

Forecasting the Unpredictable: A Review of Forecasts on Terrorism 2000 - 2012

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Abstract

In this ICCT Research Paper, Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker reviews and analyses over 60 publications that attempt to predict the future of terrorism. The Paper aims to provide a general review of publications on the future of terrorism by academics, think tanks and government agencies over the past ten years. It seeks to answer several questions including, whether we know substantially more about terrorism today than back in 2001 or 2004? Some authors believe that improvements have been made in the study of terrorism, but what about our skills and efforts to improve foresight and to know whether some development or group is a threat or not? The paper concludes with several recommendations to improve the quality of foresight studies using new and innovative research methods. The Paper also includes a comprehensive appendix categorising and summarising all of the publications reviewed.

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Introduction

"[academia] failed to predict or warn government policymakers and the public of the possibility that events of 9/11['s] magnitude could take place on the United States homeland"

- Monica Czwarno, 2006¹

Considering the complexity of the subject matter, predictions on the future of terrorism are fairly common. Such predictions have also greatly increased in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. So far, however, the track record of forecasting terrorism has not been good and this is particularly true for major changes in the modus operandi of terrorism. 9/11 is a case in point: Czwarno's quote above highlights the failure of academia to predict such an attack and attempts to explain why. She argues that, among others, methodological, and conceptual problems within and between academic disciplines created a gap in the knowledge about Islamic terrorism and groups like al Qaeda. In fact, the rise of al Qaeda caught most of the academic community by surprise on 9/11.

The same can also be said for the intelligence community. Although the 9/11 Commission Report speaks of "a shock, not a surprise", there were apparent analytical failures on the part of those who were supposed to keep the US safe from terrorism. The 9/11 report partly focused on operational failures – opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organisations and systems of that time. However, in the chapter "Foresight and Hindsight" the commission argues that the failure of imagination was the most important one. The commission stated:

"We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat. [...] al Qaeda's new brand of terrorism presented challenges to US governmental institutions that they were not well-designed to meet. Though top officials all told us that they understood the danger, we believe there was uncertainty among them as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat the US had lived with for decades, or it was indeed radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced. As late as September 4, 2001, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer long responsible for counter-terrorism policy coordination, asserted that the government had not yet made up its mind how to answer the question: "Is al Qaeda a big deal?" ².

In light of the above, the aim of this Research Paper is to provide a general review of publications on the future of terrorism by academics, think tanks and governmental agencies over the past ten years. It will examine the need for future security foresight studies and the limits of "crystal balling future threats". It seeks to answer such questions as: Do we know substantially more about terrorism today than back in 2001 or 2004? Some authors believe that improvements *have* been made in the study of terrorism, but what about our skills and efforts to improve foresight and to know whether or not some development or group is "a big deal" or not? What have been the results of academia, think tanks and government agencies in the field of forecasting after 9/11, and where do we stand today? An evaluation of the literature is necessary because, in the previous decade, future

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¹ Czwarno (2006), pp. 657 – 678.

² The 9-11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Executive Summary, p.9.

³ Jair van der Lijn, Crystal balling future threats 2020-2030: Security foresights of "actors" and 'drivers" in perspective. In: Defense & Security Analysis, 27: 12, pp. 149-167.

security foresight studies have become widely used in policymaking.⁴ Furthermore, for a global problem such as terrorism, it is important to take stock of the current knowledge available, locate potential gaps in the research and also to explore new approaches when forecasting terrorism.

This paper takes over 60 publications that have attempted to predict or forecast terrorism over the last decade. It is divided into three parts. The first describes the methodology employed when selecting the literature, the scope of the paper and limitations encountered while undertaking this comprehensive study. The second discusses all of the literature reviewed at a high level and provides an overview of broad trends and patterns that were common to most, if not all, of the publications. The final section reflects on the findings and offers conclusions for future studies. The paper is also accompanied by a comprehensive appendix that reviews every publication individually.

It should be remembered that foresight studies are not specifically limited to security issues. In the financial sector for instance a lot of effort is put into developing tools to improve our understanding of current and future developments. Mentioning this particular example, it immediately becomes obvious that looking into trend paths and possible and probable futures is extremely difficult. These studies are not about making predictions. Rather, they are a tool for identifying dynamics of change and exploring the implications of those changes to allow forecasts. Obviously, there are various limitations to future foresight studies. But this should not stop us from trying to (improve ways to) explore possible and probable futures and to avoid further "failures of imagination", especially when dealing with serious threats such as terrorism.

Methodology, Scope and Limitations

This paper reviews publications that have a clear focus on the future outlooks of terrorism. In this case "publications" is taken to mean, books, articles and reports from academia, governments, think-tanks and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Only articles and reports in English were reviewed, published after 2000 up to 2012. This timeframe was chosen because it covers the entire post 9/11 period as well as reports that were issued just before this game-changing terrorist attack. Articles focusing on past trends, threat assessments⁵, academic theoretical reflections, or very short articles and op-eds were not included in this overview.

Different methods were used to find the relevant books, articles and reports. Open data sources on the internet and databases such as Lexis Nexis were searched using combined key words such as 'terrorism', 'future', 'forecast', '2020' or 'outlook'. In addition, widely recognised (digital) libraries and portals that focus on terrorism were explored, such as the MIPT Lawson Library and the Human Security Gateway. For the academic articles, three leading journals were consulted: Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Critical Studies on Terrorism. In these three journals, simple searches were conducted using combinations of the keywords and the timeframe described above. The results were sorted by relevancy, which made it possible to explore the 100 most relevant results from each search. Seven of the selected articles in this study were published in Terrorism and Political Violence, and fifteen articles in Conflict and Terrorism. From the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism no articles were selected, as they did not meet the requirements in terms of time frame or future outlook. It should be noted that there are other journals that have occasionally published articles

⁴ One of the most prominent examples of the use of foresight studies by governments is the Foresight Programme in the United Kingdom that has helped the UK Government to think systematically about the future. Established in 1994, Foresight is headed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, who reports directly to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It is a part of the Government Office for Science within the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight

⁵ It should be noted that some threat assessments also contain some element of forecasting as they assess the chance of an attack in the near future: for example, the quarterly assessment of the Netherlands National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security. However, these assessments do not say anything of the future direction and development of terrorism and are therefore not included in the overview of future forecasts.

that focus on the future of terrorism. However, the above mentioned articles were deemed the most significant, as they are published in the most widely regarded, leading journals in the field.

Regarding the complete collection of future foresights on terrorism, an analytical distinction was made between academia, think tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and governmental agencies. The background of the authors of the articles, reports and other publications on the future of terrorism were examined, including nationality, age, sex and affiliation(s). Second, the rationale behind the article or report was analysed, as well as the methodology and the focus in terms of content or time frame. Additionally, the main findings of the publications were summarised (see the appendix for the full overview). Included are case studies that deal only with one type of terrorism or one type of modus operandi, as well as articles or reports that contained more general ideas relating to the future of terrorism.

This paper acknowledges the limitations of its scope. By reviewing literature only in English and using specific search terms, it is recognised that some potentially important and relevant articles will have been excluded. However, the paper has aimed to include the most pertinent, up to date articles and in reviewing some 60 documents, it is one of the most comprehensive literature reviews of the subject to date.

Observed Patterns and Trends

Background

Firstly a clear majority of the main authors, about fifty, are citizens of the US or US based. For instance out of the seven books reviewed the majority were written or edited by male authors from the US and the same was true for the journal article authors. Out of the NGO and think-tank reports, eight publications were written by institutions based in the US, including the Centre for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine, The Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Centre for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. In terms of the government reports, the publication dates of the reports range from 2000 to 2011, and, like those described above, were also mainly from the US. The US governmental actors include: Forecasting International Inc. and Proteus, the Future of Terrorism Task Force from the Homeland Security Advisory Council, the National Intelligence Council, the Congressional Research Service, and Homeland Defense. This is followed by a much smaller group of half a dozen authors from the UK and most others from several Western-European countries, Australia, New Zealand or Israel. Only a few are based in other parts of the world: Asia, Africa or South America. In terms of gender, it seems that studying the future of terrorism is, typically, a male thing. Of all authors and consultants, more than 80% were male. Many of them also have a long career in the field of (counter-)terrorism. The same is true for the relatively small group of female authors and consultants.

Rationale

Most publications argue that they were undertaken to contribute to the academic understanding of trends in and possible futures of terrorism and for the purpose of knowledge generation – rather than to the benefit of (strategic) policymaking. For example, Koblentz writes: 'to fully appreciate the risks posed by CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear] terrorism, it is necessary to first understand the full spectrum of opinion in the debate and how and why they disagree'. However some authors did also highlight the importance of the generated knowledge to inform strategic policy. Ackerman writes: 'in order to determine the correct level of official response, it is necessary to examine the potential for radical environmentalist groups to engage in various

⁶E.g. Larry Johnson's article 'The future of terrorism' in American Behavioural Scientist, vol. 44, no. 6, 894-913, or Martha Crenshaw, 'The psychology of terrorism: an agenda for the 21sh century' in: Political Psychology, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 405-420.

Koblentz (2011) p. 502.

⁸ See e.g. Ackerman (2003), pp. 143 – 170; Post, Ruby and Shaw, (2000), pp. 97 – 122.

levels of violence against humans'. Authors also wrote in order to contribute to ongoing debate. For example Silke's article is a follow-up from a previous one, and Taylor wrote specifically in reaction to points raised by another author.

In the NGO and think tank reports, in five cases, the purpose for writing was not described.¹² In three reports, the main purpose was reported, again, to be knowledge generation.¹³ In four reports, a link between the generated knowledge and strategic policy was established.¹⁴ As can be expected from governmental reports, all eight reports were written to present, inform, or reflect on strategic policy.

