



Addressing Online Youth Radicalisation  
in The Netherlands:  
Strategic Policy Recommendations for  
Prevention and Institutional Reform

---

Jade Hutchinson



International Centre for  
Counter-Terrorism

# Addressing Online Youth Radicalisation in The Netherlands: Strategic Policy Recommendations for Prevention and Institutional Reform

---

Jade Hutchinson  
ICCT Policy Brief  
June 2026



International Centre for  
Counter-Terrorism

## About ICCT

---

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism.

ICCT's work focuses on themes at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human rights-related aspects of counter-terrorism. The major project areas concern countering violent extremism, rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims' voices. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism.

### Licensing and Distribution

ICCT publications are published in open access format and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

This article represents the views of the author(s) solely. ICCT is an independent foundation and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy, unless clearly stated otherwise.

Photo credit: Vlad Deep/Unsplash



# Contents

---

<b>About ICCT</b>	iii
<b>Abstract</b>	1
<b>Introduction</b>	2
<b>Data and Methods</b>	4
<b>Policy Gaps and Institutional Challenges</b>	5
<b>Strategic Recommendations</b>	8
<b>Conclusion</b>	11
<b>Bibliography</b>	12
<b>About the Author</b>	16

# Abstract

This policy brief synthesises the assessments and reflections of fifty frontline practitioners, policy-makers, academics, as well as intelligence and law enforcement employees operating in the Netherlands to present an overview of and policy recommendations for understanding and addressing emerging trends in online youth radicalisation. Key recommendations include advancing contextual digital media literacy, promoting youth-driven, peer-to-peer-norm setting initiatives, with particular attention to youth who are neurodivergent, socially isolated, or navigating identity challenges, and strengthening institutional capacity for building non-securitised, developmentally-sensitive prevention practices.

## Introduction

Online youth radicalisation is an increasingly pressing concern for Europe, and the Netherlands more specifically. The Netherlands has experienced a significant evolution in the national radicalisation threat landscape over the past two decades. In 2004, a watershed moment occurred with the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a convicted terrorist, which became a critical turning point and influenced the country's approach to prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE). From 2014 to 2016, the departure of over 300 Dutch youths and young adults to join the so-called Islamic State prompted the Dutch government to develop comprehensive “broad” and “early-stage” prevention programming, with particular emphasis on educational settings as critical intervention points.<sup>1</sup> Although the Netherlands benefits from strong social welfare infrastructure and psychologically supportive public health services, the country is not immune to the drivers and consequences of online youth radicalisation.

Radicalisation is increasingly understood to be a dynamic and situated interaction between individuals and their social, technological, psychological, and institutional environments.<sup>2</sup> This places emphasis on the embeddedness and systematic conditioning of radicalisation in wider environments, such as developmental pressures, community relationships, critical digital media infrastructures, and grievances between sub-cultures. Drawing from this, this policy brief views online youth radicalisation as the cumulation of social and emotional displacements, enduring and affecting multiple levels of the individual's development, shaped and facilitated by the relationships the individual maintains with personal technologies that repeatedly bring extremist ideologies into view.<sup>3</sup> In the case of adolescents (aged approximately 12 – 17 years old), when repeated exposure to extremist ideologies is partnered with “positive” reinforcers, including constructive parasocial relationships with online influencers and peer-to-peer validation, teenage moral and cultural tendencies tend to develop differently to their counterparts. For instance, dulling their reactionary moral sensitivity to certain cultural violations and challenging their personal emotional responses that may have otherwise discouraged them from adopting more transgressive notions or behaviours.<sup>4</sup> These sensitivities have well-known neurodevelopmental foundations. Executive functions underpinning decision-making, social rewards for aggressive behaviour, impulse control, and abstract reasoning continue to mature throughout adolescence, limiting young people's capacity to appraise the moral or philosophical dimensions of extremist ideology without external guidance.<sup>5</sup>

What worsens this situation are online networks affiliated with anti-government conspiracies, jihadist extremism, and far-right and extremely misogynistic ideologies, creating and disseminating

1 Floris Vermeulen and Koen Visser, “Preventing Violent Extremism in the Netherlands: Overview of Its Broad Approach,” *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no. 128 (2021): 131-151, [https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/revista\\_cidob\\_d\\_afers\\_internacionals/128/preventing\\_violent\\_extremism\\_in\\_the\\_netherlands\\_overview\\_of\\_its\\_broad\\_approach](https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/128/preventing_violent_extremism_in_the_netherlands_overview_of_its_broad_approach); Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid [National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security], *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 2022–2026* [National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022–2026] (Den Haag: Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 20 May, 2022), <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/publicaties/2022/05/20/nationale-contraterrorisme-strategie-ncts-2022-2026>.

2 Stefan Malthaner, “Radicalization: The Evolution of an Analytical Paradigm,” *European Journal of Sociology* 58, no. 3 (2017): 369–401, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975617000182>; Joel Busher, Donald Holbrook, and Graham Macklin, *Radicalisation: A Critical Reassessment* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

3 Jade Hutchinson et al., “‘I’m Not Super Familiar with Children’s Ecosystems Online’: Expert Assessments on the Effects of Early Childhood Exposure to Extremism Online,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 19, no. 1 (2025): 65-90, <https://doi.org/10.19165/2025.5669>.

4 Jan-Jaap van Eerten et al., “Developing a Social Media Response to Radicalization: The Role of Counter-Narratives in Prevention of Radicalization and De-Radicalization” (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, Psychology Research Institute & Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, 2017), <https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=4fe0b95f-b5ec-45a1-b50a-2ff8287b4b1c>; Daniele Valentini, Anna Maria Lorusso, and Achim Stephan, “Online Extremism: Dynamic Integration of Digital and Physical Spaces in Radicalization,” *Frontiers in Psychology* 11 (2020): 524, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00524>.

