



In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 2026 Edition

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Counter-Terrorism

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Executive Summary

This report examines how European security services assess the evolving terrorist and extremist threat. Its distinctive contribution is to foreground the perspectives and priorities of practitioners, rather than relying primarily on incident databases or external assessments.

ICCT analysed 41 official reports from counter-terrorism and intelligence services across 23 EU Member States, primarily published in 2025. The analysis was complemented by information retrieved from more than 30 governmental websites, and 100 news articles, in addition to inputs from experts in 15 European countries.

Key findings

- **The overall threat remains persistent rather than fundamentally transformed.** National threat assessments are broadly stable compared with the previous year, with the terrorist threat generally more acute in Western Europe.
- **Jihadi terrorism remains the principal terrorist threat.** It is the most frequently prioritised threat across the reporting countries.
- **Right-wing extremism (RWE) remains a serious and persistent second-order threat,** manifested by an online ecosystem, which is increasingly decentralised and networked and combines nationalism, racism, antisemitism, accelerationism, anti-immigration narratives, conspiracy theories and disinformation. Some elements of that ecosystem spillover into the offline world and e.g. facilitate recruitment, mobilisation and potentially political violence or, in most extreme cases, terrorism.
- **Ideological boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred.** Anti-government extremism (AGE), nihilistic violent extremism (NVE), misogyny/incel milieus and other hybrid or “post-ideological” forms of violent extremism complicate conventional categorisation. Security services increasingly observe individuals moving between ideological milieus or motivated primarily by grievances, fascination with violence and personal factors rather than a coherent ideology.
- **The threat is increasingly characterised by low-complexity attacks that are difficult to detect.** Lone actors and small cells can mobilise rapidly, using readily accessible means against soft targets. This creates a persistent challenge for intelligence-led prevention, particularly where there is little prior contact with security services.
- **The boundary between terrorism, organised crime and hybrid/state activity is becoming more important for CT practitioners.** Russia is widely identified as the principal state-linked hybrid threat, while Iranian activity has increasingly involved proxies, criminal networks and deniable operatives targeting Jewish, Israeli and Iranian dissident interests in Europe.
- **Critical infrastructure is a growing security concern,** particularly in relation to sabotage, espionage, cyberattacks and pre-positioning by hostile states. This expands the CT/security challenge beyond conventional terrorist organisations towards resilience against state-linked and hybrid threats.
- **CT responses are adapting through legislation, prevention and financial disruption.** Member States continued to strengthen powers concerning terrorist content, data-sharing and radicalisation prevention, prison management, ML/TF controls and crypto-asset providers.
- **For policy-makers, the central implication is that CT capacity needs to become more flexible and integrated.** The emerging landscape requires sustained attention to jihadism and RWE while also developing tools for hybrid/state-linked threats, youth radicalisation, online ecosystems, ideological fluidity, terrorist financing and the intersection of terrorism with organised crime.

Overall assessment: The report depicts a European terrorist threat that is **persistent, increasingly decentralised, digitally mediated and less neatly ideological**, while simultaneously becoming more entangled with geopolitical conflict, organised crime and state-sponsored hybrid activity. For CT/CVE practitioners, this points towards the continued importance of intelligence sharing, early identification of lone actors and vulnerable youth, online and financial investigations, and cross-sector cooperation. For policy-makers, it highlights the need to ensure that legal and institutional frameworks remain sufficiently adaptable to address threats that increasingly fall between established categories.

Introduction

How do counter-terrorism services assess the threat in Europe? What trends do they notice? What are their most pressing concerns? Experts and observers regularly discuss the evolution of the terrorist threat, but what do counter-terrorism professionals have to say about this? This report aims to bring to the fore the perspectives of those that are in the first line to assess or respond to terrorism.

Compared to some other initiatives focusing on key terrorism trends (such as terrorism databases or indexes),¹ this report focuses more strictly on a counter-terrorism perspective. While some reports on counter-terrorism already exist, they are largely drafted by and for governments. This includes notably the assessments conducted by the United Nations' (UN) Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), which are unfortunately not in the public domain. In Europe, Europol's TE-SAT annual reports constitute a very useful publicly available resource, although very much focused on a law-enforcement perspective.

This report constitutes, therefore, an innovative attempt to monitor counter-terrorism efforts, with a focus on European Union (EU) Member States (MS). It focuses on original sources, such as reports published by security services, a treasure of information largely neglected by scholars. It covers various dimensions, namely:

1. National threat levels (related to terrorism and/or extremism);
2. Discussion on the main types of terrorist and extremist threats perceived;
3. National security contexts in which the aforementioned threat levels and threat assessments were produced;
4. New legislative efforts designed and introduced to help Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE) efforts;
5. Major CT operations conducted in Europe;
6. Main efforts in countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) by different EU MS;
7. Key developments with regard to terrorism sanctions and proscriptions;
8. Communication and transparency efforts related to CT and P/CVE.

To conduct this research, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) compiled and analysed 41 official counter-terrorism and security reports published by 23 EU MS, mostly in 2025,² which it combined with inputs from more than 30 governmental websites and over 100 news pieces. More details on the methodology of this report are available in the appendix.

By combining country expert inputs with detailed, structured narratives from national security documents, the report captures both operational realities and strategic priorities. These insights were used to develop specific themes for analysis, and to effectively describe the state of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Europe, as described by security services themselves.

¹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), *Global Terrorism Database 1970 – 2020* (2022), <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>; Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global terrorism index 2023: Measuring the impact of terrorism* (2023); Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), *RTV Dataset*, University of Oslo (2025), <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/groups/rtv-dataset/>.

² The report relies on the 2025 publications but in certain cases returns to 2024 as the latter year saw the publication of the latest national reports on terrorism and counter-terrorism for some EU MS. On a few occasions, if e.g. a given CT operation was continued into 2026, the authors also relied on pronouncements, reporting or documents related to developments from this year.

1. National Threat Levels

As mentioned in the previous *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism report*,³ EU MS use a variety of systems to quantitatively capture or describe the terrorist threat within their country. Most MS have developed a numerical scale with up to five threat (or vigilance) levels, some like Poland use the ALPHA-BRAVO-CHARLIE codes, and others such as Germany, Lithuania, and Italy refrain from using formal threat assessment systems altogether. Within the past year, two countries have made changes in their scaling method. On the one hand, Finland switched from a four- to a five-point scale. On the other hand, Czechia (Czech Republic) moved from a three-point scale – where 3/3 stood for an ideal low threat situation – to a four-point scale where 1/4 indicates a low threat and 4/4 a critical one. This move is expected to grant greater flexibility in the depiction of the threat, and to “better correspond to [designs] used by foreign partners”, according to Czech Interior Minister Vít Rakušan.⁴

The overall terrorism threat level to the EU MS remains largely unchanged from last year’s ICCT report, suggesting a threat that remains persistent and fairly stable, more acute in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. There exist, however, elements of uncertainty and variation as to how the threat is reported and perceived in different parts of the EU.

In 2025, six Western EU MS officially maintained high domestic terrorist threat levels,⁵ although some countries, notably France, reported a decrease in threats and attacks.⁶ This choice to uphold high threat levels may be partly explained by the continuation of successful attacks in neighbouring countries, rather than domestically, suggesting a transnational threat perception.⁷ Another contributing factor comes from increasing concerns about rapid violent radicalisation across all terrorism types,⁸ which require intelligence services to consider the terrorism threat more holistically, beyond successful attacks only.

Two new MS joined Slovenia’s medium threat level in 2025.⁹ First, as it changed its scale, Finland rounded its threat level up to 3/5.¹⁰ Conversely, Sweden decreased its threat level from 4 to 3/5 in May 2025, mainly due to a reported decrease in the risk of an Islamist attack happening domestically.¹¹ In March 2026, Luxemburg issued a statement, claiming that the terror threat remained at level 2 (Medium).¹² In their latest Police Activity Report, Luxembourgish services describe “[t]he current

3 Winkelmüller-Real Laura, Kacper Rekawek, and Thomas Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT Report, 2025), DOI: 10.19165/2025.3835, <https://icct.nl/publication/their-eyes-how-europe-an-security-services-look-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-0>.

4 Seznam Zprávy, “Vláda schválila nový systém hodnocení hrozby terorismu” [Government approves new terrorism threat assessment system], 5 February 2025, <https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-vlada-schvalila-novy-system-hodnoceni-hrozby-terorismu-269470>.

5 Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (DSN) [Austrian Directorate for State Protection and Intelligence], *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Constitutional Protection Report 2024] (2025), https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/VS/205_2025_VSB_2024_V20250929_webBF.pdf; Belgian Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), Annual Report 2024 (2025), <https://cuta.belgium.be/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Annual-report-2024.pdf>; Center for Terroranalyse (CTA) [Danish Centre for Terror Analysis], *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to Denmark 2025] (1 March 2025), <https://pet.dk/-/media/mediefiler/pet/dokumenter/analyser-og-vurderinger/vurdering-af-terrortruslen-mod-danmark/vurdering-af-terrortruslen-mod-danmark-2025.pdf>; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes [Spanish Ministry of the Presidency, Justice, and Relations with the Courts], *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [Annual Report on National Security 2024] (April 2025), <https://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/default/files/2025-05/IASN2024%20ACCESIBLE.pdf>; Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) [French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security], “Vigipirate”, n.d., <https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/vigipirate>; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV) [Dutch Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security], *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 2025* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – 2025] (9 December 2025), <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/2025/12/09/dtn-december-2025>.

6 CUTA, Annual Report 2024; Rodde Alexandre, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*, No. 110 (French National Gendarmerie Research Centre [CRGN] (January 2025), <https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/crgn/publications/the-crgn-research-note/terrorism-in-france-overview-of-the-french-extremist-movements-in-2024>.

7 Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*.

8 Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [National Security Annual Report 2024].

9 Policija [Slovenian Police], *Letno poročilo o delu policije za leto 2024* [Annual Report on Police Work for 2024], No. 0101-26/2025/106 (2025-01) (15 April 2025), https://www.policija.si/images/stories/Statistika/LetnaPorocila/PDF/LetnoPorocilo2024_Publikacija-za-tisk.pdf.

10 Suojelupoliisi (SUPO) [Finnish Security and Intelligence Service], National Security Overview 2025 (2025), <https://supo.fi/documents/38197657/39761269/National%20Security%20Overview%202025.pdf/04126ffe-6fb4-4ace-9f19-8ce6fa11456d?t=1772188841710>.

11 Swedish Security Service, “Decrease in the terrorist threat level from high to elevated”, 23 May 2025, <https://sakerhetspolisen.se/ovriga-sidor/other-languages/english-engelska/press-room/news/news/2025-05-23-decrease-in-the-terrorist-threat-level-from-high-to-elevated.html>.

12 High Commission for National Protection (HCPN), *Évaluation de la menace terroriste au Luxembourg suite à l'évolution de la situation sécuritaire au niveau international* [Assessment of the terrorist threat in Luxembourg following developments in the international security situation], Infocrise – Government of Luxembourg, <https://infocrise.public.lu/en/actualites/2025/evaluation-menace-terroriste-suite-situation-securitaire-international.html>

situation regarding extremist and terrorist activities in general” as “unchanged from the previous year”.¹³

A number of countries remain less alarmed about levels of terrorism within their territory, especially in Central-Eastern Europe. Throughout 2025, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, but also Ireland assessed the threat level to be moderate (i.e., attacks are unlikely but not impossible).¹⁴ However, Hungary raised its security threat level by one level, citing fears of retaliatory action by the Iranian regime.¹⁵ Poland extended the terror alert levels (BRAVO, BRAVO-CRP, and CHARLIE) until 31 of May 2026. BRAVO (level 2) and BRAVO-CRP (level 2, cyber threat) alerts remain in force nationwide, while a BRAVO alert also continues for Polish energy infrastructure located outside the country. In addition, the CHARLIE (level 3) alert has been extended specifically for railway lines.¹⁶

Finally, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, and Romania continue to consider the threat to be low, namely due to the absence of terrorist or terrorist-capable groups or persons.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) detected several persons who were glorifying terrorism or even had started self-training for terrorist activity, and detained two such persons last year.¹⁸ In its latest report, Latvian intelligence stated that “as the migration flow towards the West intensifies, the threats of violent activities by Islamists, right- and left-wing extremists are expected to increase”.¹⁹

Despite not formally quantifying its threat level, Germany’s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt expressed that “the terrorist threat in Germany, though often abstract, remains heightened” following the arrest of a jihadi Syrian man in November 2025.²⁰ Dobrindt had already talked about the threat coming from extremists, Islamists, and right-wing terrorists in July,²¹ thus showcasing the government’s priorities in terms of CT and P/CVE. As for Lithuania, its threat assessment describes the terrorist threat in Europe as remaining “significant”,²² while Italy’s report mentions “increasing” jihadi and right-wing threats.²³

13 Police Lëtzebuerg [Luxembourgish Police], Rapport d’activités 2024 [Activity Report 2024], 49 (11 April 2025), <https://gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/publications/rapport-activite/minist-interieur/police/2024-rapport-activite-police/20250402-ra2024.pdf>.

14 Seznam Zprávy, “Vláda schválila nový systém hodnocení hrozby terorismu” [“The government has approved a new terrorism threat assessment system”]; Heti Világgazdaság (HVG), “Miért nem elég ahhoz 287 iskolai bobariadó, hogy Pintér Sándor emeljen a terrorkészültség szintjén?” [Why are 287 school bomb threats not enough for Sándor Pintér to raise the terror alert level?], 23 January 2025, https://hvg.hu/itthon/20250123_iskolai-bom-bariado-terrorfenyegetes-keszultsegi-szint-ebx; Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa (RCB) [Polish Security Centre], “Przedłużenie obowiązywania stopni alarmowych (do 28.02.2026 r.)” [Extension of alert levels (until February 28, 2026)], 30 November 2025, <https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/przedluzenie-obowiazywania-stopni-alarmowych-do-28022026-r>; An Garda Síochána [Ireland’s National Police & Security Service], Annual Security Services Plan 2025 (2025), <https://www.iisf.ie/files/UserFiles/Documents/2025/annual-security-services-plan-2025.pdf>.

15 Zsiros Sandor, “Orbán raises terror alert and eyes election gains as Iran war disrupts energy markets”, Euronews, 1 March 2026, <https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/01/orban-raises-terror-alert-and-eyes-election-gains-as-iran-war-disrupts-energy-markets>.

16 Polsat News, *Stopnie alarmowe w Polsce przedłużone – nowy komunikat RCB* [Alert levels in Poland extended. New RCB announcement], 27 February 2026, <https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2026-02-27/stopnie-alarmowe-w-polsce-przedluzone-nowy-komunikat-rcb/#:~:text=Premier%20Donald%20Tusk%20przed%C5%82u%C5%BCy%C5%82%20do,sabota%C5%BCu%20wymierzonymi%20w%20infrastruktur%C4%99%20kolejow%C4%85>.

17 Darzhavna agencija „Nacionalna sigurnost” (DANS) [Bulgarian State Agency for National Security], *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [Annual Activity Report 2024], No. KA-429 (20 March 2025), <https://www.gov.bg>; Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO), *Annual Review 2024–2025* (14 April 2025), https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/content_page_attachments/annual-review-2024-2025.pdf; Latvian State Security Service (VDD), *Annual Report for 2025*, ISBN 978-9934-9176-7-7 (February 2026), <https://vdd.gov.lv/uploads/materials/42/en/annual-report-2025.pdf>; Kamra tar-Rap-prezentanti [Maltese House of Representatives], *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report of the Security Committee for the Year 2023] & *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report of the Security Committee for the Year 2024] (16 June 2025); Direcția de Investigare a Infracțiunilor de Criminalitate Organizată și Terorism (DIICOT) [Romanian Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism], *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024] (February 2025), https://www.diicot.ro/images/documents/rapoarte_activitate/raport2024.pdf.

18 VDD, Annual Report for 2025.

19 Ibid.,

20 Mehta Kalika, “Berlin police arrest man for planning ‘jihadi’ attack”, Deutsche Welle, 11 February 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-police-arrest-man-for-planning-jihadi-attack/a-74591178>.

21 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) [German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 vorgestellt: Verfassungsschutz ist wichtiger Schutzwall gegen Demokratiefeinde” [2024 Constitution Protection Report presented: Constitution Protection is an important bulwark against enemies of democracy], 10 June 2025, <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/pressemitteilung-2025-vsb-2024.html>.


22 Lithuania’s Defence Intelligence and Security Service (AOTD), 2025 *National Threat Assessment* (15 February 2025), 55, <https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-ENG.pdf>.

23 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica [Republic Security Information System], *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell’Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025] (4 March 2025), <https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/data/cms/posts/986/attachments/aae81005-6c29-487b-85cc-b0a310f8c9be/download?view=true>.

Portugal and Slovakia did not issue any new official statement regarding terrorist threat level in 2025. However, Portugal's Annual Internal Security Report (RASI) states that "Islamist international terrorism (...) continued to be one of the main threats likely to affect Portugal's geographical surroundings and national interests abroad",²⁴ although not commenting on its specific level nor on other types of terrorism.

More information on terrorism type-specific threat assessments can be found in section 2 on Primary Terrorism Types.

Figure 1: National Threat Levels Across EU States in 2025



²⁴ Sistema de Segurança Interna (SSI) [Portuguese Internal Security System], *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report 2024] (1 April 2025), 26, https://edge.sitecorecloud.io/centrodegges65c9-cegere0de-prod6279-8af9/media/Project/Portal-do-Governo/Portal-do-Governo/gc24/Files/Documentos/relatorio-anual-de-seguranca-interna-rasi-2024/relatorio_anual_de_seguranca_interna_rasi_2024.pdf.

2. Primary Terrorism Types

2025 security reports suggest a rather stable picture of the terrorist threat in the EU. Jihadi terrorism is still largely considered to be the most serious terrorist threat to Europe by 17 countries out of the 23 that published security reports (either stating it directly or mainly addressing this terrorism type).²⁵ Threats from right-wing extremism (RWE) come close second and are also consistently cited across 18 EU MS, though assessed differently.²⁶ The two other most addressed threats are, in order, left-wing extremism (LWE), cited by fourteen countries,²⁷ and anti-government extremism (referred to under different labels depending on the country) cited by eight.²⁸ However, while LWE is more consistently mentioned, this reflects its longitudinal character more than the strength of its threat, as only five of the fourteen countries mentioning it perceive it as potentially dangerous.²⁹ In spite of its general stability, the terrorist threat has nevertheless evolved across actors, methods, and targets.

25 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*; Sigurnosno-Obavjštajna Agencija (SOA) [Croatian Security and Intelligence Agency], *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]* (2025), [https://soa.hr/UserDocsImages/Dokumenti/Javno-izvjesce-2025%20\(1\).pdf?vel=3512180](https://soa.hr/UserDocsImages/Dokumenti/Javno-izvjesce-2025%20(1).pdf?vel=3512180); CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*; Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI) [German Ministry of the Interior], *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Constitutional Protection Report 2024]* (10 June 2025), <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2025-06-10-verfassungsschutzbericht-2024.pdf>; Greek Intelligence Service (EYP), *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24* (December 2024), <https://www.nis.gr/downloads/news/annual-report-2024-en.pdf>; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024 [2024 Activity Report]*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024* (4 July 2025), <https://english.aivd.nl/documents/2025/07/04/annual-report-2024>; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*; Swedish National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT), *Annual Review 2025* (2025), https://sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.735e45f81966926b838463/1747727632447/NCT%20rapport_%202025_ENG_Accessible.pdf.

26 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; Odbor bezpečnostní politiky (OBP) [Czech Security Policy Department], *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudiced Hatred in the Czech Republic in 2024]* (28 May 2025), <https://mv.gov.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocní-zpravy-o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx>; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025*; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

27 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

28 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

29 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]*.

Jihadi Terrorism

Jihadi terrorism remains the most cited and prioritised terrorist threat across the whole of the EU.³⁰ The jihadi threat is still driven by both organised groups such as the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda, and their affiliates, and increasingly by self-radicalised individuals. Lone actors are seen as the key source of terrorist threat in several EU MS.³¹ Even though a number of actors are “self-radicalised”, most reports indicate this usually happens under the (online) influence of established terrorist organisations, “influencer” preachers,³² or while interacting with other radicalised individuals on social media platforms.³³ TikTok is at times considered a key platform for these activities.³⁴

The radicalising effect of such content is evident in several recent cases, such as the knife attack at City Festival Solingen (Germany) in August 2024 and the knife attack in Villach (Austria) in February 2025, involving minor and/or younger perpetrators. Videos from these Salafi preachers were reportedly found on their mobile phones. In fact, in some cases, the comment sections of these channels have functioned as radicalisation hubs where likeminded individuals connected and subsequently formed group chats on more encrypted platforms such as Telegram, where they discussed extremist and terrorist content more openly and plotted attacks.³⁵

In this context dominated by lone actors radicalised online, terrorist groups remain nonetheless relevant. They are still in contact with newcomers,³⁶ and play a part in inspiring, guiding, and supporting potential perpetrators in the West.³⁷ In March 2025, three men were arrested by the Spanish Guardia Civil for allegedly researching “self-indoctrination and self-training” materials from various jihadi groups. They also carried out physical training and sometimes wore clothing like balaclavas or combat vests to make videos which they “distributed to third parties”.³⁸ Later in May, the Italian police in Perugia and local prosecutor’s office arrested a 24-year-old for self-training and found thousands of files and manuals on the construction of weapons, explosive devices, and production of gunpowder in his home.³⁹ Finally, in July, Italian police found dozens of social media accounts belonging to a 16-year-old teenager from Iran, who dubbed himself the “nightmares of skyscrapers”, glorified 9/11, shared IS manuals and filmed a pledge of allegiance, and urged attacks on “infidels” in Italy.⁴⁰

30 There exist, however, variations as to how this threat is reported as some countries base their perception of the threat on Europe as a whole rather than on their country itself, or mention jihadism while acknowledging it does not constitute a particularly great threat domestically. This is especially the case in Central-Eastern European countries like Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, or Romania or in Croatia, in Finland; and in Ireland. DANS, *Godish-nijak doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The annual activity report for 2024]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; SOA, *Javno Izvešće 2025*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Public Report 2025; OBP, *Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hatred in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2024*]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment* (April 2025), <https://www.amlcompliance.ie/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Terrorist-Financing-Risk-Assessment.pdf>; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024].