Methodology

Strikingly, for most of the studies, it must be concluded that the methodology used to produce the foresights on terrorism is at least vague or not explicated at all. Furthermore, most publications, with the exception of the governmental studies, do not provide a time frame to which their findings apply – their future seems to be an endless one. The methodologies that *are* presented range from empirical or ethnographic methods, ¹⁵ model construction, ¹⁶ reflections by expert groups¹⁷ to literature reviews, ¹⁸ and the use of scenarios and rankings. In some cases these approaches are unsystematic and many seem to lack a theoretical foundation. Two exceptions to this trend are found in the articles of Czwarno¹⁹ and Monaghan and Shirlow²⁰, who extensively describe their methodology and the related pro's and con's. In addition, many authors make reference to their data sources, although not all of them describe how the data was analysed.²¹ A variety of methods were used, ranging from analysing statistics, ²² examining case studies, ²³ reviewing literature ²⁴ to reflecting on professional experiences. ²⁵ The report from the Institute of Homeland Security Solutions should also be mentioned separately, as it specifically describes how quantitative techniques were used to characterise qualitative case studies of terrorist incidents.

However it must be reiterated that in general much of the literature lacked concrete methodologies. Brynjar Lia remarked:

"The future of terrorism literature has generally suffered from the lack of systematic thinking about how changing societal conditions can produce a variety of both permissive and inhibiting environments for terrorism, resulting in constantly evolving patterns of terrorism. It is often based on observation of related events and extrapolations from single cases, while the evolving contextual or underlying factors

⁹ Ackerman (2003), p.143.

¹⁰ Silke (2001), pp. 1 – 14.

¹¹ Taylor (2003), pp. 173 – 182.

¹² Bergen, P. and B. Hoffman (2010), Assessing the Terrorist Threat, Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group Bipartisan Policy Center; Cordesman, A. H. (2000), Defending America. Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense Homeland Defense: The Current and Future Terrorist Threat, Homeland Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Neumann, Peter R. (2008), Terrorism in the 21st century. The rule of law as a guideline for German policy, In: Compass 2020, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Berlin.; Cohen, Ariel and Morgan L. Roach (2011), Central Asian Terrorism: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Security. No. 3292, The Heritage Foundation.

¹³ Ungerer, Carl John (2011), Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine (2008), The Terrorism Index; Pantucci, Rafaello (2011), The Islamist Terrorist Threat to Europe after Osama bin Laden's Death. Chatham House Workshop Report - European Security and Defense Forum, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

¹⁴ Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (2010) Strom, K., et al. (2010) Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999 - 2009. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions; Chalk, P. et al. (2005) Trends in Terrorism. Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy; Silberglitt, R., P.S. Antón, D.R. Howell and A. Wong, et al. (2006), The Global Technology Revolution 2020, In-Depth Analyses, RAND National Security Research Division, Van der Elst, K and N. Davis (eds.) (2011) Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition. World Economic Forum: Geneva.

¹⁵ Ackerman (2003) ; Silke, (2001); Taylor (2003).

¹⁶ Gressang IV (2001).

¹⁷ Beit-Hallahmi (2002).

¹⁸ Koblentz, (2011); Post, Ruby & Shaw, (2000).

¹⁹ Czwarno (2006).

 $^{^{\}rm 20}$ Monaghan and Shirlow (2011) pp.649 – 665.

²¹ e.g. Baird (2006); Chima (2002) pp. 19 – 39; Pluchinsky (2008) pp. 182 – 200; Reed (2008), pp. 684 – 722.

²² Baird (2006); Pluchinsky (2008).

²³ Baird (2006); Cunningham (2007) pp. 113 – 129; Reed (2008).

²⁴ Bunker (2008) pp. 434 – 455; Chima (2002); Pluchinsky (2008) ;Weimann (2005), pp. 129 – 149.

²⁵ Hoffman (2003) pp. 429 – 442; Jenkins (2001) pp. 321 – 327.

shaping the very environments in which terrorism thrives or declines are not properly analysed or understood. Or it tends to focus merely on insufficiently substantiated 'conditions', which allegedly have an aggravating effect on the occurrence of terrorism while the countervailing forces are ignored." ²⁶

In fact, it is Lia's own study that is the exception amongst the literature as he provides a conceptual framework for predicting future patterns of terrorism and a critical roadmap towards understanding terrorism strategically and is probably the best guide available to date.

General Focus

Interestingly, many of the terrorism forecasts predominantly address one particular type of terrorism and the potential use of one particular weapon: Al Qaeda or jihadi terrorism, and CBRN weapons. Of the almost 60 publications, about 40 focus on al Qaeda or those affiliated or associated to it. Another type of terrorism that is frequently mentioned in relation to the future of terrorism is ethno-nationalist terrorism. Lone-wolf terrorism is often addressed in the more recent publications (2010-2012). This phenomenon is partly described as a type of terrorism and partly as a tactic or modus operandi. As mentioned above, there is a strong focus on the use of CBRN weapons; more than 25 studies specifically look at this possibility. There is also a relatively high level of attention for cyber terrorism and terrorist use of the Internet, including a number of publications that were issued before the worldwide exponential growth of the Internet in the first part of the previous decade. When categorising the literature it was helpful to separate the articles into their type of publication, as this tended to influence the focus. For instance, the focus of government reports was far narrower than the seven books reviewed. Below is an overview of the various subject matter of all of the reviewed publications.

Books

The topics and focus of the seven books reviewed varied. First, it should be noted that none of the books focused on one single terrorist organisation. Also, no books specifically focused on left or right wing terrorism. Two discussed jihadi terrorism only: Girma Menelik and Walid Phares.²⁷ In addition, specific book chapters, especially in the edited volumes, focused on specific types of terrorism, such as terrorism related to animal rights²⁸ or jihadi terrorism.²⁹ General reflections on the present and future of terrorism were common, and were found in five books.³⁰ In most cases, this contextualisation was historical. In their outlooks on terrorism, these authors related changing global and geopolitical conditions to changing terrorism in the future. In all books, authors discussed issues related to the modus operandi of terrorist organisations. Possible (non-human) targets of terrorist attacks, such as energy or food supplies, were discussed in three books.³¹ Possible tactics, such as the use of cyberterrorism or CBRN weapons were discussed in four books.³² Finally, counter-terrorism strategies were discussed in three books.³³ None of the authors were clear about the time frame when making predictions about the future of terrorism, which means that no predictions up to a specific year or for a specific period were made.

Journal articles

For this study two journals were reviewed. In general, the authors of articles in *Terrorism and Political Violence* have applied one or two focal points. The first one concerns the making of predictions about the possible future threat coming from a specific terrorist organisation or from a specific terrorist tactic, such as cyber-terrorism. This is done by three authors. Ackerman discusses the potential threat of the Earth Liberation Front and other radical

²⁶ Lia (2005) p.3.

²⁷ Menelik (2010); Phares (2005).

²⁸ Monaghan in Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2000)(eds.) The future of terrorism. London (UK) and Portland (US): Frank Cass.

²⁹ Lia (2005); Pearlstein (2004).

³⁰ Barnaby(2007); Lia (2005); Pearlstein (2004); Simonsen and Spindlove (2009); Taylor and Horgan (2000).

³¹Lia (2005); Pearlstein (2004); Taylor and Horgan (2000).

³² Barnaby (2007); Lia (2005); Pearlstein (2004); Taylor and Horgan (2000).

³³ Phares (2005); Simonsen and Spindlove (2009); Taylor and Horgan (2000).

environmental groups. 34 Post, Ruby and Shaw 35 and Gressang IV 36 focus on the threat coming from terrorists using cyber-terrorism or weapons of mass destruction respectively. A second type of focus, seen in four articles, reflects on societal, political and/or academic predictions of terrorism. Koblentz reflects on predictions of CBRN terrorism.³⁷ Taylor³⁸ and Beit-Hallahmi³⁹ reflect on the predictions made about the threat coming from environmental and religious groups respectively. Silke's article is more abstract, and focuses on the validity, credibility and reliability of research-based predictions about terrorism in general.⁴⁰ Among those who made predictions on threats coming from specific groups or tactics, no author defined the period that their prediction applied to. 41 However, out of those that reflected on predictions of terrorist threats, several authors did cover a specific time frame, such as 1995-2000⁴², mid 1990s-2011⁴³ or 1964-2002⁴⁴.

The authors of articles in the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism applied one or two foci, similar to those in Terrorism and Political Violence. First, and most commonly, several authors have made forecasts about the potential threat of a certain types of terrorism. These include the threat of particular groups: al Qaeda, 45 female terrorists, 46 Sikh separatist terrorists, 47 loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland 48, or recidivist jihadists. 49 Other authors focus on the potential threat of particular tactics: arson induced forest fires as a weapon of mass destruction, ⁵⁰ laser weapon use, ⁵¹ cyber-terrorism, ⁵² terrorist CBRN use, ⁵³ 'new warfare', ⁵⁴ and the threat of 9/11 becoming a model for future terrorism. 55 Secondly three authors specifically focus on existing terrorism forecasts. These include reflections on the failure to predict 9/11,56 their own previous predictions of terrorism as a professional,⁵⁷ and reflections on predictions made in the last twenty years.⁵⁸ Similar to the articles in the Terrorism and Political Violence journal, the authors have not stated a time frame their future terrorism outlooks. However, all authors defined a specific time frame in the past on which they have based their forecasts about the future. This time frame ranged from the last thirty, ten or two years up until the date of writing.

Think tank and NGO publications

In terms of topics covered in NGO and think tank reports, most reports discussed different organisations, tactics and trends. Out of the seven academic books reviewed, all of them divide their focus between predicting trends in terrorism and reflections on existing forecasts. Interestingly however, 13 out of 14 think tank and NGO publications discussed the former. Different topics were discussed, dealing with possible future trends or threats from specific terrorist groups, such as jihadists, ⁵⁹ or another range of terrorist groups. ⁶⁰ In addition, future trends

Foundation (2011); World Economic Forum (2011); Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine (2008); Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2008).