5 Robert M. Sapolsky, *Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017); Eveline A. Crone, Anna C. K. van Duijvenvoorde, and Jiska S. Peper, “Annual Research Review: Neural Contributions to Risk-Taking in Adolescence — Developmental Changes and Individual Differences,” *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 57, no. 3 (2016): 353–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcpp.12502>; Guillaume Bronsard, Adrian Cherney, and Floris Vermeulen, “Editorial: Radicalization Among Adolescents,” *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 13 (2022): 917557, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.917557>; N. Campelo et al., “A Clinical and Psychopathological Approach to Radicalization Among Adolescents,” *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 13 (2022): 788154, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.788154>

propaganda increasingly designed for youth consumption.<sup>6</sup> This messaging is becoming more compelling and accessible because it circulates through platforms and devices Dutch youth use daily and near constantly, including smartphones, messaging apps, social media sites, video-sharing platforms, and online gaming or gaming adjacent spaces. Their design features, such as algorithmic personalisation recommendations, notifications, short-form video, influencer cultures, and peer-to-peer sharing functions, can repeatedly bring polarising or extremist material into ordinary youth digital media routines.<sup>7</sup> For example, extremely misogynistic viewpoints continue to emerge as an concerningly normalised dimension of peer culture, manifesting through hostile attitudes toward female authority figures, endorsement of patriarchal values, and the celebration of hypermasculine “entrepreneurial” subcultures promoted by social media “manospheric” influencers.<sup>8</sup>

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated adolescent online engagement trends, intensifying young people’s reliance on digital environments for social connection, entertainment, identity experimentation, and political meaning-making.<sup>9</sup> This does not mean the pandemic directly caused online radicalisation, but it did expand the everyday conditions in which adolescents could encounter extremist, conspiratorial, and misogynistic content during a critical developmental period.<sup>10</sup> Platform recommendation algorithms, inadequate Dutch-language content moderation, and the persuasive design of social media and smartphones create conditions where adolescents, particularly young boys, can rapidly encounter narratives organised around grievance, status anxiety, belonging, and oppositional identity.<sup>11</sup> These dynamics help explain why extremely misogynistic involuntary celibate extremist offer adolescent boys adversarial explanations for loneliness, rejection, masculinity, social status, and perceived humiliation, while circulating through the social and technological dynamics that are mainstreaming other extremist content.<sup>12</sup> For instance, Recent NCTV threat assessments have specified the contours of this online extremist landscape, identifying nihilistic violence networks including 764 and The Community alongside enduring concerns about jihadist or right-wing extremism among Dutch youth.<sup>13</sup> Contemporary concern about male-perpetrated interpersonal violence therefore provides an important Dutch and European policy backdrop and represents a more specific online extremist or extremist-adjacent formation relevant to gendered pathways to youth radicalisation prevention.<sup>14</sup> This matters for prevention because gendered extremist content, conspiracy narratives, and other forms of online radicalisation create safeguarding and intervention questions for schools, municipalities, youth-care professionals, and multi-agency structures tasked with responding to young people before ideological posturing hardens into harm.<sup>15</sup>

6 H. M. Duindam et al., “Far-Right Violent Radicalization Profiles of Youth in the Netherlands,” *Psychology of Violence* (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1037/vio0000545>.

7 David Yuzva Clement, Ruxandra Mihaela Gheorghe, and Jade Hutchinson, “Assessing Early Childhood Exposure to Online Extremist Content: Literature Overview and Expert Interviews,” *Prevent Research Report* (Brussels: Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2023); Jade Hutchinson et al., “Play as a Nazi Prison Guard’: Childhood and Adolescent Exposure to Online Extremist Materials in Online Gaming Environments,” *Frontiers in Psychology* 16 (2026), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1504584>.

8 Yuzva Clement, Gheorghe, and Hutchinson, “Assessing Early Childhood Exposure”; Hutchinson et al., “Play as a Nazi Prison Guard.”

9 Joe Whittaker, “Online Radicalisation: What We Know,” *Radicalisation Awareness Network* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/RAN-online-radicalisation\\_en.pdf](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/RAN-online-radicalisation_en.pdf); H. M. Duindam, J. J. Asscher, and F. Lösel, “Understanding Unrest: Conspiracy Belief and Violent Radicalization Patterns in Young People During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Netherlands,” *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-025-09634-z>.

10 Whittaker, “Online Radicalisation”; Duindam, Asscher, and Lösel, “Understanding Unrest.”

11 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) [General Intelligence and Security Service], “AIVD Sees Increase in Threat of Online Radicalisation of Minors,” 18 April, 2025, <https://english.aivd.nl/latest/news/2025/04/18/aivd-sees-increase-in-threat-of-online-radicalisation-minors>; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV), *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland December 2025* [Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands December 2025] (Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2025). <https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/b76acc72-b7e0-4e95-ac1b-7b9652a5554a/file>

12 Hutchinson et al., “I’m Not Super Familiar with Children’s Ecosystems Online”; Hutchinson et al., “Play as a Nazi Prison Guard”; Melissa S. de Roos, Laura Veldhuizen-Ochodničanová, and Alexis Hanna, “The Angry Echo Chamber: A Study of Extremist and Emotional Language Changes in Incel Communities Over Time,” *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 39, no. 21–22 (2024): 4573–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605241239451>; NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland December 2025*.

13 NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland December 2025*; AIVD, “Increase in Threat of Online Radicalisation of Minors.”

14 Duindam, Asscher, and Lösel, “Understanding Unrest”; de Roos et al., “Angry Echo Chamber”; NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland December 2025*.

15 Anna-Maria Andreeva and Menso Hartgers, *Multi-Agency Working in Practice: The Dutch Care and Safety Houses* (Den Haag: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 3 November, 2025), <https://icct.nl/publication/multi-agency-working-practice-dutch-care-and-safety-houses>.

In further recognition of this, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) emphasised the need to prevent “young people in particular” from engaging communities of extremism online in a recent national security strategy plan.<sup>16</sup> The Ministry of Justice and Security’s ‘Intensified Online Approach’ (*Contourenbrief Versterkte Aanpak Online*) supports this goal by engaging with the internet sector and legal infrastructure to curb digital harms and promote evidence-based prevention, all the while aligning national strategies with person-centred approaches that rely on administrative, judicial, and frontline professionals to offer tailored support to at-risk individuals.<sup>17</sup> P/CVE scholars, policy-makers, clinicians, and officers are increasingly employing multi-agency practices, combining education, community involvement, private company products, security, and counter-terrorism mechanisms effectively.<sup>18</sup> Although the Netherlands has devised and applied advanced P/CVE initiatives, there remain important trends and structural or institutional gaps to be aware of, and policy recommendations to consider.

Drawing from a qualitative research project that involved fifty interviews with Dutch professionals, this policy brief aims to translate the assessments and lived experiences of Dutch academics, leaders, officers, practitioners, and policy-makers into actionable guidance for national P/CVE improvement. The sections that follow outline this research’s data and methods, gaps in policy and institutional practice and perspectives, and present a three-part framework for reform across education, platform governance, and youth and civic P/CVE infrastructure.