31 See more in the Cross-Cutting Issues section.

32 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

33 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SOA, *Javno Izvešće 2025*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Public Report 2025; OBP, *Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hatred in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2024*]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

34 Stockhammer, N. (2025, July). *From TikTok to terrorism? The online radicalization of European lone attackers since October 7, 2023*. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-tiktok-to-terrorism-the-online-radicalization-of-european-lone-attackers-since-octo-ber-7-2023/>

35 Stockhammer, N. (2025, July). *From TikTok to terrorism? The online radicalization of European lone attackers since October 7, 2023*. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-tiktok-to-terrorism-the-online-radicalization-of-european-lone-attackers-since-octo-ber-7-2023/>

36 AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

37 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025].

38 Trelinski, Alex, “Three alleged jihadists arrested for posing national security threat in Spain”, *The Olive Press*, 28 March 2025, <https://www.theolive-press.es/spain-news/2025/03/28/three-alleged-jihadists-arrested-for-posing-national-security-threat-in-spain/>.

39 Agenzia Nova, “Terrorism: Self-training and jihadist propaganda, a 24-year-old arrested in Perugia”, 26 May 2025, <https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/terrorism-self-training-and-jihadist-propaganda-24-year-old-arrested-in-perugia/>.

40 LaPresse, “Milan: 16-year-old arrested for propaganda and training for terrorism”, 13 July 2025, <https://uk.lapresse.it/news-en/2025/07/13/milan-16-year-old-arrested-for-propaganda-and-training-for-terrorism/>.

Germany observed in its Constitutional Protection Report that many of the teenagers targeted by jihadi recruiters “are often barely aware of [the Islamic State’s] heyday between 2013 and 2017” due to their young age, thus making it more likely for them to fall for misinformation and propaganda.⁴¹ Correspondingly, Denmark and Luxembourg note a resurgence in the use of old propaganda materials from the 2010s.⁴²

The threat from the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP) continues to be noted by intelligence services.⁴³ ISKP is seen as a key actor in propaganda and facilitation targeting Europe,⁴⁴ with Italy explicitly referencing its multilingual outreach and increases in recruitment among Central Asian and Caucasian individuals – either already in the EU or whose entry is less surveilled.⁴⁵ Moreover, ISKP has emerged as the main organised jihadi threat due to its strong projection capability⁴⁶ and capacity to support and coordinate attacks in Europe.⁴⁷ In September 2025, two men of Turkish origin were arrested during a festival in Italy after police discovered they had a detailed plan to open fire on festivalgoers and had equipped their rented room with a machine gun and pistols.⁴⁸ Upon investigation, authorities discovered possible ties to ISKP. In November, another man from Afghanistan was arrested and charged for suspected links to ISKP, this time in France.⁴⁹

While after the military defeat of IS, attention to foreign fighters’ became less prominent, it rose again following the regime change in Syria and the growing instability surrounding the camps and prisons, which resulted in the transfer of thousands of fighters to Iraq and the closing of al-Hol camp in early 2026.

In the recent years, European security authorities have observed a renewed increase in attempted travel to conflict zones. For instance, Spanish authorities have warned of a potential reactivation of the FTFs phenomenon.⁵⁰ Travel destinations have primarily involved countries in Africa, especially ISIS affiliates in Mozambique (ISIS-M)⁵¹ and Somalia (ISIS-S),⁵² and to a lesser extent the Afghanistan-based ISKP. Although IS was largely militarily defeated in Syria, it has still underground networks there and as such a limited number of cases have also involved individuals attempting to travel to Syria.⁵³

41 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*, 205.

42 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d’activités 2024 [Activity report]*.

43 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell’Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d’activités 2024 [2024 Activity Report]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [National Security Annual Report 2024]*.

44 Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d’activités 2024 [2024 Activity Report]*.

45 SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*.

46 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell’Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*.

47 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*.

48 D’Amato, Alessandro, “Viterbo, l’attentato sventato durante la festa di Santa Rosa: «Due turchi pronti a sparare con mitra e pistole». Spunta la pista del traffico d’armi” [Viterbo, the foiled attack during the Santa Rosa festival: “Two Turks ready to shoot with machine guns and pistols”. Check the arms traffic track], *Open*, 4 September 2025, <https://www.open.online/2025/09/04/viterbo-festa-santa-rosa-attentato-turchi-mitra/#c4rq2h2iopljwmds-vpoxpv999146fce>.

49 Le Monde, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “France arrests Afghan with suspected links to Islamic State offshoot”, 1 November 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2025/11/01/france-arrests-afghan-with-suspected-links-to-islamic-state-offshoot_6746996_7.html.

50 Departamento de Seguridad Nacional. (2024). *Informe anual de seguridad nacional 2024 [National Security Annual Report 2024]* [PDF]. Ministerio de la Presidencia, Gobierno de España. <https://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/default/files/2025-05/IASN2024%20ACCESIBLE.pdf>

51 BFMTV. (2024, July 13). Paris: quatre mineurs et un majeur, suspectés de projets terroristes, mis en examen. https://www.bfmtv.com/paris/info-bfmtv-paris-quatre-mineurs-et-un-majeur-suspectes-de-projets-terroristes-mis-en-examen_AN-202407130304.html

52 NL Times. (2024, August 26). *Terrorism suspect’s “jihadist ideology” a possible motive in Utrecht cemetery vandalism*. <https://nltimes.nl/2024/08/26/terrorism-suspects-jihadist-ideology-possible-motive-utrecht-cemetery-vandalism>

53 Kaya, S. (2026, January 16). *Islamischer Staat: Mutmaßliche Terrorpläne in Deutschland – Spezialkräfte stoppen zwei Männer am Flughafen [Islamic State: Suspected terror plans in Germany – Special forces stop two men at the airport]*. WELT. <https://www.welt.de/investigativ/article6969fae86b-40895ba7f6fa49/islamischer-staat-mutmassliche-terrorplaene-in-deutschland-spezialkraefte-stoppen-zwei-maenner-am-flughafen.html>

In most recent cases, individuals sought to join jihadist terrorist organisations either to participate in fighting abroad⁵⁴ or to get combat/explosives training,⁵⁵ possibly in order to later carry out attacks in their countries of origin. In some instances, individuals also planned to first commit an attack in Europe before subsequently attempting to flee abroad.⁵⁶

Prison radicalisation and recidivist attacks by released convicts continue to be monitored as risk multipliers.⁵⁷ In February 2025, a man killed one person and injured at least three in the city of Mulhouse, France.⁵⁸ Despite being already known to the police, registered for the prevention of terrorism following a previous imprisonment, and officially obligated to leave the French territory, the Algerian attacker had stayed in the country under house arrest.⁵⁹ Related to this, four EU MS highlighted incoming risks caused by the repatriation of radicalised IS supporters from conflict zones.⁶⁰

Finally, throughout 2025, the Gaza war stayed on top of the jihadi agenda to motivate radicalisation and violent actions.⁶¹ Italy reports that “more than half of the [jihadi] attacks [in Europe] in 2024 were explicitly linked to the conflict in the Gaza Strip – in posthumous claims by Daesh or pledges of allegiance by the attacker”.⁶² In March 2025, Spanish police arrested a man who was planning to travel to Palestine and join the Al Qassam Brigades – considered the armed wing of Hamas – to wage defensive jihad in the Gaza Strip.⁶³

Right-Wing Extremism

Overall, the threat from RWE remains persistent and serious according to Central and Northern European MS.⁶⁴ Eighteen countries mention RWE in their reports, and almost half of the reporting countries - 10 out of 23⁶⁵ - assess RWE as an increasing or ongoing threat. Some have stood by this assessment for years, e.g. Austria and Germany.⁶⁶

Widespread motivations for RWE violence include nationalism, racism, accelerationism, antisemitism, opposition to immigration, distrust in the state and the system, on top of a large role played by conspiracy theories and disinformation. For example, in June 2025, French prosecutors opened a

54 Kaya, S. (2026, January 16). *Islamischer Staat: Mutmaßliche Terrorpläne in Deutschland – Spezialkräfte stoppen zwei Männer am Flughafen* [Islamic State: Suspected terror plans in Germany – Special forces stop two men at the airport]. WELT.

55 Spilcker, A. (2024, June 9). *Islamist wollte als Ordner zur EM – so kam die Polizei auf seine Spur*. FOCUS Online. https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/ermittler-finden-belastendes-material-islamist-wollte-als-ordner-zur-em-so-kam-die-polizei-auf-seine-spur_id_260020012.html

56 Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof. (2025, August 20). *Anklage gegen einen mutmaßlichen Unterstützer der ausländischen terroristischen Vereinigung „Islamischer Staat“ erhoben*. <https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/Pressemitteilung-vom-20-08-2025.html>

57 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

58 Groyer, Flavien, and Rachel Noël, “Victime, suspect, enquête : ce que l’on sait de l’attaque au couteau de Mulhouse qui a fait un mort” [Victim, suspect, investigation: what we know about the Mulhouse knife attack that killed one person], *France Bleu*, 22 February 2025, <https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/victime-suspect-fiche-enquete-ce-que-l-on-sait-de-l-attentat-au-couteau-de-mulhouse-qui-a-fait-un-mort-9290675>.

59 Groyer, and Noël, “Victime, suspect, enquête : ce que l’on sait de l’attaque au couteau de Mulhouse qui a fait un mort” [Victim, suspect, investigation: what we know about the knife attack in Mulhouse that left one dead].

60 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024].

61 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

62 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025], 10.

63 ARA, “A radicalized young man who wanted to join Hamas’s armed wing to fight against Israel was arrested in El Prat”, 2 April 2025, https://en.ara.cat/society/radicalized-man-who-wanted-to-go-to-palestine-to-fight-was-arrested-at-prat-airport_1_5335666.html.

64 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*.

65 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [National Security Annual Report 2024].

66 See e.g.: DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

terrorism investigation after a man allegedly shot dead his Tunisian neighbour, with the investigation revealing that the suspect had posted racist videos online in the past.⁶⁷ This classification as a potential terrorist act was especially significant as it marked the first time an apparently racist murder was investigated for connections to right-wing terrorism in France, and came less than two months after a Malian man was stabbed to death inside a mosque in the south of the country.⁶⁸ Certain countries have also started highlighting the growing place of misogyny and incel thinking, pro-Russian sentiments, paramilitary groups, and of so-called “paedophile hunters” within the far-right spectrum.⁶⁹

As German authorities noted back in 2023,⁷⁰ RWE now includes a range of informal constellations linking more traditional national conservative (“Old Right”) narratives to newer, more diverse and loosely structured movements.⁷¹ Linkages to established right-wing organisations have further legitimised contemporary RWE discourse within some parts of the population. RWE has notably increased its threat level through consistent and physical mobilisation and networking, namely by organising events such as concerts⁷² and engaging in Active Clubs and combat sports tournaments⁷³ locally or transnationally. In June 2025, Swedish security services warned that far-right *aktivklubbar* martial arts gyms, which exist in almost every region of the country, were luring children and teenagers into violent extremism.⁷⁴ These clubs were especially seeded by extremists from outside Sweden.⁷⁵ Later in August, in the Netherlands, a member of Dutch active club *Geuzenbond* was arrested on suspicion of preparing a RWE crime, as he possessed weapons and had manufactured gun components and ammunition.⁷⁶

Similar to jihadi terrorism, RWE is increasingly resorting to social media and messaging platforms to mainstream its thinking, recruit, radicalise, and communicate with followers. Online extremists typically use code words, slogans, memes or encrypt their content to bypass content regulation and prosecution.⁷⁷ Likewise, young, lone individuals make up a growing part of RWE actors radicalised virtually.⁷⁸ In February 2025, a 15-year-old boy was arrested in Italy for allegedly belonging to a neo-Nazi supremacist and satanist group. According to investigators, the boy was very active on Telegram and might have been part of a plot targeting “vulnerable populations” (e.g., homeless people, migrants), whose footage would have been published on a Russia dark web site.

67 Chrisafis, Angélique, “France opens terror case after Tunisian hairdresser shot dead in ‘racist act’”, The Guardian, 3 June 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/03/france-terrorism-investigation-tunisian-hairdresser-shot-dead-alleged-racist-act-hichem-miraoui>.

68 Chrisafis, “France opens terror case after Tunisian hairdresser shot dead in ‘racist act’”.

69 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d’activités 2024 [2024 Activity Report]*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

70 Winkelmuller-Real, Rekawek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

71 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d’activités 2024 [2024 Activity Report]*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*.

72 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]*.

73 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

74 Sveriges Radio [Radio Sweden], “Säpo varnar för rekrytering till högerextrema kampsportsklubbar” [Säpo warns against recruitment to far-right martial arts clubs], 12 June 2025, <https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/sapo-varnar-for-rekrytering-till-hogerextrema-kampsportsklubbar>.

75 Sveriges Radio, “Säpo varnar för rekrytering till högerextrema kampsportsklubbar” [“Säpo warns of recruitment to right-wing extremist martial arts clubs”].

76 Openbaar Ministerie (OM) [Netherlands’ Public Prosecution Office], “Verdachte van rechts-terroristisch geweld aangehouden” [Suspect of right-wing terrorist violence arrested], 15 August 2025, <https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/08/15/verdachte-van-rechts-terroristisch-geweld-aangehouden>.

77 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*. See also: National Coordinator for Security and Counter-terrorism. (2024, May). *Memes as an online weapon: An analysis of the use of memes by the far right* [Report]. Ministry of Justice and Security, Netherlands. https://english.nctv.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2024/08/01/far-right-memes-undermining-and-far-from-recognizable/NCTV_Memes+as+an+online+weapon_English+version+May+2024.pdf

78 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*.

Though Germany is the only country providing detailed statistics on targets in its 2025 report, similar target selection pattern – attacking vulnerable populations such as minorities – is found in other EU MS. In January 2025, a 14-year-old boy was arrested in Belgium for allegedly planning to carry out an attack on a mosque.⁷⁹ Police seized weapons at the suspect's home, and noted the suspect was “said to be a member of a far-right group”.⁸⁰ In September, members of far-right group Action des Forces Opérationnelles (AFO, Action of Operational Forces) were found guilty by a Paris court for terrorism conspiracy targeting Muslim individuals and places of worship.⁸¹ They also reportedly facilitated military-style training camps.⁸²

A few Eastern European states⁸³ still consider the threat of violence by the far-right as “marginal” or online-centric, though still monitoring it. Still, one key challenge highlighted by the Netherlands is the difficulty for authorities to determine whether members of RWE online communities are actually prepared to commit acts of terrorist violence themselves, as opposed to “merely” expressing support.⁸⁴

Left-Wing Extremism

Most EU MS monitor LWE, although not with the same sense of urgency as with jihadi or far-right threats. In general, LWE remains at the bottom of the priority list in terms of security, and only five countries perceive it to be somewhat threatening (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Malta),⁸⁵ which matches expert opinions collected in last year's survey.⁸⁶ For instance, though they do mention LWE, Croatian authorities dismiss its threat “due to [left-wing extremists and anarchists'] small numbers, disorganisation and weak public support”.⁸⁷ This contrasts with the US approach, which has made left-wing terrorism one of its top counter-terrorism priorities.

Some of the key ideological movements occurring in European LWE include communism, anarchism, anti-fascism, climate activism, anti-imperialism, and to some degree anti-Zionism – sometimes verging on antisemitism. Extremists typically also express solidarity with transnational communities such as Kurdish activists and alleged political prisoners,⁸⁸ and some countries argue that climate activism is partly infiltrated, or instrumentalised by LWE to enlarge their ranks.⁸⁹

Last year's *In Their Eyes* report underlined the fragmentation of militant far-left groups across a variety of causes and movements.⁹⁰ However, the humanitarian situation in Gaza has been a particularly catalysing element for LWE, enabling its various – and sometimes opposing – subgroups to unite around a pro-Palestinian agenda and convincing part of the population of the urgent need for action,

79 Deutsche Welle, “Belgium: Teen arrested over alleged plan to attack mosque”, 23 January 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/belgium-teen-arrested-over-alleged-plan-to-attack-mosque/a-71392149>.

80 Deutsche Welle, “Belgium: Teen arrested over alleged plan to attack mosque”.

81 France Info, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “Six membres du groupe d'ultradroite AFO condamnés à deux ans de prison ferme pour avoir préparé des actes visant des musulmans” [Six members of the ultra-right group AFO sentenced to two years in prison for preparing acts targeting Muslims], 30 September 2025, https://www.franceinfo.fr/faits-divers/justice-proces/six-membres-du-groupe-d-ultradroite-afo-condamnes-a-deux-ans-de-prison-ferme-pour-avoir-prepare-des-actes-visant-des-musulmans_7523275.html.

82 France Info, and AFP, “Six membres du groupe d'ultradroite AFO condamnés à deux ans de prison ferme pour avoir préparé des actes visant des musulmans” (Six members of the far-right group AFO sentenced to two years in prison for planning acts targeting Muslims).

83 DANS, *GodišniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* (The Annual Activity Report 2024); SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* (Public Report 2025); OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* (Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024); KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* (Activity Report 2024).

84 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

85 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* (Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024); CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* (Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025); BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* (Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024); Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee].

86 Winkelmuller-Real, Rekawek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

87 SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025].

88 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; DANS, *GodišniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* (The Annual Activity Report 2024); OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025].

89 German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*.

90 Winkelmuller-Real, Rekawek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

thereby legitimising resorts to violence.⁹¹ Nine of the fourteen countries mentioning LWE do so while noting the impact of the conflict between Israel and Hamas on LWE.⁹²

LWE continuously manifested itself not only through lawful protests, counterprotests, and doxxing, but also through vandalism and with isolated acts of violence on the margins. Targets encompass political opponents, businesses, and infrastructure, with little to no fatalities. Three attacks in 2025 especially illustrate this mode of action. In April, far-left terrorist group *Epanastatikós Agónas* (EA, Revolutionary Class Struggle) bombed the offices of Hellenic Train and the Greek Ministry of Labor, causing property damage but no injuries.⁹³ In May, German group *Vulkangruppe* committed an arson attack on a power pole, causing a blackout in Tesla's Gigafactory and surrounding areas.⁹⁴ The same month, an anonymous anarchist group claimed responsibility for coordinated arson sabotage on an electrical sub-station and a power-pylon in the south of France, cutting power to 160,000 homes and briefly disrupting the Cannes Film Festival.⁹⁵

Overall, lone-actor acts are less common in LWE than in other terrorism types.⁹⁶ LWE actors still tend to operate in clusters or small groups⁹⁷ in order to predominantly intimidate political opponents and suppress unwanted or undesired, from their point of view, political opinions or views.⁹⁸

“Other” Types of Terrorism or Extremism

Extremism against the state, government, and the system in general is a key fourth type of extremism now found across several terrorist threat assessments in the EU. In this report, it is referred as anti-government extremism (AGE) and encompasses the variety of labels used by EU states (“heterodox” in Austria; “anti-establishment” in Belgium; “anti-system” in Czechia and Spain; “anti-authority” or “sovereign” in Denmark; “self-governing”, *Reichsbürger* or “anti-constitutional delegitimization of the state” in Germany; “anti-institutional” or “sovereign” in the Netherlands). More information on the general phenomenon is available in previous ICCT publications, as well as in last year's report.⁹⁹

Eight countries (out of the 23 EU MS whose reports are included in this analysis) are now reporting on the issue.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, more information on the level of AGE threat is also made available. According to reports, Germany hosts the largest AGE scene in Europe, followed by Austria.¹⁰¹ Though precise data on their number is scarce, the German Ministry of the Interior estimates that between

91 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025].

92 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodišnjiJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Před-sudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Law on Extremism and Prejudicial Hatred in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSL, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024].

93 van Koningsveld, Akiva, “Greek terrorist group dedicates bombings to Palestinian ‘resistance’”, *Jewish News Syndicate (JNS)*, 14 April 2025, <https://www.jns.org/greek-terrorist-group-dedicates-bombings-to-palestinian-resistance/>.

94 Speck, Yasser, “Brandanschlag in Brandenburg: Wer ist die ‘Vulkangruppe’?” [Fire attack in Brandenburg: Who is the “Vulcano Group”?], *RBB24*, 3 May 2025, <https://www.rbb24.de/panorama/beitrag/2024/03/vulkangruppe-sabotage-brandanschlag-tesla-gigafactory-berlin-brandenburg-linksex-tremismus.html>.

95 AP News, “Suspected arson causes a second major power outage in south of France”, 25 May 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/power-outage-nice-france-87f2b5a33e871096654e486d52a0a61d>.

96 Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*.

97 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025].

98 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

99 See: Molas, Bärbara, Anne Craanen, Sabrina Tripodi, Kacper Rekawek, and Thomas Renard, *Anti-Government Threats and their Transnational Connections*, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT Report, 2024), <https://icct.nl/publication/anti-government-threats-and-their-transnational-connections>. Rekawek, K., Renard, T., Lanchès, J., Zotova, M., Hartgers, M., Finnsjö, M., Bolpagni, A., Lombardi, M., Lucini, S. R., & Ware, J. (2026, March 10). *Recent developments of anti-government threats: Online activities and transnational connections*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), <https://icct.nl/publication/recent-developments-anti-government-threats-online-activities-and-transnational>. Winkelmüller-Real, Rekawek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

100 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Před-sudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; AIJD, *Annual Report 2024*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [National Security Annual Report 2024].

