



Multi-Agency Working in Practice: The Dutch Care and Safety Houses

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Abstract

The Care and Safety Houses represent a cornerstone of the Netherlands' approach to multi-agency working (MAW) across the security, care, and social domains. Crucially, C&S Houses also play a central role in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), serving as collaborative spaces where local and national stakeholders co-design tailored interventions.

This policy brief examines the C&S House model with a particular focus on its contribution to P/CVE efforts. Drawing on desk research and informal interviews with practitioners, coordinators, and policymakers, it maps the evolution, organisation, and operational processes of C&S Houses across the Netherlands. The brief highlights key regional differences through case studies of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Arnhem, illustrating how local contexts shape the implementation of P/CVE initiatives. The paper concludes with practical recommendations aimed at strengthening multi-agency cooperation, enhancing consistency, and fostering more effective and sustainable P/CVE outcomes within the Dutch C&S House network.

Introduction

The Care & Safety Houses (Dutch: *Zorg- en Veiligheidshuizen*, henceforth C&S Houses) constitute a type of multi-agency working (MAW) structure in the Netherlands that brings local and national experts from across security, care, and the social domains. While C&S Houses tackle various issues, such as youth delinquency, addiction, and psychosocial healthcare, they are also a cornerstone of the Dutch efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE).

There are 31 C&S Houses in the Netherlands, and three more in its overseas territories, with further smaller structures referred to as ‘C&S Rooms’ across the Netherlands. These institutions function as regional hubs connecting key partners to design, coordinate, and implement tailored P/CVE interventions. C&S Houses may be compared to similar structures in other countries, such as the Danish Infohouses, Finnish Anchor Teams, or Belgian Localised Integrated Security Cells (LICS-R), owing to shared aims and objectives and an adoption of multi-agency working principles.

This paper explores the model of C&S Houses, with a specific focus on the P/CVE aspect. Based on desk research, which is supported by informal interviews with practitioners, coordinators, and policymakers, this brief aims to uncover the wide variety of working methods that exist between the different C&S Houses in the Netherlands. It will explore the history, structure, and organisation of the C&S Houses in general, discuss the processes that govern them, and touch on the P/CVE interventions they support. Throughout the brief, we use examples of C&S Houses in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Arnhem to illustrate the differences in approaches to P/CVE based on publicly available document collection and desk work analysis.¹ Findings were corroborated with affiliated personnel through informal interviews. It is important to note that the conclusions derived are solely those of the authors, and any information related to each of these C&S Houses reflects objective process or structure aspects. This paper will further highlight the similarities and differences between C&S Houses’ approaches to P/CVE throughout the country, while also breaking down the challenges they face and the best practices they incorporate. We end by providing actionable recommendations on how to streamline and improve MAW cooperation on P/CVE in the Netherlands.

Methodology

A short note of clarification is necessary to explain decisions made in the process of writing this policy brief. The aim of the brief is to provide what we believe to be a lacking background on how MAW cooperation around P/CVE practices functions in the Netherlands. We give examples to support the descriptive nature of the brief, and we have chosen to use the municipalities of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Arnhem for this purpose. These are three of the biggest municipalities working on P/CVE across the country, with information on processes and interventions more readily available, compared to other, smaller municipalities. Overall, processes are similar across the country, thus, we feel that our conclusions and recommendations can be applied to MAW groups more generally. We acknowledge that some municipalities may have different approaches to those outlined here, and any omissions, inaccuracies, or assumptions remain fully with the authors.

Similarly, in the course of this research, we interviewed individuals from these three municipalities. The interviews were informal, conducted over the course of several months, and took various

¹ The focus on these three C&S Houses was intentional, as they are three of the biggest municipalities in the Netherlands. Access to information about these three municipalities’ approaches to P/CVE work was more readily available compared to other, smaller ones.

formats (including email exchanges, online and in-person meetings). We stress that these interviews were not done in an official capacity, and once again, the views expressed and any conclusions derived as a result of this research remain those of the authors of this policy brief. We use the information gathered from these interviews to supplement and support desk-based research and literature reviews.

