terrorism and large population displacements. Between 1978 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and its withdrawal in 1989, 6.2 million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan and Iran; most of them are still there after all these years. Four years after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, two million Iraqis had become refugees and 1.7 million became internally displaced by February 2007. In the case of Syria, by September 2015, the country had 4.1 million refugees abroad and 6.5 million internally displaced while 1.1 million Syrians had been injured by war and terrorism and more than 250,000 killed.

Foreign interventions often make bad situations worse, prolong the conflict and lead to the use of asymmetric tactics by resistance groups - terrorism being one of these.
To discover acts of terrorism in the midst of war is often difficult as independent news gathering is almost impossible and propaganda operations are widespread. Legitimate acts of warfare and war crimes occur next to each other. War crimes involve, among other things, deliberate attacks on non-combatants (e.g. prisoners of war) and unarmed civilians or on places where civilians are known or likely to shelter. War crimes resemble acts of terrorism in many cases – so much so that one effort to define terrorism suggested to extend the definition of war crimes and define an act of terrorism simply as “the peacetime equivalent of war crimes” – cutting in this way through the Gordian knot of endless definition debates (since there is a greater degree of consensus as to what constitutes a war crime in international humanitarian law than what constitutes terrorism).100

Many internal wars progress from small incidents to more massive forms of violence in stages. Single, isolated acts of terrorism are, if those responsible for them are not apprehended or otherwise neutralised at an early stage, often a step to terrorist campaigns. One or more such campaigns, if successful, might lead to a situation where a terrorist organisation can start “liberating” part of a country. From such liberated zones the armed bands can engage in “hit and run” operations, ambushes and other guerrilla tactics. Ultimately, the goal is to progress from terrorism not only to rural guerrilla warfare (usually with simultaneous urban terrorism on the side) but to create a more or less conventional army with which to take state power. Most terrorist groups never make it to stage II in Mao’s gradualist strategy of People’s War (or Protracted War) and very few ever manage to create a conventional army as stage III.101 The role of foreign interventions also has to be factored in: it can either work in favour of the aspiring terrorist group (as it did due to a nationalist backlash in Somalia after the Ethiopian intervention of 2006) or it can lead to its (temporary) demise (as in Afghanistan where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were forced to flee to Pakistan after Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001-2002).

Competition can lead to debates, debates to disputes, serious disputes to polarisation and conflict and conflict escalation to the use of political violence which can take the form of asymmetric forms of warfare including terrorism and ultimately to full scale warfare. Several forms of conflict waging can coexist simultaneously and that also applies to acts of terrorism in the middle of, or on the side-lines of warfare, sometimes conducted abroad rather than in the main conflict theatre. This is in line with another statistical finding from the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP):

“Terrorist activity historically occurs within nations that are also experiencing broader internal armed conflict. IEP...found that 55 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries in the midst of an internal armed conflict. Additionally another 33 per cent occurred in countries that were either experiencing or involved in an internationalist conflict”.102

In such conflicts, the number of externally displaced persons is sometimes lower and sometimes higher than the one of those internally displaced. For instance, in 1994/95,
the 20 most intense conflicts identified in a monitoring project of PIOOM saw at least 634,000 lives lost (cumulatively, since the beginning of these conflicts there were seven million fatalities), more than nine million refugees and almost twenty million internally displaced persons. On the other hand, another 55 lower-intensity conflicts and serious disputes produced, in the mid-1990s, 2.6 million additional fatalities, with six million internally displaced persons and nine million external refugees (or people in refugee-like situations) reversing the ratios of internally and externally displaced persons.

Europe experienced the consequences of such a conflict in the 1990s when Yugoslavia broke apart. At that time the term “ethnic cleansing” entered the vocabulary. It refers to the terrorisation of sectors of the population, usually a minority, in order to make them leave the land of their fathers so as to produce greater national homogeneity. Vamik Volkan, in his book Blood Lines. From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, defines the latter as referring to:

“Situations in which terrorist leaders have excessive attachment to their large-group identity and seek to enhance it through widespread violence and to perpetuate it under improved political conditions, such as some form of autonomy or statehood for the group. Ethnic terrorists legitimise their actions by referring to the dominant ethnic or other group as an occupying, opposing, colonizing, or foreign force.”

The Bosnian war of 1992 – 1995 produced more than 100,000 persons dead or missing while two million people were internally displaced or became refugees abroad. War crimes were committed by all sides but the large majority of them were the doings of the forces of the Bosnian Serbs (from the Republika Srpska) who were more or less openly supported by the Serbian regime in Belgrade.

Not since the Balkan wars has Western Europe seen such large refugee arrivals as in the case of the Syrian conflict. While the situation was already very bad in Syria by the fall of 2015, the massive intervention of the Russian air force between late September 2015 and mid-March 2016 on the side of the Assad regime made a bad situation even worse. Russian bombers engaged in heavy but not very precise aerial bombings (few of their bombs were “smart bombs”), producing massive additional displacement. According to Roy Gutman, the Pulitzer prize winning Middle East correspondent, the Russian air campaign, with more than 8,000 sorties since 30 September 2015, - for 90 percent directed against non-ISIS forces – displaced several hundreds of thousands of people. 75,000 persons fled from the air bombardments alone in February 2016, according to a conservative estimate of UNHCR.

The link between violent conflicts and (civil) wars on the one hand and terrorism on the other hand is well-established. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, 88 percent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing, or involved in, violent conflicts while 11 percent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that at the time were not involved in conflict. Less than 0.6 percent of all terrorist attacks

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occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict nor any form of political terror (using Gibney's scale).108

The nexus between conflict-related terrorism and refugee migration is also plausible, given the refugee levels of countries torn apart by civil wars, with and without foreign interventions. The five countries with the highest number of terrorist fatalities – together accounting for more than half of all terrorism-related fatalities in 2014 – were Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. They suffered 78 percent of all terrorist fatalities and 57 percent of all attacks that were registered in 2014.109

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 13: Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations mid-2015, according to UNHCR and cumulative number of Terrorist Incidents</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq:</td>
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<td>Nigeria:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria:</td>
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The *prima facie* evidence for links between (civil) war, terrorism and refugee production appears to be strong. However, it needs to be fleshed out in more detail through chronological process analysis in each case – something that would, *inter alia*, require the creation of cumulative data also for refugee stocks and flows which is beyond this exploratory study.

