



DYNAMICS OF SUPPORT AND ENGAGEMENT

Understanding Malian Youths' Attitudes
towards Violent Extremism

IN COLLABORATION WITH





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
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
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
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
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Mali, once an exemplar of stability in West Africa, has descended into increasing levels of violence since 2012. Facing a growing terrorist threat, which has expanded rapidly and keeps increasing, particularly since 2016,¹ the question of what motivates Malians to either support violent extremist groups, or to take part in acts of extremist violence remains not only incredibly pertinent, but also as elusive as ever. In response to the situation, Mali, along with its neighbouring countries in the Sahel region, has hosted ever-growing numbers of peacekeeping troops, such as those from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), or security forces, such as those in the French-led Operation Barkhane or Takuba Task Force. However, the problem of violent extremism has continued to pose significant threats to the country, including expanding to once unaffected regions.

While initially terrorism was mainly limited to the northern regions of the country, from 2015 onwards terrorist groups have taken advantage of existing ethnic tensions and local conflicts to establish their presence in central Mali, portraying themselves as 'defenders' of communities to enhance their popularity and local support. The ideological narrative put forward by these actors has been built on spe-

¹ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel," 15 February 2019, available at <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/>

cific grievances, has been backed up with claimed historical legitimacy, and has been spread through the most popular channels in the region. The discourse promoted by both al-Qaeda affiliated Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in Mali responds to context-specific needs and socio-economic and political frustrations, such as a widespread sense of insecurity and neglect coupled with existing intercommunal tensions, many of which—such as that between semi-nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers—have been exacerbated by climate changes.

As security-focused efforts to counter terrorism in the country have not been able to successfully halt the growing terrorist threat, the situation has become all the more “volatile”, with nearly 240,000 people in Mali alone (with even greater numbers in neighbouring states such as Burkina Faso and Niger) internally displaced as a result of security conditions.² It has become increasingly vital that efforts in Mali adopt not only a security-based approach to neutralise violent extremist organisations, but also that the conditions which have given rise to the establishment and growth of extremist groups—who have been largely successful at integrating into local communities and drawing upon them

as their bases of support—are better understood so that they can be better addressed. Without an understanding of what leads some Malians to justify or to play an active role in extremism, the cycle of violence is likely to continue.

With the purpose of enhancing understanding of the drivers behind support for and engagement in violent extremism, it was decided to prioritise the voices and perspectives of Malian youths. Young people constitute the greatest demographic group in Mali, with more than half of the population being 24 years old or younger.³ In addition, young people are particularly exposed and vulnerable to radical propaganda and affiliation, as in the process of defining their identity they are vulnerable to “ideological and passionate solicitations”⁴, they search for “affiliation and meaning”⁵ and might be exposed to driving factors.⁶ Their perspectives on the phenomenon thus provide for a particularly interesting and useful lens of analysis. Finally, Malian youths represent the future of the country. Elaborating a better understanding of their assessment of the current situation should help develop tailored initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism in the short-, medium-, and long-term.

2 UN Security Council Press Release, “Situation in West Africa, Sahel ‘Extremely Volatile’ as Terrorists Exploit Ethnic Animosities, Special Representative Warns Security Council,” 9 July 2020, available at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14245.doc.htm>

3 CIA, *World Factbook: Mali*, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_ml.html

4 Saul Levine, ‘Youth in terroristic groups, gangs, and cults: The allure, the animus, and the alienation’, *Psychiatric Annals* 29.6 (1999), pp. 342-343.

5 Jeff Victoroff, ‘The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches’, *Journal of Conflict resolution* 49.1 (2005), p. 24.

6 UNDP, *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*, 2017, p. 55, available at <http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/>

Scope and aim of the research


This report was produced within the framework of the Mali (Dis-) Engagement and Re-Integration related to Terrorism (MERIT) project, jointly conducted by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Funded by the Royal Danish Embassy in Bamako, this initiative aims to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) both inside the prison context, as well as among the broader community, especially among youths. Considering the crucial need for P/CVE efforts to build upon evidence-based research in order to maximise their effectiveness, this study was designed to improve the understanding of the reasons behind the spread of extremist violence in Mali. In particular, this research is meant to shed light on both youths' perceptions of community support for violent extremist groups, their own willingness to engage in violent behaviours, and the various risk factors to which Malian youths are exposed in three regions: Bamako, Menaka, and Mopti.

With the purpose of improving understanding of what underpins support for or engagement with extremist groups in Mali, the following fundamental questions have driven the research:

- ➔ How do Malian youth perceive their communities' attitudes towards violent extremism?
- ➔ To what extent are Malian youth willing to engage in violence themselves?
- ➔ What impact does socio-economic hardship have on youths' perceptions and willingness to engage in violence?
- ➔ In what ways has exposure to violence increased or decreased their support for violence, either perpetrated by terrorist groups or other armed actors?
- ➔ How do perceptions of the West impact youths' attitudes towards extremism?
- ➔ To what extent does the presence of terrorist groups either increase or diminish the risk of accepting extremist narratives and engaging with extremist networks?

This report explores support for and/or willingness to engage in violence across the three researched regions, focusing on the influence of diverse risk factors on possible engagement. Particular attention was given to the ability to fulfil basic needs and aspirations; the exposure to violence and insecurity; the role played by self-identification with ethnic and religious groups as drivers of engagement in violence; and finally, the respondents' attitudes towards the West.

Research areas



Researched regions

The present research is based on primary data gathered through the administration of 300 quantitative surveys in the regions of Bamako, Menaka, and Mopti.

Three locations were selected for the data collection, based on their differentiated levels of exposure—both in terms of length and

intensity—to extremist and other forms of violence. Such a selection facilitated a comparison of the levels of support for/engagement in (extremist) violence by youth confronted with different socio-economic and security environments. It moreover enabled the exploration of potential variances in the influence of certain factors across the regions.

Bamako

With a population of approximately 2.6 million inhabitants,⁷ or 153 inhabitants per square kilometre, Bamako is not only Mali's capital city but also by far the country's largest urban area, as well as the seventh largest urban centre in Africa. Located in Southern Mali, where most of the population lives, Bamako is the centre of political power and decision-making—a situation that has often been a source of tension with the northern regions. In addition to the several military coups that have punctuated Mali's contemporary political history—the latest having taken place as recently as in August 2020—Bamako's authority has been repeatedly challenged since the early days of the country's independence.⁸ Neither severe repression, nor the signing of peace agreements such as the Tamanrasset Accords of 1991 and the National Pact of 1992, or the Algiers Accords signed in 2006, have led to a durable resolution of this north-south divide.⁹

The year 2012 marked a turning point in the country's history, with severe implications for the central authorities in Bamako. Tuarég militants took up arms in early 2012 and, through a temporary alliance with violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and the

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (*Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest*, MUJAO), separatists of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (*Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad*, MNLA) were eventually able to defeat Malian armed forces and seize control over most northern regions. Following the self-proclamation in April 2012 of the independence of Azawad, covering all three regions of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao, MNLA separatist rebels were rapidly dislodged from the main cities by terrorist groups. In Bamako, this resulted in the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré on 22 March 2012, which further destabilised the country. Situated far from the epicentre of violence, Bamako has suffered few attacks in recent years compared to other regions. After a first attack at the restaurant *La Terrasse* on 7 March 2015, which resulted in five deaths,¹⁰ a larger attack was conducted on 20 November of the same year at the Radisson Blu Hotel, causing 22 casualties.¹¹ Following a period of relative quiet, a new attack targeted the hotel-resort *Le Campement* on 18 June 2017 and resulted in five casualties.¹² Despite the relatively low number of significant attacks conducted in the capital city, a pervasive fear of potential

7 CIA, *World Factbook: Mali*, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_ml.html

8 Rfi, «Tourages, les rébellions,» 15 April 2016, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/hebdo/20160415-afrique-touareg-rebellions-niger-mali-algerie-burkina-faso-histoire>

9 Le Monde, «Dans le nord du Mali, les Tourages du MNLA lancent un nouveau défi armé à l'État,» 25 January 2012, available at https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/01/25/dans-le-nord-du-mali-les-touareg-du-mnla-lancent-un-nouveau-defi-arme-a-l-etat_1634378_3212.html#:~:text=c%20des%20territoires-,Dans%20le%20nord%20du%20Mali%2C%20les%20Touaregs%20du%20MNLA%20lancent,sahariennes%20du%20nord%20du%20Mali.