## Data and Methods

This policy brief adopted a social ecological approach to collect and analyse interviewee assessments and reflections. Rather than constricting recruitment efforts to a single professional domain, findings from this research represent a diverse cross-section of perspectives from frontline, academic, civic education, policy-making, and regulatory environments.<sup>19</sup> Findings are based on fifty semi-structured interviews with professionals operating in the Netherlands – predominately in the South Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht regions of the country – with five participants upholding European Union-wide responsibilities related to counter violent extremism or with law enforcement. Interviews were conducted in-person and online between October 2024 and May 2025, lasting between 45 to 120 minutes (approximately). Following their transcription verbatim, each interview was anonymised and thematically analysed using grounded-theory coding techniques, identifying trends relevant to this policy brief’s policy-orientated objectives.<sup>20</sup> During interviews, professionals were asked to concentrate their assessments and recall their experiences with adolescents aged (approximately) 12 – 17 years old. This demographic framing focused discussion on adolescence as a key developmental period for identity formation, peer-to-peer social influence, moral experimentation, digital media immersion, and exposure to extremist communities and content online. However, young people progress through developmental milestones at different and context-specific rates, shaped by genetic, psychological, educational, familial, social, and technological factors.<sup>21</sup> Several interviewees also referred to cases and observations involving individuals slightly younger than 12 or young adults older than 17.<sup>22</sup> The

16 NCTV, *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 2022–2026*, 18.

17 NCTV, *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 2022–2026*; Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid [Ministry of Justice and Security], *Contourenbrief Versterkte Aanpak Online Inzake Extremistische en Terroristische Content* [Outline Letter on the Intensified Online Approach to Extremist and Terrorist Content] (The Hague: Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 12 December, 2023), <https://www.nctv.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2023/12/12/versterkte-aanpak-online-inzake-terroristische-en-extremistische-content/Contourenbrief+Versterkte+Aanpak+Online+inzake+extremistische+en+terroristische+content+DEFINITIEVE+VERSIE.pdf>

18 Dianne Gereluk, “A Whole-School Approach to Address Youth Radicalization,” *Educational Theory* 73, no. 3 (2023): 434–51, <https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12581>.

19 Noemie Bouhana, *The Moral Ecology of Extremism: A Systemic Perspective* (London: Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019), <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d8b7993ed915d036da0e677/Bouhana-The-moral-ecology-of-extremism.pdf>; Jade Hutchinson et al., *Violent Extremist and REMVE Online Ecosystems: Ecological Characteristics for Future Research and Conceptualisation* (Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.37805/remve2022.5>.

20 Paul Baker, *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis* (London: A&C Black, 2006).

21 Sapolsky, *Behave*.

22 Yuzva Clement, Gheorghe, and Hutchinson, “Assessing Early Childhood Exposure.”

interviews were semi-structured and designed to measure reliable responses to consistent questions while simultaneously allowing flexibility for unanticipated findings to emerge. Question techniques were deductive, open-ended, probing, and technical when prompting interviewees to reflect and offer their assessment of online youth radicalisation, conceiving prompts based on priorities in the literature and when guided by previous interviewee responses, enabling an iterative and responsive data collection process. All transcripts were analysed multiple times, coded recursively, and compared reflexively to allow contextual insights, as well as policy and practice recommendation-oriented findings to emerge. This study thus privileges professional interpretation and makes no claim to represent the experiences of Dutch children and adolescents, or all experts operating in the Netherlands.

## Policy Gaps and Institutional Challenges

This section overviews key policy openings and institutional challenges leading to the mismatch between policy ambition and practice constraints in contemporary P/CVE approaches to online youth radicalisation. Three overarching challenges surfaced across professional interviews: first, fragmented responsibility and uncertainty regarding role allocation in early-stage intervention; second, inadequate platform-to-person accountability mechanisms for digital media governance; and third, the persistence of risk-dominant prevention and counter violent extremism models that may not adequately account for adolescent developmental and digital media environments. While these challenges are – partially – unintentional, administrative, and anticipated as part of the operational setting that professionals are in, they shape how adolescents are identified by institutions as in need of intervention and delivering it. The recurring operational challenge is “who acts, on what signals, with which support, and for how long?”

### Responsibility and Uncertainty

The Dutch P/CVE responsibilities are shared across education, criminological justice, youth care, and municipal governance. However, interviewees repeatedly cited confusion about who is responsible for what, especially in situations where signs of early-stage radicalisation involve schools and the family. Fragmentation leads to a diffusion of accountability and missed opportunities for early, preventive intervention where possible, and creates un-coordination at the shared boundary of responsibility between national agencies, municipalities, schools, and parents among other institutions.<sup>23</sup> Some interviewees noted fragmentation as the expected outcome of the model of provincial and decentralised governance, where municipalities may oversee youth care and education conditions independently.<sup>24</sup> Such structural gaps are compounded by a lack of long-term, multi-year funding for practitioner networks and foundational practice. Public mistrust of local institutions can significantly hinder local prevention efforts because of vulnerable communities being less cooperative with local authorities.<sup>25</sup>

The operational effects of this fragmentation are felt acutely by frontline professionals. Interviewees frequently identified the boundaries of their expertise, their fatigue, and institutional inertia as professional settings that shape their thinking on online youth radicalisation. Frontline professionals reported receiving little institutional support to act meaningfully once such signs were observed, with particular emphasis among secondary school teachers. Conversely, interviewees such as counter-radicalisation scholars, policy-makers, and P/CVE strategists also described feelings of being disconnected from the interpersonal settings where these signs

<sup>23</sup> Vermeulen and Visser, “Preventing Violent Extremism.”

<sup>24</sup> Safeguarding Network, “Preventing Radicalisation,” 2025, <https://safeguarding.network/content/safeguarding-resources/radicalisation/>.

<sup>25</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), “RAN Practitioners Update 114,” *European Commission*, 2023, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/home/newsletter-archives/48518>; Radicalisation Awareness Network, “RAN Practitioners Update 110,” *European Commission*, 2023, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/home/newsletter-archives/45493>; Radicalisation Awareness Network, “RAN Mental Health Working Group (RAN HEALTH),” *European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs*, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/topics-and-working-groups/ran-mental-health-working-group-ran-health\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/topics-and-working-groups/ran-mental-health-working-group-ran-health_en).

emerged. This leads to a parallel mismatch in perception: frontline practitioners may lack actionable protocols or structural resources to practice effectively, while policy and academic professionals with protocols to recommend and resources to spend may be lacking important contextual information about how radicalisation manifests and is experienced by Dutch youth.