This policy brief begins by outlining the history, structures and organisations of Care and Safety Houses in general, and we note that these bodies cover a range of social issues. We provide this background as we believe it is important in informing how these structures have grown and evolved over time, as well as to illustrate part of the historical development towards P/CVE approaches in the Netherlands. Ultimately, our focus remains on P/CVE efforts of C&S Houses across the Netherlands. It would be beyond the scope or thematic aim of this brief to discuss the interventions or processes that concern the breadth of issues that C&S Houses tackle. Our discussion, recommendations, and conclusions, therefore, focus on P/CVE as a central theme.

History, Structure, and Organisation

The philosophy that underpinned the convergence of criminal justice and social services at a local level, which has since become a staple of the Care & Safety House working model, is not novel. In a general sense, multi-agency working is ingrained in the Dutch style of governance, characterised by its ‘polder model’ or consensus-based policymaking.² In 1997, the experimental Justice in the Neighbourhood project (Dutch: *Justitie in de Buurt*, or JiB) saw the establishment of four offices—each occupied by a public prosecutor, a court clerk, and an administrative clerk—across vulnerable neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, Arnhem, Maastricht, and Rotterdam. Inspired by similar practices in the US and France, the presence of the JiB offices aimed to project the visibility of the criminal justice system in these neighbourhoods to deter crime.³ At the same time, closer cooperation with municipal (mental) health care services, probation services, victim support services, and child protective services resulted in more integrated approaches towards local crime prevention and the prevention of recidivism. However, the degree of social sector involvement and the formalisation of collaboration structures varied per municipality and were often shaped by local needs.

Despite the social services’ involvement in JiB work, the project remained predominantly focused on criminal justice actors and responses in the pre-crime space. As many security questions related to neighbourhood safety and public order closely interfaced with social issues, the need for criminal justice and social sector elements to collaborate even more closely became apparent. In response, the Municipality of Tilburg, together with the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the police, founded the first Safety House in 2002.⁴ Its aim was to enhance collaboration between criminal justice actors and social partners to tackle recidivism, complex security issues, and pernicious manifestations of crime.

The Safety House in Tilburg has been widely considered a success by professionals working in law enforcement, criminal justice, and social services, resulting in the emergence of other similar initiatives across the country.⁵ A national network of Safety Houses was established in 2009, and the formulation of a national framework in 2013 saw ownership over the Safety Houses

2 A polder refers to a tract of low-lying land that has been reclaimed from water and kept dry through a complex system of dykes and drainage canals. Managing polders is a complex affair that requires broad coordination and consensus among a wide variety of stakeholders like farmers, landowners, and local governments. The polder has captured public policy discourses since the 1980s and 1990s when emerging social and economic challenges were addressed through multi-stakeholder involvement and engagement.

3 F. Luykx & M. Grapendaal, *Justitie in de Buurt*, WODC Onderzoeksnotities (Den Haag: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Datacentrum, 1999).

4 “Over ons,” Zorg- en veiligheidshuizen, <https://www.zorgenveiligheidshuizen.nl/over-ons/>.

5 *Landelijk Kader Veiligheidshuizen: Vóór en dóór partners* (Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013), p. 7.

transferred from the Public Prosecutor's Office to the municipalities.⁶ The Safety Houses then gradually transformed into Care & Safety Houses, acknowledging the need for collaboration across a breadth of criminal justice and prevention services to tackle security questions, often rooted in complex social issues, such as poor access to (mental) health care and education, addiction, and troubled family environments.⁷

The 2013 national framework makes no specific mention of work activities related to P/CVE.⁸ Although the Netherlands had been confronted by religiously-inspired extremism as early as 2004—with the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a violent jihadist—its comprehensive approach to jihadism was only clearly articulated in 2014, in response to the large number of Dutch nationals travelling to Syria and Iraq to join the so-called Islamic State (IS).⁹ As a 2016 evaluation of the national framework indicates, however, a number of C&S Houses were quick to adopt radicalisation as a core thematic area.¹⁰ Through this development, the C&S Houses became increasingly important P/CVE instruments, not only through interventions, but also by strengthening the information position through collecting and connecting intelligence and sharing with relevant law enforcement and security services.¹¹