101 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

10 and 17 percent of AGE individuals (out of estimated 25,000) present a potential for violence – depending on whether one belongs to the *Reichsbürger* and “self-governing” groups or to the broader delegitimisation spectrum.¹⁰² In Belgium, AGE accounts for less than 3 percent of the total individuals listed by the national fusion centre (CUTA). For the sake of comparison, RWE individuals are estimated to amount for about 8 percent of the threat, and LWE about 3 percent in Belgium¹⁰³

Several EU MS report a decline in AGE threat, namely in relation to a decline in levels of activity and criminal offences since the Covid-19 pandemic.¹⁰⁴ Still, investigations, arrests, and house searches were maintained.¹⁰⁵ Despite a numerical decline offline, 2024 marked the first time eight AGE followers were prosecuted for terrorist offences in the Netherlands, namely for carrying out citizens’ arrests, possessing weapons, and planning violent confrontations.¹⁰⁶ One individual also used violence motivated by AGE thoughts in 2024.¹⁰⁷ In 2025, a German court jailed five members of terrorist organisation *Vereinte Patrioten* (United Patriots, linked to the *Reichsbürger* movement) for plotting to overthrow the country’s government and planning to use explosives and carry out attacks on its power grid.¹⁰⁸ In January 2025, a 40-year-old man in France who identified with the anti-government sovereign citizen movement was charged with multiple terrorism-related offenses after police found weapons, explosives, and other evidence allegedly linking him to plans involving explosive devices during a traffic stop and subsequent searches. His partner was also charged with terrorism-related offenses but released under judicial supervision, while he was remanded in custody pending further investigation.¹⁰⁹ In November 2025, a German man with alleged neo-Nazi ties was arrested on suspicion of operating a darknet platform that published the personal details of politicians and public figures while soliciting cryptocurrency donations as “bounties” for their assassination.¹¹⁰

It is difficult to predict how the AGE threat will evolve, even in the short term, but two elements might help with its resurgence. AGE movements have started frequently exploiting and even reinterpreting protests and news events for their own purposes.¹¹¹ Most importantly, engagement with RWE groups seem to be on the rise recently, which might lead either to a growth of AGE or to its further assimilation into the RWE galaxy.¹¹²

Three other secondary threat types are also acknowledged by some reporting MS. First of all, last year’s *In Their Eyes* report noted the fact recruits of different forms of extremism seem increasingly driven by anger and a “fascination for violence”,¹¹³ increasingly labelled nihilistic violent extremism (NVE) within Europe. Some of the more well-known violent networks include No Lives Matter (NLM),¹¹⁴ MKY (Man’jaki: kul’t ubijstva, Maniac Murder Cult),¹¹⁵ and 764.¹¹⁶ This phenomenon was further documented in 2025, especially in reports from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.¹¹⁷ All four MS report the emergence of this new online scene revolving around the glorification of mass shooters and the dissemination of gruesome content, where members spread memes, share manifestos and

102 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*, 122 and 137.

103 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*, <https://cuta.belgium.be/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Annual-report-2024.pdf>, p. 26.

104 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

105 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

106 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

107 AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

108 Guilbert, Kieran, “Five jailed in Germany for far-right plot to overthrow the government”, *Euronews*, AP, 6 March 2025, <https://www.euronews.com/2025/03/06/five-jailed-in-germany-for-far-right-plot-to-overthrow-the-government>.

109 Le Parisien. (2025, January 13). *Explosifs, recette du TATP et refus de l'autorité d'État : un « être souverain » mis en examen pour terrorisme*. <https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/explosifs-recette-du-tatp-et-refus-de-lautorite-detat-un-etre-souverain-mis-en-examen-pour-terrorisme-13-01-2025-L4B5L4ARL5GA7A4PTBKIDKYXQU.php>

110 Cole, D. (2025, November 11). *German man with alleged neo-Nazi links arrested over darknet assassination calls*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/11/german-man-with-alleged-neo-nazi-links-arrested-over-darknet-assassination-calls>

111 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

112 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

113 Winkelmüller-Real, Rekaewek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

114 Dortkardesler, Stålborg, and Alec Magnus, *No Future, Only Violence: Unpacking the Propaganda of No Lives Matter (NLM) and 764* (2025), <https://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1979977/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

115 Argentino, Marc-André, Barrett Gay, and Matt Bastin, *Nihilism and Terror: How M.K.Y. Is Redefining Terrorism, Recruitment, and Mass Violence*, CTC Sentinel 17:8 (2024), <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/nihilism-and-terror-how-m-k-y-is-redefining-terrorism-recruitment-and-mass-violence/>.

116 ADL Center on Extremism, 764 (2025), <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/764>.

117 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

their brutal fantasies of violence with the goal of inspiring copycats and even exceed the number of fatalities of their predecessors. In June 2025, Polish authorities detailed a 19-year-old man who was fascinated by actions of mass-killers like neo-Nazi Anders Breivik and was suspected of planning an attack of his own.¹¹⁸ According to investigations, the suspect, along with two other men arrested earlier, was gathering pyrotechnic materials, had been collecting information on firearms handling, shooting postures, and combat operations.¹¹⁹ A statement by Polish news agency Onet indicated that the men did not belong to any terrorist organisation per se, but were rather “simply fascinated by the ideology of violence”.¹²⁰

In July, Belgium placed two men under surveillance after the FBI and Europol flagged them as local nodes of the 764 network.¹²¹ The two individuals in their mid-20s allegedly shared kidnap manuals, child-abuse fantasies and “live-sacrifice” plans in encrypted chats.¹²² In August, another man in his twenties linked to 764 was charged and jailed in France after investigators uncovered child pornographic files, evidence of forcing about 50 underage girls to mutilate themselves via webcam, and photos of animals he had decapitated.¹²³

To some degree, this “gore scene” overlaps with accelerationist RWE which strives for social collapse. Yet, this threat does not always clearly align with formal ideologies, and often draws inspiration from a combination of them, for example by sharing beheading videos from IS or communicating about school shootings.¹²⁴ As with AGE, there is a risk RWE channels capitalise on their desire for violence in order to recruit them.¹²⁵

Finally, the threat coming from incels (involuntary celibate) or misogyny-driven individuals is noted by Belgian, Danish, German, and Swedish security services.¹²⁶ While still on the fringe and very minor on its own,¹²⁷ it has some degree of influence within AGE and gore scenes,¹²⁸ and sometimes finds its place within RWE circles.¹²⁹ In the past year, the incel threat was especially in the spotlight in France. In February 2025, a 17-year-old individual broadcast a live video on TikTok, where he threatened to attack women with a knife and police officers who came against him.¹³⁰ Following the opening of an investigation for direct provocation of an act of terrorism committed by means of a telecommunications service, it was revealed that the teenager was close to the incel movement.¹³¹ July 2025 marked France’s first case of a terror plot linked to the incel movement, when an 18-year-old man suspected of planning attacks on women was arrested with two knives in his bag.¹³² According to one of the sources close to the case, he was a fan of misogynistic videos on social media platforms, particularly

118 Reuters, “Poland detains man suspected of planning terrorist attack”, 12 June 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-detains-19-year-old-man-suspected-planning-terrorist-attack-interior-2025-06-12/>.

119 Reuters, “Poland detains man suspected of planning terrorist attack”.

120 Harper, Jo, “Poland charges 3 men suspected of planning terrorist acts”, Anadolu Agency (AA), 12 June 2025, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/poland-charges-3-men-suspected-of-planning-terrorist-acts/3595371>.

121 The Brussels Times with Belga, “Belgium monitoring two members of satanic neo-Nazi terror network”, 16 July 2025, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/1665869/belgium-monitoring-tbttb>.

122 The Brussels Times with Belga, “Belgium monitoring two members of satanic neo-Nazi terror network”.

123 Tendance Ouest, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “Eure. Un jeune membre d’un réseau néonazi mis en examen pour crimes pédopornographiques, animaux décapités et cruauté” [Eure. A young member of a neo-Nazi network indicted for child pornography crimes, decapitated animals and cruelty], 22 August 2025, <https://www.tendanceouest.com/actualite-431488-eure-un-jeune-membre-d-un-reseau-neonazi-mis-en-examen-pour-crimes-pedopornographiques-animaux-decapites-et-cruaute>.

124 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

125 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

126 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

127 About 0.5 percent of the ideological threat in Belgium. CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*, p. 26.

128 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

129 Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d’activités 2024 [2024 Activity Report]*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

130 Mériot, Joane, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “Un gendarme ouvre le feu sur un adolescent muni d’un couteau, il menaçait de s’en prendre à des femmes dans une vidéo publiée en ligne” [A gendarme opens fire on a teenager with a knife, he threatened to attack women in a video posted online], France Info, 16 February 2025, <https://france3-regions.franceinfo.fr/auvergne-rhone-alpes/haute-savoie/annecy/un-gendarme-ouvre-le-feu-sur-un-adolescent-de-17-ans-qui-les-menacait-avec-un-couteau-3108883.html>.

131 Mériot, and AFP, “Un gendarme ouvre le feu sur un adolescent muni d’un couteau, il menaçait de s’en prendre à des femmes dans une vidéo publiée en ligne” [A police officer opened fire on a teenager armed with a knife; he had threatened to attack women in a video posted online].

132 Le Monde, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “French prosecutors charge ‘incel’ for plotting attacks on women”, 2 July 2025, https://www.le-monde.fr/en/france/article/2025/07/02/france-charges-teen-for-plotting-attacks-on-women-in-landmark-incel-case_6742956_7.html.

on TikTok.¹³³ This is reportedly the first time the French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office has been called upon to investigate a man who exclusively identifies himself as part of the incel subculture.¹³⁴

Finally, several countries continue to report threats from independentist, separatist, or insurrectionist movements – which were once the dominant threat in Europe. Croatia traditionally monitors Great Serbian extremism, which causes a threat to public safety and local inter-ethnic relations rather than to national security itself.¹³⁵ Some potential link with state interference is also mentioned. Ireland, despite not being a key target of primary terrorism types, remains wary of Republican paramilitary and dissident groups, some of which are continually operationally active and have been responsible for murders and bomb attacks in Northern Ireland,¹³⁶ or threats against local politicians.¹³⁷ Lastly, in Spain, Basque nationalist and separatist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Liberty) is still trying to impose its version of violence and delegitimise the rule of law, despite reducing its activity to media campaigns, protests, and social unrest.¹³⁸

Cross-Cutting Issues

Building on cross-cutting trends identified by the previous *In Their Eyes* report, issues of lone actor violence, youth, and online radicalisation remained key topics in governmental reports in 2025.

More than half of the reporting EU MS (13¹³⁹ out of 23) now mention the importance of lone-actor attacks in the threat landscape, most of whom (10¹⁴⁰) calling it the most likely source of threat along with small local cells. Lone actors were more specifically linked to jihadi terrorism by seven countries¹⁴¹, and to RWE by five.¹⁴² These attackers are typically much quicker to act and use simpler means than organised groups, such as knives, vehicles, and firearms. They also focus on soft, easily accessible locations and targets.¹⁴³ While their lack of resources may result in less complex attacks, lone actors are generally harder to track by security services due to their spontaneous mobilisation.¹⁴⁴ To illustrate, in March 2025, a 17-year-old teenager was arrested for possession of a knife in front of his high school in France. While first placed in custody for “prohibited carrying of a category D weapon”, investigation revealed potential plans for an attack on behalf of IS.¹⁴⁵

133 Le Monde, and AFP, “French prosecutors charge ‘incel’ for plotting attacks on women”.

134 Ibid.

135 SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025].

136 Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*.

137 ITV News, “Police investigate threat made against politicians by masked men in social media video,” <https://www.itv.com/news/utv/2025-12-02/masked-men-with-apparent-firearms-threaten-politicians-in-social-media-video>, 2 December 2025.

138 Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [National Security Annual Report 2024].

139 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The annual activity report for 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Constitutional Protection Report 2024; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; An Garda Síochána, *Annual Security Services Plan 2025*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

140 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

141 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

142 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

143 NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

144 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee].

145 Azais, Barbara, and Sandra Buisson, “À Vesoul, un jeune de 17 ans arrêté pour un projet d’attentat” [In Vesoul, a 17-year-old arrested for a planned attack], *Le Point*, 13 March 2025, https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/a-vesoul-un-jeune-de-17-ans-arrete-pour-un-projet-d-attentat-13-03-2025-2584669_23.php#11%20.

More than three quarters of the reporting countries mention youth radicalisation as a concern in 2025, making it an even greater trend than lone attackers and self-radicalisation.¹⁴⁶ Seven countries especially link it to jihadi terrorism,¹⁴⁷ while only three¹⁴⁸ mention its relation to RWE – although the Netherlands highlights the targeting of children by far-right campaigners handing out QR codes at schools.¹⁴⁹ On average, individuals radicalised at a young age have a more superficial knowledge of the ideology they defend,¹⁵⁰ and are usually pushed to commit more serious offences across time as they fear losing social recognition within the extremist group.¹⁵¹ The trend of youth radicalisation is not merely due to their vulnerability but is also the result of specific targeting by recruiters¹⁵² who sometimes go as far as joining gaming platforms to disseminate propaganda among minors as young as 14 years old.¹⁵³

Closely tied to youth radicalisation is the use of the Internet and social media for terrorist ends. Eighteen of the 23 reporting countries place emphasis on the online realm.¹⁵⁴ Recently, social media has become the main platform for terrorist propaganda, quicker (self-)radicalisation, and recruitment into more “official” groups,¹⁵⁵ including on applications allowing for encrypted messages like Telegram.¹⁵⁶ They allow communication to a larger, transnational audience and facilitate exchange thanks to the anonymity factor.¹⁵⁷ This phenomenon especially appeared in Italian news in 2025. In March, police arrested a man for allegedly training for activities linked to international terrorism, as investigations

146 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

147 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

148 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

149 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

150 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

151 AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*.

152 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [National Security Annual Report 2024].

153 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024].

154 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; Kamrat-Rapprežentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

155 SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Kamrat-Rapprežentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

156 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*.

157 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Working Together Against Extremism Strategy; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

revealed his involvement in closed messaging groups tied to IS and only accessible by invitation.¹⁵⁸ In October, two other men were arrested, one for distributing jihadist content and tutorials on TikTok,¹⁵⁹ and the other for posting over 200 videos and images glorifying IS and providing instructions on the same platform.¹⁶⁰ Authorities highlighted that the high number of followers the latter had on his TikTok profile, combined with the large number of shares and likes, exponentially increased the danger that others could join the jihad or emulate the acts of violence shown.¹⁶¹

Other modern technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) tools are also starting to be used to generate propaganda and fake content.¹⁶² Drones and the 3D-printing of firearms also present avenues for violent extremism.¹⁶³ Despite not being widely used in EU MS so far, some recent incidents highlight the risk to see more occurrences in the future. In June 2025, Portuguese authorities arrested six people linked to far-right group *Movimento Armilar Lusitano* (MAL, Lusitanian Armillary Movement), and seized explosive material and several firearms, some built with 3D printers.¹⁶⁴ In October 2025, the Belgian police allegedly foiled a jihadi assassination plot against the Belgian PM who was meant to be killed with the usage of a drone.¹⁶⁵

Other cross-cutting issues that stand out in the governmental reports include patterns of antisemitism and mentions of personal, mental or psychological motivators. Though half of the reporting countries (11¹⁶⁶ out of 23) point to patterns of antisemitism within the primary terrorism types, antisemitism is mainly attributed to jihadi terrorism (8¹⁶⁷ out of 23) and to RWE (5¹⁶⁸ out of 23). In October 2025, for example, German authorities arrested three jihadi Hamas operatives allegedly preparing a violent assault on Jewish and Israeli institutions in Europe. Police recovered an AK-47 rifle, several pistols, and ammunition in coordinated raids across Berlin and Rotterdam.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, on top of the targeting of sexual minorities and of women, jihadi terrorism but also RWE frequently place targets on Jewish populations and spaces. Antisemitism in LWE is only described by Bulgaria,¹⁷⁰ although the Netherlands underline an intimidation effect of pro-Palestinian agenda on Jewish communities.¹⁷¹

158 Naim, Firdaus, "Italian Authorities Arrest Moroccan National Over Terrorism Allegations", *Morocco World News*, 21 March 2025, <https://www.morocroworldnews.com/2025/03/186425/italian-authorities-arrest-moroccan-national-over-terrorism-allegations/>.

159 Carta, Marco, "Diffondeva video jihadisti su TikTok: arrestato un 31enne per apologia di terrorismo" [He spread jihadist videos on TikTok: a 31-year-old arrested for apology of terrorism], *la Repubblica*, 15 October 2025, https://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2025/10/15/news/jihadismo_latina_tik_tok_arrestato_uomo_tunisino-424914805/.

160 Papadia, Valerio, "Su TikTok pubblica video che inneggiano all'Isis e al terrorismo: 33enne arrestato in provincia di Salerno" [On TikTok, he publishes videos that praise ISIS and terrorism: 33-year-old arrested in the province of Salerno], *Fanpage*, 21 October 2025, <https://www.fanpage.it/napoli/su-tiktok-pubblica-video-che-inneggiano-all-isis-e-al-terrorismo-33enne-arrestato-in-provincia-di-salerno/>.

161 Papadia, "Su TikTok pubblica video che inneggiano all'Isis e al terrorismo: 33enne arrestato in provincia di Salerno" [A 33-year-old man posted videos on TikTok praising ISIS and terrorism was arrested in the province of Salerno].

162 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

163 NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

164 Blackburn, Gavin, AP, "Portugal arrests six people linked to far-right group and seizes cache of explosives and weapons", *Euronews*, 17 June 2025, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/17/portugal-arrests-six-people-linked-to-far-right-group-and-seizes-cache-of-explosives-and-w>.

165 Jessica Rawnsley, "Suspected jihadist drone plot against Belgian PM foiled," *BBC*, 10 October 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd721zdr4xo>.

166 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

167 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

168 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The annual activity report for 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; Working Together Against Extremism Strategy; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

169 Saltman, Max, Inke Kappeler, and Ibrahim Dahman, "Germany arrests suspected Hamas members accused of procuring weapons to target Jewish or Israeli institutions", 1 October 2025, *CNN World*, <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/01/europe/hamas-germany-arrests-israel-latam-intl>.

170 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024].

171 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

Issues of personal and mental drivers to radicalisation constitute a fifth cross-cutting trend in terrorism reports, with 14 countries mentioning the role of the perpetrator's personal situation such as a poor family background¹⁷² potential social exclusion,¹⁷³ poor or unstable mental health¹⁷⁴ in their extremism across the spectrum. This trend is best exemplified when looking at patterns in recent attacks on the continent. In March 2025, a 40-year-old man went on trial for ploughing his car through a busy pedestrian zone in Mannheim, Germany, killing two and injuring several more. Investigations revealed that the suspect had been convicted in the past for a hate speech comment on Facebook, had attended right-wing gatherings and music events in the past, but also that “he ha[d] been suffering from a mental illness for many years” at the time of the offence.¹⁷⁵ In September 2025, an 18-year-old stabbed a teacher and a student at a high school.¹⁷⁶ As part of the investigation, it was revealed that the young man had been released from psychiatric hospitalisation under duress two months before, was diagnosed with mental imbalance described as being both Islamophobic, an antisemitic racist, and fascinated by mass killings.¹⁷⁷ At the time of this first arrest, the police had found swastikas, bladed weapons, a bulletproof vest and notebooks in which the teenager described his criminal project.¹⁷⁸ In November 2025, a 31-year-old Syrian man who attacked four people on the street in German was subject to psychiatric examination “due to clear mental health indicators”.¹⁷⁹

In their reports on terrorism, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Italy, and Romania explain that ideology has now become secondary in the radicalisation process,¹⁸⁰ especially for young people who often do not have any preliminary connection to a specific agenda.¹⁸¹ Extremism is becoming more fluid, thereby facilitating the emergence of new, diverse opportunities for heterogeneous profiles to connect.¹⁸² This is often referred as the *hybridisation* of ideologies, or *post-ideological* terrorism. Online technologies further allow for high volatility between ideologies and groups¹⁸³ at a time where geopolitics, personal grievances, conspiracies, religion, and personal issues take the upper hand.¹⁸⁴

172 SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; Czech Security Information Service (BIS), *Annual Report for 2024* (10 July 2025), <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2024-vz-aj.pdf>; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*.

173 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

174 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025 [Public Report 2025]*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024 [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

175 Agence France Presse (AFP), “German Man Goes On Trial Over Deadly Mannheim Car-Ramming”, *Barron's*, 31 October 2025, <https://www.barrons.com/news/german-man-goes-on-trial-over-deadly-mannheim-car-ramming-bc21f05e>.

176 Midy, Flora, and Margaux Stive, “Attaque au couteau à Antibes : l'agresseur donnait des signes de radicalisation et avait été signalé à la préfecture” [Knife attack in Antibes: the aggressor showed signs of radicalization and had been reported to the prefecture], *France Bleu*, 11 September 2025, <https://www.francebleu.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/alpes-maritimes-06/antibes/attaque-au-couteau-au-lycee-horticole-d-antibes-l-agresseur-deja-connu-de-la-police-pour-apologie-de-crime-7895446>.

177 Midy, and Stive, “Attaque au couteau à Antibes: l'agresseur donnait des signes de radicalisation et avait été signalé à la préfecture” [Knife attack in Antibes: the attacker showed signs of radicalization and had been reported to the prefecture].

178 Midy, and Stive, “Attaque au couteau à Antibes: l'agresseur donnait des signes de radicalisation et avait été signalé à la préfecture” [Knife attack in Antibes: the attacker showed signs of radicalization and had been reported to the prefecture].