It is important to highlight Care and Safety Houses (*Zorg-en Veiligheidshuizen*) is a relatively rare though significant example of effective inter-institutional collaboration capable of bridging these operational gaps.<sup>26</sup> Care and Safety Houses are considered local multi-agency collaboration centres at the municipality level where professionals from police, probation, mental health, youth care, social services, and local government can better coordinate interventions for individuals and families with complex, interconnected problems through shared information and joint action plans, although implementation varies regionally, as case studies of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Arnhem demonstrate.<sup>27</sup> As regional hubs connecting actors across the security, policing, health, and psychosocial care domains, they provide a structure through which municipalities can coordinate responses to complex cases.<sup>28</sup> Their relevance to online youth radicalisation depends on their capacity to support joint case assessment, locally tailored intervention, and proportionate responses that avoid leaving schools, communities, and practitioners to manage ambiguous concerns in isolation. This makes them an important model for the kind of institutional infrastructure when prevention relies on coordination across diverse professional networks.<sup>29</sup> However, interviewees who described working in more ambiguous, in-direct, and multi-dimensional prevention roles expressed hesitancy to “act” in critical moments with adolescents, citing role confusion, risk aversion, and – in one case – temporarily disengaging from their obligation altogether. Diffuse accountability structures invite institutional clarifications and opportunities to further diversify the Dutch prevention community to better include interdisciplinary voices, and allocate adequate resources to support practitioner networks nationally.

## Platform-to-Person Accountability

Platform self-regulation continues to fall short, particularly in Dutch-language content moderation. For instance, recent research similarly shows that recruitment-oriented extremist content can circulate on social media platforms that are accessible to Dutch youths, underscoring the limits of mainstream moderation systems in addressing localised extremist dissemination.<sup>30</sup> Interviewees described situations in which extreme online misogynistic, conspiratorial, and pro-Neo-Nazi materials had circulated on mainstream social media platforms for extended periods of time before eventually (if at all) being removed by the proprietary company. This was especially true for fringe social media platforms and communities adjacent to gaming platforms, or smaller message-media apps, where professionals felt entirely unable to prevent adolescents from being exposed to online extremism content, to determine what aspects of the technology is most influential, or to identify to what degree does the company oversee this problem. The direct impact on students was evident among educators. One observed, “[t]he first thing I notice is their speech...[students] take these words and just use it as if they really understand what it means...I have several boys in my classroom that have their background on their laptop covered with a screensaver that says ‘I’m a Sigma male’...They’re twelve years old. What are you talking about?!...it’s what they all see online.” This represents a digitally mediated spillover effect, where extremist materials can migrate and become expressed in educational and social environments through adolescent language, aesthetics, humour, and performance.<sup>31</sup>

26 Andreeva and Hartgers, “Multi-Agency Working in Practice”; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, “Persoonsgerichte Aanpak Radicalisering” [“Person-Centred Approach to Radicalisation”], accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/persoonsgerichte-aanpak-radicalisering>.

27 Andreeva and Hartgers, “Multi-Agency Working in Practice.”; NCTV, “Persoonsgerichte Aanpak Radicalisering”.

28 Andreeva and Hartgers, “Multi-Agency Working in Practice.”

29 Ibid.

30 Stoeldraaijers et al., *Radicale Reclame op Sociale Media: Een Onderzoek naar Online Rekrutering door en voor Extremistische Groepen* [Radical Advertising on Social Media: An Investigation into Online Recruitment by and for Extremist Groups] (The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Datacentrum (WODC), 2024), [https://www.eerstekamer.nl/overig/20240904/eindrapport\\_wodc\\_online/document](https://www.eerstekamer.nl/overig/20240904/eindrapport_wodc_online/document).

31 Adam Burston, “Digitally Mediated Spillover as a Catalyst of Radicalization: How Digital Hate Movements Shape Conservative Youth Activism,” in *Social Processes of Online Hate*, eds. Joseph B. Walther and Ronald E. Rice (London: Routledge, 2024), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003472148-7>.

This enforcement asymmetry exposes adolescents to highly localised but globally resonate online extremist messaging, without adequate redress mechanisms and trusted support channels.<sup>32</sup> Some interviewees recommended real-time observatories housed in Dutch research institutions to more accurately track emerging trends concerning online youth radicalisation trends in Dutch-language domains. However, implementing real-time observatories for monitoring online radicalisation involves considerable resources to establish dedicated teams equipped with advanced analytics tools to track and analyse ideological drift online.<sup>33</sup>

Interviewees advocated for fundamental rebalancing of responsibility, such as placing more onus on the companies who produce these technological products to proactively ensure safety is foundational to the design of products made for children and adolescents. However, technology companies like Meta, YouTube, TikTok, Gab, and X do not disclose to prevention communities what factors ought to be considered, how do recommendation systems work, or how products are designed to shape adolescents' attention and experiences onsite. This absence of platform transparency and accountability was a source of frustration across almost every interview that touched on digital governance. Accordingly, many experts interviewed for this study emphasised the necessity for greater regulatory pressure on technology companies to be transparent with all independent researchers. The allure of these spaces extends beyond ideological content. Practitioners described how online extremist communities create parasocial relationships that fulfilled unmet social and emotional needs. One educator spent time in online radical communities himself, suggesting that these online spaces can “become a second family... they're that really rude uncle...they say some racist things...they send some funny things...and you feel a connection. You become a part of the sort of in-crowd.” This insight underscores why platform accountability must address design features that facilitate such intense emotional attachment and community formation.

## Risk Dominant Prevention Models

Interviewees described their concern for an institution-and-industry wide paradigm that remains tethered to the logics of securitisation and threat reduction. While P/CVE frameworks are informative and necessary for managing imminent threats of ideological violence, when applied to those aged between 12 to 17 years, it remains an imperative to definitively differentiate between “normal” and “extreme” behaviour or their intent to use violent extremism.<sup>34</sup> For instance, Borum and Patterson usefully distinguish between adolescents engaged in “exploration in breadth”, who sample extremist content without sustained commitment, and those engaged in “exploration in depth”, whose engagement deepens ideological alignment.<sup>35</sup> Most classroom expressions of extreme views among adolescents in this research appeared to fall within the first category, where boundary-testing and peer-recognition are primary drivers of performances. This research therefore cautions against control-over-care frameworks, equating radical expression with extremist threats to national security, disregarding the normative ambiguity of adolescent development, and the exceptional conditions under which adolescents are developing alongside tech.<sup>36</sup> However, it remains important to note the dichotomy between security-focused and development-focused approaches is self-made and resolved in combining perspectives.<sup>37</sup> When prevention focuses solely on securitising ideological and behavioural indicators and individual

32 Piotr Bąkowski, *Preventing Radicalisation in the European Union: How EU Policy has Evolved*, (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, April 2025), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/739213/EPRS\\_IDA\(2022\)739213\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/739213/EPRS_IDA(2022)739213_EN.pdf).