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<sup>34</sup> Ackerman (2003).
<sup>35</sup> Post, Ruby and Shaw (2000).
<sup>36</sup> Gressang IV (2001).
<sup>37</sup> Koblentz (2011).
<sup>38</sup> Taylor (2000) .
<sup>39</sup> Beit-Hallahmi (2002)
<sup>40</sup> Silke's (2001).
<sup>41</sup> Ackerman (2003); Post, Ruby & Shaw (2000); Gressang IV (2001).
<sup>42</sup> Silke, (2001).
<sup>43</sup> Koblentz (2011).
<sup>44</sup> Beit-Hallahmi (2002).
<sup>45</sup> Hoffman (2003).
<sup>46</sup> Blee, (2005) pp. 349 – 351; Cunningham (2007).
<sup>47</sup> Chima (2002).
48 Monaghan and Shirlow (2011).
<sup>49</sup> Pluchinsky (2008).
<sup>50</sup> Baird (2006).
<sup>51</sup> Bunker (2008).
<sup>52</sup> Weimann (2005)
<sup>53</sup> Hoffman (2001) pp. 417 – 428.
<sup>54</sup> Reed (2008).
<sup>55</sup> Nacos (2003) pp. 1 – 16.
<sup>56</sup> Czwarno (2006).
<sup>57</sup> Jenkins (2001).
<sup>58</sup> Atran (2006) pp. 285 – 300.
<sup>59</sup> Australian Strategic Policy Instititute (2011); Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000).
60 RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (2005); Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group (2010); The Heritage
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or threats emanating from two specific terrorist tactics were discussed, which were: technological terrorism, ⁶¹ and low intensity terrorism. ⁶² The only report that reflected on predictions is authored by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions. ⁶³ In five reports, the authors have defined specific time periods ranging from the last 30 years ⁶⁴ to approximately the last ten years. ⁶⁵ These time periods are then used to inform their future predictions. However, the majority of the authors have not defined a time frame for their *future* forecasts. In only three publications such a definition is made: the World Economic Forum focuses on terrorism trends for the year 2011, ⁶⁶ the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy makes forecasts up to the year 2020, ⁶⁷ and the Center for Strategic and International Studies up to 2025. ⁶⁸ Furthermore, the relationship between changing patterns in terrorism and broader societal changes is stressed in four reports. ⁶⁹ Factors such as demographics, scarcity of natural resources, globalisation, power shifts, technological innovations, changing perceptions of identity and changes in counter-terrorism strategies are likely to influence future terrorism, although the institutions agree that different scenarios are plausible. Finally, counter-terrorism strategies are discussed in four reports. ⁷⁰ Similar to the publications by academia, these reports conclude that there are missed opportunities to prevent terrorist attacks. This conclusion is also made by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, the only report in this section that reflects on predictions. ⁷¹

Governmental reports

In the seven government reports reviewed the majority of the outlooks focus on strategic policy.⁷² One report focuses on forecasting only.⁷³ It should be noted that this report discussed a whole range of global trends, including terrorism. In terms of time frame, only two publications defined the period that their outlook applied to. This is from 2011 to 2015,⁷⁴ or up to 2025.⁷⁵

Publications: General Findings

Unfortunately, many of the studies had vague and imprecise predications. It is acknowledged however, that it is very difficult to provide a general conclusion regarding the main findings of the foresights on terrorism. The exceptions noted are the two very obvious conclusions that are shared by almost all authors: 1) terrorism will continue to exist in the future, and; 2) terrorism is not static, but a changing phenomenon, that is likely to change in the future. Interestingly, the National Intelligence Council cautiously mentions that terrorism's appeal could diminish by 2025 when there is a continuous economic growth and increased youth employment. ⁷⁶ Many authors did however also conclude that terrorism is influenced by structural factors, be they geopolitical, demographical, technological or ideological. Again, Lia's analysis deserves special attention as he associates changes in terrorism

⁶¹ RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (2006).

⁶² Roell, P. and M. Worcester (2010) Low Intensity Terrorist Threats – A Future Trend in Europe? Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung.

⁶³ Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (2010).

⁶⁴ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2008).

⁶⁵ Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (2010); RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (2005).

⁶⁶ The World Economic Forum (2011).

⁶⁷ The RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (2005).

⁶⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies (2010).

⁶⁹ Center for Strategic and International Studies (2010); RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (2006); The Heritage Foundation (2011); World Economic Forum (2011).

⁷⁰ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2011); Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (2010); RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management and Policy (2005); Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2008).

⁷¹ Homeland Security Solutions (2010).

⁷² Lee, R and R. Perl (2003) Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy – Issue Brief for Congress. Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; Cetron, Marvin J. and O. Davies (2008) 55 Trends Now Shaping the Future of Terrorism. Forecasting International Inc. and Proteus; Homeland Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000); National Intelligence Council (2004) Mapping the Global Future – Report of the NIC's 2020 Project Based on Consultations with Nongovernmental Experts Around the World: Washington, D.C.; National Intelligence Council (2006); National Intelligence Council (2008) Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World: Washington, D.C..

⁷³ Homeland Security Advisory Council (2007) Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

⁷⁴ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) National Counter terrorism Strategy 2011 – 2015: The Hague.

⁷⁵ National Intelligence Council (2008).

⁷⁶ National Intelligence Council (2008).

to a variety of factors related to globalisation, international relations and politics, global market economy, demographics, ideological shifts and technological innovations. However, there are indeed different visions on how terrorism is likely to change.⁷⁷

In terms of threat analysis, different conclusions are made about which group(s) and which location(s) are at stake. Menelik points to the likeliness of home-grown jihadists from Europe attacking the US, 78 while Phares sees the threat mainly coming from South America and the Middle East. ⁷⁹ However, there is agreement on the continuation of the jihadi threat to the West. 80 Interestingly, Ackerman, argues that the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) poses a moderate-high threat and could begin targeting people internationally.⁸¹ Many of the government reports argued that the most significant threat should be expected to come from jihadi or violent Islamist groups, including al Qaeda and associated movements.⁸² In addition to jihadi organisations, domestic paramilitary groups, 83 other home-grown groups 84 and groups such as Hizbollah 85 are also mentioned as important future

In terms of modus operandi, some authors stress the likeliness of terrorists to use CBRN weapons in the future. 86 Possible innovations in terrorist tactics and weapons are discussed in six out of seven government reports. Tactics that are likely to be increasingly used are: WMDs⁸⁷, CBRN weapons⁸⁸, internet or cyber terrorism, 89 simultaneous attacks 90 and suicide attacks. 91 Four out of seven government reports spoke of "decentralisation", 92 in that the decentralisation of terrorist organisations is likely to lead to the emergence of dispersed sets of groups, cells and individuals, who are loosely organised and self-supportive. Another forecast related to decentralisation, is individualisation. Under the name 'lone wolf' terrorism, this trend is explicitly mentioned in two reports.⁹³

Possible future targets of terrorist attacks are also a topic of interest. Lia points out the vulnerability of the oil and energy sector. 94 Pearlstein also stresses the vulnerability of the agricultural sector, and the likeliness of terrorists attacking a nation's food supply. 95 Three authors discuss counter-terrorism strategies, and they agree that strategic policy has to be flexible in order to tackle the threat of terrorism. 96

Authors that analysed terrorism forecasts, seem to share the conclusion that the current research is of low quality. Silke even compares it with fast-food: 'quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious'. 97 Koblentz writes about heuristics and systemic errors, 98 and Beit-Hallahmi points to the role of beliefs in risk perceptions. 99 Taylor advocates careful analysis of differences and intersections of terrorist subgroups before making forecasts about the whole group together. 100

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<sup>77</sup> Lia (2005).
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⁷⁸ Menelik (2010).

⁷⁹ Phares (2005).

⁸⁰ Menelik (2010) see note 26 abov; Pearlstein (2004); Phares (2005).

⁸² Forecasting International Inc. and Proteus (2008); NCTV (2011); Future of Terrorism Task Force (2007); National Intelligence Council (2004), National Intelligence Council (2006); National Intelligence Council (2008); Homeland Defense, Homeland Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000).

¹³ Homeland Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000)

⁸⁴ Homeland Security Advisory Council (2007).

⁸⁵ National Intelligence Council (2004).

⁸⁶ Barnaby (2007); Pearlstein (2004).

⁸⁷ Congressional Research Service (2003); Homeland Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000).

⁸⁸ NCTV (2011); National Intelligence Council (2004), National Intelligence Council (2006); National Intelligence Council (2008).

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ National Intelligence Council (2004).

⁹¹ National Intelligence Council (2006).

⁹² National Intelligence Council (2008) Congressional Research Service (2003).

⁹³ NCTV (2011); National Intelligence Council (2008).

⁹⁴ Lia (2005).

⁹⁵ Pearlstein (2004).

⁹⁶ Phares (2005); Simonsen and Spindlove (2009); Taylor and Horgan (2000).

⁹⁷ Silke (2001), p. 12.

⁹⁸ Koblentz (2011).

⁹⁹ Beit-Hallahmi (2002).

¹⁰⁰ Taylor (2003).

Lastly, recommendations for counter-terrorism strategy vary. They range from the improvement of cultural and religious awareness and understanding, to public engagement¹⁰¹ or to broadening the definition of terrorism used in US law.¹⁰²

Conclusions

When attempting to describe the general picture of terrorism forecasts published between 2000 and 2012, the expression "a mixed bag" comes to mind. The literature by academia, think tanks, NGOs and governmental agencies is composed of very different types of publications, with different intentions and purposes, and different focal points. They all arrive at two very obvious and not very specific general conclusions.

This raises the question to what extent these studies actually contribute to more insights on what is yet to come and their implications for policy making. Moreover, the vagueness or absence of methodologies and the lack of theoretical foundations also leads to limited insights about the causes of change or the factors that the authors deem more important in shaping the future compared to others.