10 Rfi, «Bamako frappée au coeur: une première depuis l'opération Serval,» 8 March 2015, available at <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/2min/20150307-mali-attaque-restaurant-terrasse-attentat-bamako-terrorisme-serval>

11 The Guardian, "Mali attack: More than 20 dead after terrorist raid on Bamako hotel," 21 November 2015, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/mali-attack-highlights-global-spread-extremist-violence>

12 BBC, "Mali attack: Gunmen kill 5 at tourist resort," 19 June 2017, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40322039>

attacks, which would likely predominantly target foreigners and tourists, has emerged.

Menaka

Located in northeast Mali along the Niger border, Menaka and its population have been faced with the presence of significant instability and violence for a number of years. While the northern regions¹³ cover approximately two thirds of Mali's territory, less than 10% of the national population lives in this area.¹⁴ With a population of approximately 73,000 inhabitants, the Menaka region hosts about 0.4% of the total Malian population,¹⁵ with a density of around 1.3 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its semi-arid climate has historically favoured the development of economic systems based on caravan trade along trans-Saharan routes, as well as (semi-) nomadic pastoralism. Isolated from the centre of political power, Menaka has seen its socio-economic development overlooked by central authorities, which in turn has fed grievances against the Malian government and has played a particular role in the successive rebellions that have erupted there since the 1960s.¹⁶

In June 1990, the attack conducted by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (*Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad*, MPLA), led by then-rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghali, against a gendarmerie post in Menaka marked the starting point of the 1990-1996 Tuareg rebellion.¹⁷ In early 2012, the MNLA's attempt to take over northern Mali, and to expel the Malian forces, started with an assault conducted on January 17 against the Malian army positioned in Menaka,¹⁸ followed by other attacks in Aguelhok and Tessalit.¹⁹ Menaka was one of the first cities seized by the MNLA, and the city also became one of its last bastions as tensions increased between the group and its former terrorist allies in 2012. While extremist groups started, as of June 2012, to oust separatist rebels in order to take control over northern Mali's main cities, MNLA militants attempted to remain in Menaka to launch a counter-offensive. Following violent clashes between the two groups in November 2012, however, MNLA militants were chased out by the MU-

13 Northern regions of Mali comprise Gao, Kidal, and Toubouctou as well as Taoudénit and Menaka, these two regions having been created following the administrative reform of January 2016.

14 UNDP, "About Mali," available at <https://www.ml.undp.org/content/mali/fr/home/countryinfo.html>

15 UN OCHA, *Mali : Profil humanitaire de la région de Ménaka*, April 2019, available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/menaka_regional_profile_20191604.pdf

16 Jeune Afrique, «Mali : Ménaka la délaissée,» 19 May 2014, available at <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/133441/politique/mali-m-naka-la-d-laiss-e/>

17 Rfi, «Tourages, les rébellions,» 15 April 2016, available at <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/hebdo/20160415-afrique-touareg-rebellions-niger-mali-algerie-burkina-faso-histoire>

18 Jeune Afrique, «Nord-Mali: des rebelles touaregs attaquent Ménaka,» 17 January 2012, available at <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/177703/politique/nord-mali-des-rebelles-touaregs-attaquent-m-naka/>; See also: The New Humanitarian, «Chronologie du conflit dans le nord du pays,» 5 April 2012, available at <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/report/95263/mali-chronologie-du-conflit-dans-le-nord-du-pays>

19 Jeune Afrique, «Qui sont les rebelles du MNLA?» 26 January 2012, available at <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/143213/politique/nord-mali-qui-sont-les-rebelles-du-mnla/>

JAO,²⁰ backed by AQIM.²¹ And although these terrorist groups were officially dislodged by the French-led Operation Serval in early 2013, the region has remained very much on the radar of extremist and other armed groups ever since.

Despite the presence of the MINUSMA and the efforts of the French intervention force Operation Barkhane,²² an anti-insurgent operation that replaced Operation Serval in mid-2014, terrorist attacks are still common, as demonstrated by the assault against a military post in Menaka on 1 November 2019, claimed by ISGS.²³ In November 2020, the senior military commander of JNIM, Bah ag

Moussa, was killed in a military operation near Menaka.²⁴ With an average of six criminal incidents per month (including armed robberies and burglaries),²⁵ weapons trafficking, and a lack of effective government control, Menaka's level of insecurity has escalated. Kidnappings remain quite commonplace, most particularly in the Gao and Mopti regions.²⁶ This deteriorating security climate has considerably worsened the socio-economic and humanitarian situation throughout the region, with approximately half of the schools being closed, leaving around 8,000 children without access to education, and 61% of the population having insufficient access to food and clean water.²⁷

Mopti

Bordered by the Timbuktu region to the North, the Segou region to the West, and Burkina Faso to the South and South-east, the Mopti region houses around 2.7 million inhabitants, about 14% of the national population, and has a population density of 52 inhabitants per square kilometre.²⁸ Situated

at the junction between semi-arid Sahelian zones to the North and more humid Sudanese zones to the South, and crossed by the Inner Niger Delta, Mopti has always been an important centre for agriculture, producing around 40% of the country's rice and 20% of its millet and sorghum, while also providing

20 Le Monde, «Mali : les islamistes du Mujao chassent les rebelles du MNLA de Ménaka,» 19 November 2012, available at https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/11/19/mali-les-islamistes-du-mujao-chassent-les-rebelles-du-mn-la_1792822_3212.html

21 Rfi, «Mali: MNLA et Mujao se déchirent pour prendre Ménaka,» 20 November 2012, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20121120-mali-mnla-menaka-mujao-aqmi-ansongo-gao>

22 Sahelien, «Ménaka: Barkhane, put to the test of terrorists,» 20 March 2019, available at <https://sahelien.com/en/menaka-barkhane-put-to-the-test-of-terrorists/>

23 The Defense Post, «Mali: More than 50 Killed in 'Terrorist Attack' in Indelimane in Menaka Region,» 2 November 2019, available at <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/11/02/mali-terrorist-attack-indelilmane-menaka>

24 Al Jazeera, «French troops kill commander of al-Qaeda-linked group in Mali,» 13 November 2020, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/french-troops-kill-top-al-qaeda-commander-in-mali>

25 ACTED, «Insecurity in Menaka region affects humanitarian assistance,» 20 August 2019, available at <https://www.acted.org/en/insecurity-in-menaka-region-affects-humanitarian-assistance-2/>

26 UNICEF, *Mali: Humanitarian Situation Report*, March-April 2018, available at <https://www.unicef.org/media/79511/file/Mali-SitRep-April-2018.pdf>

27 UN OCHA, *Mali: Profil humanitaire de la région de Ménaka*, April 2019, available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/menaka_regional_profile_20191604.pdf

28 UN OCHA, *Profil régional Mopti*, February 2019, available at <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/mali/infographic/profil-r%C3%A9gional-mopti-f%C3%A9vrier-2019>

the largest source of livestock in the country.²⁹ Despite largely contributing to the national economy, Mopti ranks low in terms of human and social development—with, for instance, 8% of the region's population facing food insecurity (217,000 persons).³⁰ In addition, increased pressure on natural resources and lands in the past years, notably following the great droughts of the 1970s, has not only affected the local economy, but also enhanced competition and fed tensions between sedentary farmers and pastoralist communities living in this area.³¹