179 Tixio, “Syrer attackiert vier Menschen in Dresden-Mickten” [Syrian attacks four people in Dresden-Mickten], 12 November 2025, <https://www.tixio.de/1059067-syrer-attackiert-vier-menschen-in-dresden-mickten.html>.

180 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; *Raport de Activitate 2024 [Activity Report 2024]*.

181 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024 [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]*.

182 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024 [Activity Report 2024]*.

183 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025 [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]*.

184 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*.

3. National Security Contexts

Terrorist threats and perceptions, as well as CT responses, are shaped by a variety of internal and, perhaps most importantly, external and contextual factors. First, the war between Israel and Hamas – as well as the deteriorating situation in the Gaza strip – continues, and so do its various impacts on European security. Building on the previous *In Their Eyes* report's findings,¹⁸⁵ the conflict remains the central geopolitical trigger of radicalisation and threat, cited by almost every EU MS' security service.¹⁸⁶

Established terrorist groups (e.g., al-Qaeda, IS,¹⁸⁷ and other groups such as the Houthi movement in Yemen¹⁸⁸) have continued referring to unfolding events in Gaza to bolster their propaganda, promote ideological goals, recruit new members,¹⁸⁹ and motivate sympathisers to carry out attacks.¹⁹⁰ This can be seen especially against Israeli and Jewish interests in Europe and worldwide,¹⁹¹ as exemplified by the February 2025 stabbing of a tourist at Berlin's Holocaust Memorial, for which investigations showed the suspect had been planning to kill Jewish people for weeks.¹⁹² However, Danish authorities highlight that, notwithstanding planned action, the conflict also has significant potential for spontaneous violent reactions;¹⁹³ citizens with relatives, friends, colleagues, or other connections who have died or suffered health, property, or other damage in or because of the conflict present particular risks.¹⁹⁴ Still, it is important to note that the impact of the Israel–Hamas conflict was essentially felt in countries with a preexisting jihadi threat, and not as much in Eastern Europe for example.¹⁹⁵

The ongoing war in Gaza has turned into a major emotional trigger of violence in European societies,¹⁹⁶ across various extremist ideologies (right-wing, left-wing, and anti-governmental¹⁹⁷) and fuelling Islamophobic sentiments, anti-imperialism, and conspiracies about the Jewish elites all at once.¹⁹⁸ As mentioned in the Cross-Cutting Issues section of Chapter 2, antisemitic sentiment has spread across the continent and all four primary terrorism types,¹⁹⁹ with increases in hateful – mainly verbal – attacks against Jewish individuals.²⁰⁰ Additionally, anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic sentiments also bloomed during that period, with several violent incidents targeting Muslim individuals and sites,²⁰¹ as described in Chapter 2's section on RWE.

However, intelligence services underline that reactions to the conflict differ between countries. Looking at RWE, on one hand, Germany reports an instrumentalisation of the conflict by the far-right to propagate anti-immigration positions.²⁰² Conversely, the Netherlands report very little attention paid to the conflict among these movements, who view the struggle as distant and between two groups they consider “enemies” – Jews and Muslims.²⁰³ On the other side of the political spectrum, LWE is

185 Winkelmuller-Real, Rekawek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

186 Among countries with security or terrorism-specific reports, only Slovenia did not mention the conflict.

187 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report].

188 NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

189 AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*.

190 Latvian State Security Service (VDD), *Annual Report for 2024*, ISBN 978-9934-9176-5-3 (February 2025), <https://vdd.gov.lv/uploads/materials/40/en/annual-report-2024.pdf>; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

191 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; VDD, *Annual Report for 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

192 Hancock, Sam, “Berlin stabbing suspect planned to kill Jewish people, police believe”, *BBC News*, 22 February 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr72nrzjj5no>.

193 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025].

194 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024].

195 VDD, *Annual Report for 2024*.

196 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*.

197 SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

198 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

199 Jihadi, right-wing, left-wing, and anti-government.

200 SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025].

201 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*.

202 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

203 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

increasingly integrating pro-Palestinian narratives into its movement,²⁰⁴ but no increased willingness to use violence is reported for now.²⁰⁵ Overall, as the war drags on and claims more victims, Islamic radicalisation, global antisemitism, and far-right sentiments are expected to increase.²⁰⁶ But beyond terrorist groups and EU citizens, foreign state actors may also exploit the conflict to underpin their propaganda and further attempt to stir up political sentiment in Europe²⁰⁷ – which is part of Russia's ongoing hybrid war playbook.

The war between Russia and Ukraine was the second-most mentioned conflict among eleven reports published in 2025.²⁰⁸ Yet, its impact on the threat of terrorism to the EU is generally considered low. Russian activities include small-scale cyberattacks, intimidation, or disinformation campaigns.²⁰⁹ Even when one of the reports recognises the rise of the attacks on Ukrainians, it acknowledges that they still remain on a relatively low level.²¹⁰ However, despite little proven direct impact, the war between Russia and Ukraine is indirectly fuelling other threats, namely by facilitating entry of radicalised individuals from Central Asia and the Caucasus region – which is a demographic now readily used in ISKP recruitment – into the Schengen area, using Ukraine as a transit zone and sometimes claiming the refugee status.²¹¹

The war in Eastern Europe is further mentioned with regards to hybrid and state threats, as some countries' actions are now, according to several countries, bordering on state terrorism by their nature and effect.²¹² In its assessment of the terrorist threat, the Danish Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) highlights that:

*Whereas for many years the terrorist threat has been driven by non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist groups and their sympathisers, certain state actors are now once again pursuing strategic goals using methods associated with terrorism. (...) The use of terrorism as a means, possibly carried out by proxies, can be an opportune tool for a state engaged in a protracted so-called hybrid conflict, where the state in question wishes to harm or signal its capacity and reach to an opponent without necessarily escalating the conflict into actual or further military confrontation.*²¹³

204 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025*.

205 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

206 Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee].

207 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

208 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) [French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security], *National Strategic Review 2025* (14 July 2025), https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250713_NP_SGDSN_RNS2025_EN_0.pdf;

German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; Policija, *Letno poročilo o delu policije za leto 2024* [Annual Police Report for 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

209 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*.

210 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024].

211 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025].

212 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*; VDD, *Annual Report for 2024*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

213 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025], 9.

Across reports, Russia remains described as the main source of hybrid state threat,²¹⁴ and is identified as being increasingly aggressive and open in its actions.²¹⁵ The game of state influence and interference encompasses a combination of most – if not all – areas of society, ranging from more traditional areas like defence, finance, intelligence, and the cyberspace to more insidious ones like culture, education, and social relations. Modes of action presenting highest concerns among EU MS include sabotage,²¹⁶ especially via proxy actors,²¹⁷ small-scale cyberattacks²¹⁸ and low intensity orchestrated incidents,²¹⁹ or espionage²²⁰ with the goal of accessing sensitive data²²¹ or weakening critical infrastructure.

Critical infrastructure is a specific concern among 13 of the reporting countries,²²² several of them having entire report sections on the topic and or even dedicating an entire report to the issue in the case of the Netherlands.²²³ Although terrorist and violent extremists can pose a threat to critical infrastructure, disruptive activity in the Netherlands has, until now, only ever originated from foreign states. The 2025 Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) report on the subject names Russia and China as the two key state actors posing a threat to critical infrastructure.²²⁴ Similarly with the aforementioned hybrid strategies, attacks on critical infrastructure encompass sabotage, espionage and pre-positioning, cyber-attacks, disinformation, but also the exploitation of economic pressure and strategic dependencies to exert influence. In November 2025, several incidents on critical infrastructure took place in the EU, such as repeated violations of Lithuanian airspace by Belarusian balloons,²²⁵ and railway sabotage and bombing on the Warsaw–Lublin line in Poland.²²⁶ Despite its consistent denial of accusations, Russia is overwhelmingly seen as the key threat to European critical infrastructure – with Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski openly referring to the Kremlin's actions as “state terrorism”.²²⁷ In May 2025, for example, three Ukrainian nationals were arrested in connection with a Russia-linked parcel bomb plot.²²⁸ In November, Poland charged three other Ukrainian citizens with “terrorist” railway sabotage carried out on behalf of Russian intelligence, blowing out a section of track used by passenger trains and for moving Western military aid to Ukraine.²²⁹ In January 2026, six nationals of Spain, Colombia, Cuba, Russia, and Belarus

214 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; Security Public Report 2025; BIS, *Annual Report for 2024*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*; German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism* (12 June 2025), https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/publikationen/2025/BMI25057-strategie-demokratie-eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; VDD, *Annual Report for 2024*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

215 AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

216 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvešće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

217 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

218 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*.

219 SOA, *Javno Izvešće 2025* [Public Report 2025].

220 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; BIS, *Annual Report for 2024*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024].

221 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

222 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [Annual Report 2024]; SANS, *Annual Activity Report 2024*; BIS, *Annual Report for 2024*; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; Constitutional Protection Report 2024; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), *Critical National Infrastructure Threat Landscape 2025* (14 November 2025), <https://english.nctv.nl/documents/2025/11/14/the-critical-national-infrastructure-threat-landscape>; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

223 NCTV, *Critical National Infrastructure Threat Landscape 2025*.

224 Ibid.

225 Labanauskaitė, Goda, “Belarus balloon incursions cost Lithuania’s airports over €750,000”, *AeroTime*, 2 December 2025, <https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/lithuania-counts-750000-losses-smuggling-balloons>.

226 Nicholls, Catherine, Antonia Mortensen, and Charlotte Reck, “Poland blames Russia after rail track used to transport aid to Ukraine is destroyed by ‘act of sabotage’”, *CNN World*, 18 November 2025, <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/17/europe/poland-train-track-ukraine-aid-sabotage-intl>.

227 Lepiarz, Jacek, “Poland accuses Russia of carrying out state terrorism”, *Deutsche Welle*, 20 November 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-ac-cuses-russia-of-carrying-out-state-terrorism/a-74827889>.

228 Cole, Deborah, “Germany arrests three Ukrainians over alleged Russian parcel bomb plot”, *The Guardian*, 14 May 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/14/germany-arrests-three-ukrainians-over-alleged-russian-parcel-bomb-plot>.

229 Anwer, Ammar, “Poland pursues European Arrest Warrants for suspects in rail sabotage case”, *TVP World*, 1 December 2025, <https://tvpworld.com/90309692/poland-seeks-european-arrest-wants-for-ukrainians-in-rail-sabotage-case>.

were arrested and charged for attempted arson attacks on a plant that supplies radio wave scanners to the Ukrainian army; and attempted arson attacks on a buses, a post office, and a cinema in Czechia, on construction warehouses in Poland, and on oil infrastructure in Romania in 2024.²³⁰ According to Lithuanian authorities, these attempts were all coordinated by Russia's military intelligence, and perpetrators were mainly motivated by money.²³¹

Following last year's findings,²³² in this new threat landscape, "the Kremlin has chosen to prioritise social media campaigns, in the development and dissemination of which the use of AI tools has taken on particular importance",²³³ using disinformation²³⁴ to target public opinion and undermine democracy in Europe.²³⁵ Still, most EU MS have not identified any lasting impact of Russian disinformation in their countries so far²³⁶ and usually base their perception of the threat on incidents in neighbouring countries such as France and Germany,²³⁷ while remaining cautious as the influence game usually plays out in the long term.²³⁸

*Exerting influence is a long-term strategy that manipulates and gradually erodes the confidence of a population. The potential effects may therefore only become apparent gradually, mainly building on pre-existing divisions and crises.*²³⁹

Other state threats to European security are especially focused on the cyber realm,²⁴⁰ and come from China²⁴¹ and Iran in particular.²⁴² China's EU interference especially consists in either supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine, for example by acting as an intermediary and providing it with attack drones, deploying Chinese soldiers (although apparently in private capacity)²⁴³ or in espionage, while Iran has especially been targeting pro-Israeli and pro-Jewish targets in its espionage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and influence strategy²⁴⁴ – although with much less aggressiveness than Russian attacks. In July 2025, a Danish national was arrested on suspicion of spying for Iran by collecting information on Jewish sites and individuals in Berlin, Germany.²⁴⁵ According to prosecutors, the man might have received his orders from Iranian intelligence services in early 2025.²⁴⁶ In March 2026, new group Harakat al-Ashab Al-Yamin al-Islamiyah (HAYI) emerged in Europe, taking responsibility for a series of attacks on synagogues and other Jewish, Israeli, and US targets across Europe. Overall, the group took responsibility for eighteen attacks, although in some of these cases it is hard to prove their involvement. The group had distinct features of an Iranian proxy group. In May 2026, Iraqi national Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi was arrested in Turkey and extradited to the US

230 Reuters, "Lithuania charges multinational gang of Russian-directed sabotage attacks", *Al Jazeera*, 16 January 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/16/lithuania-charges-multinational-gang-of-russian-directed-sabotage-attacks>.

231 Reuters, "Lithuania charges multinational gang of Russian-directed sabotage attacks".

232 Winkelmüller-Real, Rekawek, and Renard, *In Their Eyes: How European Security Services Look at Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*.

233 Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*, 103.

234 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; BIS, *Annual Report for 2024*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

235 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*.

236 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

237 Ibid.

238 CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*.

239 Ibid., 14.

240 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*; An Garda Síochána, *Annual Security Services Plan 2025*.

241 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [Annual activity report 2024]*; BIS, *Annual Report for 2024*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025 [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

242 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*; Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

243 Wong, Tessa(), "Zelensky claims 155 Chinese fighting for Russia in Ukraine," *BBC News*, 10 April 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1twd-d228953o>.

244 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – June 2025 (24 September 2025)*, <https://english.nctv.nl/documents/2025/09/24/terrorist-threat-assessment-for-the-netherlands-june-2025>; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

245 Murray, Miranda, and Stine Jacobsen, "Danish national arrested on allegedly spying on Jewish targets in Berlin for Iran", *Reuters*, 1 July 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-citizen-arrested-suspicion-spying-iran-german-prosecutors-say-2025-07-01/>.

246 Ibid.

in suspicion of coordinating HAYI activities.²⁴⁷ Interestingly, sometimes there is an overlap between the proxy activities of different hostile states. For example, above-mentioned al-Saadi, who acted on behalf of Iran, was also visiting Moscow, possibly participating in a major arms fair in Moscow in 2024 at the official Iranian government stand.²⁴⁸ Countries such as North Korea²⁴⁹ and Belarus²⁵⁰ are also named in some reports, but in much less detail.

The continued instability and conflicts in the broader Middle East and Africa further hamper effective counter-terrorism.²⁵¹ Geopolitical developments and deteriorating situations in these regions allow declining jihadi terrorist groups to regain ground, expand their areas of operation,²⁵² and recruit new members²⁵³ both on site and by potentially attracting militants from the West.²⁵⁴ Syria remains a zone of concern in the Middle East, not least following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Sweden and Denmark report no short-term impact within the EU yet,²⁵⁵ though the latter, along with Finland, notes that this sudden power vacuum will likely enable terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to have greater freedom to operate in the region and grow stronger again.²⁵⁶

As concerns rose, the UN Monitoring Team expanded on the situation in its thirty-sixth report, published in July 2025, highlighting the range of challenges that might develop.²⁵⁷ At the collapse of the Syrian regime, ISIL and al-Qaeda members seized stockpiles of heavy weaponry held by the previous government and released more than 500 detainees from detention facilities.²⁵⁸ Furthermore, ISIL exploited shifting conditions and maintained up to 3,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria, reorganised and redeployed its operatives, expanded covertly into populated areas through small mobile cells, and reinforced smuggling networks to facilitate movement.²⁵⁹ Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Syrian Arab Republic also remained active. Though in January 2025, *Hurras al-Din* (*HaD*, also referred to as al-Qaeda in Syria) announced its dissolution, the group retained approximately 2,000 fighters who were instructed to keep their weapons,²⁶⁰ and several members joined Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, which comprises about 700 fighters and now operates freely, including in urban areas.²⁶¹ Foreign terrorist fighters at large in Syria are thus estimated at more than 5,000,²⁶² some of which were integrated into the interim government unified military structure.²⁶³ Some are also exploring relocation to Afghanistan, Africa, or Yemen under al-Qaeda leadership.²⁶⁴

247 Burke, Jason, "Arrest of Iraqi terror suspect with alleged links to Iran's Quds Force is astonishing but not surprising," *The Guardian*, 16 May 2026., <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/16/mohammad-baqer-saad-dawood-al-saadi-iran-guards-hayi>.

248 Burke, Jason, "Could this one man have been behind terrorist attacks on Jewish communities across Europe?," *The Guardian*, 7 June 2026, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/ng-interactive/2026/jun/07/could-this-one-man-have-been-behind-terrorist-attacks-on-jewish-communities-across-europe>.

249 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024].

250 AOTD, 2025 *National Threat Assessment*.

251 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

252 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024].

253 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024].

254 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025].

255 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

256 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*.

257 United Nations (UN) Security Council, *Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities*, UN Doc. S/2025/482 (24 July 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482>.

258 Ibid., 11.

259 Ibid., 13.

260 Ibid.

261 Ibid.

262 Ibid., 12.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid., 14.

As Syria remains one of the strategic base for both ISIL and al-Qaeda's external operations,²⁶⁵ continued instability in the country, but also in Lebanon,²⁶⁶ Iraq,²⁶⁷ and Iran, risks letting terrorist organisations in the region further strengthen their presence in the Middle East, with possible repercussions on their external projection capacity in Europe.²⁶⁸

Political and security instability on the African continent helps jihadi groups and threats in their gradual expansion, especially in the Sahel region²⁶⁹ and the Horn of Africa,²⁷⁰ which heightens the risk of terrorist threat on the longer term. Several jihadist groups across Africa either control territory or sustain long-running insurgencies. For example, JNIM in Mali has emerged as a highly potent actor and poses a significant threat to state authority, with the group already controlling substantial parts of the country. While JNIM has so far shown little interest in attack plotting beyond its regional focus, al-Qaeda (to which JNIM is affiliated) doctrine at one point inevitably implies transnational ambitions. Should JNIM gain real power, Mali could serve as a training hub for individuals to receive combat training, while JNIM would also gain significant financial and operational resources that could support external attack capabilities. This is especially relevant topic after the coordinated offensive by JNIM and the Tuareg separatist Front de Libération de l'Azawad (FLA) in April 2026.²⁷¹

Similarly, although no Islamic State-affiliated group in Africa currently is comparably strong as JNIM, several IS affiliates have demonstrated ambitions extending beyond their immediate areas of operation. For example, IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has shown indications of interest in facilitating or coordinating activities in Spain. Other affiliates, such as IS-S, have not been directly linked to external attack plotting, but play an important role as financial and logistical hubs within the broader Islamic State network.

Migration, especially of populations coming from war or unstable contexts, is mentioned as a concern by eight countries²⁷² insofar as crisis-driven mobility may be exploited by organised networks to facilitate cross-border movement.²⁷³ France also notes that the current decline of humanitarian funding worldwide – accelerated by the United States' withdrawal from international cooperation – has resulted in greater migration from crisis zones and to its exploitation by international organised crime networks,²⁷⁴ which might then lead to further growth of terrorist groups and possible infiltration into the EU.

Beyond structural vulnerabilities in migration governance, Lithuanian security services anticipate risks associated with processes of radicalisation within established – and growing – Muslim communities in the country.²⁷⁵ According to their report, increasing influx to Muslim communities, the subsequent insufficient space in places of worship, and language barriers may contribute to the formation of closed worship groups, where radicalisation becomes more likely – a pattern reportedly observed in other EU countries.²⁷⁶

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 11.

²⁶⁶ CTA, *Vurdering af terroristruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

²⁶⁷ Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

²⁶⁸ Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025].

²⁶⁹ SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [National Security Annual Report 2024].

²⁷⁰ Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025].

²⁷¹ Jake Lapham, Makuochi Okaforand, Mohamed Ibrahim, "Armed groups launch coordinated attacks across Mali," *BBC*, 26 April 2026, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyx7nnrkqdo>

²⁷² DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; Policija, *Letno poročilo o delu policije za leto 2024* [Annual Police Report for 2024].

²⁷³ SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*.

²⁷⁴ SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*.

²⁷⁵ AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*.

²⁷⁶ AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*.

As illustrated by the aforementioned conflicts, the world is growing more polarised²⁷⁷ and conflict is becoming more open.²⁷⁸ Beyond traditional wars, this state of global polarisation also takes the form of interstate competition – between China and the United States in particular²⁷⁹ – which then results in the disengagement of key states from world security and weakens European collective security frameworks as a result.²⁸⁰

But polarisation does not thrive strictly at the global level. Indeed, international crises quickly spread and place pressure on national governments themselves,²⁸¹ polarising opinions in the broader public²⁸² and sometimes leading to new emerging forms of violent, primarily politically and interest-driven extremism.²⁸³ In particular, German²⁸⁴ and Dutch²⁸⁵ reports highlight that as their societies are shifting to political (right-wing) extremes and gaining support in the ballots, violent action among RWE is simultaneously being normalised, for example with growing instances of violent protests degenerating into attacks on minorities and political opponents. In September 2025, anti-immigration protests turned violent in The Hague, Netherlands.²⁸⁶ On top of attacks against police forces, protestors smashed the windows of the offices of the centre-left D66 party, viewed by many on the far-right as a party that serves a progressive elite.²⁸⁷ At least 30 people were arrested.²⁸⁸

Whereas in the past, individuals refrained from actively expressing extreme views by fear of negative social consequences, they have become less and less reticent in recent years. Due to election victories by far-right and RWE parties in several European countries, extremists now feel more empowered in their thinking and justified in their behaviour. Research has shown that victories of this kind can lead to a rise in hate crimes, as was the case, for example, after the Brexit referendum and after the election of Donald Trump in 2016.²⁸⁹ While no European MS has identified the formation of new local terrorist groups as a result of electoral success, caution is exercised.²⁹⁰

Finally, Bulgarian²⁹¹ and German²⁹² reports acknowledge the potential roles of socio-economic instability, inflation, and global economic and financial crises in radicalisation schemes, as extremists instrumentalise any and all kinds of vulnerabilities in their recruitment.