How the C&S Houses and their respective P/CVE approaches are currently structured and which partners are involved in the chain of justice, law enforcement, and social services varies across these institutions and is shaped by local needs and the availability of local services.¹² As such, while the C&S Houses broadly incorporate the same philosophy of multi-agency working, their implementation across the P/CVE space in the Netherlands varies. For example, the Action Centre Security and Care, the C&S House to which the Municipality of Amsterdam is connected, works with a total of 47 organisations, whereas the C&S House in Rotterdam works with 31 such organisations.¹³ The difference in number is likely related to the number of available local implementers. The roles and responsibilities of these partners are outlined in the Covenant, a statutory document which is signed by the involved parties. Each C&S House has its own covenant, meaning that implementing partners vary across regions.

The evolution of Care & Safety Houses in the Netherlands reflects an adaptive, consensus-based approach to addressing complex security issues through multi-agency working. Initially focused on criminal justice responses, this model has expanded to include a range of social services,

6 Ibid. See also: Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid, *Meerjaren agenda Zorg en Veiligheids-huizen 2021-2024*. CMS. Available at: <https://cms.denederlandseggz.nl/assets/publications/meerjarenagenda-zvh-2021-2024.pdf>

7 A 2016 review of the Safety Houses refers specifically to Care & Safety Houses, denoting that increasingly, criminal justice and (health)care actors collaborate with one another. See: Frank Koen, *Zorg voor het Veiligheidshuis* (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016), <https://vng.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/2016/20160608-zorg-voor-het-veiligheidshuis.pdf>.

8 It is important to state here that developments in activities aimed at countering terrorism began much earlier in the Netherlands. For example, by the end of the 1990s, a comprehensive approach had been established across the country, with a focus on criminal justice and preventative approaches. For the purpose of this research, the focus here is on the Care and Safety Houses, where a specific P/CVE lens was only formally adopted later on. For more on earlier approaches to CT and P/CVE in the Netherlands, see, for example: Sanne Groothuis, "Racialisation and counter-radicalisation: a study of Dutch policy frameworks," *Acta Politica*, 58 (2023). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-022-00256-5>

9 This is not to say that jihadism was not on the radar of intelligence services prior to 2014. The attacks of September 11 and the bombings in Madrid and London of 2004 and 2007 respectively certainly led to increased scrutiny by intelligence services of jihadist inspired terrorism. As early as 2004, the Central Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) published its analysis of jihadism and provided recommendations on addressing it (see: AIVD, *Van dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde* (Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2004). However, the publication of the Action Plan Integrated Approach Jihadism saw the establishment of the first interdepartmental policy framework to address jihadism. See also: Ministrie van Veiligheid en Justitie, *Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties*. 29 August 2014. Available at: <https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/ronl-archief-34fd2206-62da-446e-90b0-1fe2743cba8e/pdf>

10 Koen, *Zorg voor het Veiligheidshuis*, p. 7. See also: Rovers, B., and Hoogeveen, C. *Landelijk kader voor de veiligheidshuizen: Invoering, ontwikkelingen en knelpunten*, Bureau voor Toegepast Veiligheidsonderzoek, April 2016. Available at: https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/2233/2663-volledige-tekst_tcm28-74293.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

11 Koen, *Zorg voor de Veiligheidshuis*, p. 20; *Meerjaren Agenda Zorg en Veiligheidshuizen 2021-2024* (Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en veiligheid, 2021), p. 9.

12 Possible partners in C&S House interventions can include municipalities, prison services, probation and so forth. For example, see ZSM and Safety House CEP study visit, CEP website: <https://www.cep-probation.org/zsm-and-safety-house-cep-study-visit/>.

13 Compare and contrast: *Convenant: Samenwerking tussen ketenpartners in Zorg- en Veiligheidshuis Zuid-Holland Zuid*, <https://www.zorgveiligheidshuizen.nl/wp-content/uploads/Documenten/Convenant-Zorg-en-Veiligheidshuis-Zuid-Holland-Zuid.pdf> with *Algemeent Convenant Actiecentrum Veiligheid en Zorg*, <https://www.amsterdam.nl/bestuur-organisatie/organisatie/overige/acvz/verwerking-persoonsgegevens-acvz/>.

demonstrating a shift toward an integrated approach to public safety and crime prevention. Shaped by local needs, each Care & Safety House embodies a unique configuration of partnerships and services, sharing an underlying philosophy to addressing both security and social issues such as mental health, addiction, education, and, in the context of this analysis, P/CVE.