Given its central location, stability in Mopti has historically been impacted by spillover effects of the Tuareg rebellions,³² such as the increased illicit circulation of arms and the development of banditry. However, the crisis initiated by the 2012 rebellion and the subsequent development of terrorist groups have affected the Mopti region even more heavily. While contained for a time to northern Mali, insecurity and violence rapidly spread southward to reach the Mopti region over the past few years. Since 2015, the Mopti region has indeed witnessed a drastic rise of terrorist and

other types of violence.³³ For instance, founded in 2015 by the radical Mopti-based preacher Amadou Koufa, the Katiba Macina rapidly gained ground in the region, becoming in a few years one of the most lethal terrorist groups active in Mali.³⁴

In Mopti, identity politics has played a significant role, with violent extremist groups frequently co-opting historical inter-communal discrepancies. Exploiting existing tensions between local communities living in central Mali, most notably between Fulani herders and Dogon farmers, violent extremist groups have initiated a devastating cycle of violence. Increased instability, combined with the absence of state officials and a deteriorating economic climate, created a security vacuum, which has been filled by the emergence of a range of community-based self-defence militias—such as Dan nan Ambassagou.³⁵ Also known as the Dogon hunters, this non-state armed group progressively evolved into a large regional threat³⁶ and mainly targets Fulani communities, who are frequently accused of supporting terrorist groups. This has initiated a cycle of retaliation that has led to

29 IFPRI, *A Micro-Level Perspective on the Relationship between Presence of Armed Groups, Armed Conflict Violence, and Access to Aid in Mopti*, May 2019, available at <https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/133274>

30 UN OCHA, *Mali: Profil humanitaire de la région de Mopti*, February 2019, available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/mopti_regional_profile_2018_v2.pdf

31 Adam Thiam, Centre pour le dialogue humanitaire, *Centre du Mali: Enjeux et dangers d'une crise négligée*, March 2017, <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Centre-du-Mali-Enjeux-et-dangers-dune-crise-n%C3%A9glig%C3%A9e.pdf>

32 *Ibid.*

33 Quartz Africa, "Mali's volatile mix of communal rivalries and a weak state is fuelling jihadism," 31 March 2019, available at <https://qz.com/africa/1584289/mali-weak-state-fuels-jihadism-mopti-rivalries-fulani-dogon/>

34 Pauline Le Roux, *Répondre à l'essor de l'extrémisme violent au Sahel*, Centre d'Études Stratégiques de l'Afrique, Bulletin de la sécurité africaine n.36, 14 January 2020. <https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/repondre-a-lessor-de-lextrémisme-violent-au-sahel/>

35 Rfi, «Mali: qui est Dan Nan Ambassagou, la milice accusée du massacre d'Ogossagou?», 25 March 2019, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190325-mali-milice-dan-nan-ambassagou-milice-accusee-massacre-ogossagou>

36 HRW, *We Used to Be Brothers: Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali*, 7 December 2018, available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/07/we-used-be-brothers/self-defense-group-abuses-central-mali>

the massacre of civilian populations on both sides.³⁷ In addition, recurring allegations of human rights violations, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and extrajudicial executions by security and defence forces have further aggravated the security and humanitarian situation,³⁸ while creating a favourable environment for armed and terrorist groups to expand their pool of recruits.

Mopti has thus seen its security climate continuously deteriorate over the past five years. The number of attacks and fatalities in Mopti has continued to grow rapidly.³⁹ Ranked as the

fourth most affected region by terrorism in the country between 2013 and 2017,⁴⁰ the Mopti region eventually experienced the highest number of attacks and acts of violence across the country in 2019, underscoring its new position as the epicentre of violence.⁴¹ In 2020 alone, a series of attacks have been carried out in Mopti against various actors, leaving at least 589 dead.⁴² These developments have had disastrous humanitarian consequences; the region alone, for instance, registered nearly half of the total of 218,000 internally displaced persons in Mali in early 2020.⁴³

37 Crisis Group, *Central Mali: Putting a Stop to Ethnic Cleansing*, 25 March 2019, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/centre-du-mali-enrayer-le-nettoyage-ethnique>; DW, "Mali's security crisis: A cycle of exploitation and corruption," 2 at <https://www.dw.com/en/malis-security-crisis-a-cycle-of-exploitation-and-corruption/a-48067929>

38 MINUSMA, Division des Droits de l'Homme et de la Protection, *Note sur les tendances des violations et abus de droits de l'homme (1^{er} Janvier – 31 Mars 2020)*, April 2020, available at https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/note_trimestrielle_sur_les_endances_des_violations_et_abus_des_droits_de_lhomme.pdf

39 UN, "Situation in central Mali 'deteriorating' as violence, impunity rise, UN rights expert warns," 21 February 2020, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057911#:~:text=UN%20Podcasts-,Situation%20in%20central%20Mali%20'deteriorating'%20as%20violence%2C%20impunity,rise%2C%20UN%20rights%20expert%20warns&text=Local%20population%20in%20Gossagou%2C%20a,numerous%20huts%20and%20granaries%20burnt>

40 World Data, "Terrorism in Mali," available at <https://www.worlddata.info/africa/mali/terrorism.php>

41 ACLED, "CDT Spotlight: Navigating a Violent Insurgency in Mali," available at <https://acleddata.com/2020/04/16/cdt-spotlight-navigating-a-violent-insurgency-in-mali/>

42 OHCHR, "589 killed in central Mali so far in 2020 as security worsens – Bachelet," 26 June 2020, available at [https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26005&LangID=E#:~:text=GENEVA%20\(26%20June%202020\)%20%E2%80%93,Michelle%20Bachelet%20said%20on%20Friday.](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26005&LangID=E#:~:text=GENEVA%20(26%20June%202020)%20%E2%80%93,Michelle%20Bachelet%20said%20on%20Friday.)

43 UN OCHA, *Mali: Rapport de Situation*, 28 August 2020, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/ocha-mali-rapport-de-situation-derni-re-mise-jour-28-ao-t-2020>



TERMINOLOGY: TERRORISM, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND JIHADISM

The authors use terrorism and violent extremism interchangeably, but it is worth highlighting that respondents tend to use more frequently the term “jihadists” or “jihadism”. Among Malian youth, and Malian society more generally, these terms—or indeed the term terrorism itself—are used to describe actors or actions that fall outside of the normally accepted definition. Thus, it is common for Malians to describe criminal actors not affiliated with violent extremist groups as terrorists or jihadists. This report has preserved the respondents' choice of words, but when not referring to responses from the data gathering, uses terrorism and violent extremism, in line with the main characteristics of these phenomena outlined by the United Nations.

Methodology


Participants

Participants were selected based on geographical representation (Bamako, Menaka and Mopti) and age (18-30 years old). Due consideration was also given to adequate ethnic and socio-economic representation (see Annex 1 for a complete overview of participants' socio-demographics) and an effort was made to achieve gender balance to the


greatest extent possible, although ultimately more men were surveyed than women. In line with these criteria, although a total of 300 surveys were conducted, eleven were excluded from the statistical analysis⁴⁴; hence the findings are based on the analysis of data gathered from 289 participants.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Ten participants were excluded due to missing or wrong indications of their region of origin. One additional observation was excluded due to violating the age criteria.

⁴⁵ While the MANOVA tests were run with 289 participants, the regression analysis was conducted with 287 participants. Two additional observations—both men from Menaka—had to be excluded due to missing responses to question 50 (“I strongly identify with my ethnic group”) that was relevant to the regression analysis.