E. Refugee Camps and Diasporas as Causes (and Targets) of Terrorism?

(i) The Role of Refugee Camps

There are refugee camps in more than 125 countries and while one would like to think that these are temporary structures, the sad fact is that the average lifespan of a refugee situation is seventeen years.110 One would also like to think that refugee camps are safe places where those who escaped the experience of violence or the threat of

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persecution can recover, wait for the end of hostilities and plan how to pick up their lives upon return. Unfortunately, this is usually not the case: refugee camps tend to be insecure places as they are generally under-policed. Refugee camps are often synonymous with misery and lack of perspective for those who have to wait there for a change to the better. Like prisons, they can become breeding grounds for terrorism. Slightly more than half of the world’s refugee population is younger than 18 years old. Young people are more prone to join terrorist groups than older people. Open-ended residence in such camps offers recruitment opportunities for terrorists and guerrilla fighters.

Brian M. Jenkins, a highly respected analyst of terrorism, asked in a recent blog, whether the Syrian conflict will produce a new generation of terrorists, in analogy to the Palestinian conflict. There is certainly much going on in refugee camps around Syria that should be a source of great concern. It is therefore instructive to look back at the Palestinian experience.

The classic example of how refugee camps can become breeding grounds for terrorist activities is provided by the fate of Palestinians many of whom were forced from their homes when Israel was established. Some 700,000 Palestinians fled after Israel took control of their land between spring 1948 and spring 1949. In 1947, Jewish terrorist groups like the Irgun and the Stern gangs had attacked both British soldiers and Palestinian civilians which would ultimately lead to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The plight of the Palestinians led to interventions of Arab states to undo the Israeli state formation of 14 May 1948 but it was unsuccessful. A series of wars followed in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and beyond. The 1967 Six-Day War, in particular, caused another massive outflow of between 200,000 and 325,000 Palestinian people. While most refugee populations shrink after some time, in the case of the Palestinians there are still some 1.5 million refugees and their offspring in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as these neighbouring states refused to integrate them fully for political reasons. Once it became clear to the Palestinians after the Six-Day War in 1967 that the Arab states were both unwilling and unable to recover their land for them, several Palestinian groups resorted to commando operations that generally took the form of terrorist attacks on Israeli settlements. However, the bloodiest confrontation was with one of the host countries of Palestinian refugees. In Jordan, where half of the population consisted of exiled Palestinians, armed Palestinian formations challenged the Hashemite monarchy and sought its overthrow. After a series of clashes between September 1970 and July 1971 the Palestinian fedayeen were decisively beaten and 30,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians in tent camps, lost their lives. Out of this defeat emerged an even more extremist wing of the Palestinian...
resistance - Black September. Its first victim was Wasfi Tall, the Jordanian Prime Minister; he was assassinated by a Palestinian cell in Cairo on 28 November 1971.119

Most militants of the armed Palestinian resistance had by then moved to Lebanon from where they launched terrorist attacks while also destabilising Lebanon. By the mid 1970s, their state-in-a-state presence led to the first Lebanese civil war (1975/76) which would last 18 months and cost 60,000 lives. Palestinian refugee camps had largely escaped the control of host countries (Jordan and Lebanon) and extremist elements engaging in terrorism threatened Israel, triggered repression and civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon, several Israeli interventions as well as one from Syria. Palestinian militants also engaged in international terrorism in Europe and beyond.120

Today Lebanon again experiences the fallout of a conflict, similar to the experience of Jordan after 1948. Lebanon’s Syrian refugee population now amounts to almost a quarter of the country’s total population and it is again facing destabilisation from refugee camps. In late 2015, Elias Bou Saab, Lebanon’s minister of education, claimed that at least 20,000 jihadists had infiltrated refugee camps in his country.121

While there were, in 2015, 1.1 million Syrians in Lebanese camps some 619,000 Syrians are in Jordanian camps, with more than half of them being under 18 years of age.122

One aid worker in a UN refugee camp in Jordan noted:

The Muslim gangs come as refugees, but they have their agendas. They are like a mafia. People are even killed inside the camps....(....)The camps are dangerous because they have IS, Iraqi militias and Syrian militias. It’s another place for gangs.(....) They’re killing inside the camps, and they’re buying and selling ladies and even girls.123

Similar stories about the presence of armed militias reach us from Turkey. Here is the account of what a Syrian defector from ISIS, Abu Jamal, told two researchers about a Turkish refugee camp:

Abu Jamal estimated that Akçakale Refugee Camp had approximately thirty thousand refugees, mostly Arabs. He said that in the Kobani battle it was found that many of the killed IS members were actually carrying Akçakale Camp ID’s on their body. He went on to state that there are around twenty quarters in the Akçakale Camp with each having its own mosque with its own Arabic imam or some other unofficial preacher. Jamal stated that some of them recruit for IS inside the camp. As a result young boys leave the camps to join IS. ‘These sheikhs preach that jihad is fard ayn [a mandatory individual responsibility] for every Syrian man according to Islam, as Syria is in war,’ Abu Jamal declared. Likewise he

119 Ibid., p.167.
121 H. Roberts, ‘ISIS threatens to send 500,000 migrants to Europe as a ‘psychological weapon’ in chilling echo of Gaddafi’s prophecy that the Mediterranean will become a sea of chaos’ The Daily Mail http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2958517/The-Mediterranea-see-chaos-Gaddafi-s-chilling-prophecy-interview-ISIS-threatens-send-500-000-migrants-Europe-psychological-weapon-bombed.html
insisted ...that the IS recruiters pressure and threaten men to join without the camp authorities knowing they are doing so. “They ensure you that if you die in battle, that they will take care of your family. If you do not want to join IS then you have to flee the camp. They will not let you alone.”(...) Our informants told us several stories of young boys being talked into joining IS and then running away from their families. They all ended up dying - carrying out suicide missions.\(^{124}\)