Processes

The management of C&S Houses in the Netherlands continues to be decentralised from the central Dutch government and instead lies with each relevant municipality. This has led to differences in operations and processes, in terminology used, in funding and opportunities, and in staff knowledge and expertise (these points are elaborated on in this and the following section on interventions). For example, some municipalities refer to the case manager as a *procesregisseur* and others as *procesmanager* – all effectively translating to the same position as case manager. The role entails similar responsibilities across municipalities, which largely extends to identifying the right partners for each case and facilitating the MAW process. However, in Amsterdam, the case manager's role goes a step further and includes ensuring that the agreed-upon intervention is carried out to the full extent. In Arnhem, there are also chain managers in place, with the difference between the two roles being that chain managers are responsible for the overall safeguarding of the intervention process, whereas case managers are responsible for the cooperation between individual cases. In Rotterdam, there is a further distinction with the addition of *casusregisseurs* who are working as practitioners directly with the individuals. They may be assigned from any partner organisation, such as probation services or youth workers, and are usually the ones who bring the case to the attention of the C&S House.

As the C&S Houses began from work in other fields, such as youth delinquency and crime more generally, many now have several different teams responsible for each thematic area. This is based on the needs of the municipality in which they operate. For example, in Amsterdam, there are fifteen teams working across several thematic areas, including youth prevention, gender-based and sexual violence, and neighbourhood intimidation, with approximately two or three case managers for each respective thematic area.¹⁴ These teams meet, together with the municipality, prosecutor's office, and police representatives, regularly – roughly every one or two months. Further, some C&S Houses, such as in Arnhem, have regional coordinators who organise bigger information-sharing and capacity-building activities for the wider region.

Case managers everywhere are responsible for gathering all partners together regularly (on a needs-based frequency) and ensuring that the interventions in place are still appropriate. Case managers create and maintain the dialogue between all partners until the case no longer requires MAW cooperation. As coordinators of the process, C&S House case managers are responsible for ensuring partners also comply with regulations, such as the international General Data Protection Regulation standards. During the interviews for this research, this was identified as a challenge. Information-sharing practices may be outlined in the Covenants signed by C&S Houses and their chain partners, with additional upcoming legislation¹⁵ strengthening legal bases for the sharing of personal data of (at-risk) radicalised individuals. However, GDPR considerations extend beyond the type of information that is shared, pertaining in addition to where data is

¹⁴ An overview of thematic areas is provided on the website of the Care & Safety House Amsterdam (named the Action Centre Security and Care, AcVZ): <https://www.amsterdam.nl/bestuur-organisatie/organisatie/overige/acvz/>.

¹⁵ These are the proposed "Law on Data Processing for a Personalised Approach to Radicalisation and Terrorist Activities" which will oblige municipalities to organise case meetings for persons at risk of radicalisation, and the promulgated "Legal Basis for Data Sharing in Care & Safety Houses", which enables and regulates the sharing of personal data between organisations involved in the Care & Safety Houses. The law will take effect on 1 January 2025. See: [https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/36225_wet_gegevensverwerking#:~:text=Met%20dit%20wetsvoorstel%20wordt%20de,worden%20besproken%20in%20het%20casusoverleg](https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/36225_wet_gegevensverwerking#:~:text=Met%20dit%20wetsvoorstel%20wordt%20de,worden%20besproken%20in%20het%20casusoverleg;); <https://vng.nl/nieuws/wettelijke-grondslag-voor-gegevensdeling-zvh-en#:~:text=Op%201%20januari%202025%20wordt,in%20het%20zorg%2D%20en%20veiligheidsdomein.>

stored—including servers and platforms like email—and for how long such data is stored. In other words, while it is imperative that the right information is shared among partners, the exact parameters of these information-sharing practices are undefined or poorly understood. Although a decentralised approach, as is in the Netherlands, allows for some flexibility in how and what information is shared, the lack of formal guidelines leads to confusion and ambiguity about what is (not) allowed. Therefore, interviewees identified that many partners either infringe on GDPR or are reluctant to share information for fear of being reprimanded and/or breaking the rules.