33 European Commission, “Prevention of Radicalisation,” *Migration and Home Affairs*, accessed 2026, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation_en).

34 Hutchinson et al., “I’m Not Super Familiar with Children’s Ecosystems Online.”

35 Randy Borum and Tia D. Patterson, “Juvenile Radicalization Into Violent Extremism: Investigative and Research Perspectives,” *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry* 58, no. 12 (2019): 1142–48.

36 Sanne Groothuis, “Racialisation and Counter-Radicalisation: A Study of Dutch Policy Frameworks,” *Acta Politica* 58, no. 3 (2023): 614–33, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-022-00256-5>.

37 Adrian Cherney, Kathleen De Rooy, and Ryan Williams, “An Evidence Review of Strategies Targeting Youth Who Have Radicalised to Violent Extremism,” *Journal for Deradicalization*, No. 33 (2022): 40–69, <https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/667>.

profiling based on adult models of radicalisation, initiatives neglect the broader systemic dynamics, such as stigma, trust erosion, and surveillance anxiety, that can push youth further toward the margins. Adverse childhood experiences, including bullying, abuse, marginalisation, and household instability, are associated with heightened susceptibility to violent extremism.<sup>38</sup> Prevention frameworks that focus on ideological content while leaving this developmental substrate unaddressed are likely to miss the conditions most relevant to adolescent vulnerability. To correct the overemphasis on threat detection, government resources can be allocated to diversifying prevention communities and establishing support architecture that prioritises healthy adolescent and childhood development. Critically, practitioners observed that much of what appears to be ideological conviction among adolescents is importantly performative behaviour anchored in social status dynamics. One youth worker noted, “They’re not quoting [Andrew Tate] because they’re committed, they’re quoting him because he sounds confident, and that’s what they’re trying to be.” These observations highlighted the importance of distinguishing between developmental performances of identity and genuine ideological radicalisation when designing prevention responses.

## Strategic Recommendations

This section presents a series of strategic recommendations for prevention and counter radicalisation reform, organised around three interlocking domains that support the development of adaptive prevention infrastructure and resilient networks of Dutch professionals. While previous sections outlined the scope of the problem and identified shortcomings, this section discusses what can be realistically implemented at national, municipal, and community levels. Prevention must avoid control-over-care logics and expand the prevention community, assigning responsibility and resources to address the technologies and settings that shape adolescent development.

### Youth-Centred Civic Programs

Counter online youth radicalisation efforts can be situated within the broader context of adolescent health and well-being. Many interviewees spoke of social and emotional disconnections, and the unmet developmental needs among Dutch youngsters today. The European Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation similarly frames youth vulnerability to extremism through identity, belonging, perceived injustice, and unmet developmental needs, emphasising sustained investment in protective developmental factors.<sup>39</sup> For instance, youth experience longer periods of familial dependency, prolonged digital immersions, and increased identity insecurity, and yet, segments of the prevention support system surrounding them remains inefficient, or over-securitised to address it. Within the Dutch context, however, certain models including the Care and Safety Houses and the *Person-Centred Approach* do offer suitable frameworks for bridging this divide.<sup>40</sup> If the prevention community were to further diversify into adjacent communities of science and practice, programming design would likely become more youth-centred, prioritising consistency or presence over time, instead of depending on short-term, national security focused interventions.

One key recommendation is to reframe counter radicalisation prevention as a civic and community development exercise that is grounded in strengthening participation and belonging. This includes funding local norm-building campaigns or civic education initiatives that promote national belonging, dignity, and pluralism. This denotes the community-based exercises aimed

38 Z. Marchment, C. Clemmow, and P. Gill, “Adverse Childhood Experiences and Susceptibility to Violent Extremism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2025): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2025.2557594>.

39 Isabel Pérez Pérez et al., *How and Why Minors and Youth Are Attracted by Extremist Ideologies? Meeting of Thematic Panel 1: Ideologies & Conspiracy Narratives, Conclusion Paper* (Brussels: European Knowledge Hub on Prevention of radicalisation, 26 May 2025) [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/conclusion-paper-how-and-why-minors-and-youth-are-attracted-extremist-ideologies\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/conclusion-paper-how-and-why-minors-and-youth-are-attracted-extremist-ideologies_en).

40 NCTV, “Persoonsgerichte Aanpak Radicalisering.”

at establishing positive behavioural standards through interpersonal care and conversations, such as mentorship programmes, community service projects, and youth clubs that promote ethical behaviour and resilience against radical viewpoints.<sup>41</sup> The *Dare to be Grey* organisation, for example, promotes youth participation in challenging political polarisation and binary ways of thinking in discussion with professional adults.<sup>42</sup> Their initiatives include workshops, online campaigns, and psycho-educational resources aimed at fostering open dialogue and understanding across perspectives.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, *Samen Veerkrachtig* provides accessible support services to some vulnerable populations. By fostering community resilience through co-designed programming and experience-sharing, they empower participants to navigate challenges in dialogue.<sup>44</sup> Lastly, the *Emancipator* programme offers a distinct contribution by incorporating boys and young men in the prevention of gender-based violence, promoting alternative masculinities through education, policy, and local interventions. In doing so, *Emancipator* contributes a gender-conscious prevention model that connects everyday experiences of masculinity with broader efforts to reduce violence, polarisation, and youth radicalisation.<sup>45</sup>

Importantly, the moral and ethical potential of primary prevention services like these can extend into certain digital media environments, such as online gaming platforms. As one clinician and academic recommended, there can be in-game online peer-to-peer support services that offer community-building exercises or personal engagements, rewarding exemplary moral behaviour with spotlight advantages, including the creation of youth ambassadors who encourage safe, meaningful dialogue during gameplay in communal environments.<sup>46</sup> To implement such a feature into popular online games, however, collaboration and professional trust must be nurtured between prevention professionals and the technology companies responsible for producing online games.

When focused on the prevention community, supporting practitioner integrity and sustainability was considered essential. Clear institutional protections and direction is crucial to support ethical discretion, guide developmental sensitivity, and relational pedagogy, while more holistic support services could alleviate practitioner teams who cannot extend themselves to encompass added prevention responsibilities. These recommendations for local primary prevention aim to strengthen institutional legitimacy, public trust, and community bonds across the Dutch prevention infrastructure.