277 German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*.

278 AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

279 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

280 SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*.

281 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

282 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [The Annual Activity Report 2024]*.

283 Policija, *Letno poročilo o delu policije za leto 2024 [Annual Police Report for 2024]*.

284 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*.

285 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*.

286 Graham, Chris, “Dutch police clash with anti-immigration protesters”, *BBC News*, 21 September 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0jqgg755wwo>.

287 Graham, “Dutch police clash with anti-immigration protesters”.

288 Ibid.

289 NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*, 27.

290 Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

291 DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

292 German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*.

4. New Legislation

Throughout 2025 EU MS have continued to update their counterterrorism legislation. The list below discusses some of these developments in chronological order, while indicating CT thematic areas covered by the given amendment:

1. **Possession of Terrorism Content/Revocation of Citizenship:** In April 2025, Italy implemented a set of measures on public order and security, including CT provisions (converted into Law 80/2025).²⁹³ This reform package aims to intervene preventively against preparatory conduct by criminalising the possession of material with terrorist intent and to overall strengthen the police and security forces' powers to intervene preventively in contexts of terrorist and extremist threats.²⁹⁴ Barely a month after its promulgation, a 24-year-old Lebanese national was arrested after police found three smartphones filled with IS videos and self-shot clips urging jihad against Christians and Jews; he was subsequently jailed on the basis of the newly introduced legislation.²⁹⁵ The Italian law also extends the time limit for revocation of citizenship following serious terrorist crimes from 3 to 10 years after final conviction, and now explicitly references cases of asset diversion linked to terrorist financing (TF) and assistance to terrorist associations – even without full membership. These changes reportedly aim to facilitate stripping citizenship from foreign born individuals involved in terrorist activities – a measure Italy had used sparingly in the past.²⁹⁶
2. **Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing:** In May 2025, Romania's Law no. 86/2025 “on amending and supplementing Law no. 129/2019 on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF)” entered into force. It aims to remedy the deficiencies identified following the evaluation of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval Committee). Among other things, it established new obligations to prevent and combat ML/TF for associations and foundations – as well as sanctions for non-compliance thereof,²⁹⁷ notably by expanding reporting and due diligence requirements for banks and other financial institutions.²⁹⁸ Associations and foundations now also face new internal controls and reporting obligations and can be supervised on a risk-basis to avoid risks of misuse to channel funds illicitly.²⁹⁹
3. **Prisons/Prevention:** In June 2025, Denmark amended its Execution of Sentences Act (Lov nr. 726 af 20/06/2025) by authorising prisons to house terror convicts in specialised departments separate from the general population, and allowing authorities to deviate from regular placement rules (e.g., open prison placement or proximity to home) when deemed necessary for security reasons.³⁰⁰ This law also expands custodial security powers and empowers the Danish Prison and Probation Service to photograph and archive correspondence found in cells, aligning with recurring concerns about radicalisation, extremist network and plotting while in custody or in prisons.³⁰¹ Among other similar instances, in September 2025, Italian authorities precisely reported

293 Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Office Gazette of the Republic of Italy], *Decreto-legge 11 aprile 2025, n. 48, Disposizioni urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica, di tutela del personale in servizio, nonché di vittime dell'usura e di ordinamento penitenziario* [Decree-Law of 11 April 2025, No. 48, Urgent provisions on public security, protection of personnel in service, victims of usury, and prison system], Serie Generale, No. 85 (11 April 2025), <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2025/04/11/25G00060/sg>.

294 Camera dei Deputati and Senato della Repubblica, Servizio Studi [Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic, Research Service], *Disposizioni urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica, di tutela del personale in servizio, nonché di vittime dell'usura e di ordinamento penitenziario: D.L. 48/2025 – A.C. 2355, Dossier n. 471* (16 April 2025), <https://documenti.camera.it/leg19/dossier/pdf/D25048.pdf>.

295 Agenzia Nova, “Bergamo: 24-year-old arrested for publishing reels and posts of jihadist propaganda”, 1 July 2025, <https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Bergamo-published-reels-and-posts-of-jihadist-propaganda--24-year-old-arrested/>.

296 Camera dei Deputati and Senato della Repubblica, Servizio Studi, *D.L. 48/2025, Dossier n. 471*.

297 bpv Grigorescu Ștefăniță, “Legal Amendments on Preventing and Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing”, 3 June 2025, <https://www.bpv-grigorescu.com/legal-amendments-on-preventing-and-combating-money-laundering-and-terrorism-financing/>.

298 Teaha Consulting, “New Rules on Customer Due Diligence – Law 86/2025”, 16 June 2025, <https://teaha.ro/en/2025/06/16/new-rules-on-customer-due-diligence-law-86-2025/>.

299 Teaha Consulting, “New Rules on Customer Due Diligence – Law 86/2025”.

300 Folketinget, *Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om fuldbyrdelse af straf m.v., lov om samarbejde med Finland, Island, Norge og Sverige angående fuldbyrdelse af straf m.v. og lov om erstatning fra staten til ofre for forbrydelser (Etablering af særlige afdelinger for terrordømte m.v., styrkelse af kriminalforsorgens indsats over for radikaliseret og ekstremisme m.v.)* [Bill amending the Enforcement of Sentences Act and related legislation to establish special units for terrorism convicts and strengthen counter-radicalisation measures], Lovforslag L 198 A, Lov nr. 726 af June 20, 2025 (11 June 2025), https://www.folketingstidende.dk/samling/20241/lovforslag/L198A/20241_L198A_som_vedtaget.pdf.

301 Folketinget, Lovforslag L 198 A, Lov nr. 726 af June 20, 2025.

that one individual convicted of terrorism in the Turin prison repeatedly attempted to influence other inmates into jihadism³⁰² In April 2026, it was also reported in Belgium that one inmate had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State while in prison.³⁰³

- 4. Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing:** In June 2025, Luxemburg amended its law relating to the fight against money laundering and against the financing of terrorism. It provides detailed rules for the organisation and functioning of Luxembourg's competent authorities in the field of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing cooperation, called the Committee for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The Grand-Ducal Regulation outlines the Committee's structure, procedures, and responsibilities.³⁰⁴ In June 2025, Cyprus' "Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering from Illegal Activities (Amendment) (No. 2) Law of 2025" entered into force, focusing on ML compliance matters for crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) and aligning with EU Directive 2015/849, as amended by EU Regulation 2023/1113 and relevant recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).³⁰⁵
- 5. Penal Code/Prevention:** In July 2025, the Netherlands implemented two reforms of its legislation, both by raising the maximum penalty for participating in a terrorist organisation with the aim of committing the most serious terrorist crimes from 15 to 20 years,³⁰⁶ and providing a legal basis for multi-agency, local "case meetings" and data sharing about individuals at risk of radicalisation or terrorist involvement (through the Data Processing for Radicalisation and Terrorism Prevention Act, or "Wet PARTA").³⁰⁷
- 6. Terrorism Content Online:** The same month, Portugal promulgated a framework law authorising its government to adapt national legislation to Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on the removal of terrorist content online.³⁰⁸ This law came as a few months earlier, the European Commission referred Bulgaria, Ireland, and Portugal to the Court of Justice of the EU for not complying with its 2022 Terrorist Content Online Regulation.³⁰⁹ Following this law, the Portuguese Judiciary Police can now order websites or platforms to remove terrorist content, even without a judge if there is an urgent threat – though a judge must still approve the order within 48 hours. This measure had previously gained broad support across the political spectrum and will require platforms to act fast – usually within one hour – or they may face fines or penalties.³¹⁰

302 ANSA, "In carcere a Torino jihadista, 'pronto a morire per l'Islam' In carcere a Torino jihadista, 'pronto a morire per l'Islam'" [Jihadist in prison in Turin, 'ready to die for Islam'], 15 September 2025, https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2025/09/15/in-carcere-a-torino-jihadista-pronto-a-morire-per-l-islam_813ce0d9-85fd-4be3-8e86-d8b1df72f534.html.

303 Le Soir, "Il prête allégeance à l'Etat Islamique depuis la prison : sept ans requis contre Bennane," [He pledged allegiance to the Islamic State from prison: seven years requested for Bennane], 15 April 2026, <https://www.lesoir.be/741006/article/2026-04-15/il-prete-allégeance-letat-islamique-depuis-la-prison-sept-ans-requis-contre>.

304 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. (2025, June 11). *Règlement grand-ducal du 11 juin 2025 portant modification de dispositions relatives à la procédure administrative contentieuse* [Grand-Ducal Regulation of 11 June 2025 relating to the composition and operation of the Committee for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing]. Legilux – Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.

305 Harneys, "Amendments to Cypriot AML laws for crypto-asset service providers", 10 September 2025, <https://www.harneys.com/our-blogs/regulatory/amendments-to-cypriot-aml-laws-for-crypto-asset-service-providers/>.

306 Government of the Netherlands, "New Justice and Security laws as of 1 July 2025", 30 June 2025, <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2025/06/30/new-justice-and-security-laws-as-of-1-july-2025>.

307 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV) [Dutch Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism], "Wet gegevensverwerking Persoonsgerichte Aanpak Radicalisering en Terroristische Activiteiten treedt in werking" [Data Processing Act Personalised Approach to Radicalisation and Terrorist Activities enters into force], 30 June 2025, <https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/06/30/wet-gegevensverwerking-persoonsgerichte-aanpak-radicalisering-en-terroristische-activiteiten-treedt-in-werking>; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV) [Dutch Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism], "Wet gegevensverwerking Persoonsgerichte Aanpak Radicalisering en Terroristische Activiteiten in vogelvlucht" [Data Processing Act Personalised Approach to Radicalisation and Terrorist Activities at a glance], 30 June 2025, <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/2025/06/30/wet-gegevensverwerking-persoonsgerichte-aanpak-radicalisering-en-terroristische-activiteiten-partia-in-vogelvlucht>.

308 Assembleia da República [Portuguese Parliament], *Lei n.º 60/2025, de 22 de outubro, autoriza o Governo a adaptar a ordem jurídica interna ao Regulamento (UE) 2021/784 relativo ao combate à difusão de conteúdos terroristas em linha* [Law No. 60/2025 of 22 October authorizing adaptation of national law to Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on combating the dissemination of terrorist content online], *Diário da República*, 1.ª série, No. 204 (22 October 2025), <https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/60-2025-941547425>; CM Jornal, "PJ terá 48 horas para validar bloqueio de conteúdos na internet junto de autoridade judicial" [PJ will have 48 hours to validate blocking of content on the internet with judicial authority], 26 September 2025, <https://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/pj-tera-48-horas-para-validar-bloqueio-de-conteudos-na-internet-junto-de-autoridade-judicial>.

309 European Commission, "Commission refers BULGARIA, IRELAND and PORTUGAL to the Court of Justice of the European Union for not complying with the Terrorist Content Online Regulation", 18 June 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1496.

310 Ambrósio de Sousa, Filipa, "Extremismo e terrorismo. PJ vai poder bloquear conteúdos na net sem autorização de um juiz" [Extremism and terrorism. PJ will be able to block content on the net without authorization from a judge], *Advocatus*, 30 July 2025, <https://eco.sapo.pt/2025/07/30/extremismo-e-terrorismo-pj-vai-poder-bloquear-conteudos-na-net-sem-autorizacao-de-um-juiz/>.

- 7. Monitoring of Encrypted Communications:** Also in July 2025, Austria introduced new legal regulations which allow domestic intelligence services new limited powers to monitor unencrypted and encrypted communications to prevent serious threats to the constitutional order, such as terrorism. Encrypted-message monitoring requires installing software on a target device, may be used only as a last resort, needs approval from the Federal Administrative Court, is limited to up to three months, and is subject to oversight by the legal protection officer, deletion duties, and reporting requirements.³¹¹
- 8. Penal Code:** In July 2025, Bulgaria extended its legal framework concerning terrorism. This structured legislation covers a variety of related topics, such as the conceptualisation of terrorist offences, and the legal consequences of participation in them, including financing, preparation, recruitment and training for terrorism; participation in or leadership of terrorist groups; public incitement of terrorism; hostage-taking; attacks using explosives or other dangerous means; and attacks on transport systems, critical infrastructure, information systems and public facilities.³¹²
- 9. Crime-Terrorism Convergence:** In July 2025, Spanish National Security Council approved the National Strategy against Organized Crime and Serious Crime 2025, which aims to combine tackling serious crimes, such as money laundering, drug trade, human and arms trafficking with countering terrorism. The strategy acknowledges the increasing convergence between terrorist groups and organised crime networks.³¹³
- 10. Data Sharing:** In November 2025, Malta issued the Police Act (CAP. 164) called “Exchange of Personal Data, Information and Cooperation concerning Terrorist Offences Regulations, 2025”. This regulation requires Malta’s authorities to share relevant information on terrorist investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and related evidence with Europol, Eurojust, and other EU Member States when cases affect more than one Member State. Such exchanges include specified categories of data, such as data which identifies the person, group or entity, acts under investigation and their specific circumstances, the offence concerned, links with other relevant cases, the use of communication technologies, the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction. and must comply with EU and national data protection laws. Data sharing is subject to regulations under privacy laws.³¹⁴
- 11. Immigration and Terrorism:** In December, Cyprus amended its Refugee Act to give its government explicit power to cancel refugee or subsidiary-protection status when a beneficiary is found to pose a security risk or has committed serious offences – terrorism included.³¹⁵

311 Bundesministerium für Inneres. (2025, November 12). *neue Ermittlungsmaßnahmen [new investigative measures]*. https://www.bmi.gv.at/magazin/2025_11_12/23_neue_ermittlungsmassnahmen.html

312 Народно събрание на Република България. (2025, July 29). *Закон за изменение и допълнение на Наказателния кодекс [Law amending and supplementing the Criminal Code]*. *Държавен вестник*, 61. <https://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=236209>

313 Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes. (2025, August 5). *Orden PJC/846/2025, de 29 de julio, por la que se publica el Acuerdo del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de 14 de julio de 2025, por el que se aprueba la Estrategia Nacional contra el Crimen Organizado y la Delincuencia Grave 2025*. *Boletín Oficial del Estado [Order PJC/846/2025, of July 29, publishing the Agreement of the National Security Council of July 14, 2025, approving the National Strategy against Organized Crime and Serious Crime 2025. Official State Gazette]* (BOE), 187. https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2025-16215.

314 Government of Malta, (“Exchange of personal data, information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences regulations, 2025 (Legal Notice 263 of 2025),” *Government Gazette of Malta*, 14 November 2025, No. 21,538. <https://legislation.mt/eli/ln/2025/263/eng>

315 Visas & Immigration Team, “Cyprus Tightens Asylum Regime – New Law Lets Authorities Revoke Refugee Status For Serious Crimes”, *VisaHQ*, 7 December 2025, <https://www.visahq.com/news/2025-12-06/cy/cyprus-tightens-asylum-regime-new-law-lets-authorities-revoke-refugee-status-for-serious-crimes/>.

5. Major CT Operations

Throughout 2025 and early 2026, jihadi terrorism remained a key concern of security services across the EU. Major operations especially reflect the growing importance of the Internet in this regard, with arrests both in relation to social media and messaging groups as well as to the sharing of propaganda materials. Mirroring EU MS' conclusions noted in Chapter 2 on Primary Terrorism Types, the past year was also marked by numerous searches and arrests targeting terrorist group The Base and RWE in general, whose targets mainly spanned migrants, refugees, and political opponents. The trend of youth radicalisation can be clearly seen throughout major operations against jihadi and RWE terrorism, with most arrests involving at least one underage individual and some operations exclusively targeting online radicalisation.

This chapter does not aim to cover comprehensively all counter-terrorism operations across Europe, but to give a snapshot of terrorism trends through some major CT operations.

Jihadi Terrorism

Starting with key CT operations tackling jihadi terrorism, in February 2025, a joint operation between Spain's Guardia Civil and Morocco's General Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DGST) led to the arrest of a Moroccan social media influencer with over 100,000 followers, along with another individual.³¹⁶ Investigations revealed the two suspects used multiple digital platform profiles focused on fitness (physical training, calisthenics, and self-defence) as a cover for spreading jihadi messages and IS material.³¹⁷ One of their closest followers, a minor, was also arrested for amplifying these messages.³¹⁸

In March 2025, the Spanish police joined the Italian state police and arrested eleven Pakistani nationals on suspicion of belonging to the banned terrorist organisation, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).³¹⁹ The TTP promotes violent action such as murder and beheading via encrypted communication channels, and, according to media reports, one of these communication channels was managed exclusively by women who both promoted indoctrination and played an active role in selecting potential victims.³²⁰

In June and July 2025, following several months of monitoring by the French DGSJ (General Directorate for Internal Security), a 20-year-old man and a 15-year-old girl were arrested on the basis of association in preparation for a terrorist act and apology of terrorism.³²¹ Investigations revealed the young man had started viewing religious extremist content only during the COVID-19 lockdown period, gradually moving to more violent content and radicalising his younger partner into jihadism.³²² Both have psychiatric history, with the young man having been hospitalised in the past.³²³ Two other minors were arrested the following month for allegedly plotting attacks on Paris synagogues and the Eiffel Tower.³²⁴ The 15- and 17-year-olds had pledged allegiance to IS online, researched bomb-making, and discussed mass shooting before the DGSJ intervened. They had also discussed a project for jihad abroad and reportedly watched ultra-violent content.³²⁵

316 Faouzi, Adil, "Spanish-Moroccan Operation Nets Fitness Influencer in Major Terror Probe", *Morocco World News*, 7 February 2025, <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/02/164787/spanish-moroccan-operation-nets-fitness-influencer-in-major-terror-probe/>.

317 Ibid.

318 Ibid.

319 Mehmood, Arshad, The Media Line, "Spanish police arrest 11 suspected members of Pakistani Taliban in Barcelona", *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 March 2025, <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-845427>.

320 Ibid.

321 Buhagiar, Rémi, "Deux jeunes radicalisés arrêtés par la DGSJ à Toulouse : ils voulaient attaquer des 'juifs et des mécréants'" [Two radicalized young people arrested by the DGSJ in Toulouse: they wanted to attack 'Jews and unbelievers'], *La Dépêche*, 11 July 2025, <https://www.ladepeche.fr/2025/07/11/info-la-depeche-deux-jeunes-radicalises-arretes-par-la-dgsi-a-toulouse-ils-voulaient-attaquer-des-juifs-et-des-mecreants-12820359.php>.

322 Ibid.

323 Ibid.

324 Chichizola, Jean, "Terrorisme : deux mineurs voulaient s'en prendre à des synagogues et à la Tour Eiffel" [Terrorism: two minors wanted to attack synagogues and the Eiffel Tower], *Le Figaro*, 26 August 2025, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/terrorisme-deux-mineurs-voulaient-s-en-prendre-a-des-synagogues-et-a-la-tour-eiffel-20250826>.

325 Ibid.

In October 2025, Belgian police arrested three young men aged 18, 23, and 24 in Antwerp as part of coordinated anti-terror raids.³²⁶ According to media reports, the three suspects knew each other personally³²⁷ and were plotting jihadist-inspired drone attacks against politicians such as Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever, Antwerp Mayor Els Van Doesburg, and Dutch politician Geert Wilders.³²⁸ Improvised explosives and a 3D printer were found in the home of two of the suspects.³²⁹

In November 2025, security authorities in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland carried out a coordinated operation targeting extremist online networks.³³⁰ Austrian police and security services searched 15 properties and arrested three suspects, seizing weapons, ammunition, cash, and data carriers.³³¹ Germany led more than 50 searches, many among teenagers and young adults accused of spreading propaganda on platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, Rocket.Chat, and Telegram.³³² Overall, around a hundred searches were carried out and temporary weapon bans were imposed.³³³ Authorities stressed this operation was meant to increase security in the run-up to the Christmas season, as attacks on Christmas markets are a recurrent concern.³³⁴

The same month, a 22-year-old Syrian man was arrested in Berlin for planning an attack after authorities discovered materials to manufacture explosives during searches at his residences.³³⁵

In early February 2026, Dutch authorities arrested fifteen individuals following a nationwide investigation into a TikTok account that spread IS propaganda with Dutch subtitles and whose posts were viewed more than 100,000 times.³³⁶ According to reports, thirteen of the suspects have Syrian nationality, three have Dutch citizenship, and four are minors – as young as 16 years old.³³⁷

RWE

2025 was marked by five main operations targeting RWE at large. In May 2025, the German Federal Prosecutor's Office arrested numerous suspected members of a right-wing terrorist cell, all between 14 and 18 years old and allegedly planning attacks. The group is said to have planned attacks on refugees and political dissidents and had tried to put these plans into practice several times.³³⁸

The same month, Greek police arrested 25 individuals – including twelve minors – linked to the far-right group Nationalist Youth of Thessaloniki. The group is accused of committing violent acts, robberies, and hate crimes, including attacks on migrants, political opponents, and students, and has ties to fascist organisations such as Holy Battalion 2012.³³⁹

In June, Portuguese authorities arrested six people linked to a far-right group with “big capabilities” to conduct some action “of a certain dimension” as part of an investigation tracking online movements.³⁴⁰

326 El Baye, Anas, “Everything we know so far about the suspects in the PM assassination plot”, *The Brussels Times*, 10 October 2025, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/1788040/terrorist-assassination-plot-everything-we-know-so-far-about-the-suspects>; The Brussels Times Newsroom, “Terror suspects who planned attack on Belgian PM will remain in prison”, 15 October 2025, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/1795962/terror-suspects-who-planned-attack-on-belgian-pm-will-remain-in-prison-for-another-month>.