Interventions

The C&S Houses across the Netherlands work with a variety of individuals and caseload profiles, all under the mandate of the local municipality. Cases concerning radicalisation and extremism have been incorporated into a model that was originally created to facilitate the exchange of information and provide support between different actors. C&S Houses also intervene to support cases concerning youth delinquency, social issues, and crime in a broader sense. C&S Houses have now also established dedicated teams (sometimes as small as one or two people, such as in Rotterdam) tasked with the management of extremism-related cases. In municipalities such as Arnhem, the C&S Houses only began dealing with extremism-related cases as recently as 2014 (with a few jihadism-related cases). Interviewees for this research indicated that one of the biggest challenges has been the lack of necessary knowledge to deal with the various forms of extremism. The relative newness of the caseload has meant that some case/process managers may not have acquired the necessary skill set to understand the complexities of each individual case they are managing.

The profiles in the extremism-related caseload include a range of ideologically motivated individuals, such as jihadists, right-wing extremists, anti-government extremists, left-wing and anarchist extremists, etc. This presents another challenge in the fluidity, evolution, and complexity of characteristics that make up the profile of individuals. Professionals are not always equipped to detect the signs of every case of extremism. Trainings in understanding and detecting various forms of radicalisation are offered in some municipalities, but this also differs based on the available resources and the needs of the staff. Interviewees indicated that although some staff are trained or more experienced, there are other partners, such as police officers, who work at the frontline of detection but still lack the necessary knowledge to identify signs of radicalisation. The fluidity of ideology in the extremism landscape is now also reflected and found online, which has added an extra level of complexity to the problem. Interviewees mentioned that, in addition to understanding the threat, the online aspect is particularly hard to tackle because of the lack of regulation and mandate in information sharing. These challenges highlight the need for regular training for all partners working under the C&S Houses model in the Netherlands to ensure there is a common understanding of the threats, the signs of radicalisation, and the risks associated with various forms of extremism.

Complex cases make it imperative that C&S Houses tailor P/CVE interventions to each case they receive. This is done across the C&S Houses interviewed for this research, though it can be limited in some respects. For example, it is sometimes the case that when an individual has been convicted of a crime, the Public Prosecutors Office will issue an assessment, which serves as a baseline for the subsequent intervention that can be provided through the C&S House. However, in other cases, C&S Houses will carry out the risk assessment, often through their own risk assessment tools. For example, in Rotterdam, the C&S House does not have its own risk assessment tool, though the partners they work with usually conduct risk assessments, and relevant results may be shared in common meetings. Staff in Amsterdam have developed a survey-

based assessment that seeks to identify the individual's intentions, capacities, and activities, leading to a comprehensive overview of the stage of radicalisation. This tool is used throughout the intervention process and is supplemented by a yearly evaluation between all partners to assess whether it is still necessary to continue with the joint intervention. These evaluation processes were also echoed by the interviewees from the other C&S Houses. Interventions are adjusted at various stages of the process, depending on the continuous evaluation of progress.

One major challenge, which persists across all multi-agency working and cooperation, is the process of information sharing between partners. Many of the challenges arise due to essential laws and regulations regarding personal information sharing, such as international GDPR. Some organisations work on a strict need-to-know basis, where information is only shared with partners to the extent that cooperation can be furthered, and only the level of information necessary. Interviewees indicated that the abundance of barriers to information-sharing makes case processing more challenging, and highlighted that more flexibility would be beneficial in streamlining the process.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Desk-based research for this piece provided interesting insight into the background and evolution of the C&S Houses model in the Netherlands. Much has been internationally written on models covering other countries, such as Denmark and Belgium, but an English-language, comprehensive overview of the Dutch model is thus far still missing from international discourse. Through research of Dutch-language official documents, and informal interviews with C&S House staff across the country, this brief provides a baseline for further research (such as more focused research on the role of the covenant, interventions by other municipalities, and so on), as well as an overview of the model's key features, including history, structure, organisation, processes, and interventions. Although the C&S Houses are successful, challenges and recommendations regarding P/CVE have nevertheless been identified.