It should also be noted that most forecasts say more about the present state of terrorism and terrorism research, than about the future. In most cases, current trends and latest incidents dominate terrorism foresights. This should not necessarily be considered negatively, as generally, tomorrow looks very much like today, as today is very similar to yesterday. But as we have witnessed, from time to time, terrorists manage to surprise us and strike us where we least expect it or in ways we could hardly imagine. Therefore, it does not suffice to expect future terrorism to be more or less the same as today. If we want to avoid unpleasant surprises we cannot permit another "failure of imagination" as some argue was the case with 9/11. We need to be able to look beyond today or at least have some idea of what the future might bring.

It is questionable whether the last ten years have seen an improvement in the quality of terrorism foresight studies and an increase in the chance of forecasting unpleasant surprises and avoiding another failure of imagination. Of course, many of the approximately 60 publications investigated provide valuable insights about possible developments in terrorism. But they do not provide systematic tools nor go much beyond vaguely formulated conditions that may have an aggravating effect on the threat of terrorism.

Moreover, this study questions whether experienced, but relatively older, Western male experts who deal with (counter-) terrorism on a daily basis are best equipped to ponder and assess the future of terrorism in the new innovative ways this ever changing phenomenon seems to require.

Therefore, this review on foresights on terrorism argues for a more systematic approach including the involvement of fresh pairs of eyes. For instance, an international group of younger, non-expert and gender-balanced group of persons could be asked to look into the future of terrorism by way of a survey. Such an alternative approach is not an alternative for the entire body of foresights on terrorism, but could contribute to a more systematic and broader approach to look into the future of terrorism.

All in all, it is safe to say that there is still a lot of room for improvement regarding the study of trends and future developments in terrorism. There are still many obstacles and limitations to the extremely difficult exercise of discerning trend paths and possible and probable futures. But improvements can be made so that "our guesses about the future do not have to be pure speculations". ¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Future of Terrorism Task Force (2007).

¹⁰² Congressional Research Service (2003).

¹⁰³ Lia, (2005), p.187.

Recommendations

In light of the above mentioned flaws and weaknesses, as well as the expressed need to look ahead, the following two recommendations can be made. The first one relates to the focus and methodologies of future foresights. The second one is linked to the background of a part of the authors of these studies and the need to prevent failures of imagination.

- 1) In line with Lia's remarks, the study of the future of terrorism needs **more systematic thinking** about how changing societal conditions can produce a variety of both permissive and inhibiting environments for terrorism, and how this results in evolving patterns of terrorism. To this end, we have to analyse the contextual or underlying factors that shape these environments in which terrorism either thrives or declines. ¹⁰⁴ The latter option is rarely included in terrorism forecasts as they seem to be preoccupied with possible developments in a negative direction.
- 2) In line with the findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the US, the study of the future of terrorism faces the potential failure of imagination. Noticing the strong overrepresentation of US based, relatively older and experienced male experts, one could argue that the potential failure of imagination is still relevant as most of these authors did not grasp the venomous character of al Qaeda until 9/11. This raises the question to what extent those who have spent a big part or even most of their lives investigating terrorism can still 'think outside the box' and approach this phenomenon in new innovative ways; conceptualizing it differently and in a way that they had never thought of before? Without denying the incredible experience and intellect of the older generation of experts, it might be an interesting idea to invite young and non-expert persons to look at possible futures of terrorism. In addition, it might be wise to select a more international group of people, including citizens or residents from non-Western countries as well as more women. Furthermore, according to Joshua Sinai, we need to utilise the latest and innovative conceptual methodologies and software-based systems that are grounded in the social and behavioural sciences if we want to stay ahead of the terrorist threat. 105 This US scholar believes there is a lot to gain from theoretically grounded, conceptually precise, methodologically rigorous, and analytically oriented research that can help us to fully understand the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism. According to Sinai, a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach, especially in combination with new software systems, will enable us to better understand how to assess, model, forecast and pre-emptively respond to current and future terrorist threats. 106

In a follow-up project of ICCT – The Hague, an innovative alternative approach to forecasting terrorism will be researched and tested, one that is based on a systematic survey asking a younger audience from all parts of the world about their ideas on the future of terrorism.

¹⁰⁶ Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004, Volume 3073/2004, 531-533, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-25952-7_50

¹⁰⁴ Lia, (2005) p. 3

¹⁰⁵ Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004, Volume 3073/2004, 531-533, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-25952-7_50

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Appendix

| Type of institution | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| Academic | | Governmental | | Think tank NGO | | |
| i ◆ | | | | 49 | | |
| | | Types of | terrorism extracted from | the texts | | |
| Al Qaeda Jihadist | Other religiously Al Qaeda Jihadist inspired Left wing Right wing terrorism | | | Nationalist Separatist Loyalist | | |
| 13. | | | | | | |
| | Special | focus; mod | dus operandi extracted fro | om the publication | on | |
| WMD CBRN | | Lone wolf / Unaffiliated | | | Cyber Internet | |
| * | | | | S [™] N | | |
| Authors and participants | | | | | | |
| Predominantly r | nantly male* Predominantly female* Nationality (flag) > 5 nationalities (map) | | | | | |
| ď | | Q | | | | |

Publications listed chronologically, then alphabetically

| author(s) (year of publication) <i>Title</i> . Place of | Academic/Governmental/Think | Symbol Type of terrorism focus (majority) |
|--|-----------------------------|---|
| * * | | Flag Nationality (majority) |
| · | | Flag Nationality (majority) |
| Method | Horizon study | |
| Summary of the publication https://www. Link to document / Reference source | | |

^{*} Predominantly = > 80%

Books

| Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (eds.) (2000) <i>The future</i> of terrorism. London (UK) and Portland (US): Frank Cass. | ♠ ≥ | |
|--|------------|--|
| M. Taylor and J. Horgan, D. Veness, E. Marotta, G. Head, M. Gheordunescu, X. Raufer, A. Merari, P. Wilkinson, L. Weinberg and W. Eubank, A. P. Schmid, D. Claridge, M. Leitenberg, R. Monaghan, R. D. Crelinsten, M. Dartnell, L. Richardson | চ | |
| Papers presented at meeting | 1999 – | |


"These papers are from a meeting at University College Cork, Ireland, at which terrorism experts from academia and law enforcement presented and discussed their views on future developments in terrorism. This book brings together papers presented at the meeting and offers a series of challenging, and at times controversial, perspectives on the unfolding nature of terrorism. Themes considered in this book include: the effects of the changing geo-political context on terrorism; strategic and tactical responses to innovations in terrorism and the challenges posed to law enforcement; the changing nature of terrorism; the reality of the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations; and single-issue terrorism."

http://books.google.nl/books/about/The future of terrorism.html?id=B nOFI OZq4C&redir esc=y

| Pearlstein, R. M. (2004) Fatal Future? Transnational terrorism and the New Global Disorder. Austin: University of Texas Press. | |
|--|----------------|
| Richard Merrill Pearlstein | o The second |
| Literature review, summarising arguments, statistics | 1970s – 2004 – |


"The nature and goals of terrorist organizations have changed profoundly since the Cold War standoff among the U.S., Soviet, and Chinese superpowers gave way to the current "polyplex" global system, in which the old rules of international engagement have been shattered by a new struggle for power among established states, non-state actors, and emerging nations. In this confusing state of global disorder, terrorist organizations that are privately funded and highly flexible have become capable of carrying out incredibly destructive attacks anywhere in the world in support of a wide array of political, religious, and ethnic causes. This groundbreaking book examines the evolution of terrorism in the context of the new global disorder. Richard M. Pearlstein categorizes three generations of terrorist organizations and shows how each arose in response to the global conditions of its time. Focusing extensively on today's transnational (i.e., privately funded and internationally operating) terrorist organizations, he devotes thorough attention to the two most virulent types: ethnoterrorism and radical Islamic terrorism. He also discusses the terrorist race for weapons of mass destruction and the types of attacks, including cyberterrorism, that are likely to occur in coming years. Pearlstein concludes with a thought-provoking assessment of the many efforts to combat transnational terrorism in the post-September 11 period."

http://books.google.nl/books?id=gmytM -gwVkC&hl=nl&source=gbs navlinks s



"This new study is devoted to understanding how international terrorism is shaped, how it evolves and what we can expect in the future. Drawing upon research and methods outside the traditional focus, and by taking both a theoretical approach and a new practical predictive perspective, it delivers a fresh and fascinating contribution to terrorism studies. While predicting terrorism is a highly speculative business, there are ways of identifying certain long-term causes, driving forces and their links with society. Terrorists are usually integral players in local and sometimes global politics. Hence, when the local, regional and international contexts change, so does terrorism. Thoroughly reviewing the body of literature on the causes of terrorism, this study also combines predictive and futuristic analyses on globalisation, supported by a range of key case studies. It spans from the transformation of international relations, the globalisation of the market economy, demographic factors, ideological shifts and technological changes. The result is a set of key conclusions about the future patterns of terrorism, which are not simply best guesses, but also backed up by solid research."