## Governing Technological Influence

Social media and smart phone technologies were almost unilaterally mentioned as the first point of discussion during interviews with professionals. These were identified as the means through which Dutch young people are exposed to ideologically extreme content, and interviewees described widespread apathy or unpredictability when confronting the prospect of private industry efforts in platform governance. Moderation was considered not effective, especially since interviewees highlighted that there are no reliable response protocols that attended to the content requests of prevention experts by platform regulators. To safeguard youth, regulatory enforcement must prioritise algorithmic transparency and design rationale requests, including information about how content is ranked, recommended, and removed for vulnerable young people, with audit mechanisms accessible to Dutch municipalities and prevention services in cases of radicalisation to violence. This concern is shared internationally. Five Eyes intelligence and law enforcement partners have characterised young people and violent extremism as a collective challenge requiring coordinated regulatory action across jurisdictions, and Dutch alignment with these international efforts can strengthen the case for greater platform accountability domestically.<sup>47</sup>

41 European Commission, "Prevention of Radicalisation."

42 Dare to be Grey, "Home," accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://www.daretobegrey.com/home>.

43 European Commission, "Dare to Be Grey," accessed 12 February, 2026, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/dare-be-grey\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/dare-be-grey_en).

44 Samen Veerkrachtig, "Home," accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://www.samenveerkrachtig.be>.

45 Emancipator, "Home," accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://emancipator.nl/en/>.

46 European Forum for Urban Security, "Preventing Violent Radicalisation: A New Set of Practical Tools for Local Authorities" (2023), <https://efus.eu/topics/radicalisation-polarisation-en/preventing-violent-radicalisation-a-new-set-of-practical-tools-for-local-authorities/>.

47 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), "Five-Eyes Insights – Young People and Violent Extremism: A Call for Collective Action" , 2024, <https://rcmp.ca/en/corporate-information/publications-and-manuals/five-eyes-insights-young-people-and-violent-extremism-call-collective-action>.

Another avenue is positioned to reframe and intervene in the relationship between adolescents and the technologies they use to access and experience extremist materials. Aligning with national legislation excluding smart phones from school or classrooms, public-private partnerships can design and formalise policy initiatives to reduce the disproportionate influence of specific commercial products on teenage development, shifting the responsibility currently placed on teachers, families, and youth toward the proprietary companies who produced those products. Without legislative change, however, it remains necessary to invest in instruments and expertise that accounts for the design logics and positioning of smart technologies in the process and impacts of online youth radicalisation.

## Education and Digital Literacy

This research reaffirms that schools are uniquely positioned to build protective capacities through relational coherence and digital media literacy. However, this potential is not yet systematically supported. Educators described their efforts to indirectly address digitally-mediated harms like online youth radicalisation without sufficient training, time, or institutional scaffolding to respond effectively. In addition to this, frontline practitioners across education and social work networks emphasised that students who display warning signs need more than indirect methods focused on content or contacts online. Instead, necessitating consistent and personalised support to better contextualise and understand how digital architecture and devices shape emotional responses, identity construction, and peer-to-peer surveillance dynamics, among others.<sup>48</sup> For instance, one professional working in education and academia recommended that schools in the Netherlands aim to create a dedicated digital media liaison role, aiming to reduce the generational misunderstanding or confusion currently expressed within school communities concerning online culture and the evolving risk of extremism. Additionally, prevention programming may include digital media literacy modules alongside skills in socially navigating their offline relationships.<sup>49</sup> Interviewees stressed that this would require ethically sensitive and structured mentorship, and incentives that encourage existing and future professionals to commit to such changes with adequate compensation, rather than volunteerism.

Dutch educators reported feeling under trained and unconfident engaging with male students considered at-risk. Most prevention “tools still prioritised rational refutation over emotional scaffolding when addressing student expression without appropriate pedagogical support.”<sup>50</sup> For instance, some educators and practitioners identified behavioural and discursive patterns among teen boys in vocational settings who were academically or socially marginalised as more likely to adopt online manospheric and reactionary postures. For instance, when describing the in-class behaviour, one educator remarked on the increasing prevalence of online manospheric references to pseudo neo social Darwinian views of gender and economic hierarchies: “[i]t’s sometimes as if they’re talking about law of the jungle or something...students seem to think if you fail, that’s your choice.” Another practitioner recounted, “[t]hese students are 13 years old... they’d just seen a compilation of a few comments in a few speeches that Trump made...and now that’s it, we need to vote for Trump. I found it weird because they don’t live in America. They live in the Netherlands, and they’re not able to vote [in the election].” These examples illustrate how adolescents can adopt ideological stances without comprehending their relevance or implications, treating them as social identity markers rather than well-considered belief positions. This research suggests countering online youth radicalisation is not just about communicating the “correct” information, but of connection and recognition between practitioners and the social environments that are meaningful to adolescents, including classrooms and at home.

48 Yuzva Clement, Gheorghe, and Hutchinson, “Assessing Early Childhood Exposure.”

49 Gereluk, “Whole-School Approach.”

50 Netherlands Youth Institute (NJI), *Youth Policy in the Netherlands* (Utrecht: Netherlands Youth Institute, 2007), [https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/42128013/47261806/Youth\\_Policy\\_in\\_the\\_Netherlands\\_WEB.pdf/e0b2a92d-5833-4dd6-beba-15221e8f481e](https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/42128013/47261806/Youth_Policy_in_the_Netherlands_WEB.pdf/e0b2a92d-5833-4dd6-beba-15221e8f481e).

Finally, schools must unify their smart phone exclusion policies with broader national legislation around device use in classes and discourse about adolescent well-being. While some schools adopted guidelines for banning smart phones across the school day, others banned device use during class time but informally permitted limited use during the breaks. The lack of systemic consensus was perceived as undermining the intentions and advantages of removing technologies of distraction. Educators described a fragmented landscape in which enforcement was left to individual teacher discretion, frequently without administrative backing, leading to strained teacher-student dynamics. These dynamics underscore the need for educators to receive adequate professional training that helps them navigate the complex terrain between digital media influences, adolescent social developmental boundary-testing, and genuine warning signs of online radicalisation.

## Conclusion

Drawing on the interviews with fifty professionals across the Dutch prevention infrastructure, several core patterns emerged from the data. First, interviewees described adolescents' exposure to extremist narratives as deeply intertwined with algorithmic infrastructures, attention economies, and affective architectures that rewards boundary-pushing, contrarianism, and simplified identity scripts. Second, findings reaffirm the need to disentangle youth performance, behavioural mimicry, and affective signalling from adult conceptions of radicalisation, particularly in reference to gendered antagonism or conspiratorial posturing in educational settings.