289 surveyed
186 men, 103 women
between ages of 19-28



Ethnicities of respondents:

Arab (**6**), Bambara (**70**), Bobo (**1**), Bozo (**5**), Dogon (**20**), Fulani (**49**), Haoussa (**2**), Malinke (**1**), Mossi (**2**), Sarakole (**14**), Songhay (**34**), Soninke (**2**), Tamasheq (**82**), No Answer (**1**)

Data collection process

The research began with a pilot phase in December 2019 and January 2020, with full implementation of the data gathering taking place between January and March 2020. While ICCT and UNICRI developed the research design as well as the data collection material, the data collection process was coordinated by an international researcher and carried out by local research teams. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all respondents, in order to promote candid responses. While it may have impacted the homogeneity of the process, the involvement of several different local researchers positively contributed to the project in various ways, including their in-depth knowledge of local context and the possibility to use local languages to facilitate the administration of the survey.

The quantitative research was carried out via a written survey, initially designed in English (see Annex 2) and translated into French, with local researchers being able to explain orally, in local languages and dialects, each question and answer category to the participants as and when needed. The questionnaire was structured around three sections, respectively exploring (1) the respondent's own experiences and opinions, as well as the respondent's view on which opinions prevail within his or her (2) ethnic group and (3) religious community. The questionnaire was composed of 70 rating questions mainly ranging on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) on a variety of aspects related to: youth's general living conditions and access to basic services; their exposure to violence and crime; their personal, ethnic, and

religious sense of significance; their sense of belonging towards and willingness to use violent or non-violent means to defend one's ethnic group or religious community; as well as their opinions on the presence and impact of terrorist and other armed groups in their

region. As the questions were structured along a Likert scale, it was not possible for the surveyors to ask open-ended questions or for respondents to provide additional information alongside their responses.

Statistical Analysis Methods

Overall, this report builds on the data collected to identify and analyse the factors that contribute to support for or engagement in violent extremism in Bamako, Menaka, and Mopti. The analysis draws upon: (1) the differences in youths' perceptions of their community's support for violent extremism and their own willingness to engage in violence across three regions, which are affected by the presence of extremist or criminal groups to differing degrees, and (2) the correlation between

different risk factors and a youth's propensity to engage in violent activities or their perceptions on community support for jihadist groups. While each section will start with preliminary observations based on the raw data and average scores reported by youth on different questions, findings discussed within this report are largely based on quantitative analysis⁴⁶, whose main steps are summarised in the box below.

⁴⁶ See Annex 4 for a complete overview of the results



QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The quantitative analysis consisted of various tests. First, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run to examine (1) to what extent the three locations Mopti, Menaka and Bamako differ on variables measuring youths' support for/engagement in extremist activity, and (2) how the locations differ across various risk factors that are expected to be drivers of support/engagement (such as feelings of insignificance).⁴⁷ To examine the nature of these differences, a series of Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests were conducted. In the next step, a linear regression analysis has been run for all 'extremism types'⁴⁸, including all risk factors and a set of control variables as independent variables. The purpose of the regression analysis is to test how well the various risk factors can predict the values of the 'extremism types', i.e. assess which of these factors likely function as drivers of support/engagement, and which do not or do to only a lesser extent. In addition to that, various interaction models⁴⁹ have been run, in order to test whether certain location-specific factors, such as living in Menaka, have an impact on the risk factors, which then jointly affect the outcome variable of the analysis. The presentation and discussion of the analysis results will be grouped according to the risk factors. For each risk factor, the MANOVA results will be discussed first, followed by the regression results of the baseline models, and if applicable, the interaction models.

Measures

The data collection process has been driven by the attempt to assess what elements have an impact on engagement in violent extremism. In doing so, a set of aspects have been taken into consideration for what are referred to as the risk factors in this study, which have been included in all estimation models. The category of risk factors assessed in the current report comprise of the fulfilment of ba-

sic needs and aspirations; the respondent's degree of identification with his/her ethnic and religious community; exposure to various forms of violence and feelings of insecurity; and attitudes towards the West. The willingness to engage in either non-violent and violent means to defend one's ethnic and religious groups, and perceptions of community support of jihadist groups were, for their

47 Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) serves to compare differences of multiple continuous variables across one independent grouping variable, which is 'location' in this study. Hence, the MANOVA tests in this study aim to identify differences across the regions Mopti, Menaka and Bamako, while an additional Bonferroni corrected post-hoc test analyses the nature of these differences. The Bonferroni corrected post-hoc test aims at reducing type I errors, i.e. false positives, when running many statistical tests simultaneously. For these tests, the location dummy variable (Mopti vs. Menaka vs. Bamako) has been used as independent variable, and in two separate tests, various forms of extremism and potential risk factors have been included as dependent variables respectively.

48 See p. 49 for a detailed explanation of all variables.

49 The inclusion of interaction effects in the baseline models for each type of extremism aims at detecting how certain risk factors interact with other variables, and whether the effect of one input variable is contingent on the value of another input variable. The models including the interaction effects were run incorporating all variables of the baseline model and are presented in tables 4-6 in Annex 3.

part, analysed as indicators of levels of (perceived) support for violent extremism (see Figure 1). Additionally, a categorical variable controlling for regional effects, and variables for age, gender, marital status, occupation, a respondent's self-perceived socioeconomic status, and education have been included

Demographic variables

In addition to gender and age (see above), participants indicated the highest education level they had completed, their socioeconomic status, and their employment status. Education was measured with an open-ended item asking them to write in their highest level of education. Responses were then categorised as: no formal education, madrasa (primary), primary, secondary (*collège*), high

school (*lycée*), and university. To measure socioeconomic status, participants were provided with a 10-rung ladder and asked to indicate where on that ladder they were located, with lower rungs indicating those worst off in society, and higher rungs indicating the most privileged. Employment status was measured with a simple yes/no item (employed vs. unemployed).

Risk Factors

Basic needs

In addition to significant needs, we measured the extent to which participants' basic or lower-level needs were satisfied. Participants responded to four items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly

agree). These items measured the extent to which their access to housing, food/water, clothing, and medical treatment was satisfied.

Exposure to violence

We measured the extent to which participants were exposed to violence where they lived with three items: I have witnessed violence where I live; I personally know people who have been hurt by violence in the region;

I personally know people who have been hurt by jihadist groups in Mali. The items were answered on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).

Identification with ethnic or religious group

Identification with one's ethnic or religious group was measured by asking the respondents to assess their agreement with three statements for ethnic identification and three items for religious identification on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The items for ethnic identification were: I identify strongly with my ethnic group;

My ethnicity is an important part of who I am; I feel a strong sense of solidarity with other members of my ethnic group. Those for religious identification were: I identify strongly with my religion; My religion is an important part of who I am; I feel a strong sense of solidarity with other followers of my religion.

Attitudes to the West

Perceptions of and attitudes to the West were based on the following items: The West should do more to help my people; The West has abandoned my people when they

needed help; The West is indifferent to our sufferings. A 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) was used for questions relating to Attitudes to the West.

Outcome variables

Support for jihadist groups

Participants answered seven questions that measured their perceptions of their respective communities' support for jihadist groups. Given the security situation, which remains tenuous—particularly in the northern and central regions of the country—one of the main challenges was indeed related to the phrasing of questions on sensitive matters. Rather than asking about participants' personal support for jihadist groups, these questions were structured as seven items framed as measuring descriptive norms (e.g., People in my community sympathise with the goals of jihadist groups; People in my community trust jihadist groups more than the Malian government; People in my community believe the violence perpetrated by jihadist groups is justified, etc.), and thus measured the extent to which they felt jihadist groups were supported by their community. Research has demonstrated

that phrasing difficult, sensitive, or controversial constructs as an indirect question, asking about the behaviour or experience of another person or group, rather than about personal behavior or experience, increases participants' willingness to answer honestly.

Indirect questions such as these are beneficial in that they reduce social desirability bias (answering questions in a way the respondent views as the most socially desirable), however because the respondent is not providing a direct response to his or her behaviour, experience, or feelings, the responses to these indirect questions can only accurately speak to perceptions of community support.