(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780714652610/




"This Foreign Affairs bestseller from MSNBC terrorism expert Walid Phares allows a frightening look into the future of jihad. Phares—who has served as an expert with the Justice Department, briefed the Defense and State Departments, and testified to Congress—shows that there has been a fundamental misunderstanding about al Qaeda's ultimate goal in the West and what victory means to jihadists. Future Jihad shows how our defenses have been infiltrated; identifies the future generation of home-grown terrorists; and points the way for America to win the ideological war at the heart of jihad."

http://us.macmillan.com/futurejihad/WalidPhares

| Barnaby, F. (2007) <i>The future of terror</i> . London: Granta Books | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| Frank Barnaby | Q N |
| Literature review, trends, summarising arguments, statistics | 1 st Century BC – 2007 – |


"Terrorism has changed. New terrorist ideologies have been accompanied by new methodologies - weapons that are harder to detect and suicide tactics that are much harder to protect against than the 'old' terrorism. But what does our immediate future hold? And how well prepared are we to confront it? Frank Barnaby looks at the new weapons and tactics available to today and tomorrow's terrorists, including 'dirty bombs', liquid explosives, and cyber-terror, which can wreak havoc with nothing more specialist than a laptop. In examining terrorism past, present and future, Barnaby shows how we have come to our present situation and reviews the limits of counter-terrorism."

http://books.google.nl/books/about/The Future of Terror.html?id= kAAAAIAAJ&redir esc=y



"Taking an unbiased approach, this book offers a lens into the history and status of terrorism around the world. Written from a global perspective, it addresses different regions of the world and the terrorist groups that originate there. Featuring new maps and photo art, this edition clearly shows students where terrorism exists and how prevalent it is today. Its systems approach explores various elements of terrorism, terrorists, and their motives and its wide range of current topics make the text suitable for all disciplines and points of view."


http://www.pearsonhighered.com/educator/product/Terrorism-Today-The-Past-The-Players-The-Future/9780135006375.page



"On November 28th 2009, referendum, a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new minarets was approved by 57.5% of the participating voters in Switzerland (based on their direct-vote system).The outcome of such a referendum angered not the moderates but all radical Muslims throughout Europe, the Middle-East, Asia, Africa and Pakistan.Do those radicals do the same if Vatican venture to construct a Church in Riad or Istanbul?The reason is simple, the people of Switzerland (57%)were afraid by the dramatic development of Islamic institutions and the Europe-wide agitation of radicalists' through their mosques and forums. As you can read in this book, the radical Muslims were angry because one of their strategic pillar that carried their future goals has failed, hidered or doomed. The initial strategy targeting Europe as the future battleground for radical Islamic terrorists, was born in Geneva, Switzerland. Their goal is to get back Europe, the continent once belonged to them . For that purpose, they have laid down the groundwork that has been in process since the 1950s. Early in 1950, most members of Islamic Brotherhood (Ikwans, together with those retired Arabic soldiers who fought alongside Nazi-Germany, planted their Mosques in Geneva and Munich. Today, the Ikwans; allied with the Turkish (Milli Goerues) and Asian Islamic fundamentalists, succeeded (with oil Dollars from the Wahabists) in establishing hundreds of Mosques, Research Institutes and diverse business firms throughout Europe. Radical Muslims in Europe operate with a new under-cover strategy -attracting educated youngsters; immigrants, students and converted Europeans to execute their hidden agenda. The bombers of Madrid and London are not the radicals who travelled from the Middle East or Afghanistan to launch their terror actions; they originate from Europe or- mostly home-grown. In the future, as it is today, most of the Islamist terrorist threat to the United States will largely originated "


http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/141972/europe-the-future-battleground-of-islamic-terrorism

Academic articles




"The vulnerability of the critical infrastructure has led to increasing concern that it will be the target of terrorist attacks. This article explores definitional aspects of information terrorism and identifies two groups likely to find information terrorism attractive: conventional terrorist groups and information culture groups. As computer sophisticated youth move into the ranks of conventional terrorist groups, the groups will increase their reliance on computer technology, and information terrorism will be incorporated into a hybrid tactical repertoire. Information culture groups, however, confine their attacks to cyberspace. In contrast to the powerful group dynamics of the traditional underground terrorist group, networked groups, particularly information culture terrorists, may only be in contact electronically, and are subject to a radically different group psychology, virtual group dynamics, that significantly affects their decision making and risk taking, and has dangerous security implications."

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550008427563




"Whether or not terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a vexing question which plays on our fears of the unpredictability of terrorism and the revulsion we harbor of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. This article outlines an approach to that question through consideration of terrorism as a contest for influence, rather than for power or control. The terrorist is assessed in terms of his being fundamentally oriented around the interactive dynamic between terrorist and perceived audience. The author argues that the likelihood of terrorist WMD use - on a mass scale - may be better indicated by examining the terrorists' own perceptions and expectations of audience, the tone and content of both symbolic and rhetorical messages, and the status of terrorists' interactions with the larger society. The author uses that model to suggest that the terrorists most likely to seriously consider large-scale WMD use are those who champion a message of destruction for, or to, an ethereal audience and who consciously seek to withdraw as completely as possible from society."



Terrorism today reflects both change and continuity. New adversaries with new motivations and new rationales have appeared in recent years to challenge some of the most basic assumptions about terrorists and terrorism. Their emergence, however, has not produced the anticipated changes in either terrorist weaponry or tactics that were predicted to follow in the wake of the Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Instead, as has been the case for more than a century, the gun and the bomb remain the terrorists' main weapons of choice. Thus, as fanatical or irrational as even this new breed of terrorists may seem, like their more traditional counterparts, they too have remained remarkably conservative operationally: adhering to the same familiar and narrow tactical repertoire that they both have mastered and equally importantly believe maximizes their likelihood of success. For this reason, future terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons may be far less certain than is now commonly assumed and therefore current efforts to address this threat may prove as ineffective as they are misplaced."

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


"The article analyses the situation of terrorism in the 21st century. According to the author, some of the traditional terrorist tactics, such as hijackings and embassy takeovers, occur far less frequently today. But physical security by itself does not end terrorism. The decline in some tactics and terrorist targeting has been offset by a trend toward attacking softer targets. Intelligence collection and analysis has improved, and more information is being usefully shared. A number of terrorist groups have been successfully suppressed, primarily in Western Europe. Overall, the volume of international terrorism has declined; and although terrorists have become more indiscriminate in their violence, even the number of fatalities is down from its peak of the late 1980's and early 1990's. While a number of successes have been achieved, the terrorist threat has also evolved. The motives driving terrorism have changed from ideology to ethnic conflict and religious fanaticism. This has produced a new breed of terrorists, people less constrained by the fear of alienating perceived constituents or angering the public. The approach to policy and research in the 1990's was an extremely pragmatic one. Researchers paid less attention to what might cause terrorism and instead focused on its suppression, on improving intelligence, on increasing security, on identifying effective counterterrorist strategies, and on applying new technology."


| Silke, A. (2001) 'The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism', <i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i> , 13 (4): 1 – 14. | N.A. |
|--|-------------|
| Andrew Silke | Q V |
| Qualitative, empirical/ethnographic | 1995 – 2000 |

"In a review in 1988, Schmid and Jongman identified a number of key problems in research on terrorism. These included serious concerns with the methodologies being used by researchers to gather data and with the level of analysis that was undertaken once data was available. Following on from this work, this article draws on a review of research published between 1995 and 2000. It was found that the problems identified in 1988 remain as serious as ever. Research is ultimately aimed at arriving at a level of knowledge and understanding where one can explain why certain events have happened and be able to accurately predict the emergence and outcome of similar events in the future. Terrorism research, however, has failed to arrive at that level of knowledge. This article outlines some of the causes of these continuing problems and highlights ways in which the situation can be improved."

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


"Can we develop a credible risk assessment system for new religious movements? We are challenged by the complexity of interactions between beliefs, individual members, leadership and the surrounding environment. In addition, our ability to predict the actions of specific groups is severely hampered by a strong apologetic bias on the part of most NRM researchers. Beyond the problem of bias, we are faced with one practical problem and that is obtaining reliable intelligence. The truth is that scholars do not really know much about what is going on inside the thousands of religious groups in existence today."




The existing literature on the "Punjab crisis" is largely descriptive , offering only post-hoc explanations for" both its emergence and for its decline. There is a paucity of literature that offers inferential quality in terms of predicting the possible rise of future Sikh separatism in Punjab, India. How can empirically oriented scholars use qualitative methods to build such models? Furthermore, what conditions have led to separatism in the past? Are current concerns about the possible re-emergence of Sikh separatism warranted? This article attempts to answer these questions. By building on an important work by Paul R. Brass, this article will systematically construct, present, and apply a predictive model of Sikh separatism. It is argued that Sikh separatism will not reemerge in the near future, but transformations in the four political conditions delineated in the model have significant predictive value and need to be closely monitored by both academics and policymakers alike."

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/105761002753404131




'The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is radical environmentalist group that has in the past engaged in profile acts of arson, thus far without causing casualties. In order to determine the correct level of official response, it is necessary to examine the potential for the ELF and other radical environmentalist groups to engage in various levels of violence against human beings. Using empirically-based threat assessment, this study investigates the motivational and capability-related attributes of the ELF and concludes that there is a moderate-high threat of an escalation to internationally targeting people, a moderate probability that its members will at some point seek to inflict mass casualties and a low potential for ELF attacks using unconventional weapons. The assessment also identifies several factors indicating that the threat of all three types of violence is increasing, although determining the magnitude of this increase requires further study. Recommendations are given for law enforcement strategies with respect to the ELF and similarly-oriented radical groups."




"This article assesses current trends in terrorism and future potentialities. It examines first the presumed state of Al Qaeda today with particular reference to its likely agenda in a post-Iraq War world. It then more broadly focuses on some key current terrorism trends in order to understand better both how terrorism is changing and what the implications of these changes are in terms of possible future attacks and patterns. The discussion is organized along three key questions: (1) What is the state of Al Qaeda today and what effects have nearly two years of unremitting war had on it? (2) What do broader current trends in terrorism today tell us about future potentialities? (3) How should we be thinking about terrorism today and tomorrow?"

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100390248275



"Terrorists commit lethal acts of violence in order to realize their goals and advance their causes. They have a mixed record of success. This article explores the question whether the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon outside of Washington, D.C. were successful from the perspective of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda group. Although stunningly triumphant in exploiting the news media for their publicity goals and partially successful in advancing some of their short-term political objectives, the architects of the kamikaze attacks of 9-11 did not realize, and perhaps not even further, their ultimate desire to provoke a cataclysmic clash between Muslims and what bin Laden calls the "Zionist-Crusader" alliance. The argument here is nevertheless that from the terrorist perspective the suicide terror of 9-11 was successful in many respects and could well become an attractive model for future terrorism."