At an institutional level, this study noted a mismatch between the perceived urgency of radicalisation prevention among youths and the direction, support, and clarity given to prevention actors and organisations tasked with enacting it. Community practitioners are increasingly expected to operate as first responders, and frequently do so without clear protocols, sustained training, or inter-agency collaboration with counter-terrorism teams. While current initiatives offer promising results and supportive structures, the broader prevention landscape reserved for primary and secondary online youth radicalisation programming and related research remains somewhat reactive, uncoordinated, and under-developed.

In this context, prevention in the Netherlands is moving quickly to address both early detections of ideological drift, as well as the broader enabling environments in which extremist messages are made resonant. This means equipping schools to teach contextualised digital media literacy and maintaining coherent phone policies, clarifying institutional roles with multi-year support, addressing gendered antagonism through developmentally sensitive, peer-led local mentor programming, and advocating for platform governance are no longer optional additions to future prevention efforts concerning online youth radicalisation, but critical components in safeguarding Dutch youths from extremist views.

## Bibliography

Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) [General Intelligence and Security Service]. “AIVD Sees Increase in Threat of Online Radicalisation of Minors.” 18 April, 2025, <https://english.aivd.nl/latest/news/2025/04/18/aivd-sees-increase-in-threat-of-online-radicalisation-minors>.

Andreeva, Anna-Maria, and Menso Hartgers. “Multi-Agency Working in Practice: The Dutch Care and Safety Houses” (Den Haag: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 3 November, 2025), <https://icct.nl/publication/multi-agency-working-practice-dutch-care-and-safety-houses>.

Baker, Paul. *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis* (London: A&C Black, 2006).

Bąkowski, Piotr, *Preventing Radicalisation in the European Union: How EU Policy has Evolved* (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, April 2025), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/739213/EPRS\\_IDA\(2022\)739213\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/739213/EPRS_IDA(2022)739213_EN.pdf).

Borum, Randy, and Tia D. Patterson. “Juvenile Radicalization Into Violent Extremism: Investigative and Research Perspectives,” *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry* 58, No. 12 (2019): 1142–48.

Bouhana, Noemie. *The Moral Ecology of Extremism: A Systemic Perspective* (London: Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019), [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334785197\\_The\\_Moral\\_Ecology\\_of\\_Extremism\\_A\\_Systemic\\_Perspective](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334785197_The_Moral_Ecology_of_Extremism_A_Systemic_Perspective).

Bronsard, G., A. Cherney, and F. Vermeulen. “Editorial: Radicalization Among Adolescents,” *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 13 (2022): 917557, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsy.2022.917557>.

Burston, Adam. “Digitally Mediated Spillover as a Catalyst of Radicalization: How Digital Hate Movements Shape Conservative Youth Activism,” in Joseph B. Walther and Ronald E. Rice, eds., *Social Processes of Online Hate* (London: Routledge, 2024), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003472148-7>.

Busher, Joel, Donald Holbrook, and Graham Macklin. *Radicalisation: A Critical Reassessment* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

Campelo, N., A. Oppetit, C. Thompson, D. Cohen, and E. Louet. “A Clinical and Psychopathological Approach to Radicalization Among Adolescents,” *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 13 (2022): 788154, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsy.2022.788154>.

Cherney, Adrian, Kathleen De Rooy, and Ryan Williams. “An Evidence Review of Strategies Targeting Youth Who Have Radicalised to Violent Extremism,” *Journal for Deradicalization*, No. 33 (2022): 40–69, <https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/667>.

Crone, Eveline A., Anna C. K. van Duijvenvoorde, and Jiska S. Peper. “Annual Research Review: Neural Contributions to Risk-Taking in Adolescence — Developmental Changes and Individual Differences,” *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 57, No. 3 (2016): 353–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcpp.12502>.

Dare to be Grey. “Home.” Accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://www.daretobegrey.com/home>.  
de Roos, M. S., L. Veldhuizen-Ochodničanová, and A. Hanna. “The Angry Echo Chamber: A Study of Extremist and Emotional Language Changes in Incel Communities Over Time,” *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 39, No. 21–22 (2024): 4573–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605241239451>.

Duindam, H. M., J. J. Asscher, and F. Lösel. "Understanding Unrest: Conspiracy Belief and Violent Radicalization Patterns in Young People During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Netherlands," *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-025-09634-z>.

Duindam, H. M., R. E. J. Verhoef, A. L. van den Akker, and J. J. Asscher. "Far-Right Violent Radicalization Profiles of Youth in the Netherlands," *Psychology of Violence* (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1037/vio0000545>.

Emancipator. "Home." Accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://emancipator.nl/en/>.

European Commission. "Dare to Be Grey." Accessed 12 February, 2026, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/dare-be-grey\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/dare-be-grey_en).

European Commission. "Prevention of Radicalisation." Migration and Home Affairs, accessed 2026, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation_en).

European Forum for Urban Security. "Preventing Violent Radicalisation: A New Set of Practical Tools for Local Authorities" (2023), <https://efus.eu/topics/radicalisation-polarisation-en/preventing-violent-radicalisation-a-new-set-of-practical-tools-for-local-authorities/>.

Gereluk, Dianne. "A Whole-School Approach to Address Youth Radicalization," *Educational Theory* 73, No. 3 (2023): 434–51, <https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12581>.

Groothuis, Sanne. "Racialisation and Counter-Radicalisation: A Study of Dutch Policy Frameworks," *Acta Politica* 58, No. 3 (2023): 614–33, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-022-00256-5>.

Hutchinson, Jade, Julian Droogan, Lise Waldek, and Brian Ballsun-Stanton. "Violent Extremist and REMVE Online Ecosystems: Ecological Characteristics for Future Research and Conceptualisation" (Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.37805/remve2022.5>.

Hutchinson, Jade, David Yuzva Clement, Ruxandra M. Gheorghe, Lorraine Kellum, and Alexander Shuttleworth. "'I'm Not Super Familiar with Children's Ecosystems Online': Expert Assessments on the Effects of Early Childhood Exposure to Extremism Online," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 19, No. 1 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.19165/2025.5669>.

Hutchinson, Jade, Ruxandra M. Gheorghe, David Yuzva Clement, Kenton Bell, Lorraine Kellum, Mubarak Rana, Alexander Shuttleworth, et al. "'Play as a Nazi Prison Guard': Childhood and Adolescent Exposure to Online Extremist Materials in Online Gaming Environments," *Frontiers in Psychology* 16 (2026), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1504584>.

Malthaner, Stefan. "Radicalization: The Evolution of an Analytical Paradigm," *European Journal of Sociology* 58, No. 3 (2017): 369–401, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975617000182>.