For this reason, the findings described below, while shedding light on important trends, should thus be understood within this context. The items were answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).

Violent and Non-violent Acts

Given the ethnic implications, among other aspects, that many of the conflicts occurring in Mali have been progressively presenting, the survey included items that measured participants' willingness to take actions to defend their ethnic group. Three items measured non-violent measures—i.e., willingness to give away one's belongings, endure intense suffering, and give their life to defend the ethnic group.

Three items measured violent measures—i.e., willingness to support violent protests, attack police, and use violence to defend the ethnic group. The same items used to measure violent and nonviolent acts for an ethnic group were used to measure religion. The items were phrased such that the behaviours referred to defending their religion. All items were completed on the same 5-point Likert scale.

RISK FACTORS

BASIC NEEDS

- ➔ I have sufficient access to food and water
- ➔ I have sufficient access to appropriate clothing and footwear
- ➔ I am satisfied with my housing arrangements
- ➔ I am satisfied with my access to medical treatment

EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE

- ➔ I have witnessed violence where I live
- ➔ I personally know people who have been hurt by violence in the region
- ➔ I personally know people who have been hurt by jihadist groups in Mali

SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Ethnic group

- ➔ I identify strongly with my ethnic group
- ➔ My ethnicity is an important part of who I am
- ➔ I feel a strong sense of solidarity with other members of my ethnic group

Religion

- ➔ I identify strongly with my religion
- ➔ My religion is an important part of who I am
- ➔ I feel a strong sense of solidarity with other followers of my religion

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE WEST

- ➔ The West should do more to help my people
- ➔ The West has abandoned my people when they needed help
- ➔ The West is indifferent to our sufferings

SUPPORT FOR JIHADIST GROUPS

People in my community...

- ...identify with the ideology of the jihadist groups in Mali
- ...sympathise with the goals of jihadist groups
- ...believe jihadist groups want to protect our people
- ...think the jihadist groups in Mali have our best interests in mind
- ...have joined the fight alongside jihadist groups
- ...trust the jihadist groups more than the Malian government
- ...believe the violence perpetrated by jihadist groups is justified

VIOLENT ACTS

Ethnic violence

- I would support protests to defend my ethnic group, even if those protests turn violent
- I would be willing to attack police or security forces to defend my ethnic group
- I would be willing to use violence to defend my ethnic group

Religious violence

- I would support protests to defend religion, even if those protests turn violent
- I would be willing to attack police or security forces to defend my religion.
- I would be willing to use violence to defend my religion

NON-VIOLENT ACTS

Ethnic non-violence

- I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my ethnic group
- I would be willing to endure intense suffering to defend my ethnic group
- I would be willing to give my life to defend my ethnic group

Religion non-violence

- I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my religion
- I would be willing to endure intense suffering to defend my religion
- I would be willing to give my life to defend my religion

Figure 1 Variables under study

CHAPTER 2

SUPPORT FOR EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE RESEARCHED REGIONS



Since 2012, Mali has faced an unprecedented crisis that has brought the country, and more broadly the Sahel region, to the centre of global attention. This landlocked West African state has experienced the emergence of a growing terrorist threat, coupled with a surge of various other types of violence. While initially centred in the northern regions, the presence of extremist and other types of non-state armed actors has increasingly extended southward, with violence rising in central Mali, and putting southern regions, including the capital Bamako, at risk.

A common narrative to explain the spread of extremist groups in Mali (and throughout the Sahel) has been that groups such as JNIM and ISGS have been particularly successful in integrating into local communities, who have then served as their bases of support.⁵³ More recently, however, observers have called into question the extent to which communities do support such groups, suggesting that they do not in fact enjoy widespread public support.⁵⁴ The survey used in this research was therefore designed in part to measure the extent to which respondents felt jihadist groups were supported by their community.

53 Raleigh, Clionadh, Héni Nsaibia, and Caitriona Dowd. "The Sahel crisis since 2012." *African Affairs* (2020). See also: CTC, *Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM's Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali*, April 2014, available at <https://ctc.usma.edu/guns-money-and-prayers-aqims-blueprint-for-securing-control-of-northern-mali/>

54 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, *The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel*, 1 December 2020, available at <https://africacenter.org/publication/puzzle-jnim-militant-islamist-groups-sahel/>


Youths' perceptions of community support for violent extremist groups

First, regardless of their region of origin, the respondents generally see their communities as *not* supportive of jihadist groups. Youths from Menaka report, however, for all questions, relatively higher average levels of perceived community support for such groups than their counterparts living in Bamako and Mopti. In addition, youths from Mopti, while living in the region currently facing the highest level of violence, consistently responded that their communities support jihadists at rates lower than both Menaka and Bamako

across almost all seven questions in this category. Figure 2 provides an overview of the data collected in this regard.

Although useful in understanding perceptions, community support for violent extremist groups does not mean that individuals are ready to take action and directly engage in violence themselves. Therefore, questions asked as part of this data collection also referred more directly to the respondents' own willingness to engage in violent behaviours.

Figure 2 Youths' perceptions of the support for jihadist groups within their community



Youths' willingness to engage in violent behaviours

A set of questions also aimed at assessing youth respondents' willingness to utilise violent tactics to defend their ethnic group (see Figure 3) and religion (see Figure 4). As seen in the figures below, youths in Menaka experience on average the strongest willing-

ness to engage in violence for their respective religious or ethnic group, coming in slightly higher than in Bamako on all questions apart from "I would support protests to defend religion, even if those protests turn violent."

Figure 3 Youths' willingness to use violence to defend their ethnic group





Figure 4 Youths' willingness to use violence to defend their religion



On the contrary, Mopti differs strongly from both other regions: youths from Mopti are on average less likely to engage in violent acts

and are instead a lot more likely to opt for non-violent means on behalf of their ethnic and religious group (see Figures 5 and 6).

Figure 5 Youths' willingness to use non-violent means to defend their ethnic group





Figure 6 Youths' willingness to use non-violent means to defend their religion



Regional discrepancies: engagement in violence as a direct result of one's place of residence?⁵⁵


Looking at the extent to which the differences across the three regions can be attributed solely to a respondent's place of residence⁵⁶—this is, when other factors such as socioeconomic status, education, age, etc. are held constant—shows that being in Menaka has a statistically significant impact on support for all types of violent behaviours, both in terms of community perception of support for jihad-

ist groups, as well as individual engagement in violence both on behalf of one's ethnic or religious group (see Figure 7). In short, living in Menaka is connected with an increased likelihood of resorting to violence and supporting jihadist groups. This contrasts with the tendency among Mopti youths to resort to non-violent means to defend their ethnic and religious group.

55 Comparing to what extent the average support for jihadist groups or engagement in violence differs across Mopti, Menaka and Bamako, and whether these differences are statistically significant. For the first MANOVA analysis, the location dummy (Mopti, Menaka, Bamako) has been included as independent variable, while the five extremism types function as dependent variables. The first analysis confirms that the propensity for Malian youths' engagement in any form of extremism is significantly dependent on where in Mali respective youths reside, $F(10, 566) = 27.418, p < 0.001$; Wilk's $\lambda = 0.454$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.326$. The results of a between-subject comparison, and those of the Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests are reported in Table 2.

56 The impact of regional effects refers to the degree to which location alone—when other variables, such as socio-economic status, age, education level, exposure to violence, etc. are held constant—can account for changes in the dependent variable, that is support for jihadist groups or engagement in violence.