Recent claims that Radical Environmentalists are becoming increasingly likely to deploy weapons of mass" death are characterized by a selective reading of the facts, a failure to apprehend significant differences among radical groups, and injudicious speculation. A more careful analysis of the likelihood of violence emerging from radical environmentalist, animal rights, and green anarchist groups requires an analysis of the differences that characterize these groups as well as their intersections. Such an analysis suggests that among these three groups, only green anarchism can provide a possible ideological rationale for the use of weapons of mass death, but even in this case, there are many reasons to doubt they will utilize such tactics."

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
Kathleen M. Blee



Qualitative: explanatory, threat assessment


19th Century – 2005

"Racial terrorism—violence perpetrated by organized groups against racial minorities in pursuit of white and Aryan supremacist agendas—has played a significant role in U.S. society and politics. Women have been important actors in much of this violence. This article examines women's involvement in racial terrorism from the immediate post-Civil War period to the present. Although organized racial violence by women has increased over time, this trend may not continue. The strategic directions and tactical choices of Aryan and white supremacist groups are likely to alter the extent and nature of women's involvement in racial terrorism in the future."




"Cyberterrorism conjures up images of vicious terrorists unleashing catastrophic attacks against computer networks, wreaking havoc, and paralyzing nations. This is a frightening scenario, but how likely is it to occur? Could terrorists cripple critical military, financial, and service computer systems? This article charts the rise of cyberangst and examines the evidence cited by those who predict imminent catastrophe. Psychological, political, and economic forces have combined to promote the fear of cyberterrorism. From a psychological perspective, two of the greatest fears of modern time are combined in the term "cyberterrorism." The fear of random, violent victimization segues well with the distrust and outright fear of computer technology. Many of these fears, the report contends, are exaggerated: not a single case of cyberterrorism has yet been recorded, hackers are regularly mistaken for terrorists, and cyberdefenses are more robust than is commonly supposed. Even so, the potential threat is undeniable and seems likely to increase, making it all the more important to address the danger without inflating or manipulating it."

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


"Intelligence estimates based on models keyed to frequency and recency of past occurrences make people less secure even if they predict most harmful events. The U.S. presidential commission on WMDs, the 9/11 commission, and Spain's comisión 11-M have condemned the status quo mentality of the intelligence community, which they see as being preoccupied with today's "current operations" and tactical requirements, and inattentive to tomorrow's far-ranging problems and strategic solutions. But the overriding emphasis in these commissions' recommendations is on further vertically integrating intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Such proposals to further centralize intelligence and unify command and control are not promising given recent transformations in Jihadist networks to a somewhat "leaderless resistance" in the wake of Al Qaeda's operational demise. To defeat terrorist networks requires grasping novel relations between an englobing messianic moral framework, the rootless intellectual and physical mobility of immigrant and diaspora communities, and the overarching conceptual, emotional, and logistical affordances of the Internet. Britain's WWII experience provides salutary lessons for thinking creatively with decentralized expertise and partially autonomous approaches."




"The United States is at significant risk of a future pyro-terrorist attack—when terrorists unleash the latent energy in the nation's forests to achieve the effect of a weapon of mass destruction—the threat, must be defined, America's vulnerabilities understood, and action taken to mitigate this danger to the United States."

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100600698477



'Most academic experts within the International Relations (IR) community and other, more specialized disciplines, failed to predict or warn government policymakers and the public of the possibility that events of 9/11 magnitude could take place on the U.S. homeland. Given that long-term investigation of trends in world affairs is one of the sources that has always informed policy analysis, this represents an interesting question to examine. The analysis contained in this assessment suggests that the ontological, methodological, and conceptual problems within and between the disciplines, combined with a skewed absorption with the prospect of developments in Asia, created a gap in the knowledge about Islamic terrorism and groups like Al Qaeda, which in turn caught most of the academic community unaware on 9/11. This article performs a quantitative study to determine the nature and scope of this apparent analytical failure on the part of academics in IR and other specialized disciplines to predict 9/11 and aims to address why this failure took place."



"This analysis examines female terrorist activity in three cases (the United States, Israel, and Russia) and identifies six counterterrorism deficiencies (exploitation, organizational, technological, denial and deception, tactical, and cultural/ideological) that help to explain why observers failed to anticipate the emergence and scope of female militancy. Drawing from these lessons, two potential scenarios for significant and/or surprising female terrorism are examined with respect to left-wing terrorism in the United States and global Islamism."

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100601101067

| Bunker, R. J. (2008) 'Terrorists and Laser Weapons Use: An Emergent Threat', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31 (5): 434 – 455. | |
|--|----------|
| Robert J. Bunker | Q |
| Qualitative: literature review | 1990s – |

"The trends leading to the emergent threat of terrorist laser weapons use are that a military weaponry transition from conventional to Directed Energy Weapons is taking place; that laser weapons offer clear tactical and operational advantages over conventional weapons; that laser prices are dropping while laser performance is increasing; that criminals, criminal-soldiers, and foreign militaries have all utilized laser devices and weapons for counteroptical purposes; and that criminal-soldiers are evolving and getting more sophisticated from both an organizational and weaponry use perspective. This article will look at the aforementioned trends, analyze them, and then offer some concluding thoughts concerning terrorist laser weapons use futures."


| Pluchinsky, D. A. (2008) 'Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31 (3): 182 – 200. | |
|--|---------------|
| Dennis A. Pluchinsky | ď |
| Quantitative/qualitative: statistics, literature review | 2002 – 2007 – |

This commentary examines the issue of global jihadist recidivism and identifies it as a potential long-term' international counterterrorism concern. Although there are no comprehensive and accurate statistics on global jihadist recidivism, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that suggests that the tendency for released imprisoned global jihadist terrorists is to return to terrorist activity. It is important to understand that arresting, indicting, and sentencing a captured global jihadist terrorist is not the end of the counterterrorism skirmish. In fact, the next stages of incarceration and reformation are more crucial to the endgame. The problem of global jihadist recidivism is at the core a manpower issue. Prisons have always been an important front for all types of terrorist groups. Recidivism or the failure of prison rehabilitation programs is simply one component of this front. Terrorist groups do not want their imprisoned members to reform and resign from the organization. Further research needs to be conducted on the recidivism rate for terrorists and whether religious terrorists would have a higher rate than secular ones."

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100701878457

| Reed, D. J. (2008) 'Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict', <i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> , 31 (8): 684 – 722. | ♠ | |
|---|----------|--|
| Donald J. Reed | চ | |
| Quantitative/qualitative: case studies | 2001 – | |

Fifth generation warfare has arrived and is irreversibly changing the character and nature of human conflict. It confronts the United States with the evolving strategic dilemma of not only dealing with the War on Terror, but of simultaneously crafting strategies that look beyond military preparedness for past wars and embrace the perspective of national preparedness for the spectrum of future conflicts. This article uses four essential elements of war—the new domains of conflict, the changing nature of adversaries, the changing nature of objectives, and the changing nature of force—to build a generational typology of war and conflict that informs the characteristics of fifth generation warfare. The resultant model produces two outcomes: First, it demonstrates how recent events such as the rise of computer hackers, the 2001 anthrax and the 2003-2004 ricin attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the emergence of Al Qaeda demonstrate characteristics of fifth generation warfare. Second, it illustrates the way in which these events are unique indicators of a future in which non-state entities are increasingly able to wage war on equal footing with nation-states. The article concludes that the United States must embrace fifth generation warfare if it is to successfully confront these threats that have taken on new and heretofore unimagined forms in the postmodern era of war."



"Since the mid-1990s, academic and policy communities have debated the risk posed by terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Three major schools of thought in the debate have emerged: the optimists, the pessimists, and the pragmatists. Although these three schools of thought draw on the same limited universe of data on CBRN terrorism, they arrive at strikingly different conclusions. Given the highly subjective process of CBRN terrorism risk assessment, this article analyzes the influence of mental shortcuts (called heuristics) and the systemic errors they create (called biases) on the risk assessment process. This article identifies and provides illustrative examples of a range of heuristics and biases that lead to the underestimation of risks, the overestimation of risks and, most importantly, those that degrade the quality of the debate about the level of risk. While these types of biases are commonly seen as affecting the public's perception of risk, such biases can also be found in risk assessments by experts. The article concludes with recommendations for improving the CBRN risk assessment process."


http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2011.575487

| Monaghan, R. and P. Shirlow (2011) 'Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland Since 1994', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 34 (8): 649 – 665. | |
|--|---------------|
| Rachel Monaghan and Peter Shirlow | Q 60 |
| Qualitative | 1994 – 2011 – |

"This article considers in detail loyalist paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland since the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994. The continuing nature of contemporary loyalist violence is documented with reference to sectarian attacks against members of the "Other"/Catholic community and associated symbols of that community, violence directed at other loyalists, and the potential for future violence given constitutional uncertainty regarding Northern Ireland's position within the United Kingdom. The article also challenges assumptions within the broader literature of an inability within loyalist paramilitary groups to move beyond violence in the post-cease-fire period with particular reference to their conflict transformation efforts."