Anecdotal evidence also links other refugee camps to terrorist recruitment, e.g. in Kenya where up to half a million of Somali refugees found shelter. Some of them become the targets of recruiting efforts of opposing forces in the civil war. In the case of the terrorist attack on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall on 21 September 2013, one of the perpetrators was, according to press reports, a refugee from the Kakuma camp. Another suspect in that attack appeared to made a phone call to someone in Dadaab, Kenya’s largest camp of Somali refugees.\(^{125}\) 67 people died in that attack, while 175 suffered injuries from the four terrorists. Militants from Al-Shabaab as well as some of those who oppose Al-Shabaab, recruit in camps like Dadaab, sometimes under false pretenses, making promises to gullible young men which they are not going to keep. As one researcher from Human Rights Watch, Letta Taylor, put it: “The boys and men who are in these camps risked their lives to flee. Now they're being asked to return to that (...) Recruitment of fighters in refugee camps undermines their very purpose, which is to be a place of refuge from conflict”.\(^{126}\)

Not only non-state armed groups but also governments have been known to use refugee camps for the recruitment of fighters.

In a survey of refugee radicalisation, Barbara Sude and her colleagues noted in 2015:

> The host country, sometimes with the cooperation of international relief organisations, also might directly or indirectly encourage radicalisation by allowing political wings of militant groups to participate officially in relief efforts or by supporting a faction and/or conducting military operations in the refugees' home country"(...)The risk of radicalisation can be higher if the receiving country is unable or unwilling to provide for the camps and surrounding area. It is worse if militant groups take over camp security and/or are able to cross at will into the country of origin for armed activities.\(^{127}\)


\(^{127}\) Ibid, p. 5.
Such situations of radicalisation and recruitment in refugee camps are not uncommon (see Box 14).

**Box 14: Radicalisation in Refugee Camps – Selected Cases**

1. Palestinian refugees in Middle East, esp. Lebanon, 1967-1993: radicalised groups gain control of camps in Lebanon; conduct cross-border attacks;
2. Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, 1978-1988: initially minor radicalisation followed by direct recruitment into militant groups;
3. Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran 1990s: radical recruitment intensifies and is exported;
4. Somali refugees in Kenya, 1990s-2002: radical groups active in camps at various periods;
5. Rwandan refugees in DRC, 1990s-2000s: radicalised groups control camps; conduct cross-border attacks; violence spreads in region

Source: Adapted from: Barbara Sude, David Stebbins, and Sarah Weilant. Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization. RAND Perspective, 2015, p.3.

Radicalisation to violent extremism and recruitment for terrorist groups becomes more likely where refugee camps are in direct contact with fighters from an ongoing conflict. The temptation to join the fight rather than wait in despair is real for many young men, especially when refugees cannot obtain education or employment and are isolated in camps for years.128

When in the 1980s millions of Afghans fled the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan many ended up in refugee camps in Pakistan. Some of these camps became recruiting grounds for the mujahedeen. They also offered recruiting opportunities for foreign states and intelligence agencies who sought to instrumentalise refugees for their purposes. In Pakistani camps like the Jalozai camp near Peshawar, young males were recruited by Pakistani intelligence and the American CIA.129 In the 1989, after the Soviet troops had left Afghanistan and put their puppet Mohammad Najibullah’s in their place, American and Pakistani intelligence officials recruited young men from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and provided them as fighters to warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against the Najibullah regime. As the American diplomat McWilliams later recalled: “What they wound up doing was emptying the refugee camps….It was a last ditch effort to throw these sixteen-year-old boys into the fight in order to keep this thing going. It did not work”.130 Instead of the warlords, Afghanistan got the Taliban in 1996. By mid-2015 Hekmatyar advised his supporters to back the “Islamic State”.131

The Islamic State has not only tried to set up a new province in Khorasan (the old name for greater Afghanistan) but also tried to penetrate Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. One of these is the Yarmouk refugee camp which is only a few kilometers from Damascus itself. In 2015 ISIS tried to take over the camps, perhaps hoping to gain willing supporters among the camp’s 18,000 residents (which included, next to Palestinians, also displaced Syrians). When the Syrian regime counter attacked, ISIS used the refugee population, including 3,500 children, as human shields. The Assad regime has also attacked refugee camps in Syria. In one of these attacks on May 5, 2016, 28 people, including women and children got killed in an airstrike while 50 more were wounded in the Kamouna camp 10 kilometers from the Turkish border.

These are not the only instances where refugee camps came under attack. In more than six years of terrorism and unconventional warfare, Boko Haram forced more than 2,600,000 to leave their homes. However, that was not the end: Boko Haram even carried the persecution into the refugee camps. On 9 February 2016 two young female suicide bombers killed 58 persons and seriously wounded 78 others in the Dikwa refugee camp, a camp that housed more than 53,000 people, located 85 km northeast of Maiduguri, the capital of the federal state of Borno, in the north of Nigeria. The third prospective suicide bomber changed her mind at the last moment, explaining that she did not want to see her parents (who were refugees in the camp) be killed.

For countries receiving large numbers of refugees, the risk of terrorist attacks by “refugee warriors” and, on the opposite side, by native xenophobic vigilantes targeting on refugee populations increases. A cross-national, time-series data analysis of 154 countries covering the period 1970–2007 found that countries with many refugees are more likely to experience both domestic and international terrorism. Another study found that “Refugee flows significantly increase the likelihood and counts of transnational terrorist attacks that occur in the host country, even when controlling for other variables”.  

(ii) The Role of Diasporas

While refugee camps are usually closed areas far from the population centres of hosting countries, some of those exiled from their country for political reasons live legally in hosting countries and form diasporas, mainly in urban areas. They are joined by compatriots who come to the West as family members (e.g. through arranged marriages enabling migration to the West), as students or in some other capacity.

When leaving their country of origin, migrants are rarely able to leave their past behind. Animosities that led to conflict in the home country are often continued in the new host country – conflicts have, as it were, become portable. For instance, many Indians and Pakistanis have brought the conflict between their home countries with them to the United Kingdom. When the British colonial power left India in 1947/48, it had arranged a partition that displaced more than 15 million people and led to the slaughter of between one and two million Indians and Pakistanis in the process, leaving traumatic scars in the people on both sides. Many Pakistanis and Indians, even those abroad, still treat each other as quasi-enemies.