Figure 7 Mean responses to support for extremist measures⁵⁷



The explanation for why living in Menaka stands out in terms of support for jihadism, as well as for utilisation of violence for ethnic and religious defence when other risk factors are taken into consideration, may be the result of a number of factors. The region has been exposed to terrorism for significantly longer than Mopti or Bamako, which may have led to a normalisation of extremist narratives and groups. In addition, it may be that, because terrorist groups have been more prevalent in Menaka for a longer period of time, youths surveyed have the impression that more of their fellow community members support them. These findings may also

be linked to the historical absence of the government and the poor provision of services in Menaka, and in the north more generally: the quasi-governmental function terrorist groups perform, whether in terms of providing access to justice, administering taxes, or regulating access to other services,⁵⁸ could in part explain why residents of Menaka perceive more support for these groups than in the other regions. The absence of the state may also explain why they are more willing to use violent means to defend either their ethnic or religious group—they may have looked at the long history of the Malian state failing

57 The graphs have been generated from the MANOVA results and compare the mean response of youth in Mopti, Menaka and Bamako on composite measures of the 'extremism type' variables which function as outcome variables in the regression analysis.

58 UNICRI and ICCT, *When the Music Stops: The Impact of Terrorism on Malian Youths*, 2020, available at <https://icct.nl/publication/when-the-music-stops-the-impact-of-terrorism-on-malian-youth/>

to defend their interests and decided to do it for themselves.

Exploring further the reasons behind perceived community support for extremist activity and readiness to engage in violence may

shed some more light on these observed regional differences. The following section will thus examine the influence of different contextual, socio-economic and psychological factors on such support and/or engagement.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM

In addition to seeking to assess youths' perceptions of community support for violent extremism, as well as their own willingness to take action to defend their ethnic or religious group, the survey sought to uncover additional information that may shed light on the highly complex interplay of a variety of factors that may impact attitudes towards violence and extremism.

Socio-economic fragility and youths' ability to fulfil their basic needs

As one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)⁵⁹, Mali suffers from profound internal inequalities and a large part of the population in both urban and rural environments relies heavily on the informal sector. The formal labour market is not able to absorb labour supply, in particular among youth and more marginalised communities, and public services are not delivered equally on a national basis, with Bamako receiving most of the resources and the expenditures of the state.⁶⁰


59 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, available at: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category-mali.html>

60 AFDB, "Mali Economic Outlook," available at <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/mali/mali-economic-outlook>

These trends were confirmed by the data collected, which revealed consistent patterns for almost all items related to basic needs (see Figure 8), socio-economic opportunities (see Figure 9), levels of education (see Figures 10-12), and socio-economic status (see Figure 13). Participants in Bamako were better off than those in Mopti, who were statistically significantly better off than those in Menaka in terms of access to food and water, clothing and footwear, and housing, as well as opportunities for employment⁶¹. In several regards, the differences were striking: of the participants in Menaka, 65.7% reported having no formal education, relative to only 25.3%


in Mopti and 11.6% in Bamako. Likewise, a full 87% of participants in Menaka viewed themselves as residing in the lowest rung of society, whereas not a single participant in Mopti or Bamako placed him/herself on this position. (See table 8 and 9, annex 3, for frequency tables). In contrast, respondents from Mopti mentioned having a better access to medical treatment and greater opportunities to further their education, followed by respondents from Bamako, and then Menaka. At the same time, youths from Mopti considered having lower ability to achieve financial security than young people from Bamako and Menaka.

Figure 8 Youths' access to basic services across locations



⁶¹ All three locations differ in a statistically significant way from one another on measures of the accessibility of basic needs, as shown by the second MANOVA test (see Annex 3, Table 2).

Figure 9 Youths' economic and educational opportunities



Contrary to common expectations, the analysis of the survey responses sheds light on a diverse dynamic concerning the influence of the economic situation on possible engagement in extremism activity. The results from the regression analysis show that sufficient access to basic provisions such as water, clothing, housing, healthcare, and a stable income, are related to an increased perception of community support towards jihadist groups.⁶³ This finding is particularly interesting in view of the previous between-subject comparison, which shows that youths in Menaka report a lower level of access to basic needs, while also expressing a higher level of support for jihadist groups among their communities. The results of the regression analysis show that it is not necessarily those youths who have least access to basic needs in Mena-

ka that put forward the greatest perceptions of community support of jihadist groups, but the other way around: while better access to basic needs is linked to increased support for jihadist groups across all three regions, living in Menaka *and* having sufficient access to basic needs is linked to a quite strong increase in perceptions of community support for jihadist groups.⁶⁴

Turning to gender and its impact on support for and engagement into violent extremism, women are significantly less prone to resorting to any type of defence of religious or ethnic group than male respondents, whether in regards to either non-violent or violent actions. However, both male and female respondents assess their own communities' support for jihadist groups similarly. Age, marital status, and occupation do not seem

63 (b = 0.200, p < 0.01); See annex 3, table1: Coefficient for 'Fulfilment of Basic Needs' risk factor in the 'Support for Jihadist Groups' model.

64 (b = 0.575, p < 0.001); See annex 3, table 4: Coefficient for 'Basic Needs*Menaka' interaction variable in the 'Support for Jihadist Groups' model.

Figures 10-12 Education in Mopti (10), Menaka (11), and Bamako (12)





Figure 13 Youths' self-perceived position within the Malian society (socio-economic status)



to have a meaningful impact on respondents' perceptions of community support for jihadist groups, nor on their willingness to engage in defence of their ethnic or religious groups. Notably, neither unemployment nor a low self-perceived socioeconomic status increases the chances of Malian youths' involvement in acts of religious or ethnic defence, or their perceptions of community support for jihadist groups.⁶⁵ Generally, a respondent's education does not seem to have a meaningful impact on his/her support for or engagement in extremist activity nor on his/her perception of community support for jihadist groups as such. Attending a medersa or Koranic school does increase support for jihadist groups and engagement in religious non-violent acts in a statistically significant way. However, given the small sample size of respondents who at-

tended either a medersa or a Koranic school (9 persons in total), and the fact that the label 'medersa' covers a variety of education types, it would be pre-emptive to state that there is a link between such religious education and support for violent extremism. The results do show, however, that respondents who consider themselves (relatively) advantaged in terms of their socioeconomic status are also more likely to resort to violence, slightly more so for violent acts for their religion than for violent acts for their ethnicity.

These results reinforce other research that has focused on the complex and nuanced link between poverty and terrorism, calling for a critical reassessment of the common arguments pertaining to economic incentives of violent extremist and terrorist activity.⁶⁶

65 See Annex 3, Table 1 for the regression coefficients of the discussed socioeconomic control variables.

66 Marc-Olivier Cantin, *Reexamining the Terrorism-Poverty Nexus*, Columbia SIPA Journal of International Affairs (2018), available at <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/reexamining-terrorism-poverty-nexus#:~:text=Here%20again%2C%20the%20link%20between,in%20which%20terrorists%20often%20thrive>.


Youths' exposure to violence and need for protection

Past research conducted with Malian youth previously involved in terrorist groups underlined that many of them “expressed the desire to protect themselves, their family and/or community as a motivation for joining the groups.”⁶⁷ In addition to socio-economic factors, levels of exposure to violence and feelings of insecurity were therefore also con-

sidered as potential risk factors impacting youths' propensity to support and/or engage in (extremist) violence.

Data collected revealed that, overall, 154 out of 289 youth surveyed reported medium to high levels of direct exposure to violence,⁶⁸ representing around 53% of the total respondents.⁶⁹

Figure 14



As expected, survey data collected confirmed that feelings of insecurity were higher in regions currently faced with a strong presence of terrorist organisations and other armed groups (see Figure 14). Indeed, youth respondents from Mopti and Menaka reported higher perceptions of insecurity than youth from

Bamako.⁷⁰ Insecurity in Mopti and Menaka is likely not only linked to the presence of terrorist groups, but reflects the broader context-which includes the presence of banditry, so-called self-defence militias, and a limited presence of state security actors and institutions.


67 ISS, “Mali’s young ‘jihadists’: Fuelled by faith or circumstance?”, Policy Brief 89, August 2016, p.4., available at <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief89-eng-v3.pdf>

68 Respondents who scored 4 (agree) or 5 (strongly agree) to the statement “I have witnessed violence where I live.”

69 See frequency table in Annex 3, Table 7.

70 The MANOVA test shows that the mean response to the question whether youths feel unsafe differs in a statistically significant way between Mopti and Menaka in comparison to Bamako ($p < 0.001$); see Annex 3, Table 3.