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Publications: Think Tanks




The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 is a federal policy measure that a private security market should provide the foundation of financial recovery from future terrorist attacks (federal government assistance is made available to support this market at least in the short run). In this document, the question is analysed whether the structure of TRIA is in line with the fundamental qualities of the risk of terrorism and with likely evolving trends in this threat. It considers Al Qaeda as the principal focus of US concern about transnational terrorism. It discusses past events targeting Al Qaeda and concludes that the monolithic structure of the organisation from the 1990s has changed to a "movement of movements". Four trends based on this assessment which are likely to develop are listed; a continuing interest in attacking hard targets, but an increased focus on soft, civilian-centric venues; an ongoing emphasis on economic attacks; continued reliance on suicide strikes; a desire to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons but little ability to execute large-scale unconventional attacks. In addition, domestically inspired terrorism (of anarchists, far-right extremists and radical environmentalists) is on the rise. All trends share in common an increased risk for the private sector, due to the changed operational environment in the Global War on Terror. On the basis of these analyses, policy recommendations on TRIA are provided.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND MG393.pdf




The National Intelligence Council sponsored this study by the RAND corporation to assist US policymakers. Between 2004 and 2005, RAND identified technologies and applications that have the potential for significant global impact by 2020. In Appendix F a section is dedicated to "technology and terrorism". This appendix looks at technological change creating new vulnerabilities and targets, application of new technologies enabling or hindering terrorist operations, and new technologies providing potentially new weapons for terrorists.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR303.html




The introduction by Brian Michael Jenkins generally addresses jihadist innovations and examines how terrorism has stayed the same. He introduces the chapter authors as senior analysts whose research precedes 9/11 and who collectively represent two centuries' worth of analysis. Their essays all concern the struggle against jihadist terrorism, as the authors agree that violent jihadists (continue to) present the most serious threat to Western security. Al Qaeda is considered a more serious threat, but not new or unique. This wave of terrorism is expected to eventually pass, but it will be a long struggle. This Senior Fellows report starts with three chapters on "the Future of Terrorism", followed by three chapters on "the Future of Counterterrorism". Jenkins summarises in his introduction the recommendations by all authors; a multidimensional strategy, engaging the international community is necessary, preserving our basic values. The current counterterrorist strategy in the US is not working. All authors agree that today's jihadists have inherited terrorism tactics from previous struggles and added some innovations, and tomorrow's terrorists will inherit theirs.

http://www.mipt.org/Websites/mipt/Images/media/Publications/SeniorFellowMasters.pdf



The Terrorism Index is aimed at informing the public about the assessment of the national security establishment in the US on the war on terror and global threats. The report is based on the results of surveys designed by the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy. Participants in the survey were selected for their expertise in terrorism and US national security, including people who have served as national security advisor, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, senior White House aides, top Pentagon commanders, seasoned intelligence professionals, and distinguished academics (no one currently in government). The survey was administered online in 2006, twice in 2007, and 2008. Respondents were asked to self-identify their ideological bias. In order to ensure balance, the survey was weighted according to ideology to make the number of weighted liberal respondents equal to the number of conservative respondents. Moderate and conservative respondents remained unweighted. The survey lists the names of all participants; few people were below 35. There is a consistent finding that terrorism remains likely; some threats ebb away and some increase. The experts display generally increasing optimism on global safety.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/terrorism_index.html/



This report builds on Forecasting International's list of trends of fifteen years ago. They update the list periodically, most recently in the summer of 2007. The expert panel included members of the intelligence community, specialists from the US government and military, security consultants, think tanks, forecasters, academics, and local police officials, mostly from the US. Three baseline terrorism trends in the years ahead are identified; terrorist ranks are growing; they will gain access to Weapons of Mass Destruction; and they will gain legitimacy. From a list of 55 trends the experts were asked to pick out ten they felt would be most important to the future of terrorism and evaluate their likely effects. Some difficulties in the method are discussed; including that relatively few of the panellists rank-ordered the ten trends they believed would be most important for terrorism. A final list is arranged according to the average rank assigned by the participants, with extra weight accorded to trends that were picked the most often. The result is not the order Forecasting International would have chosen. Only the first three trends were relatively clear, but the list does not match the order of any of the participants. 1) The economy of the developed world is on path to grow for at least the next five years (Trend1); 2) Militant Islam continues to spread and gain power (Trend9); 3) The world's population is on course to reach 9.2 billion by 2050 (Trend2). The report continues with a list of all 55 trends and comments by experts, including extra comments in Appendix C.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/proteus/docs/55-terror.pdf




This paper outlines the key influences for the transformation of terrorism over the last three decades. It discusses the diffusion and transnationalisation of terrorist group structures, the rise of religiously inspired ideologies, and the greater lethality and brutality of terrorist operations, as the trends that constitute 'new terrorism'. Salafi jihadism is by far the most significant threat , but other potential sources should stay monitored, such as the far Right. The anti-globalisation movement, the anti-immigrant Right and non-Islamist religious groups, especially evangelical Christian groups, are briefly discussed. Two scenarios are provided that sketch the different ways in which the currently dominant terrorist threat may evolve in the next decade or two. The first scenario is based on Bruce Hoffman's argument on Al Qaeda 'resurgent' and the second scenario on Marc Sageman's 'leaderless jihad' argument.

http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/06063.pdf

| Bergen, P. and B. Hoffman (2010) Assessing the Terrorist Threat. Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group. | |
|---|---------------|
| Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman | ď |
| U.S. counterterrorism officials not listed, but mentioned as source in Executive summary | N.A. |
| Expert interviews, desk research | 2001 – 2010 – |


This report is based on interviews with senior U.S. counterterrorism officials at the federal and local level, and "embracing the policy, intelligence, and law enforcement communities", supplemented by literature study. It focuses on the jihadist threat; its diversification, Americanisation and radicalisation and recruitment. The overall strategy of Al Qaeda is discussed as well as its weaknesses. Potential future attacks are discussed, starting with an examination of the Times Square incident of May 1, 2010. This event was not perpetrated by a "lone wolf", but is part of an emerging pattern of terrorism presenting new challenges to national security. It presents possible future targets, analysed and complemented by examples of previous plots; commercial aviation, distinctive Western brand names — in particular American hotel chains, Israeli/Jewish targets, American soldiers fighting wars in two Muslim countries. Potential future tactics are listed as well; suicide operations, "Feyadeen" (self-sacrificer) attacks, assassinations of key leaders and US officials and those who are perceived as insulting Islam. Mass-casualty attacks involving true weapons of mass destruction are unlikely, and so is an attack on a mall in some Midwestern town or other less populous region of the U.S. The authors express concern that there is no federal government agency or department specifically in charge of identifying radicalization and recruitment within the US and they end with questions on; this threat of homegrown terrorism, the response to this threat, and the current national security architecture.

http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf




This publication shortly lists definitions of terrorism and examines low intensity terrorism, based on the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, TE-SAT 2010, and other public resources. Low intensity attacks produce less direct damage, but are also carried out by individuals or by less hierarchical organisations. This type of terrorism is expected to increase in the future, because of the success of the Security Services in countering the threats posed by Islamist terrorism, and the current economic situation in many European countries. Islamist terrorism is still perceived as the biggest threat to most Member States according to TE-SAT, and on the basis of several loose examples this publication argues that radical left wing groups in Germany, lone wolf terrorism and cyber war should be reckoned with as clear threats. Academia should be included to analyse motivations of terrorist groups and private security organisations will be more effective than the state for protection against attacks.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=117402




For this study, cases were identified from the GTD for 1999 to 2007, WITS for 2008 to 2009, government sources from FBI, DOJ, DHS, the White House, as well as media accounts, and incident summary lists from the Heritage Foundation, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Fur Commission. Cases were selected from those sources based on criteria such as the definition, stage of plots, aim of plots, but not on any ideological motivation. Although a disclaimer is given referring to the incompleteness of the data and warning not to confuse it with statistical analyses, a coding scheme was used to identify cases with similar attributes to establish trends and patterns within the dataset. 86 cases were identified that met the specific criteria, of which 18 plots reached execution. Findings include an average frequency of 8 plots per year, and the modus operandi consisting of 76% plots for conventional attack, 16% targeted attacks and 8% CBRN plots. 35 Plots were committed by 'lone wolves', who have also been more successful. A breakdown of group types per motivation and the number of plots associated with them shows that Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) plots are in the majority (40 plots), white supremacists were responsible for 20 plots and militia/antigovernment groups for 12 plots. Results demonstrate that while the threat of AQAM is significant, other groups should not be ignored. Less than half of the identified plots were sponsored or inspired by AQAM.

https://www.ihssnc.org/portals/0/Building on Clues Strom.pdf



This paper argues that the US and NATO should pay closer attention to the spread of international terrorism and to the expansion of radical Islamic organisations to the north and through the borders of Central Asia, rather than just Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The paper focuses on Kazakhstan, because of the government's willingness to take a greater role in the war on terror compared to its neighbouring countries and the expulsion of Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents from Afghanistan and Pakistan make it vulnerable to terrorist activity. May 2011 suicide bombers attacked Kazakh security services' headquarters. Further attacks could jeopardise transit facilities, such as the Northern Distribution Network for non-military supplies to Afghanistan, and massive energy projects. The report is largely based on sources from the news media, and information on the strategic importance of the region. The method is not so much trend analysis, but a forecast of possible further incidents and factors contributing to escalation of the problems.

http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3292.pdf



This report is the end result of a year-long project consisting of a base-line assessment of AQAM in a report called 'AQAM, A Threat Transformed', case studies, field research, and the expertise of a Senior Advisory Group, consisting of former and current counterterrorism practitioners and experts. The case studies included a range of groups with diverging operating areas and trajectories. From these cases key internal and external factors were identified that drove AQAM's development (such as 'foreign intervention' and 'networking'). These factors informed paradigms for the future which are discussed in a separate chapter in this final report. The report consists of four analyses and ends with policy recommendations; 'Future Environment', 'Paradigms of the Future', 'Strategic Shocks'. In the conclusion the key factors are summarized that can impact the broader AQAM movement through 2025 and around these key factors policy recommendations are given.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110826 Nelson %20ConfrontingAnUncertainThreat Web.pdf