Where state repression rather than war has driven people abroad, refugees often try to mobilise third parties against their enemy at home, e.g. seeking the support of the host government, political parties or sectors of civil society as allies (e.g. the anti-Castro Cuban lobby in Florida). Sometimes economic migrants and political refugees from both sides of a conflict at home are present in the host country and continue their conflict. Such has, for instance, been the case in Germany between Turks and Kurds. The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) has used Germany for fund-raising and for the recruitment of young activists who have been sent as fighters to the mountainous region in northern Iraq as well as to eastern Turkey. At the same time Kurdish militants have repeatedly launched attacks in Germany, both against Turkish embassies and against German citizens.

In diasporas we also find newly arrived students from the home country who often engage in political activism. They might have become radicalised only in the host country, as a result of visiting Salafist mosques or after meeting Afghan veterans. Such was the case with the Hamburg group that formed the core of the attack team of Al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001. Hamburg with its al-Quds mosque was not the only center of conspiracies by terrorists in European diasporas. Many jihadists were groomed in London, so much so that the British capital was dubbed “Londonistan”. To quote from Petter Nesser’s history of Islamist Terrorism in Europe:

London was at the heart of the jihadi sub-culture in Europe. From the British capital a critical mass of radical preachers who had spent time in Af-Pak [Afghanistan-Pakistan], Bosnia and other conflict zones acted as leaders and recruiters within a growing jihadi scene. These veteran militants also acted as religious guides for foreign armed groups. French security officials invented the name “Londonistan” in part because of the many jihadists in London, and partly because the city became a transit station for recruits heading for training camps in Afghanistan.

139 Personal observation, based on conversations with Indians and Pakistanis.
“Londonistan” became slang for the tendency of the British authorities to turn a blind eye to extremism and to offer sanctuary to terrorists. (...) However, while the significance of London cannot be overstated, jihadi networks also emerged all over Britain and the rest of Europe.¹⁴¹

These networks persist to this day and some have grown stronger as Muslim diasporas in the West have grown in size (e.g. Molenbeek, a district of Brussels). While the first generation of Muslim immigrants to Europe – in many cases labour migrants - was mainly conservative and often apolitical, their children - the second generation - found themselves often unable to integrate into the host society. Yet these sons of Muslim fathers from North Africa and the Middle East also found it difficult to identify with the traditional views of their fathers.¹⁴² Thousands of them radicalised and began to identify with the jihadi in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Somalia and Syria. These conflicts often touched a responsive chord with rebellious young Muslims and with recent converts to Islam, especially when the host country and the authoritarian government of their fathers' homeland were on good terms with each other, as was (and is), for instance, the case with Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.¹⁴³ Satellite-based news media and Internet-based social media allow young Muslims in the West to link up with those who fight against repressive regimes in the Muslim world.¹⁴⁴ While the American intervention in Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 attacks drew some of them to militant jihadism, the unjustified invasion of Iraq in 2003 convinced many more that Islam itself was under attack and needed to be defended at home and abroad. The Arab Spring of 2011 raised political awareness even more and when popular mass protests in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world were brutally repressed, many became convinced that non-violent change was not possible. Vivid accounts of the atrocities of the Assad regime strengthened in many young Muslims in the West the conviction that the Sunni uprising needed to be supported with more than just words. While a first wave of foreign fighters made it to Syria already in 2012 and 2013, it was the proclamation of a new Caliphate in mid-2014 that made the numbers of those who travelled from Western diasporas to Syria increased tremendously (see Box 14 below).

Those foreign fighters from Western diasporas (6,000+) were even more numerous than those who departed from the territories of the former Soviet Union (4,700) or Southeast Asia (900), though they were fewer than those originating from the Maghreb (8,000) or the Middle East (8,245).¹⁴⁵ What brought them together was a powerful ideology (“Islam is under attack and it is every Muslim's duty to defend it”) and the existence of an organisational crystallisation point (the new Caliphate) awash with cash looted from Mosul’s central bank. Therefore a large-scale migration of young Muslims to Syria took place, with foreign fighters originating from more than 100 countries. As their arrival in Syria and Iraq exacerbated the fighting, more people began to move in the opposite direction, migrating towards Europe to escape terrorism and warfare.

¹⁴² One of the alleged perpetrators of the Bardo Museum massacre in Tunisia was said to have crossed from Libya into Italy hidden among ordinary asylum seekers.
(iii) Host Country Xenophobia as Cause of Terrorism

Once asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants have reached a host country in large numbers, local xenophobic resistance is sometimes triggered. It takes two directions: targeting the asylum seekers and economic migrants on the one hand and targeting liberals and social-democrats who welcome them on the other. Xenophobic resistance against economic migrants and asylum seekers in Europe has mainly taken the form of arson attacks by Molotov cocktails on asylum centers. Firebomb attacks and similar ones involving iron rods, axes and knives have taken place in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Sweden which in 2015 alone received more than 160,000 asylum seekers (including 35,000 unaccompanied minors) has seen some 50 attacks against asylum seekers – more than in the previous four years combined.

The German authorities reported for 2015 more than 900 xenophobic incidents – 30 percent more than in 2014. Almost 700 people were injured in such incidents. Is this right-wing and xenophobic political violence terrorism? The term terrorism is often reserved in the public discourse for Islamist jihadist attacks only. Yet there is no good reason to call many of these attacks anything other than acts of terrorism. Robin Schroeder (Kiel University) has compared the elements of the most widely used definitions of terrorism as well as the one used by the German government with the characteristics of some of these attacks on asylum centres – more than 200 arson attacks on refugee centers in 2015 in Germany alone - and concluded:

When one compares ...the core elements of scientific definitions of terrorism with the...actual arson attacks on refugee housings, one arrives at the following conclusion: the goal of the attacks is a political one, the selection of victims is random and the purpose of the attacks, namely to communicate xenophobic messages, is very clear. The message is directed as a threat to the social group of refugees, as a violent message of resistance it addresses the political decision-makers and as a call to mobilisation it aims at the politically like-minded in society. That the call strikes a responsive chord is shown by the rising number of arson attacks on inhabited refugee homes. This makes it clear that this deed can, from a social scientific perspective, be called a terrorist act.