Figure 15 I have witnessed violence where I live




Interestingly, an inverse pattern appeared in regards to the respondents' own experiences in witnessing acts of violence: those in Menaka report slightly lower levels than youths in Bamako as having witnessed violence where they live, whereas the youth respondents from Mopti report to have witnessed significantly less incidences of violence than young people in Bamako and Menaka (see Figure 15).⁷¹ This latter result could be explained in several ways,

considering that violence may take several forms and, as previously mentioned, may be perpetrated by various actors: youths in Bamako may effectively face a higher number of violent acts, including non-terrorism related violence, which is often the case in a country's capital city. In addition, youth outside Bamako might face a higher number of violent acts but may have a tendency to downplay or become accustomed to pervasive violence.

⁷¹ The MANOVA test shows that the difference between Menaka and Bamako regarding the question of whether youths have witnessed violence does not differ in a statistically significant way. The mean response in Mopti however differs from both Menaka and Bamako. This difference is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). See Annex 3, Table 3.

Figure 16 Youths' indirect exposure to violence




The survey participants were asked about violence perpetrated by different actors, including terrorist groups, actors involved in illegal drug trafficking, and the government, in their respective localities (see Figure 16). Respondents from Mopti most frequently answered that they personally know people who have been hurt by violence in their region, followed by respondents from Bamako, and then from Menaka. This observation is true for all sources of violence, except for illegal drug trade, to

which respondents from Bamako seem to be exposed most frequently.

In all locations, jihadist groups were depicted as the main party responsible for violence targeting people in the respondents' close environment, yet the average responses differ in a statistically significant way across all three regions, with youths from Mopti reporting the highest exposure to violence by jihadist groups, followed by youths from Bamako and after that, Menaka.⁷² The self-reporting of Menaka as the location where respond-

⁷² The MANOVA test results show that the differences between Mopti (mean = 4.30), Menaka (mean = 2.68) and Bamako (mean = 3.35) in response to the question "I personally know people who have been hurt by Jihadist groups" are statistically significant. See Annex 3, Table 3.

Figure 17 Youths' opinions on the shared responsibility of diverse actors in current levels of violence



ents are the least exposed to violence by jihadist groups among the three is surprising, given that it is the region that has endured the presence of violent extremists for the longest period of time. In Menaka and Bamako, youths report illegal drug trade as second most prevalent source of violence, even though on average, a lot more youths in Bamako know victims of drug trade than in Menaka.⁷³ Youths in Mopti, for their part, consider the Malian government on average as

the second most prevalent source of violence, with a striking difference to youths in Menaka and Bamako.⁷⁴

In order to get a better sense of youth perceptions, participants to the survey were asked to give their opinion on the share of responsibility of different actors and dynamics in the high level of violence Mali is currently facing (see Figure 17). While jihadist groups appear as the main actors blamed for the

73 The difference between Bamako (mean = 3.11) and Menaka (mean = 2.41) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). See Annex 3, Table 3.

74 The mean response of youth in Mopti (mean = 3.07) to the question “I personally know people who have been hurt by actions of the Malian government” differs in a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) way from the mean response in Bamako (mean = 2.52) and Menaka (mean = 2.34).

current state of the security landscape-registering the highest average score in all locations-youth surveyed also point to the responsibility of a wide range of other actors and dynamics. Overall, the existence of inter-ethnic conflicts-and to a lesser extent the state of the Malian economy and the existence of drug trafficking-score closely behind jihadist groups as important drivers of violence.

For some items, perceptions of the youth respondents differ according to their respective region of origin. For instance, economic factors are assigned a greater responsibility by respondents from Mopti, while drug trafficking is considered particularly problematic by respondents from Bamako. These findings further underscore the complexity of the Malian security landscape, which is not only characterised by a growing terrorist threat but rather by the co-existence and overlap of various conflicts and divisions. On a smaller scale, even the terrorist threat alone is unequally present across the Malian territory, and affects the three researched regions differently.

In terms of the impact of these variables on youths' propensity to engage in extremism or on their perceptions of their community's propensity to support jihadist groups, the regression analysis notably shows that witnessing violence in one's community significantly increases the perceived support for jihadist

groups.⁷⁵ However, the results also show that personally knowing victims of violence, or knowing victims of drug trade, jihadism, or the government does not have an impact on the support for jihadist groups, nor on youths' willingness to engage in *non-violent* acts. Only youth's willingness to engage in *violent* acts is affected by their knowledge of victims of violence. In particular, knowing victims of the Malian government increases the likelihood of youth's engagement in violent acts on behalf of their religious⁷⁶ and ethnic⁷⁷ group. However, knowing victims of jihadist groups decreases the likelihood of youths' involvement in violent religious act.⁷⁸ Finally, the feeling of insecurity has a mixed impact, with only the coefficients measuring the impact on violent acts obtaining statistical significance: respondents who do not feel safe in their community are accordingly less likely to resort to violence in order to defend their ethnic⁷⁹ and/or religious⁸⁰ groups.

Interestingly, the degree to which a respondent's exposure to violence impacts his/her perception of community support for jihadist groups does not seem to be contingent on his/her place of residence.⁸¹ However, youths from Mopti, who are more frequently exposed to violence, tend to engage less in ethnic violence, compared to their peers in Bamako and Menaka.⁸² Youths in Menaka, who are frequently confronted with violence,

75 Having witnessed violence ($b = 0.118$; $p < 0.01$) in one's community increases the likelihood of supporting jihadist groups; see Annex 3, Table 1.

76 ($b = 0.169$, $p < 0.01$); see annex 3, table 1.

77 ($b = 0.165$, $p < 0.01$); see annex 3, table 1.

78 Knowing victims of jihadist groups reduces the likelihood of a violent religious act (-0.180 , $p < 0.05$); see annex 3, table 1.

79 ($b = -0.211$, $p < 0.001$); see Annex 3, Table 1.

80 ($b = -0.151$, $p < 0.01$); see Annex 3, Table 1.

81 Increases support for jihadist groups across all locations equally. Coefficients for the interaction variable Mopti*Exposure to violence and Menaka*Exposure to violence do not obtain statistical significance in the 'Support for Jihadist Groups' model; see Annex 3, Table 4.

82 ($b = -0.302$, $p < 0.05$); see Annex 3, Table 6. Coefficients for Mopti*Exposure to violence interaction variable in 'Ethnic violent act' model.

are less likely⁸³ to engage in acts of violence to defend their religion than youths who experienced similar levels of exposure to violence in Bamako and Mopti. It follows that being exposed to violence has an impact on youths' engagement in violent behaviours, depending on where these youth live, yet not on non-violent acts or perceived support for jihadist groups. These nuances could allow for some preliminary inferences. While a general feeling of insecurity can function as a suppressor of willingness to engage in violence, the severity and type of exposure to violence

influences whether youths are supportive of jihadist groups or engage in acts of violence themselves. Moreover, what is most evident from these results is the juxtaposition of motives related to defending oneself against violence and abuse of power by the government versus the barrier to engagement in violence/support for jihadist groups. The effect of the risk factors 'exposure to violence' seems to be fairly location-specific, which resembles with the previous elaboration of the complex security landscape of Mali.


83 (b = -0.243, p < 0.05); see Annex 3, Table 6. Coefficients for Menaka*Exposure to violence interaction variable in 'Religious violent act' model.

Self-identification

Seeking to understand whether a strong identification with an ethnic or religious group has an impact on youths' support for violent extremism, for example if there is a link between a strong identification and a willingness to use violence to protect that group, the survey explored these dynamics.