Marchment, Z., C. Clemmow, and P. Gill. "Adverse Childhood Experiences and Susceptibility to Violent Extremism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2025): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2025.2557594>.

Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid [Ministry of Justice and Security]. “Contourenbrief Versterkte Aanpak Online Inzake Extremistische en Terroristische Content” [“Outline Letter on the Intensified Online Approach to Extremist and Terrorist Content”] (The Hague: Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 12 December, 2023), <https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/dpc-98bd32c3b58ae623ff002c0aa085bb65dd8e0f85/pdf>.

Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid [National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security]. *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland December 2025* [Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands December 2025] (Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2025).

Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid [National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security]. *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 2022–2026* [National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022–2026] (Den Haag: Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 20 May, 2022), <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/publicaties/2022/05/20/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie-ncts-2022-2026>.

Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid. “Persoonsgerichte Aanpak Radicalisering” [“Person-Centred Approach to Radicalisation”]. Accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/persoonsgerichte-aanpak-radicalisering>.

Netherlands Youth Institute (NJI), *Youth Policy in the Netherlands* (Utrecht: Netherlands Youth Institute, 2007), [https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/42128013/47261806/Youth\\_Policy\\_in\\_the\\_Netherlands\\_WEB.pdf/e0b2a92d-5833-4dd6-beba-15221e8f481e](https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/42128013/47261806/Youth_Policy_in_the_Netherlands_WEB.pdf/e0b2a92d-5833-4dd6-beba-15221e8f481e).

Pérez, Isabel Pérez et al., *How and Why Minors and Youth Are Attracted by Extremist Ideologies? Meeting of Thematic Panel 1: Ideologies & Conspiracy Narratives, Conclusion Paper* (Brussels: European Knowledge Hub on Prevention of radicalisation, 26 May 2025) [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/conclusion-paper-how-and-why-minors-and-youth-are-attracted-extremist-ideologies\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/conclusion-paper-how-and-why-minors-and-youth-are-attracted-extremist-ideologies_en)

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). “RAN Practitioners Update 110,” *European Commission*, 2023, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/home/newsletter-archives/45493>.

Radicalisation Awareness Network. “RAN Practitioners Update 114,” *European Commission*, 2023, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/home/newsletter-archives/48518>.

Radicalisation Awareness Network. “RAN Mental Health Working Group (RAN HEALTH),” *European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs*, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/topics-and-working-groups/ran-mental-health-working-group-ran-health\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/topics-and-working-groups/ran-mental-health-working-group-ran-health_en).

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). “Five-Eyes Insights – Young People and Violent Extremism: A Call for Collective Action,” 2024, <https://rcmp.ca/en/corporate-information/publications-and-manuals/five-eyes-insights-young-people-and-violent-extremism-call-collective-action>.

Safeguarding Network. “Preventing Radicalisation.” (2025), <https://safeguarding.network/content/safeguarding-resources/radicalisation/>.

Samen Veerkrachtig. “Home.” Accessed 12 February, 2026, <https://www.samenveerkrachtig.be>.

Sapolsky, Robert M. *Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst*. New York: Penguin Press, 2017.

Stoeldraaijers, C., E. Rodermond, F. Thijs, R. Leukfeldt, and F. Weerman. *Radicale Reclame op Sociale Media: Een Onderzoek naar Online Rekrutering door en voor Extremistische Groepen* [*Radical Advertising on Social Media: An Investigation into Online Recruitment by and for Extremist Groups*] (The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Datacentrum (WODC), 2024), [https://www.eerstekamer.nl/overig/20240904/eindrapport\\_wodc\\_online/document](https://www.eerstekamer.nl/overig/20240904/eindrapport_wodc_online/document).

van Eerten, Jan-Jaap, Bertjan Doosje, Elly Konijn, Beatrice de Graaf, and Mariëlle de Goede. “Developing a Social Media Response to Radicalization: The Role of Counter-Narratives in Prevention of Radicalization and De-Radicalization” (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, Psychology Research Institute & Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, 2017), <https://dare.uva.nl/search?identificator=4fe0b95f-b5ec-45a1-b50a-2ff8287b4b1c>.

Valentini, Daniele, Anna Maria Lorusso, and Achim Stephan. “Onlife Extremism: Dynamic Integration of Digital and Physical Spaces in Radicalization,” *Frontiers in Psychology* 11 (2020): 524, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00524>.

Vermeulen, Floris, and Koen Visser. “Preventing Violent Extremism in the Netherlands: Overview of Its Broad Approach,” *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, No. 128 (2021), [https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/revista\\_cidob\\_d\\_afers\\_internacionals/128/preventing\\_violent\\_extremism\\_in\\_the\\_netherlands\\_overview\\_of\\_its\\_broad\\_approach](https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/128/preventing_violent_extremism_in_the_netherlands_overview_of_its_broad_approach).

Whittaker, Joe. “Online Radicalisation: What We Know.” Radicalisation Awareness Network (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/RAN-online-radicalisation\\_en.pdf](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/RAN-online-radicalisation_en.pdf).

Yuzva Clement, David, Ruxandra Mihaela Gheorghe, and Jade Hutchinson. “Assessing Early Childhood Exposure to Online Extremist Content: Literature Overview and Expert Interviews.” Prevent Research Report (Brussels: Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2023).

## About the Author

---

### Jade Hutchinson

Dr Jade Hutchinson is an internationally recognised expert on violent extremism and online youth radicalisation. Holding a Cotutelle Doctorate of Philosophy from the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University (Australia) and the Groningen Research Institute for the Study of Culture's Research Centre for Media and Journalism Studies at the University of Groningen (The Netherlands), Jade's research focuses on the confluence of extremism, sociotechnical systems, and socioemotional harm.

His work examines how digital media technologies shape the pathways through which young people engage with extremist content, and how these technologies facilitate political grievance, extreme misogyny, and conspiratorial ideologies. Jade has advised governments, civil society organisations, and private companies on countering violent extremism and has led major research projects on incel and far-right extremism, technological influence, and online youth radicalisation in Australia, Canada, and Europe. His approach integrates digital media analysis, behavioural science, socioecological and developmental frameworks to understand and prevent radicalisation to violence.

Jade regularly works with international partners across academia, policy, and tech to develop evidence-based, multi-stakeholder strategies for addressing online harms and promoting digital media resilience.



International Centre for  
Counter-Terrorism

---

**International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)**

T: +31 (0)70 763 0050

E: [info@icct.nl](mailto:info@icct.nl)

[www.icct.nl](http://www.icct.nl)