The lack of compassion in some sectors of host societies with those who have escaped civil war, state failure, state repression or insurgent terrorism in their countries of origin is a worrying issue. Its deliberate exploitation by demagogic right-wing leaders and populist politicians makes matters worse.

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148 De Telegraaf, 11 February 2016. Provisional figures for 2015 provided by the German Ministry of the Interior.
Sometimes lone actors and right-wing groups attack not only the refugees themselves but also those (usually social-democrats and liberals) who are most willing to welcome them are willing to give them shelter. The worst example of this has been the double attack of Anders Behring Breivik, a lone actor, in Norway on 22 July 2011. After exploding a car bomb in the government district of Oslo (which killed eight people), the right-wing perpetrator proceeded to the island of Utoya where he killed 69 young people of the Workers’ Youth League at gunpoint, while wounding 66 more. As reason for the massacre he stated that its purpose was to save Norway and Western Europe from a Muslim takeover, and that the Labour Party had to “pay the price” for “letting down Norway and the Norwegian people.”

In the past there have also been fights between right-wing groups and left-wing anti-fascists in various European countries. So far few of these have been directly motivated by the immigration issue. However, as the demographic composition of host societies in some urban areas changes under the impact of irregular immigration, polarisation between nationalistic and more internationalist groups might yet lead to more acts of “horizontal” terrorism between them.

Having looked at some of the possible causes of terrorism and migration, let us now look at the direct relationship between migrants and terrorists.

F. Migrants as Terrorists? Terrorists as Migrants?

Human rights organisations warn us that we should not confuse or associate refugees with terrorists since they are often the very opposite, namely victims of terrorism. This is a valid point and by and large true but, as usual, reality is more complex. Migrants can become terrorists (or refugee warriors) and vice versa or be both at the same time. Some examples of this complexity:

(i) Migration in the Footsteps of the Prophet

When the Caliphate was proclaimed in mid-2014, the Islamic State’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reminded Muslims that the Prophet had migrated from Mecca to Medina for his faith. The Arabic word for that migration is *hijrah*. The new Caliph claimed that it was now the duty of every Muslim to make a similar migration to the Caliphate and assist in the construction of the Islamic State. His call has been heard and thousands of foreign fighters (and female supporters of the Caliphate) have migrated to Syria and Iraq. In total some 30,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries have gone to Syria since 2012. Somewhat surprisingly, a sizeable portion of those who moved to

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152 A.P. Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State”, (The Hague: ICCT, 2015), p. 13: “The call to perform *hijrah* – which means both emigration and withdrawal from an un-Islamic society to a Muslim one – is one of the most powerful instruments in the Islamic tradition as it implies following in the footsteps of the Prophet. ISIS makes clever use of it to lure vulnerable young Muslims to its state-building project. It is a standard tenet of militant Salafism that jihad is the personal duty of every Muslim.”

the Caliphate had a criminal record before they departed from Europe although few of them had engaged in terrorism at home. In recent years more than six thousand young men (and women) have migrated from Europe to Syria and Iraq (see Box 15) to join organisations that have been labeled “terrorist”.

Some 1,500 of the more than 6,000 men and women who had gone to Syria from Western countries have, after a “tour of duty”, returned from the Caliphate. A few of them have in the meantime engaged in acts of terrorism at home. They are hijrah migrants who turned into terrorists or at least joined a jihadist organisation which engages in acts of terrorism. Those of them who returned to Europe not out of disillusionment but with the intent to conduct attacks in their country of origin are returnee migrants turning terrorists, serving as a fifth column of the Islamic State in the West. One of the strategy papers captured from the Islamic State made clear that the refugee streams towards Europe was to be used to infiltrate terrorists. The real

Box 15: Foreign Fighters from Twenty European Countries Who Left for Syria and Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>80+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,155</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


154 Information obtained from government officials during an international conference in April 2016.

refugees who flee Syria rather than join the Islamic State are regarded as “infidels’ by the leaders of IS.

(ii) Migration from one Jihadist Theatre of Conflict to the Next by Professional Jihadists

The rise of global jihadism in the last 30 years has led to a situation where some jihadists move from one conflict to the other, e.g. from Afghanistan to Bosnia and from there to Chechnya and further on to Syria. They are wandering terrorists, partly because their country of origin would arrest them if they returned home and partly because jihad has become for them a way of life. The number of these migrants might increase after the names of thousands of jihadists with the Islamic State have been made public in March 2016 by a leak from a disillusioned jihadist, allowing their arrest when they try to return to their home country. They will have nowhere else to go unless states offer them amnesties. Many of these foreign fighters might therefore become perpetual migrants, going from one jihadist hotspot to the next until they die.

(iii) Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Foreign fighters are by definition migrants but a number of them are returning migrants who have often been further radicalised in the conflict zones of jihad. When back home some of them are sleepers who sooner or later will get involved in plots. An analysis by Petter Nesser of 75 IS plots in the West revealed,

At least one-third of ISIS-linked plots against the West involved a foreign fighter - an individual who has gone abroad to train or fight in a terrorist safe haven. However, this figure is probably low, as extremists are increasingly taking steps to hide their communications, and in recent cases the involvement of a foreign fighter was often not clear until weeks or months into an investigation. These experienced jihadists were suspects, accomplices, or instigators in two-dozen identified cases. Roughly half of these cases involved “returnees,” foreign fighters who came home from ISIS safe havens to launch the attacks themselves. This includes the Paris attackers, the assailants responsible for killing Western tourists at a Tunisian museum and beach resort, the suspect behind the shooting at a Jewish museum in Brussels in 2014, and more. Some 1,500 of the more than 6,000 European foreign fighters have, according to press reports, returned to Europe. Returning foreign fighters use various routes to come home. Some use their own passports, some falsified travel documents and some come with stolen identity papers while a few travel without documents, hiding in the stream of irregular migrants and asylum seekers that moved to Europe since the fall of 2015.