327 Ibid.

328 NL Times, “Wilders reportedly on Belgian terror cell's target list; Pulls out of election debate”, 10 October 2025, <https://nltimes.nl/2025/10/10/wilders-reportedly-belgian-terror-cells-target-list-pulls-election-debate>.

329 Ibid.

330 VOL.AT, “Paukenschlag in der islamistischen Szene: Mehrere Festnahmen im DACH-Raum” [Bombshell in the Islamist Scene: Several Arrests in the DACH Region], 13 November 2025, <https://www.vol.at/paukenschlag-in-der-islamistischen-szene-mehrere-festnahmen-im-dach-raum/9802844>.

331 Ibid.

332 Ibid.

333 Ibid.

334 Ibid.

335 Mehta, “Berlin police arrest man for planning ‘jihadi’ attack”.

336 Rahn, Wesley, Agence France Presse (AFP), and Reuters, “Dutch police arrest 15 over ‘Islamic State’ TikTok posts”, *Deutsche Welle*, 10 February 2026, <https://www.dw.com/en/dutch-police-arrest-15-over-islamic-state-tiktok-posts/a-75900127>.

337 Rahn, AFP, and Reuters, “Dutch police arrest 15 over ‘Islamic State’ TikTok posts”.

338 ZDF Heute, “Mutmaßliche rechte Terrorzelle zerschlagen” [Suspected right-wing terror cell smashed], <https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/rechtsex-tremismus-terrorismus-festnahme-bundesanwaltschaft-100.html>.

339 Stamatoukou, Elina, “Greek Police Arrest Far-Right Youth Activists in Thessaloniki”, *Balkan Insights*, 7 May 2025, <https://balkaninsight.com/2025/05/07/greek-police-dismantle-far-right-youth-group-in-thessaloniki/>.

340 Alves, Helena, and Teresa Medrano, “Portugal arrests 6 people linked to a far-right group, seizing explosives and weapons”, *AP News*, 17 June 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/portugal-arrests-far-right-group-explosives-weapons-b9b6b4e0614338854a06c37b823813e2>.

The detainees are believed to belong to the Portuguese MAL, seeking to establish itself as a political movement supported by an armed militia, and promoted far-right nationalist views, anti-system ideology, and incitement to hatred and violence against migrants and refugees.³⁴¹ Police seized explosives, detonators, rounds of ammunition, firearms, and knives in the operation.³⁴² Some firearms had reportedly been built with 3D printers for ease of concealing.³⁴³

Around the same time, Italian authorities arrested a 21-year-old man on charges of racial propaganda, who reportedly was the “guru” of a virtual white supremacist and anti-LGBTQ+ community.³⁴⁴ This arrest was part of a larger national operation encompassing 26 searches throughout the territory and dismantling the extremist network and had started back in December 2023 following the monitoring of the young man’s profiles on Telegram and TikTok.³⁴⁵ His channels contained propaganda, accelerationism and “apologetic content of violent actions against people of colour, immigrants, people of Islamic religion and those related to the LGBTQ galaxy”.³⁴⁶ As investigations expanded, 29 other members of the network were identified, many of them young people between the ages of 18 and 25 and five of them minors at the time of the events.³⁴⁷

In November 2025, Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) supported the Spanish National Police in disrupting activities of the far-right terrorist group The Base.³⁴⁸ Over a three-day operation and five house searches, the police seized various materials and arrested three suspects related to The Base.³⁴⁹ A variety of weapons (including bladed weapons and two firearms) were seized along with ammunition; military tactical equipment used in training activities; accelerationist and supremacist material, documentation, and propaganda; neo-Nazi paraphernalia and documentation glorifying other terrorist organisations.³⁵⁰ Following this operation, The Base leader Rinaldo Nazzaro, currently living in Russia, called the arrests another “example of political persecution” by world governments that are “further justifying our resistance to its hegemonic rule by any means necessary”, according to The Guardian. European law enforcement made it clear the cell’s leader was in direct contact with Nazzaro, with “potential ties to Russian sabotage operations in Europe, whether or not the cell members were aware of it”.³⁵¹

Finally, Italian police also carried out more than twenty searches against radicalised male minors in July 2025.³⁵² As part of this nationwide operation, about fifteen minors between the ages of 13 to 17 were arrested, some of them had illegally carried weapons in public, authored messages on supremacist and neo-Nazi Telegram channels, allegedly were members of supremacist group The Base, or carried out fascist propaganda activities to collect funds.³⁵³

341 Ibid.

342 Ibid.

343 Ibid.

344 Redazione Brescia, “Neonazisti su Telegram e TikTok: smantellata rete di 30 estremisti guidata da un ragazzo bresciano di 21 anni” [“Neo-Nazis on Telegram and TikTok: a network of 30 extremists led by a 21-year-old boy from Brescia dismantled”], *Il Giorno*, 17 July 2025, <https://www.ilgiorno.it/brescia/cronaca/neonazisti-estremismo-fascisti-giovani-ivbn7skt>.

345 Ibid.

346 Ibid.

347 Ibid.

348 *Europol*, “Europol and Spanish National Police disrupt activities of far-right terrorist group ‘The Base’”, 1 December 2025, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-and-spanish-national-police-disrupt-activities-of-far-right-terrorist-group-base>.

349 Ibid.

350 Ibid.

351 Makuch, Ben, “US leader of global neo-Nazi terrorist group signals retribution for arrests”, *The Guardian*, 5 December 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/05/neo-nazi-base-leader-on-terrorism-arrest>.

352 Rai News, “Blitz in tutta Italia contro l’estremismo giovanile, perquisizioni anche a Messina” [Blitz throughout Italy against youth extremism, searches also in Messina], 31 July 2025, <https://www.rainews.it/tgr/sicilia/articoli/2025/07/blitz-in-tutta-italia-contro-lestremismo-giovanile-perquisizioni-anche-a-messina-26a1b087-4124-4ad5-a0fe-21126f06d3a5.html>.

353 Rai News, “Blitz in tutta Italia contro l’estremismo giovanile, perquisizioni anche a Messina” [Blitz throughout Italy against youth extremism, searches also in Messina], 31 July 2025, <https://www.rainews.it/tgr/sicilia/articoli/2025/07/blitz-in-tutta-italia-contro-lestremismo-giovanile-perquisizioni-anche-a-messina-26a1b087-4124-4ad5-a0fe-21126f06d3a5.html>.

LWE

In January 2025, German authorities arrested six suspected members of a left-wing extremist organisation accused of participating in coordinated violent attacks against individuals they believed to be right-wing extremists during the 2023 Day of Honour events in Budapest. Prosecutors allege the group committed multiple assaults using weapons such as batons and pepper spray, causing serious injuries, while one suspect, Paul M., also faces additional charges for his alleged leadership role in an earlier extremist network responsible for planned attacks on perceived right-wing targets in Germany between 2018 and 2020.³⁵⁴

Online Operations

Previous examples of operations targeting jihadi and right-wing terrorism involved multiple arrests of young adults and even minors, which is a trend clearly identified by reporting MS in the past few years. In this spirit, Europol coordinated two Referral Action Days (RADs) in 2025. First, on 27 May, eleven EU MS (Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) and five other European countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom) participated in the removal of more than 2,000 links pointing to violent jihadist and right-wing extremist and terrorist propaganda in order to act against minors' online exploitation and radicalisation.³⁵⁵

On 13 November, a second RAD took place across seven EU countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and the United Kingdom, with the support of Europol.³⁵⁶ This time, authorities focused on identifying and removing racist and xenophobic propaganda shared on gaming and gaming-related platforms.³⁵⁷ Thousands more links across different platforms were referred to authorities for leading to dangerous and illicit online material, including around 5400 links to jihadist content, 1000 links to violent right-wing extremist and terrorist content, and 100 links to racist and xenophobic content.³⁵⁸

AGE

As mentioned earlier in this report, 2025 saw notable arrests with regards to AGE. In June 2025, Dutch police arrested eight people in different parts of the country on suspicion of possession and use of weapons and dangerous substances. The suspects considered themselves sovereign citizens and were part of a criminal network that adheres to anti-institutional ideology, and may want to use violence.³⁵⁹

In August, German police arrested three suspected members of the Reichsbürger movement in coordinated raids: approximately 300 officers searched multiple sites across Bavaria, Saxony, and Thuringia, seizing weapons regulated items and electronic media.³⁶⁰

354 Federal Public Prosecutor General at the Federal Court of Justice. (2025, January 21). *Arrest of six suspected members of a left-wing extremist organisation*. <https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2025/Pressemitteilung-vom-21-01-2025-2-engl.html>.

355 Europol, "Europol coordinates operation against terrorist content online targeting minors", 3 June 2025, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-coordinates-operation-against-terrorist-content-online-targeting-minors>.

356 Europol, "Europol and partner countries combat online radicalisation on gaming platforms", 17 November 2025, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-and-partner-countries-combat-online-radicalisation-gaming-platforms>.

357 Ibid.

358 Ibid.

359 Politie [Dutch Police], "Onderzoek naar crimineel netwerk: acht verdachten aangehouden" [Criminal network investigation: eight suspects arrested], 11 June 2025, <https://www.politie.nl/nieuws/2025/juni/11/01-onderzoek-naar-crimineel-netwerk---acht-verdachten-aangehouden.html>; NL Times, "Eight 'sovereign citizens' arrested in criminal network investigation", 12 June 2025, <https://nltimes.nl/2025/06/12/eight-sovereign-citizens-arrested-criminal-network-investigation>.

360 Connor, Richard, Agence France Presse (AFP), and dpa, "Bavarian police arrest far-right Reichsbürger suspects", *Deutsche Welle*, 7 August 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/bavarian-police-arrest-far-right-reichsbuerger-suspects/a-73554963>.

State-Backed Terrorism

Apart from operations targeting traditional ideology-based terrorism, EU MS have also put in place operations against alleged state-connected terrorist activities from the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia. In April 2025, a European operation involving France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom exposed and dismantled a multinational Hezbollah smuggling network.³⁶¹ According to French newspaper *Le Figaro*, authorities intercepted large quantities of drone components (capable of producing at least hundreds of explosive Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAVs]) intended for use in attacks against Israel.³⁶² Between October 2023 and October 2025, two major Hamas-related plots were disrupted in Germany and Denmark. Additionally, on 1 October 2025, German authorities arrested three suspected Hamas operatives accused of planning a terrorist attack in Germany. According to prosecutors, the suspects had obtained firearms and ammunition intended for use in targeted attacks against Israeli or Jewish institutions and had allegedly been acting on behalf of Hamas since the summer of 2025.³⁶³

In June 2025, Swedish and European intelligence services uncovered a sweeping Iranian deal with Foxtrot gang boss Rawa Majid.³⁶⁴ In exchange for safe-haven, no-extradition guarantees, and unrestricted movement in Tehran, Majid's network had agreed to "wage a Europe-wide terror campaign against Israeli and Jewish targets".³⁶⁵ According to the investigation, gang operatives had, in the past few years: planted a "proof-of-intent" grenade outside Israel's embassy in Stockholm, gunned down the same building a few months later, then bombed the Israeli mission in Brussels; twice plotted explosives at the site of an Israel-based international military technology company and defence contractor (Elbit Systems) in Sweden and staged follow-on grenade gun attacks at Israel's embassy in Copenhagen; received an Iranian "target catalogue" covering kidnappings or assassinations of Israelis, strikes on synagogues and Jewish centres across Europe, and a plan to murder exiled Iran International journalists in Britain; and routinely used teenage operatives in shootings or bomb missions, while following strict "zero-contact" payment channels to mask Tehran's role.³⁶⁶

With regard to Russia-backed activity, two main joint operations took place in 2025 and early 2026. In October 2025, a sabotage network planning a series of explosions and arsons via courier parcels was uncovered in Poland and Romania.³⁶⁷ Three individuals arrested were from Ukraine, and authorities prevented the delivery of parcels destined to Romania and Ukraine.³⁶⁸ According to investigations, they acted under the direct guidance of Russian special services and were part of a broader campaign of hybrid attacks targeting Ukraine's logistics infrastructure in Europe.³⁶⁹ In this light, a terrorist group suspected of carrying out several arson attacks in Eastern Europe on behalf of a foreign intelligence service is to be taken to court across Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania this year.³⁷⁰ Investigations started back in July 2024 when a suspect was caught taking photos of possible locations to set on fire in Romania. Another was found to have set fire to buses in Czechia and scouted other locations for follow-up attacks.³⁷¹ Suspects arrested in Lithuania had targeted a factory producing materials for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.³⁷² Following the creation of a joint team at Eurojust, it was revealed that these acts "used the same methods and acted with the common

361 Levaton, Stav, "Hezbollah-linked drone smuggling ring uncovered in Europe – report", *The Times of Israel*, 14 April 2025, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-linked-drone-smuggling-ring-uncovered-in-europe-report/>.

362 Ibid.

363 Levitt, Matt, "Hamas plots in Europe: A shift toward external operations?," *CTC Sentinel*, 14 October 2025, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/hamas-plots-in-europe-a-shift-toward-external-operations/>.

364 Duschnitzky, Jonathan, "Sweden exposes Iran's Europe-wide Israeli assassination network", *Israel Hayom*, 19 June 2025, <https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/06/19/sweden-exposes-irans-europe-wide-israeli-assassination-network/>.

365 Ibid.

366 Ibid.

367 *UNN*, "In Poland and Romania, Russian saboteurs were detained who planned a series of explosions and arsons in the EU via 'Nova Poshta' (New Post)", 21 October 2025, <https://unn.ua/en/news/in-poland-and-romania-russian-saboteurs-were-detained-who-planned-a-series-of-explosions-and-arsons-in-the-eu-via-nova-poshta-new-post>.

368 Ibid.

369 Ibid.

370 *European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust)*, "Terrorist group responsible for arson attacks across Europe taken to court", 27 January 2026, <https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/terrorist-group-responsible-arson-attacks-across-europe-taken-court>.

371 Ibid.

372 Ibid.

objective of intimidating people, fostering fear and distrust, and hindering support for Ukraine in the war”, and had been carried out by the same terrorist groups suspected of “having links with a foreign intelligence service”.³⁷³ So far, two individuals were convicted in Romania and Czechia. The trial of six other suspects is expected to start later this year in Lithuania, on the basis of participating in an organised terrorist group and attempting to carry out terrorist attacks.³⁷⁴ Finally, Polish investigations revealed subversive activities carried out by a citizen of the Republic of Colombia responsible for subsequent arson attacks in Czechia.³⁷⁵ Before travelling to Czechia, the suspect had committed two arsons in Warsaw and Radom, Poland.³⁷⁶

373 Ibid.

374 Ibid.

375 Ibid.

376 Ibid.

6. Countering Terrorism Financing

In 2025, five EU countries have published extensive reports on money-laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) activities: Belgium,³⁷⁷ France,³⁷⁸ Ireland,³⁷⁹ Italy,³⁸⁰ and Latvia.³⁸¹ Luxembourg published a risk assessment of ML,³⁸² but will only update their terrorist financing assessment in 2026. While the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) states it publishes yearly TF assessments, none has been made public within that timeframe. Other countries such as Estonia,³⁸³ Germany,³⁸⁴ and Sweden³⁸⁵ instead included sections on TF directly into their security or terrorism threat reports. Finally, five EU countries' general security reports sporadically mentioned TF-related issues.³⁸⁶ Analysing 23 European reports, this chapter walks through EU MS' main points of focus in terms of CTF.

General Findings by Group and Ideology

Most of the focus of MS reports on the financing of terrorism deals with the way foreign-based jihadi terrorist organisations finance themselves. For example, reports from Denmark, Germany, and Austria mention specific instances of unveiled jihadist TF within their territory. The Danish CTA assesses that TF from individuals in Denmark mainly goes to militant Islamist groups or individuals in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Türkiye, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian autonomous areas.³⁸⁷ In Germany, the searches of seven properties in Berlin, Hamburg, Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein, as well as the arrest of two suspects on 25 July 2024, were the result of ongoing investigations by authorities. The suspects are alleged to have joined a criminal organisation founded by other individuals in early summer 2022 with the aim of collecting funds for IS in Germany and other European countries, and to have participated in several transactions in favour of IS with a total volume of over 25,000 euros.³⁸⁸ In Austria, Chechen IS networks continue to be active and play a central role in terrorist financing as well as in cooperation with ISKP structures.³⁸⁹ Austria's latest report takes the example of a cell that established itself in Austria consisting primarily of three men of Tajik and Chechen origin and one woman of Turkish origin, whose initial focus was on activities such as seeking suitable financing.³⁹⁰ More recently in July 2025, German police arrested a Bosnian man as part of an investigation on the financing of an Islamist attack in the west of the Germany.³⁹¹

TF has been heavily influenced by the war in Gaza,³⁹² with jihadist organisations exploiting the conflict for financing ends.³⁹³ According to Belgium, reports referring to possible TF links with the

377 Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières (CTIF) – De Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking (CFI), *Rapport d'activités 2024* [Activity Report 2024] (21 June 2025), https://www.ordevanvlaamsebalies.be/nl/fetch-asset?path=ovb/CTIF-CFI_JV24_NL_2024.pdf.

378 Tracfin, *AML/CFT: Threat Assessment 2024–2025* (5 February 2026), https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/media-document/Tracfin_t3_EN_web.pdf?v=1770290276.

379 Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*.

380 Italian Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF), *Annual Report 2024*, No. 17 (May 2025), https://uif.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-annuale/2025/UIF_Annual_Report_2024.pdf?language_id=1; Comitato di sicurezza finanziaria (Csf) [Italian Financial Security Committee], *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Money Laundering Risk Analysis – November 2024] (27 May 2025), https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/documenti_it/prevenzione_reati_finanziari/prevenzione_reati_finanziari/Sintesi-NRA-ML-TF-versione-finale-clean-rev-1.pdf.

381 Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing* (2024), https://fid.gov.lv/uploads/files/2024/Guidelines%20on%20the%20Prevention%20of%20Terrorism%20and%20Proliferation%20Financing_2024_ENG.pdf.

382 Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, *2025 National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering* (26 May 2025), <https://gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/images-documents/actualites/2025/05/26-evaluation-risque-blanchiment/2025-nra-vs-site-internet.pdf>.

383 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*.

384 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

385 NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

386 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; Kamra tar-Rapprežentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

387 CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025], 19–20.

388 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 208.

389 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 81.

390 Ibid.,], 91.

391 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Young Bosnian arrested in Germany over ‘terror’ plot”, Arab News, 9 July 2025, <https://arab.news/bjqye>.

392 Kamra tar-Rapprežentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee], 5.

393 UIF, *Annual Report 2024*, 28.

conflict between Israel and Hamas have sharply increased since October 2023,³⁹⁴ and, in its 2025 report, Estonia highlighted that the highest-risk transactions related to TF were those linked to the Gaza region.³⁹⁵ Hezbollah, similarly with Hamas, focuses most of its EU activities on financing.³⁹⁶ The Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, PKK) is another foreign-related extremist organisation under scrutiny of European financial intelligence services, especially in Austria, Estonia, Germany, and Sweden.³⁹⁷

The RWE scene, on the other hand, combines a wide variety of more or less traditional financing means due to its proximity to mainstream political circles. Yet, in previous FATF reports, several jurisdictions had identified that members of far right groups are becoming increasingly knowledgeable about moving and hiding their funds.³⁹⁸ It is also important to note that contrary to foreign and jihadi terrorist groups, most of RWE funding comes from legitimate sources, as these groups are less concerned about concealing their activities than other types of TF.

Raising Funds: Donations, Retail, and Crime

The two main legal means through which individuals finance terrorism are donations and the purchase of goods or services. The role of donations in TF is mentioned by eight countries,³⁹⁹ and is reportedly used within jihadism⁴⁰⁰ and RWE⁴⁰¹ alike. Following previously reported patterns, countries note a continuing increase in donations from the Palestinian diaspora,⁴⁰² as well as an increase in appeals for donations from Shiite extremist groups as the conflict spread to Lebanon.⁴⁰³ Hence, as calls for donations and fundraising multiply, so does the risk that some of these humanitarian funds may also benefit Hamas structures.⁴⁰⁴ The PKK also reportedly raises funds through fundraising and donation campaigns.⁴⁰⁵ Donations are increasingly made on crowdfunding platforms, whose ease of use and independence increases the likeliness of reaching transnational audiences, and thus creates a “‘monetised ecosystem’ where funds are raised for a wide variety of causes”.⁴⁰⁶ In this regard, France describes crowdfunding platforms as presenting high AML/CFT risks due to their lack of systematic checks on the veracity of projects and the difficulties in identifying the origin of funds.⁴⁰⁷

According to Estonia and Latvia, the risks of terrorist fundraising are strongly linked to Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs),⁴⁰⁸ which aligns with concerns brought forth by the FATF. In particular, Italy notes the FATF's focus on religious and cultural associations and on those transferring funds raised within Europe to areas where terrorist organisations are present.⁴⁰⁹ For example, in Germany, supporters of Hezbollah maintain organisational and ideological cohesion in local mosque associations, primarily financed by donations.⁴¹⁰ As for the PKK, some of its financiers' highest revenues come from events such as concerts and festivals.⁴¹¹ The revenues of the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) in particular come from the music group *Grup Yorum* which, on top of recruiting

394 CTIF–CFI, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report], 6.

395 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*, 54.

396 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

397 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

398 FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*, 14.

399 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; Tracfin, *AML/CFT: Threat Assessment 2024–2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*; Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024]; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

400 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024].

401 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

402 AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*.

403 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 208.

404 Ibid.

405 Ibid.; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

406 CTIF–CFI, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report], 31.

407 Tracfin, *AML/CFT: Threat Assessment 2024–2025*.

408 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*, 54; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*.

409 Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024].