Having emerged from already existing structures, with networks and frameworks in place are identified as a strong characteristic of the C&S House model. This has allowed for the sharing of information, as well as for a structured approach to intervention and case management. Because this model has emerged organically from previous working structures, practitioners from different backgrounds and agencies also have a certain level of mutual trust already in place. Additionally, being under municipal mandate has allowed C&S Houses across the country to remain flexible in their approaches to designing P/CVE interventions. This has also led, to a certain extent, to the very individualised and tailored approach taken across all C&S Houses, and the Netherlands in general when it comes to the radicalisation, reintegration, and other extremism-related interventions. Having moved from the management of the public prosecutor's office to the local municipalities also means that C&S Houses do not sit within the criminal justice system, but rather they operate in a more holistic and prevention-focused approach.

However, this model – like most – remains subject to improvement in certain regards. Because the C&S Houses have historically dealt with far more cases of delinquency and general crime, many of the staff, as well as partners in other organisations such as police or social services, are not sufficiently knowledgeable on the topic of extremism. Further, as this field of study evolves at a staggering speed, it remains challenging for practitioners to stay up to date with the evolution of extremism. Even within research, there are no clear delineations between forms of extremism and ideologies, therefore, setting clear parameters for understanding how and why individuals engage with extremism is difficult. This fluidity and complexity of extremism is a challenge

across practitioner networks in many countries, working in preventing and countering violent extremism.¹⁶

The lack of a centralised management system for all C&S Houses in the Netherlands also means that there are no formalised training modules across all municipalities. Trainings across municipalities on P/CVE matters could include: introduction and/or updates to base knowledge of extremism and radicalisation; comprehensive risk and needs assessment for those associated with extremism; multi-agency cooperation, and so on. The lack of such support provisions can lead to staff who are not confident in dealing with case factors subject to constant changes in the extremism landscape. Knowledge exchange between practitioners and (academic) experts on extremism could prove a useful collaboration in enhancing skills in detecting extremism.

Currently, some municipalities do provide capacity-building exercises, trainings, and have various levels of support offered to staff, but the availability of these remains dependent on funding and capacity. This disparity means that some areas are better prepared to deal with the extremist threat than others. Furthermore, the lack of a centralised directive can also lead to mismanagement of funding allocated to training, especially in areas where capacity is not at sufficient levels. To redirect resources and ensure that there is enough staff (albeit not fully trained) may be a priority in municipalities where a lack of personnel resources is a problem.

In the course of this research, we found no signs of any gender-based awareness included in intervention, training, risk/needs assessments, or anywhere else in the process. This can partly be attributed to the strongly rooted approach in the Netherlands toward individualised interventions and assessments. However, the lack of intentional gender focus can also be extremely detrimental.¹⁷ Professionals interviewed consider the lack of a gendered component as a profound gap in understanding and helping individuals to the fullest extent possible. Gendered considerations as part of a tailored intervention should consider the ways in which men and women are differently impacted by the proposed intervention, how they have experienced radicalisation and extremism thus far, and provide significant avenues for more effective disengagement. Further, to ensure successful interventions in the long term, there should be considerations regarding how gender intersects with other areas of life that are already considered as part of the approach of the C&S Houses.

Finally, as information sharing was reported as a particular challenge by all those interviewed, it is important for municipalities as well as central governmental bodies to consider the structures in place. Without sufficient pathways for information to be securely exchanged, practitioners will always struggle in providing interventions that maximise disengagement and deradicalisation efforts.

¹⁶ Andreeva, A. et al., *Assessing Gender Perspectives in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Practices*, ICCT Report, 20 November 2024. Available at: <https://icct.nl/publication/assessing-gender-perspectives-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-practices>

¹⁷ Ibid.

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Anna-Maria is the Managing Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism and ICCT Publications, as well as a Junior Research Fellow at ICCT. In addition to her editorial work, Anna-Maria's research focuses on gender and radicalisation, reintegration, and risk assessment. She has worked on projects including Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), IOM, and PREPARE (HORIZON 2020). Her research covers topics including gender mainstreaming, EU policies and practices on gendered radicalisation, the reintegration and rehabilitation of women and minors from Syria and Iraq, and the impact of living in extremism-affiliated families on children and youth.

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