Their number is small – so far not much more than a few dozen suspected jihadists posing as Syrian war refugees have been discovered among the hundreds of thousands escaping Syria or the refugee camps in Turkey and Lebanon. However, their presence among genuine refugees has raised alarm in the intelligence community and, even more so, among populist right-wing politicians. Some of those who hide in the stream of refugees are, however, not returning foreign fighters but other Syrian or Iraqi jihadists. A few of them have been registered and fingerprinted at the borders of Greece or Turkey or carried residence papers from refugee centers in Germany. Nabil Fadli, a suicide bomber who killed ten German tourists on Istanbul’s Sultan Ahmet Square on 12 January 2016, for instance, had entered Turkey one week earlier and had himself registered as asylum seeker. Abdel Majid Touil, one of the alleged perpetrators of the Bardo Museum massacre in Tunisia had crossed among ordinary asylum seekers the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy but was caught (but later released for lack of proof). A Tunisian man named Walid Salihi (he has several other identities as well) who attacked a police station in Paris on 7 January 2016 – the anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attack – had registered in the asylum center of Recklinghausen in Germany. He wore a fake explosive belt but carried a real meat cleaver and shouted “Allahu Akhbar” when he attacked. He was shot before he could do any harm. Two of the terrorists who attacked sites in Paris on 13 November 2015 had entered Europe hidden among the refugees stream, carrying false Syrian passports. How many more such disturbed and dangerous jihadists are among the refugees we do not yet know. The German Federal Migration Office had to admit at one time that the identities of up to 400,000 people in the country were not known. 130,000 asylum seekers who had entered Germany somehow “disappeared”, with some of them probably moving to other countries.

The Islamic State profits both from the returning jihadists and regular asylum seekers. According to Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Minister of the Interior, IS has formed an entire “industry” in fabricating passports stolen in Syria and Iraq. As indicated above, two of the terrorists responsible for the massacres in Paris on 13 November 2015 were reported to have re-entered Europe with probably false Syrian passports. How many ISIS terrorists have been sent to Europe is not known. One source involved in the smuggling of people, claimed that ISIS had sent “some 4,000 fighters to Europe” – an unverified and, in all likelihood, highly exaggerated number. According to the Dutch immigration Minister Klaas Dijkhoff, about thirty war crimes suspects – one third among them Syrians – were found among 59,000 people applying for political asylum in the Netherlands in 2015. Similar low numbers have been found in earlier refugee flows. Among 25,000 or more Algerian asylum seekers reaching the United Kingdom since 1980, only 44 were thought to have been involved in terrorism. In the case of Somali refugees in the United States, only 36 out of 85,000 were suspected of links to terrorism.

159 Migrant smuggling in the EU, (The Hague: Europol, 2016), p. 12
160 Sam Mullins, op. cit., p.25.
163 “Germany reports disappearance of 130,000 asylum seekers”, BBC, 28 February 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-netherlands-idUSKCN0W211Y.
terrorism. Such figures of 0.2 percent or less indicate that fears about “refugee terrorists” are largely unfounded.

(iv) Economic Migrants Turning Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

There is another way in which migrants can become (terrorist) fighters: The Islamic State province in Libya has plenty of enemies and only limited manpower – between 4,500 and 6,000 men, all but some 800 of them non-Libyans. In order to boost its ranks, IS in Libya has begun abducting economic migrants from Sudan, Eritrea and West Africa en route through the Sahara to Europe. One Nigerian plumber who was kidnapped together with a group of Sudanese and Ghanian migrants in Benghazi was brought by IS fighters to a desert camp where they were made to recite verses from the Qu’ran. Those who could not recite verses were considered to be Christians and their heads were cut off before the eyes of the abducted Muslims. Subsequently, this Nigerian man and other Muslims were sent to a training camp and after several weeks of military instructions considered ready for combat. This particular Nigerian witness managed to escape and tell the story but lives in constant fear of being rounded up again by the Islamic State:

At times I have entered mosques here in Libya to ask Allah to make my death fast and easy. Now, I think about leaving here and try to shut out what I saw in the desert that day – how those men just cut of the heads of other men, like they were chopping vegetables, like it was nothing… When I have enough money, I will take the boat to Italy. I have survived so much already, maybe I will also survive crossing the sea.

(v) Migrants’ Offspring Radicalising into Terrorism

There is yet another way migrants can turn terrorists. If they are not fully integrated in host societies, they might develop resentment and with some that anger might become so strong that they – or more likely, their children – turn against the host society. That has been one of the reasons why so many of the foreign fighters from Europe were the sons of immigrants. The short-term likelihood that recent refugees arriving in Western Europe become radicalised is, however, very low. However, there is a danger that some irregular migrants who stay illegal in the European Union might be recruited by either criminal or terrorist (or hybrid) networks. Their personal resentment against a society that is unwilling to accept them might motivate some of them to engage in acts of political violence.

Yet the overwhelming majority of migrants have nothing to do with terrorism. There are figures to illustrate this. Between the fall of 2001 and early 2016, the United States accepted more than 800,000 refugees in its resettlement program. Only five persons of those who were vetted in the framework of the resettlement program have been arrested on terrorism charges, according to the State Department and the Migration Policy Institute”.

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\(^{165}\) Sam Mullins, op. cit., p. 26.


the ICSR in London, has noted that of the 600,000 Iraqis and Syrians who arrived in Germany in 2015 “only 17 have been investigated for terrorist links.”

To sum up: international terrorists are often migrants and migrants (or their children) in refugee camps and diasporas can at times but very rarely become terrorists (or refugee warriors) if governments fail to provide them with better perspectives.

**G. Counter-Terrorist Operations as Cause of Forced Migration?**

Terrorism is often a strategy of provocation. Those who engage in it seek to provoke an overreaction. The less intelligence a government has about the location and identity of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, the more likely it is that the law enforcement and security forces use a heavy-handed approach that targets the entire sector of society that the terrorists are associated with. That is often part of the terrorist calculus: the repression, they argue, will open the eyes of the people and then the people will see that the government is “evil” which should make more people turn towards the terrorists, providing them with support and new recruits. It is a cynical calculus to provoke repression against the very sector the terrorists claim to defend - but such is the lack of morality and cunning strategy of many insurgent terrorists.