410 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

411 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

new members, likely uses proceeds from concerts to finance terrorist activities in the EU.⁴¹² In the same vein, Greece mentions the threat from alleged “associations of friends” from abroad who visit different EU MS under the pretence of organising sports events and hobbies, despite indications that they operate as drug trafficking and ML rings.⁴¹³ This phenomenon is especially salient in RWE, with country reports from Austria, Germany, and Latvia mention the organisation of music events and the establishment of sports communities as financing sources.⁴¹⁴ RWE also benefits from association networks, for example with the association *Ein Prozent e.V.* in Germany, which previously collected donations “in the low five-figure range” for the video studio of the right-wing extremist *COMPACT Magazin GmbH* and for three activists of the right-wing extremist IBD⁴¹⁵ before being prohibited.⁴¹⁶ These findings have pushed countries like Germany⁴¹⁷ and Belgium⁴¹⁸ to value the banning associations as an important tool for limiting the organisational and financial capabilities of terrorist actors.

Apart from donations, terrorism is increasingly financed by businesses such as Salafist fast-food restaurants or retail shops, as highlighted by Germany⁴¹⁹ and Estonia;⁴²⁰ RWE merchandise, as noted by Austria, Germany, and Latvia;⁴²¹ and by AGE fantasy documents.⁴²² For example, authorities mention the case of a United Arab Emirates resident with links to terrorism who tried setting up an IT company in Estonia as a front for financing terrorist activities, or that of a EU citizen with ties to the PKK who was prevented from establishing a business which could have been used as a front for financing terrorist activities.⁴²³ As a whole, German intelligence highlights that the jihadi scene has built up an economic power that should not be underestimated, and projects that these activities will further expand and professionalise in the future.⁴²⁴ With regard to RWE, real estate transactions are also promoted in order to secure funding value and potentially launder transactions.⁴²⁵ Bordering on illegal financing, AGE groups in Europe and especially in Germany sometimes sell their supporters make-believe documents such as driving licences or vehicle registration plates, and encourage their followers to establish their own business within the group.⁴²⁶

Terrorist actors also finance their activities illegally, through ongoing criminal endeavours, white-collar crime, or through ransomware as reported more recently. Ongoing criminal activities such as “smuggling, extortion, robberies and the ‘taxing’ of criminals involved in activities such as organised prostitution, the drug trade”, or counterfeiting are typical to Irish domestic terrorism, and participates in the financing of larger operations.⁴²⁷ White-collar crime as a TF strategy, on the other hand, is especially linked to RWE, for instance with biker gangs who use the cash channels typical of this scene to conceal financial transactions, thus blurring the boundaries between general and politically motivated crime.⁴²⁸ Interestingly, Latvian authorities report several known cases of ransomware attacks conducted for TF purposes, in which victims are forced to transfer funds to specific virtual currency wallet addresses in order to regain access to stolen or encrypted data.⁴²⁹

412 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

413 EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*.

414 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*.

415 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 91.

416 Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI), “Rechtsextremistische Vereinigungen ‘COMPACT-Magazin GmbH’ und ‘CONSPECT FILM GmbH’ verboten” [Right-wing extremist associations “COMPACT-Magazin GmbH” and “CONSPECT FILM GmbH” banned], 17 July 2024, <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2024/07/verbot-compact.html>.

417 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 227.

418 Belga News Agency, “Government approves preliminary draft law on radical organisations”, 25 July 2025, <https://www.belganewsagency.eu/government-approves-preliminary-draft-law-on-radical-organisations>.

419 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 207.

420 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*.

421 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*.

422 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 126.

423 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*, 55.

424 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024].

425 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*.

426 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 126.

427 Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*, 7.

428 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024], 77.

429 FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*, 15.

Moving Funds: Regulated, Informal, and Crypto-Based Digital Transfer Channels

Moving on to the transfer of funds, financiers of terrorism still resort to physical transfers, but overwhelmingly use a combination of both regulated, informal, or crypto-based digital transfer channels. Simultaneously, actors are increasingly moving towards cloud-based messaging applications like Telegram to coordinate their operations and facilitate transfers.⁴³⁰

Most transfer of funds to terrorist ends take place online, which explains why Belgian, Estonian, and Swedish services emphasise their focus on an increasingly broad range of new digital payment platforms, instruments and assets, encompassing payment service providers (PSPs) and neobanks, virtual International Bank Account Numbers (vIBANs), crypto- and other virtual currencies, Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and digital prepaid credit cards.⁴³¹ Likewise, Greece⁴³² and Spain⁴³³ explicitly state that they pay increasing attention to the monitoring of online transactions to TF ends.

There are three main ways terrorist funds may be transferred to beneficiaries. First, when using regulated fiat-based (i.e., conventional currency-based) digital transfer channels, financiers may exploit loopholes or conceal their identity. This encompasses all transfers within the formal financial system, made through PSPs, neobanks, or vIBANs for example. This is the easiest transfer sector to regulate, which is something Estonia has recently focused on, “with only a few firms reporting transactions suspected of terrorist financing” according to the Estonian Financial Intelligence Unit.⁴³⁴ Yet, despite this ease of regulation, Italy and Spain worry that generative AI might be opening an even larger field of possibilities for TF, as it can allow organisations to effortlessly deceive Know Your Customer processes, for example through identity theft and the disassociation of the final beneficiary from the criminal activity.⁴³⁵

Second, individuals and organisations may transfer funds via Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS). This method is especially used by jihadi terrorist networks,⁴³⁶ who have moved from traditional cash couriers to operations within the Hawala IVTS network.⁴³⁷ Outside regulated banking infrastructure, IVTS are highlighted as a significant TF risk, along with other similar transfer systems used within other immigrant communities in Europe.⁴³⁸

Crypto-asset related activity is identified as a third growing TF threat by Italy⁴³⁹ and Estonia,⁴⁴⁰ especially in connection to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Hamas,⁴⁴¹ and to jihadism in general.⁴⁴² In the case of jihadism, for example, a 23-year-old Swedish-Syrian man was notably charged with financing or attempting to finance IS via cryptocurrencies in November 2025.⁴⁴³ As for Hamas, Estonian services report that VASPs based in third countries are commonly used due to their lack of licences and of proper due diligence measures.⁴⁴⁴ Although Germany reports a rather minimal use of cryptocurrencies

430 Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024].

431 CTIF–CFI, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

432 EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*, 16.

433 Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

434 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*, 54.

435 Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024];

Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

436 Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024];

BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

437 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*.

438 Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*.

439 UIF, *Annual Report 2024*.

440 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*.

441 UIF, *Annual Report 2024*.

442 Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024];

BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report].

443 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Swedish-Syrian charged over attempt to travel to Somalia to join IS”, CTV News, 20 November 2025, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/article/swedish-syrian-charged-over-attempt-to-travel-to-somalia-to-join-is/>.

444 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*.

in RWE,⁴⁴⁵ in November 2025, German police arrested a 49-year-old man with alleged neo-Nazi links for running a darknet platform soliciting crypto donations to fund assassinations of politicians.⁴⁴⁶ Irish services explain this increase in the role of virtual and crypto-currencies and infrastructure by the general growth of the crypto-asset market since 2019. In its latest report, Estonia further reported that for a total annual transaction volume of Estonian licenced VASPs of above €30 billion, Estonian residents account for less than 10 percent of these transactions.⁴⁴⁷

Moving Funds: Physical Transfers

Though most countries focus on digital channels within their CTF efforts, Italian intelligence services warn that the physical transport of cash by couriers “continues to play an important role in terrorist operations, perhaps in response to increased scrutiny of operators providing payment services”, and that the spread of virtual currencies in TF appears to be rather slow and still very limited.⁴⁴⁸ According to the same report, jihadi terrorism in particular still makes use of cash couriers on top of digital methods.⁴⁴⁹ This combination of several financial transfer systems, known as hybrid models, has become the focus of authorities’ investigations and is also highlighted by Spain.⁴⁵⁰ In April 2025, for example, the Irish Gardaí caught a Syrian national with €200,000 in cash at Dublin Airport; the suspect had arrived a few days before and was due to fly to Türkiye when he was stopped and searched. Investigations suspect the cash was the proceeds of Islamist fundraising in Ireland, and the suspected was charged with ML offences as of latest update.⁴⁵¹ Prepaid cards represent another offline TF risk.

Using Funds

Beyond funds, CTF operations may also lead to the detection and arrests of suppliers of tools and weapons for terrorist actors, in line with the “follow the money” approach. This is illustrated with the arrest of a man by the Danish PET in May 2025, on suspicion of having bought drones for Hamas to use in an attack.⁴⁵²

445 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*, 77.

446 Cole, Deborah, “German man with alleged neo-Nazi links arrested over darknet assassination calls”, *The Guardian*, 11 November 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/11/german-man-with-alleged-neo-nazi-links-arrested-over-darknet-assassination-calls>.

447 KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*, 55.

448 Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024 [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024]*, 30–31.

449 Ibid.; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*.

450 BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]*, 206–207; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024 [2024 National Security Annual Report]*; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

451 Foy, Ken, “Gardaí investigate possible Jihadi terrorism fundraising link after man caught with €200,000 at Dublin airport”, *Irish Independent*, 5 April 2025, <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/crime/gardai-investigate-possible-jihadi-terrorism-fundraising-link-after-man-caught-with-200000-at-dublin-airport/a1392289214.html>.

452 CNews, “Danemark : Un homme lié au Hamas placé en détention pour ‘terrorisme’” [Denmark: A man linked to Hamas detained for ‘terrorism’], 19 May 2025, <https://www.cnews.fr/monde/2025-05-19/danemark-un-homme-lie-au-hamas-place-en-detention-pour-terrorisme-1683307>.

7. Sanctions in CT

In 2025, several organisations were designated as terrorist, and therefore banned. Furthermore, some debates emerged with regard to the designation of additional groups, notably on the far-left.

LWE: Debates over the designation of “Antifa”

The question of whether violent far-left networks – often grouped under the “Antifa” label – should be treated as terrorists gained momentum in the EU in the second half of 2025. Following the US administration’s move to designate Antifa as a terrorist organisation in September 2025, ripple effects were felt in Europe.⁴⁵³ Lawmakers from the Belgian far-right Vlaams Belang (VB) party called on the government to ban Antifa domestically.⁴⁵⁴ In Germany, the political opposition (namely the far-right Alternative für Deutschland [AfD]) called for banning Antifa, especially after some violent incidents by far-left militants involving assaults on neo-Nazis.⁴⁵⁵ In the Netherlands, the Dutch Lower House adopted a non-binding motion calling on the government to designate the Antifa movement as a terrorist organisation, here again with an impulse from far-right members of parliament (MPs, from Forum voor Democratie, BoerBurgerBeweging, and Partij voor de Vrijheid).⁴⁵⁶ In Poland, the opposition party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) also called on the new government to push for an EU ban on Antifa, and announced it would formally ask Prime Minister Donald Tusk to table this at the EU.⁴⁵⁷ In Spain, far-right party Vox launched an online petition to a designation.⁴⁵⁸ Most importantly, Hungary took an unprecedented step and created its own national terrorist list in order to immediately list the Antifa and an affiliated German militant group Hammerbande (also referred as Antifa Ost) as terrorist.⁴⁵⁹ As of mid-2026, Hungary remains the only EU MS that actually banned Antifa.

Right-wing politicians in general seized on the idea, and submitted a motion in the European Parliament in October 2025, calling for Antifa to be declared a terrorist organisation; the motion was signed by 79 MEPs from 20 different EU MS.⁴⁶⁰ Although this resolution was once again non-binding – only the Council (i.e. EU member state governments) can alter the terror list – it sought to steer a new direction in counter-terrorism priorities. Still, much of the reporting on the topic considers the expansion of the EU terrorism listing towards LWE to be unlikely in the short term. Europol and security services note that left-wing terrorist activity is relatively low compared to jihadi and right-wing threats;⁴⁶¹ moreover, Antifa is better qualified as a loose movement rather than a single structure group, making formal listing legally problematic.⁴⁶² While the Council of the EU designated The Base in spite of its decentralised character, it considered the fact it had an identifiable leader, membership vetting, as well as operational intent.⁴⁶³ This would prove more difficult to put into legal action in the case of Antifa, whose violence remains more episodic, localised, and usually unpremeditated.⁴⁶⁴

Thus, despite occurrences of violence and political noise, under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, Antifa remains framed as street-level disorder and extremism at the EU level rather than as terrorism.⁴⁶⁵

453 NL Times, “Dutch parliament wants to follow U.S. example and label Antifa a terrorist organization”, 19 September 2025, <https://nltimes.nl/2025/09/19/dutch-parliament-wants-follow-us-example-label-antifa-terrorist-organization>.

454 Lecerf, “It Can’t Happen Here”? Designating Antifa as a Terrorist Organisation in Europe.

455 Ibid.

456 NL Times, “Dutch parliament wants to follow U.S. example and label Antifa a terrorist organization”, 19 September 2025, <https://nltimes.nl/2025/09/19/dutch-parliament-wants-follow-us-example-label-antifa-terrorist-organization>.

457 Lecerf, “It Can’t Happen Here”? Designating Antifa as a Terrorist Organisation in Europe.

458 Ibid.

459 Ibid.

460 Ibid.

461 Ibid.

462 Ibid.

463 Renard, and Rekawek, *The Base, and the Basis for Listing Far-Right Terror Groups*.

464 Lecerf, “It Can’t Happen Here”? Designating Antifa as a Terrorist Organisation in Europe.

465 Council of the EU, “Sanctions against terrorism”.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

In July 2025, Belgium's foreign-affairs committee had already approved a resolution urging the government to add the IRGC to Belgium's – and the EU's – terror lists, to freeze its assets, and to press Tehran to free Swedish-Iranian academic Ahmadreza Djalali.⁴⁶⁶ Germany, Italy, and more recently France and Spain's support for the designation led to a formal addition of the IRGC to the EU terrorist list in its January 2026 review, after unanimous approval from all 27 MS.⁴⁶⁷ Though the EU likely chose to designate exclusively the IRGC (and not the entire government) as terrorist in an attempt to maintain dialogue and stability in Iran's government,⁴⁶⁸ Tehran described the EU decision as a “stunt” and a “major strategic mistake”.⁴⁶⁹

Domestic Sanctions: AGE, RWE, and LWE in Germany, France, and Belgium

Countries within the EU sometimes possess tools allowing them to domestically sanction individuals and organisations they deem terrorist with more flexibility, for example through dissolutions, bans, or enhanced surveillance.

In May 2025, Germany outlawed Königreich Deutschland (KRD, Kingdom of Germany), the biggest and most subversive Reichsbürger group promoting AGE sentiment in the country.⁴⁷⁰ The ban order resulted in the seizure of the group's assets, police raids on properties across seven states, the shutting down of KRD's online presence, and the arrest of its ringleader Peter Fitzek.⁴⁷¹ Among others, the KRD's activities involved setting up a pseudo-state with its own “ministries,” issuing fake ID cards, and refusing to recognise Germany's legitimate government.⁴⁷² Activist influencer group Muslim Interaktiv was also banned in November for its calls for a caliphate.⁴⁷³

In June 2025, France's Council of Ministers announced the dissolution of both the Jeune Garde, a left-wing anti-fascist movement, and Lyon Populaire, a far-right group.⁴⁷⁴ In September, France also dissolved the European Institute of Human Sciences, a school of imams accused of legitimising “armed jihad”.⁴⁷⁵

A procedure to dissolve the Urgence Palestine group is also ongoing, but has so far faced concerns from UN special rapporteurs and Amnesty's French antenna regarding potential human rights violations.⁴⁷⁶

Outside organisations, in August 2025, Belgium withdrew the right of asylum from the coordinator of the European Samidoun network, a network of solidarity with Palestinian prisoners that had already

466 Iran International, “Belgian parliament committee backs IRGC terror listing, MP says”, 3 July 2025, <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507034124>.

467 Jozwiak, “Brussels Weighs IRGC Terrorist Designation As Sanctions Debate Intensifies”; Aikman, Ian, and Ben Hatton, “EU adds Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorist list”, *BBC News*, 30 January 2026, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20gypw8enjo>.

468 Schwammenthal, Daniel, “The EU Needs to Designate Hezbollah as a Terrorist Organization”, *American Jewish Committee (AJC)*, 21 July 2023, <https://www.ajc.org/news/the-eu-needs-to-designate-hezbollah-as-a-terrorist-organization>.

469 Aikman, and Hatton, “EU adds Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorist list”.

470 Cole, Deborah, “Germany bans major part of far-right movement seeking to undermine state”, *The Guardian*, 13 May 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/13/ban-major-part-of-far-right-movement-kingdom-of-germany-seeking-to-undermine-state>.

471 Cole, “Germany bans major part of far-right movement seeking to undermine state”.

472 Ibid.

473 Reuters, “Germany bans Muslim Interaktiv association, searches properties”, 5 November 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/germany-bans-muslim-interaktiv-association-searches-properties-2025-11-05/>.

474 Le Monde, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “La Jeune Garde et Lyon Populaire ont été dissous, selon le ministre de l'intérieur, Bruno Retailleau” [La Jeune Garde and Lyon Populaire have been dissolved, according to Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau], 12 June 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/06/12/le-ministre-de-l-interieur-bruno-retailleau-annonce-la-dissolution-de-la-jeune-garde-et-de-lyon-populaire_6612522_823448.html.

475 Le Monde, and Agence France Presse (AFP), “L'Institut européen des sciences humaines, école d'imams soupçonnée de légitimer « le djihad armé », dissoute en conseil des ministres” [The European Institute of Human Sciences, an imam school suspected of legitimising “armed jihad”, dissolved in the Council of Ministers], 3 September 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/religions/article/2025/09/03/l-institut-europeen-des-sciences-humaines-ecole-d-imams-soupconnee-de-legitimer-le-djihad-arme-dissoute-en-conseil-des-ministres_6638746_1653130.html.

476 Migeant, Pauline, “Dissolution d'Urgence Palestine : face aux rapporteurs spéciaux de l'ONU, la France botte en touche” [Dissolution of Palestine Emergency: in the face of UN special rapporteurs, France kicks sidelines], *Politix*, 28 November 2025, <https://www.politis.fr/articles/2025/11/dissolution-durgence-palestine-face-aux-rapporteurs-speciaux-de-lonu-la-france-botte-en-touche/>; Le Monde, and AFP “La Jeune Garde et Lyon Populaire ont été dissous, selon le ministre de l'intérieur, Bruno Retailleau”.

been banned in Germany in 2023.⁴⁷⁷ In January 2026, Estonia banned entry to at least 261 Russian citizens known to have fought in Ukraine, some of whom were implicated in terror against civilians to prevent potential terrorists from coming to Estonia.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁷ Steffens, Eric, "La Belgique retire le droit d'asile à Mohammed Khatib, coordinateur de Samidoun en Europe" ["Belgium withdraws the right of asylum from Mohammed Khatib, coordinator of Samidoun in Europe"], *VRT News*, 7 August 2025, <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/fr/2025/08/07/la-belgique-re-tire-le-droit-dasile-a-mohammed-khatib-coordinate/>.

⁴⁷⁸ ERR News, "Estonia bars entry to 261 Russian citizens who fought in Ukraine war ", *LRT*, 12 January 2026, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2804248/estonia-bars-entry-to-261-russian-citizens-who-fought-in-ukraine-war?srltid=AfmBOoqx19oEPqefCsaact2pXf-H8TCstm0K8_UgAnU-A9ZsJ5Dm2L3K6.

8. Communication and Transparency

Transparency in counter-terrorism reporting is a crucial measure of how security institutions engage with the public and convey their priorities. Though all EU MS acknowledge terrorism as a threat in their annual security reports or risk assessments, fewer than half provide specialised documents solely dedicated to counter-terrorism and only Czechia separates (jihadi) terrorism and political extremism into different reports.⁴⁷⁹ Instead, most EU MS feature CT within their broader defence and security reports or strategies.⁴⁸⁰ Moreover, some EU MS focus on sub-elements of the terrorist threat in their outward communication – for example, the Netherlands also report on the critical infrastructure threat landscape,⁴⁸¹ and five countries publish separate reports dealing with money laundering and terrorism financing.⁴⁸²

Beyond annual reports or strategic documents, public threat level communication varies widely among EU MS. Almost all countries supplement their official threat levels with qualitative explanations to provide the public with a broader context on why a given country maintains a certain level at any moment.⁴⁸³ This approach helps justify government responses and promote public awareness. Germany, Lithuania, and Italy stand apart by opting for qualitative assessments and no numeric or ALPHA-BRAVO-CHARLIE quantitative systems.

While more than half of reporting countries (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, German, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden) now provide summaries or full reports in English, a large number (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain) still restrict their publications to national languages. Some countries like France, interestingly, also publish German versions of their documents.

Moreover, even among those publishing in English, translated reports sometimes only come out months after the original language one. France's AML/CFT authority Tracfin, for instance, published its English report in February 2026 although its French one was available as early as 29 September 2025.⁴⁸⁴

In continuity with last year's reports findings, in most countries, counter-terrorism efforts remain typically documented and published by ministries of the interior or foreign affairs websites, as well as by specialised intelligence agencies or dedicated platforms, such as centres focused on counter-terrorism and hybrid threats like the CUTA in Belgium or the Dutch NCTV.⁴⁸⁵ France, for instance, consistently maintains a comprehensive online presence, with frequent updates on legislation,⁴⁸⁶ policy changes, and counter-terrorism operations, but still does not have a single overarching national report on the phenomenon of terrorism. At the same time, Denmark's PET website, which published an annual report, keeps providing monthly updates on court cases, legislative developments,

479 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nendávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024].

480 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvešće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali ghas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat ghas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]; Policija, *Letno poročilo o delu policije za leto 2024* [Annual Police Report for 2024].