This workshop paper links concrete examples to discuss what possible trends may be underlying these cases; sources are given in footnotes most of the time. The focus is on Europe and how it is connected to the broader threat the US faces. It is noted in the introduction that the number of incidents from Islamist extremism was lower than every other group aside from right wing extremists according to Europol's 2011 TE-SAT report. However, with its preference for large-scale multiple strikes using suicide bombers often coordinated by outside actors, violent Islamist terrorism continues to be the main threat focused on by European security services. The threat from AQIM, from East Africa and the Somali Al Qaeda connected group al Shabaab and Shabaab's connections with AQAP are discussed. A network of plots shows that the Al Qaeda core and affiliated groups in Waziristan continue to have operational command and control over cells in the west. The key problem for counter-terrorism in Europe is that while the threat is reducing, it continues to fragment in a far wider array of directions. There is an underestimated trend towards lone wolf terrorism, as well as Al Qaeda sending back individuals after training and AQAP inciting and claiming responsibility for individual attacks. The Arab Spring is an uncertainty, that could undermine the appeal of al Qaeda, but also has an unknown impact on terrorist networks with links to the countries that have overturned old regimes.

http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CH_IslamistTerroristThreattoEuropeafterOBLDeath.pdf

| Ungerer, Carl John (2011) <i>Beyond bin Laden:</i> future trends in terrorism. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. | |
|---|---------------|
| Carl John Ungerer | ď |
| Trends, waves, desk research | 1990 – 2011 – |

This report assesses the geographical, operational and ideological trends driving the current wave of jihadist terrorism. With or without Al-Qaeda, and despite splintering within Al Qaeda and between Al-Qaeda's franchises, religiously motivated terrorism will be there for decades to come. It deals with the ideological foundation of this fourth wave of global terrorism in chapter two, and with the way the ideology has been operationalised (and the clash between the advocates of an 'organisational' jihad versus the new generation of individuals) in chapter three. Three interrelated trends are identified; decentralization, localization and individualization. Chapter four concerns the shifting geography of terrorism and chapter five examines the extent of terrorist innovation in weapons and tactics. Based on the previous chapters, chapter six discusses elements of a more effective strategy for Australia.

http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=324



This report aims to enhance understanding of how 37 global risks are evolving, how their interaction impacts a variety of stakeholders, and what trade-offs are involved in managing them, and is meant as a tool for policy-makers, CEOs, senior executives and thought leaders around the world. It has a disclaimer at the beginning cautioning readers not to place undue reliance to these statements. Appendix 1 lists the sources and in the acknowledgement names of participants and experts are listed, except of the people who participated in the Global Risks Survey. Appendix 2 has an interesting table (table 7) that shows differences in risk perception among respondents of the survey: governments, business, academia, international organisations, as well as a difference between North America, Europe, and Asia. Appendix 1 explains the methodology. The last chapter of the report identifies the following "risks to watch", based on low levels of confidence in the answer or strongly variant expert views as to the likelihood and impact; Cyber security; Demographic challenges and opportunities: population "cluster bombs", global greying and demographic dividends; Resource security; Retrenchment from globalisation; Weapons of mass destruction.

http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2011/

Government agencies

Cordesman, A. H. (2000) Defending America. Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense. Homeland Defense: The Current and Future Terrorist Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies











Anthony H. Cordesman



Trend analysis and strategic policy

1990s - 2000 -

The publication argues that terrorist and extremist violence comes in uncertain cycles. The failure to attack the US homeland since 1993 only shows that a threat exists, though it has not been successful at the time of writing. The report lists information on terrorist organisations and individuals. It discusses past experience with terrorism in the US, but it also details major foreign terrorist groups and extremists. Also: the existence of domestic paramilitary groups or "militias" poses a particular threat in the sense that some such groups already have attempted to use weapons of mass destruction and that they are organised to attack American civil society.

http://edocs.nps.edu/AR/org/CSIS/currfutureterrthreat.pdf

Lee, R and R. Perl (2003) Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy – Issue Brief for Congress. Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.









Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl




Trend analysis and threat assessment

2003 –

This publication finds a trend towards loosely organised, self-financed, international networks of terrorists, a trend which is ideologically or religiously motivated, and a third trend of cross-national links among different terrorist organisations. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also seen as a trend looming over the issue of international terrorism. The likely profile for the terrorist of the 21st Century may be a private individual not affiliated with any established group, but drawing on similarly-minded individuals for support. These assessments are based on previous incidents and reports, without giving a precise bibliography. The document discusses the definition that is widely used in US government circles and incorporated into law, which concerns citizens or property of more than one country, and politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets such as subnational groups or clandestine agents. This excludes individual (lone wolf) terrorist activity, cyberterrorism and problematises the attack against the USS Cole in 2000.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/16601.pdf



This report is based on 'Global Trends 2010' (1997), 'Global Trends 2015' (2000), six global conferences, follow-up meetings, and research by the NIC 2020 Project staff. This team set up a Scenario Steering Group, consisting of members of the policy community, think tanks, and analysts from the intelligence community. Eight scenarios were examined in a workshop with a broader group of experts. Four were included in the final publication, they are; contradictions of globalisation, the changing geopolitical landscape, new challenges to governance, and pervasive insecurity. In the last chapter, experts assess that the majority of international terrorist groups will continue to identify with radical Islam and several key factors for the spread of radical Islam are discussed. By 2020, Al Qaeda is expected to be superceded by more diffuse Islamic extremist groups. A new class of terrorists may arise out of Iraq and other future conflicts, while a growing support comes from Muslims who are not necessarily supporters of terrorism. State sponsorship is no longer necessary and organisations become self sufficient, like Hizbollah. Most terrorist attacks will continue to employ conventional weapons, but will be original in their operational concepts. One concept could be a large number of simultaneous attacks, possibly in widely separated locations. The greatest concern is that groups may acquire weapons of mass destruction, such as biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device. Terrorists will also try to conduct cyber attacks.

http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf

| NIE (2006) Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" Office of the Director of National Intelligence | 圁 | |
|---|--------|--|
| N.A. | N.A. | |
| N.A. | 2006 – | |

This document provides an overview of judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate, without reference to methodology or who is involved. Al Qaeda is considered the greatest threat, although decentralisation of the movement is discussed as well as causes that might fuel or slow down the spread of the Jihadist ideology. Most Jihadist movements are expected to use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets, but CBRN capabilities are also expected to continue to be sought by terrorist groups. The internet is mentioned as a tool to communicate, propagandise, recruit, train and obtain logistical and financial support that will increasingly be used.

http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf

| Homeland Security Advisory Council (2007) <i>Report</i> of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. | 圁 | |
|--|-------------|---|
| Honorable Lee Hamilton, Chairman Frank J. Cilluffo, Vice Chairman | Q | |
| Task Force Members, Homeland Security Advisory Council Staff, Subject Matter Experts listed | ঠ | |
| Briefings and discussions | 2007 – 2012 | 2 |

The Future of Terrorism Task Force, comprising of members of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, assists the Department of Homeland Security in addressing future threats to the US over the next five years. The task force consulted subject matter experts from the public and private domain, domestic and international, through briefings and discussions. The report does not set out to provide an in-depth examination of threats and their sources, or to forecast the next attack; the larger part of the report provides recommendations. The greatest threat is a global movement underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology. Al Qaeda's ideology is spreading according to the National Intelligence Estimate. Other trends affecting terrorism include hostile nations, franchising of Al Qaeda and "homegrown" terrorists, technology, mobility, internet, the alienation of Muslims (esp. in Western Europe), the challenge posed to existing paradigms of federal, state, and local responders and the bifurcation of homeland security and national security.

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-future-terrorism-010107.pdf

| National Intelligence Council (2008) Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World. Washington, D.C. | 囯 | |
|---|-------------|--|
| Foreword by C. Thomas Fingar, Chairman NIC, acknowledging Mathew Burrows | ত | |
| In acknowledgements; the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Stimson Center, and other (mostly U.S.) Professors and Doctors listed | Q | |
| Conferences, consultations (internet), trends | 2008 – 2025 | |

This study builds upon 2010, 2015 and 2020 editions of "Global trends". Several drafts were shared via the internet and a series of discussion sessions took place in various countries. It differs from the 2020 edition in three ways. Firstly, it assumes a multipolar future instead of US dominance. Secondly, whilst the 2020 report finds political instability might affect the international oil markets but emphasised the domination of fossil fuels, the 2025 report considers energy scarcity a driving factor in geopolitics and sees the world in the midst of a transition to cleaner fuels. Thirdly, both reports project global economic growth and the rise of the BRIC countries, absent major shocks, but the 2025 report finds a high likelihood of major discontinuities (nuclear arms race in the Middle East and possible interstate conflicts over resources). If economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East, terrorism's appeal could diminish by 2025. The opposite occurs in the absence of employment and legal means for political expression. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a mix of descendents of long-established groups and of self-radicalised and disenfranchised individuals. Of great concern is that terrorists or other groups employ biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device. Counter-terrorism efforts should focus on why and how a successor group to Al Qaeda might evolve.

http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF 2025/2025 Global Trends Final Report.pdf

| NCTB (2011) National counterterrorism strategy 2011 – 2015. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security. | |
|--|-------------|
| N.A. | N.A. |
| | |
| N.A. | 2011 – 2015 |

The Netherlands National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security identifies risks and threats that are a strategic priority from 2011 – 2015. The priority areas are: 1) International Jihadism (incl. Jihadist conflict areas and Jihadist discourse/propaganda); 2) Migration and travel movements; 3)Technology and innovation (incl. Internet, Technological Developments, CBRN/E); and 4) Continued development of the Surveillance and Protection System (incl. on Radicalised individuals, Security awareness and performance). These strategic priorities are intended to inform activities to ensure that the Dutch government is prepared for future developments and threats. No concrete methodology is provided for the selection procedure of these priorities. The report identifies the most acute and probable future terrorist threat against the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad as Jihadist.

http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Nationale%20CT-Strategie%202011-2015%20UK_tcm92-369807.pdf?cp=92&cs=25496