Provoked over-reactions by the state has costs tens of thousands of lives and caused hundreds of thousands of refugees. After 11 September 2001, the American attacks on Afghanistan not only led to an exodus of 300 or so Al-Qaeda members to Pakistan, it also displaced thousands of others. In the tribal territories of North Waziristan the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other jihadists found a safe haven. Pakistan sought to utilise some of them for its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir but in the end became a target itself. After the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and after suffering a number of direct attacks from the Pakistani Taliban, the army decided to act decisively. In 2014, the Pakistani military began to conduct major attacks against the safe havens of the Pakistani Taliban and elements of Al Qaeda in Waziristan. In this process over one million civilians were displaced from their homes. The saddest thing about this displacement caused by counter-terrorist operations was that someone in the Pakistani security apparatus sympathetic to the objectives of the jihadists had apparently warned the terrorist leadership in advance, so that the large-scale operation missed many of its targets as many of the tipped off militants had already moved across the border into Afghanistan to wait for the storm to be over. As so often the common people pay the largest price.

In Syria, the Assad government has tried to sell its generalised repression of Sunnis under the label of countering terrorism, a label that it not only used against the Islamic

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169 For instance, the chief strategist of the German Red Army Faction, Horst Mahler later admitted: "The strategy of the terrorist nuclei was aiming at provoking the overreaction of the state in the hope to stir the flames of hate against the state and to channel new recruits into the armed underground". A. P. Schmid, “Political Terrorism, A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature”, (Amsterdam: North Holland publ. Company, 1984), p. 185.


171 Ibid.
State and al-Nushra (the Al-Qaeda group in Syria) but also against more moderate fighters resisting the near-genocidal regime. The Syrian government has been greatly helped by Iran and, from late September 2015 onwards, by the Russian air force which, unlike the American one, hardly uses smart precision bombs. As a result, civilian casualties of the Russian counter-terrorism campaign in Syria are high. When in February 2016, the Russian air force increased its bombardments on Aleppo to enable the advance of Syrian government troops, at least 15,000 Syrians fled the fighting in northern Aleppo with many of them gathering at the Bab al-Salam border crossing to Turkey where they were not allowed to proceed.172

The Russian intervention from the air and the stronger engagement of Iran on the ground in Syria turned the tide as the Assad regime had by September 2015 lost more than 80 percent of the territory of Syria. This new intensification of the repression convinced hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in camps in Lebanon and Turkey that they had hoped in vain for a victory of the popular insurgency and that a return to a devastated Syria still ruled by Assad was no longer an option. By that time more than eighty percent of the Syrian refugees in camps in Jordan and Lebanon lived lives below the poverty level threshold. When Western donors reduced their contributions to UNCHR in 2015, the situation of these refugees became hopeless. The combination of these factors: having, after the Russian intervention, given up hope that Assad would fall and the war would end soon, the growing poverty in the refugee camps as a result of the further reduction of aid to UNHCR, made hundreds of thousands of them decide to risk the perilous journey to Europe since the German chancellor Angela Merkel indicated in 5 September 2015 that Germany would welcome them.

The effects of state over-reaction to insurgent terrorism have, sadly, often been worse than the damage done by insurgent terrorists. The over-reaction of the United States with its intervention in Iraq in 2003 (where Saddam Hussein was wrongly accused of supporting Al-Qaeda and of possessing weapons of mass destruction) alone, directly and indirectly, led to the death of between 137,000 and 165,000 civilians and the internal displacement of 1,300,000 people while more than 1,400,000 became refugees.173 The American intervention in Afghanistan and attacks across the border into Pakistan following the 9/11 attack cost the lives of 26,000 and 21,500 civilians respectively, not counting those who were armed and directly involved in the fighting.174 The Afghan refugee population in Pakistan consists of 1,500,000 documented refugees and about one million more undocumented ones, the latter partly a result of the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan in 1978.175

Links between Terrorism and Migration: an Exploration

H. Migration Control for Counter-Terrorism?

The European Union with its 28 member states counts some 510 million people, while the Schengen area consists of twenty-six countries with a combined population of more than 420 million people. The Schengen Agreement of 1995 allows Europeans to move freely across a political space of 4,312,099 square kilometers, with a common external frontier made up of 42,672 kilometers of land border and 8,826 kilometers of coastline. Frontex, the organisation for European border control, however, had, until recently, to do with merely 310 personnel and an annual budget of 114 million Euros. Border control is still largely the prerogative of national governments. However, as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, the Schengen borders are only as strong as those of its Mediterranean members, in particular, Italy and Greece. Originally conceived for controlling illegal immigration, border controls have since 9/11 increasingly been used for countering terrorism, especially in the United States.

To keep out terrorists is a legitimate objective but the effectiveness of border controls is limited by the fact that many terrorists are “homegrown” or are foreigners with legal residence permits. Sometimes terrorism is imported not by foreigners but by citizens who got (further) radicalised while abroad. That puts a limit at what migration control can do to stop terrorism. Nevertheless, migration control has increasingly been used as an important instrument for terrorism control. On the other hand, anti-terrorist legislation can impact negatively on migration and be especially detrimental for refugees seeking asylum. Writing in 2014, Nazli Avdan concluded, looking at Schengen area data from 1980 to 2007, that “....the humanitarian principles underpinning asylum recognition have not been eroded by terrorism". Today, nine years later, migration policies have been securitised in Europe as well, as they were in the United States after 2001.

H. Cinoglu and N. Atun have asked “why despite the fact that there is no organic link between international migration and terrorism", both the United States and EU countries are focusing on migration and border control policies in the fight against terrorism? They noted some of the disadvantages:

Creating an artificial link between the immigrants and terrorism creates anxiety and rage in the immigrant societies and increases the hostile feelings against the state. In these situations, hostility against foreigners

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176 The Schengen countries include 22 EU members and four non-EU state (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein). The six EU member states outside the Schengen zone are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom. Currently six states have introduced border controls: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. “Schengen: controversial EU free movement deal explained”. BBC News, 7 March 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-131947233.