481 NCTV, *Critical National Infrastructure Threat Landscape 2025*.

482 CTIF–CFI, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; Tracfin, *AML/CFT: Threat Assessment 2024–2025*; Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*; Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024]; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*; Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières (CTIF) – De Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking (CFI), *Rapport d'activités 2024* [Activity Report 2024] (21 June 2025), https://www.ordevanvlaamsebalies.be/nl/fetch-asset?path=ovb/CTIF-CFI_JV24_NL_2024.pdf.

483 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia.

484 Tracfin, *AML/CFT: Threat Assessment 2024–2025*.

485 Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic], “Boj proti terorismu” [Fight Against Terrorism], https://mzv.gov.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/bezpecnostni_politika/boj_proti_terorismu/index.html; Sisäministeriö [Ministry of the Interior], “Terrorismin torjunta” [Counter-Terrorism], <https://intermin.fi/poliisiasiat/terrorismin-torjunta>; Ministerstvo na v'nshnite raboti na Republika B'Igarija [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria], “Borba s terorizma” [Fight Against Terrorism]; <https://www.mfa.bg/bg/3103>.

486 Vie publique, “Chronologie de la législation antiterroriste (1986–2024)” [Chronology of Antiterrorism Legislation (1986–2024)], <https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/18530-chronologie-de-la-legislation-antiterroriste-1986-2024>.

and arrests.⁴⁸⁷ Estonia is another example that also demonstrates a strong online presence and a commitment to inform while publishing frequent updates related to counter-terrorism legislation and investigations.⁴⁸⁸ On the other hand, countries like Cyprus and Slovakia provide very limited information on the aforementioned topics online.

Including quantitative data like number of arrests, prosecutions, or monitored individuals is key to assessing transparency. Like in previous years, Belgium, Germany, and Austria stand out by providing detailed tables and statistics that make it easier to analyse trends and understand counter-terrorism operations in a national context. Belgium's CUTA and Austria's Ministry of the Interior continually share comprehensive data on monitored individuals and investigations, Germany's reports as well as website offer detailed figures on arrests, prosecutions, and international collaboration. Countries like Spain also include data on arrest figures, however, the presentation lacks the level of detail and specificity found in the reports from Belgium, Germany, and Austria.

The Table 1 below attempts to take stock of this complicated picture of EU MS (not) reporting transparently to the public on terrorism, CT, or P/CVE in 2025.

487 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste [Danish Security and Intelligence Service], "Center for Terroranalyse: Terrortruslen mod Danmark er skærpet" [Center for Terror Analysis: The Terror Threat Against Denmark is Heightened], 21 March 2024, <https://pet.dk/pet/nyhedsliste/terrortruslen-mod-dan-mark-erskaerpet/2024/03/21>.

488 Siseministeerium [Estonian Ministry of the Interior]. "Terrorismi tõkestamine" [Combating Terrorism], <https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/combating-terrorism>.

Table 1: Transparency in Counter-Terrorism and P/CVE Reporting Across EU Member States

Country	Terrorism within general security report	Separate document for terrorist threat assessment	Communicates on CT or P/CVE	Language
Austria	✓	X	✓	German
Belgium	✓	X	✓	Dutch, French, English and German
Bulgaria	(activity report)	X	✓	Bulgarian
Croatia	✓	X	✓	Croatian
Cyprus	X	X	X	
Czechia	✓	✓	✓	Czech and English
Denmark	✓	✓	✓	Danish and English
Estonia	✓	X	✓	Estonian and English
Finland	✓	X	✓	Finnish and English
France	X	✓	✓	French, English and German
Germany	✓	X	✓	German and English
Greece	(activity report)	X	✓	Greek and English
Hungary	X	X	X	Hungarian
Ireland	X	For ML/FT	✓	English
Italy	✓	For ML	✓	Italian
Latvia	✓	For ML/TF	✓	Latvian and English
Lithuania	✓	X	✓	Lithuanian and English
Luxembourg	(activity report)	For ML/TF (but not in 2025)	✓	French and English
Malta	✓	X	✓	Maltese
Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	Dutch and English
Poland	X	X	✓ (website)	Polish
Portugal	✓	X	✓	Portuguese
Romania	X	(activity report)	✓	Romanian
Slovakia	X	X	X	
Slovenia	(activity report)	X	✓	Slovenian
Spain	✓	X	✓	Spanish
Sweden	✓	✓	✓	Swedish and English

Note: ✓ indicates the presence of information or documentation; X indicates its absence.

Conclusion: 2026 trends

Europol's *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2026* (EU TE-SAT), published in July 2026, summarises terrorism and counter-terrorism developments of the previous year, which emanate from country data forwarded to the agency by the EU MS. The report largely confirms findings from this report. It concludes that jihadism continues to remain Europe's primary terrorist threat and is responsible for more than 50 percent of terrorist attacks in the EU and 71 percent of terrorism arrests in the EU MS. At the same time, however, as has been underscored in this report, the terrorism "threat landscape was further complicated by destabilising ideological currents, blurred ideological boundaries, and other forms of violence." Terrorism in Europe, according to EU TE-SAT, is dominated by simple attacks perpetrated by "lone actors or small, self-initiated cells." Moreover, the report also notes that the metastasising geopolitical reality allows for a rejuvenation of extremist narrative which act as radicalisation and recruitment drivers. This rejuvenation is mostly conducted online with the support of different AI tools and AI generated materials.⁴⁸⁹

In 2026, many of these trends will continue or possibly take on more significance. This section does not aim for comprehensiveness nor predictive power, but to highlight some of the key trends that will likely be high on the priorities of European counter-terrorism.

The resurgence of state-linked terrorism in Europe is certainly a growing concern for security services, whether originating from Russia (via its crime-terror nexus, as theorised and described by ICCT in another publication)⁴⁹⁰ or from Iran (as represented by Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) [Islamic Movement of the People of the Right]).⁴⁹¹ The latter has been called a creation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and is held responsible for a string of attacks on Jewish targets throughout Europe.⁴⁹² Following these attacks, a series of investigations and arrests took place. The most prominent example was outside of the EU, in the United Kingdom, where at least 28 arrests took place. The Netherlands conducted ten arrests, France conducted four, and Belgium conducted seven. Several arrested were formally charged. Interestingly, different countries treated the incidents differently. Dutch and French authorities have treated them as terrorism-related offenses, filing charges for arson with terrorist intent, and "attempted destruction in connection with a terrorist enterprise."⁴⁹³ At the same time, British authorities have mainly pursued standard criminal charges like arson and criminal damage, despite the London cases being investigated by counterterrorism police.⁴⁹⁴

HAYI showcases a potentially dangerous trend in terrorism development across EU MS, namely the ability and preparedness of nefarious state actors to invent and then launch groupings staffed with deniable and single use agents/terrorist operators as a part of their operations in Europe. These can be directed to punish defectors, dissidents or a given regime's adversaries present in Europe (as is the case with the Russian hybrid campaign of kinetic incidents), or for example, to directly attack communities or installations associated with state adversary of the nefarious regime (as is the case with Iran targeting Jewish targets, in their minds – synonymous with Israeli). In this sense, EU MS could become not only targets but also, just like in the 1970s and the 1980s, an arena for terrorism score settling by outside powers. This will have serious implications for the security structures of the EU MS which have focused their attention on the bottom-up terroristic efforts of the jihadis and the extreme-right and not necessarily state-backed operators supported by Moscow or Tehran.

489 See: Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2026* (EU TE-SAT), 13 July 2026, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-TE-SAT-2026.pdf>.

490 Kacper Rekawek, Julian Lanches, Maria Zotova, *Russia's Crime-Terror Nexus. Criminality as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Europe*, ICCT, GLOBSEC: September 2025, https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2025-09/Russia%20Crime%20Terror%20Nexus_Criminality%20as%20a%20Tool.pdf.

491 Julian Lanches, Uljana Vlagimirova, *Hybrid Threat Signals: Assessing Possible Iranian Involvement in Recent Attacks in Europe*, ICCT: 23 March 2026, <https://icct.nl/publication/hybrid-threat-signals-assessing-possible-iranian-involvement-recent-attacks-europe>.

492 See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-iran-linked-criminal-group-that-publicly-claimed-responsibility-for-recent-attacks-on-jewish-locations> for the comments on HAYI and its designation as a terrorist organization by the UK government.

493 Lisa Vinogradova, "Four Suspects in Rotterdam Synagogue Attack Formally Charged With Terrorism," *Dutch Brief*, 17 March 2026, <https://www.dutchbrief.com/p/four-suspects-in-rotterdam-synagogue-attack-formally-charged-with-terrorism>.

494 Shtuni, Andrian, "Deniable, Disposable, Disruptive: Iran's Hybrid Warfare in Europe Demands a Proactive Response," The Washington Institute, May 4, 2026, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/deniable-disposable-disruptive-irans-hybrid-warfare-europe-demands-proactive>.

In this context, the ongoing war between the US, Israel and Iran started on the 28 February 2026 also contributes to the further destabilisation of the international security environment. Iranian proxy activities outside of the region, including in Europe, increase the chance of more terrorist attacks on Jewish and Israeli institutions and individuals, Iranian dissidents, and other targets.⁴⁹⁵

Overall, what the above developments underscore is the increased blurring of the lines between criminality, terrorism and hybrid warfare. States have now the demonstrated capacity and will to recruit individuals, notably online, to conduct criminal or terrorist acts with a good degree of plausible deniability. This challenges profoundly Europe's threat perception and counter measures, as the responses to criminal acts, terrorist operations and hybrid warfare are different – and yet must now be reconciled.

Next to state-linked threats, it is also possible that European jihadism will receive a boost due to recent developments. On 30 January 2026, the infamous al-Hol camp where thousands of foreign fighters families were kept was closed, and many “left in a largely unplanned and chaotic manner,” according to Human Rights Watch.⁴⁹⁶ Just before, a few thousand ISIS foreign fighters had been transferred from Syria to Iraq, in the context of the clashes between Syrian government forces and Kurdish militias, while some individuals also reportedly escaped.⁴⁹⁷ This new situation creates a renewed risk for European countries to see some of these individuals returning to Europe and pose a threat.

Meanwhile, Africa remains the continent most affected by jihadist terrorism and holds a certain spillover potential into Europe. Several jihadist groups across Africa either control territory or sustain long-running insurgencies. For example, JNIM in Mali has emerged as a highly potent actor and poses a significant threat, with the group already controlling substantial parts of the country.⁴⁹⁸ While JNIM has so far shown little interest in attack plotting beyond its regional focus, al-Qaeda (to which JNIM is affiliated) doctrine at one point inevitably implies transnational ambitions. Should JNIM gain real power, Mali could serve as a training hub for individuals to receive combat training, while JNIM would also gain significant financial and operational resources that could support external attack capabilities.

Similarly, several IS affiliates have demonstrated ambitions extending beyond their immediate areas of operation. For example, IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has shown interest in facilitating or coordinating activities in Spain.⁴⁹⁹ Other affiliates, such as IS-S, have not been directly linked to external attack plotting, but play an important role as financial and logistical hubs within the broader Islamic State network.

Far-left violent extremism is also likely to rise on the security services' agenda, although it is unlikely to surpass threats from jihadi or far-right terrorism. First, as this report has shown, events in the Middle East, and especially those related to the Gaza War and the US/Israel-Iran war, animate a more active and militant far-left milieu which might result in more political violence.⁵⁰⁰ Second, there is a growing pressure from the US ally to focus more on this particular threat, as illustrated by the summit on countering “far-left international terrorism,”⁵⁰¹ hosted by US State Secretary Marco Rubio on 16 July

495 Lanchès, Julian, Vlagimirova, Uljana, “Hybrid threat signals: Assessing possible Iranian involvement in recent attacks in Europe,” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, 23 March 2026, <https://icct.nl/publication/hybrid-threat-signals-assessing-possible-iranian-involvement-recent-attacks-europe>.

496 Human Rights Watch, “Northeast Syria: Camp Closures Leave Thousands Stranded,” 23 February 2026, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/23/northeast-syria-camp-closures-leave-thousands-stranded>.

497 Ghaith al Sayed et al., “US military transfers first 150 Islamic State detainees from Syria to Iraq,” *Associated Press*, 21 January 2026, <https://ap-news.com/article/syria-alhol-sdf-hassakeh-islamic-state-prisoners-2b4ec1e38c689b1858655de0c25e10ef>.

498 Nasr, Wali,), “Mali: What were the reasons and the consequences of the 25 April attacks?,” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, 28 May 2026, <https://icct.nl/publication/mali-what-were-reasons-and-consequences-25-april-attacks>.

499 Wójcik, Paweł, & Webber, Lucas, “Local expansion, transnational interests? The evolution of the Islamic State's Sahel Province,” *Hudson Institute*, 8 July 2026, <https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/local-expansion-transnational-interests-evolution-islamic-states-sahel-province-pawel-wojcik-lucas-webber>.

500 Maciej Czarnecki, „Rubio organizuje szczyt o „skrajnie lewicowym terroryzmie”. Ekspert: Europa pod presją,” [Rubio organises a summit on ‘far-left terrorism.’ Expert: Europe Under Pressure], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16 July 2026, <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,32916286,rubio-organizuje-szczyt-o-skrajnie-lewicowym-terroryzmie.html>.

501 See: U.S. Department of State's factsheet on the issue of the summit of July 16, 2006, <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/state-department-addresses-international-resurgence-of-far-left-political-terrorism/>.

2026, in presence of most EU member states. Navigating this political pressure will become a key challenge in itself for European leaders, as well as for security services – one that could have very serious consequences, since US intelligence services contribute significantly to European counter-terrorism operations.

Beyond the traditional categories of terrorism ideologies, another major concern for security services will remain the further blurring of these categories, and of the role of ideology more broadly, under the established label of *salad bar extremism*.⁵⁰² More specifically, the so-called NVE, nihilistic violent extremism, will probably acquire more weight in the reporting on violent extremism and terrorism emanating from EU MS, as is already the case with the Dutch *Terrorist Threat Assessment* for July 2026 which mentions NVE for the first time.⁵⁰³ Anti-technology extremism, which is also cutting across different ideologies, could also become a greater focus for security services, in light of recent attacks against AI or technology companies.⁵⁰⁴

Finally, the radicalisation of (very) young individuals is likely to remain a key concern for security services in 2026. As discussed in this report, the number of minors arrested in relation to terrorism has been rising for the past couple of years already. Young people are continuously exposed to extremist content online, but they also become themselves producers of such content – helped by new AI tools. The radicalisation of minors is not only a security threat, but it also raises significant questions to European lawmakers and online regulators for a better protection of vulnerable youth. These debates will undoubtedly perdure in 2026.

502 See: special issue of *Advances in the Psychology of Violent Extremism*, <https://advances.in/psychology/10.56296/psychology-of-violent-extremism/>, for a discussion on the term and its usefulness to our understanding of terrorism.

503 NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland juni 2026* [Terrorist Threat Assessment 2026], Hague: June 2026, <https://www.nctv.nl/document-en/2026/06/30/dreigingsbeeld-terrorisme-nederland-juni-2026>.

504 Lubrano, Mauro, “War against technology: An analysis of recent developments in anti-technology violence,” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, 11 May 2026., <https://icct.nl/publication/war-against-technology-analysis-recent-developments-anti-technology-violence>.

Appendix: Methodology

For this report, ICCT first tracked annual reports published by national CT and P/CVE services. However, not all EU MS communicate openly (or annually) on counter-terrorism. As a result, more reports were covered to provide a fuller picture of the world of CT and P/CVE from the eyes of CT professionals. To glean the CT and P/CVE knowledge, we included 41 documents in our sample, which could be categorised into five groups:

1. CT- and P/CVE-focused documents (8), in which the agency or the ministry tasked with overseeing of such efforts reports on its activities from the past year and/or assesses current and future threats.⁵⁰⁵
2. Broader security reports (21) of intelligence agencies, ministries, or the police, which offer yearly assessments of their activities related to national security, counter-terrorism, intelligence, or all of these together.⁵⁰⁶
3. Strategic documents (3), such as national security strategies, outlining overarching approaches to all security threats, or counter-terrorism specific strategies that focus on prevention and adaptation to evolving threats (e.g., defence strategies, while mostly focused on military preparedness, were also included due to their content overlap with aforementioned documents).⁵⁰⁷
4. Finance-related reports (7), covering activities and current TF challenges faced by financial intelligence services.⁵⁰⁸
5. The final category includes unique or one-off documents (2), such as the Netherlands' report on threats to national critical infrastructure or Spain's report on the removal of online terrorist content.⁵⁰⁹

Despite this approach, not all countries and categories are equally represented. Some countries have multiple detailed documents across all categories, while others contributed fewer or less comprehensive materials. Moreover, in many cases, the relevant documents were outdated and thus not included in our sample of secondary sources. This report covers documents published in 2025, and early 2026 only, with a few exceptions from late 2024 deemed relevant.

In certain cases, such as discussions of major CT operations by different EU countries, the research team went outside the list of sources provided above and decided to use other published and widely available sources such as media articles. This was done to ensure the widest and most up-to-date coverage of CT-related events in the EU MS. All in all, 108 news articles were used in this analysis,

505 OBP, *Zpráva o Extremismu a Předsudečné Nenávisti na Území České Republiky v roce 2024* [Report on Extremism and Prejudicial Hate in the Czech Republic in 2024]; CTA, *Vurdering af terrortruslen mod Danmark 2025* [Assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark 2025]; Rodde, *Terrorism in France: Overview of the French Extremist Movements in 2024*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – December 2024*; NCTV, *Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands – June 2025*; NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 2025* [Terrorism Threat Assessment Netherlands 2025]; DIICOT, *Raport de Activitate 2024* [Activity Report 2024]; NCT, *Annual Review 2025*.

506 DSN, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; CUTA, *Annual Report 2024*; DANS, *GodishniJat doklad za dejnostta prez 2024* [The Annual Activity Report 2024]; SOA, *Javno Izvješće 2025* [Public Report 2025]; BIS, *Annual Report for 2024*; KAPO, *Annual Review 2024–2025*; SUPO, *National Security Overview 2025*; BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024* [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2024]; EYP, *Annual Report of Priorities and Key Fields of Activity 23/24*; Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione Annuale sulla Politica dell'Informazione per la Sicurezza 2025* [Annual Report on Information Security Policy 2025]; VDD, *Annual Report for 2024*; VDD, *Annual Report for 2025*; AOTD, *2025 National Threat Assessment*; Police Lëtzebuerg, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; Kamra tar-Rappreżentanti, *Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2023 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà & Rapport Annwali għas-Sena 2024 tal-Kumitat għas-Sigurtà* [Annual Report for the Year 2023 of the Security Committee & Annual Report for the Year 2024 of the Security Committee]; AIVD, *Annual Report 2024*; SSI, *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna RASI 2024* [Annual Internal Security Report RASI 2024]; Policija, *Letno poročilo o delu policije za leto 2024* [Annual Police Report for 2024]; Ministerio de la Presidencia, Justicia y Relaciones con las Cortes, *Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2024* [2024 National Security Annual Report]; VSSE, *Intelligence Report 2025*.

507 SGDSN, *National Strategic Review 2025*; German Federal Government, *Working together to promote democracy and fight extremism*; An Garda Síochána, *Annual Security Services Plan 2025*.

508 CTIF–CFI, *Rapport d'activités 2024* [2024 Activity Report]; Tracfin, *AML/CTF: Threat Assessment 2024–2025*; Irish anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit, *Ireland Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*; Csf, *Analisi Nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio di denaro – Novembre 2024* [National Analysis of Money Laundering Risks – November 2024]; UIF, *Annual Report 2024*; FIU Latvia, *Guidelines on the Prevention of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing*; Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, *2025 National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering*.

509 NCTV, *Critical National Infrastructure Threat Landscape 2025*; CITCO, *Transparency Report 2023–2024: Removal of terrorist content*.

allowing the research team to gather information on countries that do not publish official CT-relevant reports, such as Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

To complement these findings, the ICCT research team partnered with CT and P/CVE experts from fifteen different European countries, all of whom kindly accepted to gather information on recent terrorist plots unveiled, arrests, sanctions and penalties, as well as on legislation. As such, the ICCT research team working on this project would like to thank Nicolas Stockhammer, Miroslav Mareš, Tommi Kotonen, Marc Hecker, Ioannis Armakolas, Péter Marton, John Morrison, Jānis Bērziņš, Tomas Janeliūnas, Cátia de Carvalho, Isabela Pirlogea, Tomáš Beňuška, Alvaro Vicente for their respective inputs on Austria, Czechia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.

Appendix: Acronyms

AGE	Anti-government extremism/extremist
AI	Artificial intelligence
AIVD	(Dutch) General Intelligence and Security Service
(A)ML/(C)TF	(Anti-)money laundering and (countering) terrorist financing
CFT	Countering the financing of terrorism
CT	Counterterrorism
CTA	(Danish) Centre for Terror Analysis
CUTA	(Belgian) Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis
DGSI	(French) General Directorate for Internal Security
EES	(European) Entry/Exit System
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
ICCT	International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
IRGC	(Iranian) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISKP	Islamic State in the Khorasan Province
IVTS	Informal value transfer systems
KRD	(German) <i>Königreich Deutschland</i> , Kingdom of Germany
LWE	Left-wing extremism/extremist
MAL	(Portuguese) <i>Movimento Armilar Lusitano</i> , Lusitanian Armillary Movement
MS	Member State(s)
NCTV	(Dutch) National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P/CVE	Prevention and countering of violent extremism
PET	(Danish) Security and Intelligence Service
PKK	(Kurdish) <i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i> , Kurdistan Workers' Party
PSP	Payment service provider
RAD	Referral Action Day
RWE	Right-wing extremism/extremist
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
TTP	<i>Tehreek-e-Taliban</i> Pakistan, Pakistani Taliban
UN	United Nations
VASP	Virtual asset service provider
vIBAN	Virtual international bank account number

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