180 Ibid. p. 111.
(xenophobia) rises along with the possibility of clashes between societal groups. Creating a balance between the human rights and security is not an easy task for the countries which seek more security. Immigrants usually have a disadvantaged position in their countries and terrorist groups can abuse this situation or the boundary policies of the countries. (...) The strict policies and practices adopted within the framework of combating international terrorism might cause a gradual decrease of positive contributions of migration to the receiving societies. (...) Targeting specifically certain categories of immigrants and foreigners for the sake of prevention of terrorism can be reconciled neither with the theories of liberal democracy that the West has been defending for many years nor with the preached approach of combating terrorism within the limits of respect for human rights.¹⁸¹

One additional danger of using controls of migrants for countering terrorism is that the enlarged toolbox which governments acquire in the process of controlling the movement of foreigners will also be extended for the control of its own citizens. David Cole, in his book Enemy Aliens, has argued “....that it is in our interest not to trade immigrants’ rights for citizens’ purported security because the rights we deny to immigrants will almost inevitably be denied to citizens later and because double standards undermine security by impairing the legitimacy of the war on terrorism.”¹⁸²

Stretched to its limits, migration- and border-controls will close open cosmopolitan societies and ordinary people will pay a high price for the crimes of the few. There are other ways of combatting terrorism with fewer negative side-effects. Attacking the ideology of terrorists and their organisational infrastructures is a more promising route than the control of all individuals in their movements in the hope to catch some terrorists among them.

5. Conclusion

Since the fall of 2015 European public opinion has been stirred by graphic pictures of victims of terrorism in Paris and Brussels on the one hand and by video footage of long trails of migrants making their way through the Balkans to Austria, Germany, Sweden as well as other European countries on the other hand. Two issues - terrorism and migration - have been combined in public discourse so that the impression has been created that terrorist and migrant populations significantly overlap and that we are dealing with one and the same problem. For instance, in the fall of 2015 when ten thousand people a day arrived in Central Europe via the Balkan route, both the Czech President Milos Zeman and the Slovak Prime minister Robert Fico had suggested that terrorists would use the cover of refugee streams through the Balkans for infiltration to set up "sleeper cells" in host countries.¹⁸³ However, the very few instances of terrorists posing as refugees should be seen for what they are – exceptions.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. pp.103 and 112.
Peter Neumann, the director of the ICSR in London was right when he said

People who have just escaped civil war, oppression or poverty are unlikely to be interested in attacking the very society that has given them safety and the opportunity for a fresh start. I know of no empirical evidence that would demonstrate that first generation immigrants are particularly rebellious or receptive to extremist messages. Instead, the historical record suggests that they tend to be busy building a new existence for themselves and their children and have little time for politics or religious extremism. Even if radical Salafists like the German preacher Pierre Vogel have started targeting refugees, their message is likely to fall on deaf ears.\(^{184}\)

That is a sound judgment, also supported by Europol\(^{185}\) - although since late 2015 a few more suspected jihadi terrorists have been found disguised as refugees coming from Turkey and Libya to Europe.\(^{186}\)

As indicated earlier, the massive trek of an additional half a million refugees to Europe in late 2015 was caused by a variety of push and pull factors, including signals of welcoming from Sweden and Germany, in particular Chancellor Angela Merkel's speech of 5th September 2015. When donors of the UNHCR cut back their contributions to refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan in 2015 and when the hope for an early victory over the Assad regime waned with the Russian intervention, many Syrians in Turkey and Lebanon decided to head for Europe rather than spend many more years in refugee camps (It should be remembered in this context that an average refugee situation lasts 17 years). No wonder that many refugees after some years had enough of the misery of under-resourced and under-policed refugee camps.

If the member states of the European Union could have agreed on a fair burden-sharing scheme, taking into account its recipient country's carrying capacity, the reception of more than a million of refugees in countries with more than 500 million inhabitants would not have been a major problem. Europe's own uncoordinated and erratic policies contributed to the refugee crisis.\(^{187}\) The failure of Greece to manage the refugee stream was visible for a long time but no decisive steps were taken to save the Schengen system from collapsing. To this day, the members of the Schengen Accord still have no comprehensive and seamless system of monitoring people entering and

\(^{184}\) P.R. Neumann, “The refugees are not the problem”, The Security Times, February 2016, p. 35, (Special edition of The Atlantic Times for the 52nd Munich Security Conference). - Strange enough, Pierre Vogel’s name appeared on a death list of the Spring 2016 issue Dabiq. (No. 14) the online journal of IS. Apparently he was not radical enough. – “ISIS has Hit List of Western Leaders”. The Clarion Project, http://www.clarionproject.org/category/tags/dabiq

\(^{185}\) Europol had reported in mid-January 2016 that “There is no concrete evidence that terrorist travellers systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed.” Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks. Review held by experts from Member States and Europol on 29 November and 1 December 2015, (The Hague: Europol, 2016), p.3.

\(^{186}\) Sam Mullins, op. cit., p. 25.

leaving the Schengen.\textsuperscript{188} The exchange of intelligence on terrorist movements in Europe remains deficient.

However, technical solutions go only so far in de-linking migration and terrorism. What is at least as important for the management of migrants and the countering of terrorist are two measures that need to be taken:

(i) those who seek asylum in Europe ought to make a solemn public commitment to respect the host countries' laws of the land, their political culture and Europe's core values (democratic majority rule with respect for rights of minorities, rule of law, human rights, separation of state and religion, gender equality, freedom of thought and religion, social solidarity, pluralist acceptance of diversity and mutual tolerance); and

(ii) those who come to our shores to seek protection from prosecution and terrorism, should be obliged to assist the lawful authorities in identifying terrorist recruiters, facilitators and operators in their midst as well as report on those who are seeking to join jihadist networks.

Such commitments from refugees and other migrants to hosting countries are a small price to pay for being offered an opportunity to rebuilt their lives on a continent that, after centuries of religious conflicts and hegemonic power struggles, has successfully overcome these historical scourges and wants to keep it that way.

\textsuperscript{188} “De Maziere fordert Reiseregister für Europa”, \textit{n-tv}, 13 March 2016, \url{http://www.n-tv.de/politik/De-Maiziere-fordert-Reiseregister-fuer-Europa-article17205886.html}.
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May 2016


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The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism.

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Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism.

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