The results show that youths from Menaka tend to identify less with their respective ethnic and religious group, compared to youths in Mopti and Bamako, who both identify to a similar extent with their ethnic and/or religious groups (see Figure 18).⁸⁴

Figure 18 Degree of identification with the youth's respective ethnic and religious group



Not surprisingly, the regression results show that youths who feel a stronger identification with their own ethnic group are more likely to defend their ethnic group, especially with non-violent means,⁸⁵ but also with violent

means.⁸⁶ Similarly, respondents who experience a stronger religious identification are more likely to engage in both non-violent⁸⁷ and violent⁸⁸ actions to defend their religious

84 The difference in the mean responses to questions on ethnic or religious identification are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) between Menaka and both Mopti and Bamako. The differences between Mopti and Bamako are not statistically significant. See Annex 3, Table 3.

85 ($b = 0.526, p < 0.001$); see Annex 3, Table 1.

86 ($b = 0.379, p < 0.001$); see Annex 3, Table 1.

87 ($b = 0.892, p < 0.001$); see Annex 3, Table 1.

88 ($b = 0.817, p < 0.001$); see Annex 3, Table 1.

group; they are also more likely to act on behalf of their respective ethnic group.

These results open up the question of what elements and factors might contribute to an increased willingness to engage in either violent or non-violent acts: while youths in Mopti and Bamako experience a similar degree of identification, youths in Mopti are more likely to engage in non-violent measures, while youths from Bamako are more willing to con-


sider violence as a viable tool in defence of their religious and ethnic groups. Likewise, Menakan youth, who identify to a lesser degree with their ethnic and religious groups are still most likely to resort to violence.⁸⁹ Such questions exemplify the complexity of radicalisation dynamics, and imply that other factors aside from the mere degree of youths' identification with a certain group primarily determines their willingness to commit violent acts.

Youths' attitudes towards the West

Malian youths' attitudes towards the West differ most notably in Menaka compared to Mopti and Bamako. Menakan youths are less likely to express a feeling of abandonment by the West and least likely expect the West to

provide help, while the average agreement to the question "do you feel like the West should do more to help" is fairly high in both Mopti and Bamako (see Figure 19).⁹⁰

Figure 19 Malian Youths' attitudes towards the West



89 See coefficients for location variable; Annex 3, Table 1.

90 See MANOVA test results in Annex 3, Table 3.

Testing for the impact of the respondents' attitudes towards the West yields statistically significant results for the level of perceived community support of jihadist groups. Youths (across the three regions) who feel like the West should provide more help to Malians reported lower levels of community support for jihadist groups.⁹¹ The same effect applies to youths who perceive the West as indifferent to their problems; those who see the West as indifferent also report lower levels of community support for jihadist groups.⁹² In contrast, youths who feel abandoned by the West (not expressing a value judgement on whether the West should provide more assistance or

if the West is merely indifferent to Malians' plight) are more likely to perceive their communities as supportive of jihadist groups,⁹³ and are more prone to consider engagement in violent means to defend their religious group.⁹⁴

Observing that lower expectations of the West to provide help and the feeling of abandonment by the West correlate with an increased community support for jihadist groups implies that a strong anti-Western sentiment, which may be a result of a disillusionment of the West's interest and ability to support Mali or the Sahel region, can fuel the support for jihadist groups.

91 (b = -0.100, p < 0.05). See Annex 3, Table 1.

92 (b = -0.080, p < 0.5). See Annex 3, Table 1.

93 (b = 0.121, p < 0.01). See Annex 3, Table 1.

94 (b = 0.146; p < 0.05). See Annex 3, Table 1.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the high community support for jihadist groups perceived by youths residing in Menaka was expected, more surprising are the relatively low levels of support reported by respondents in Mopti. These are indeed comparable to—and sometimes even lower (i.e. identification with jihadist ideology, justification for terrorist violence, willingness to use violence, etc.) than—those reported by respondents from Bamako, although these two areas have been faced with very different security situations for the past five years. While central Mali has become “the epicentre of jihadism”⁹⁵, Bamako district has been relatively spared and suffered far fewer attacks in recent years compared to other regions.

The regression analyses have identified certain factors as being related to higher community support for jihadist groups or a youth’s inclination to engage in violence. As for the support of jihadist groups, an improved accessibility to basic services, being frequently exposed to violence, and feeling strongly abandoned by the West tend to intensify the perceived community support for jihadist groups. Yet, the impact of some of these risk factors is dependent on where a respondent resides. This is, for example, the case for the impact of basic needs: the strength of the effect of such factors seems to be dependent on whether a respondent resides in Menaka or not, in-

95 Boukary Sangare, *Le Centre du Mali : épiceutre du djihadisme* ? Note d’Analyse du GRIP, 20 May 2016, available at <https://grip.org/le-centre-du-mali-epiceutre-du-djihadisme/>

dicating that more research on such aspects as well as possible additional related factors is needed. Regarding the involvement in violence for one's ethnic and religious group, the degree of identification with one's religious or ethnic group are significant determinants (increasing the tendency to be willing to use violent and non-violent means to defend those groups). Witnessing violence increases the perception that one's community supports violent extremist groups, but personally knowing victims makes individuals less likely to engage in acts of violence. While female respondents seem to be strictly less likely to commit a violent act, gender did not have an impact on perceived community support for jihadist groups. Notably, the study confirms that socioeconomic grievances do not foster the support for jihadist groups, nor the involvement in any form of violence, but in fact the opposite is true.

The degree and manner in which youths are exposed to violence exemplifies the interplay between incentives for radicalisation vis-à-vis barriers to engaging in violence/supporting jihadist groups. In fact, being directly exposed to violence or knowing victims of Malian governmental violence can reinforce perceived support for jihadist groups or youths' engagement in violence, while knowing victims of jihadist groups and a general feeling of insecurity function as deterrents and reduce the likelihood of engagement in violence and support for jihadist groups. Again, the impact of being exposed to violence is moderated by the place of residence of Malian youths, for instance with those most frequently exposed to violence in Mopti being less likely to engage in ethnic violence, compared to their peers in Bamako and Menaka, which reinforces the idea that taking the local context into consideration is essential when approaching the issue of extremism.

The findings from the data collected confirm that support for or engagement in violent extremism remains a highly complex process. It is not a phenomenon that can be eradicated through simple measures, such as by reducing levels of poverty. Rather, the results tell us that it is necessary to simultaneously address a diverse range of factors. Although a formidable challenge, a comprehensive approach that accounts for the intricacy of the problem is undoubtedly necessary. From the findings presented above, the following elements shall be taken into consideration when it comes to preventing and countering violent extremism in Mali:

- **First, engagement in violence and perceived support for jihadist groups are very much linked to the contextual situation:** for instance, perceived levels of support for violent extremism in Menaka tell us that the longstanding feelings of neglect by the central state has likely made the north of Mali more open to—or at least more vulnerable to—extremist groups. These groups, who frequently provide some basic services and/or fill other quasi-governmental roles, are able to gain traction where the state has long been absent.
- **Second, data analysed confirm that no clear relationship can be traced between poverty and violent extremism:** on the contrary, better access to basic needs is in fact linked to increased perception of community support for jihadist groups across all three regions.
- **Third, although jihadist groups were identified as the main actor responsible for violence in the country, other sources of instability and threat have been pointed out in the research, confirming the complexity of the security landscape in Mali.** In this regard, external

interveners also play a role in influencing local perceptions and actions: a connection can be traced between a strong anti-Western sentiment, which may be a result of a disillusionment of the West's interest and ability to provide adequate support, and an increased perception of community support for jihadist groups. Furthermore, the fact that knowing a victim of state security forces—no matter the location—increases willingness to engage in violence highlights the need for accountability for extrajudicial killings and other abuses committed by state security forces. Attacks by such actors on civilian populations undermine efforts to counter the continued presence of extremist groups in the country. At the same time, given that knowing victims of violent extremist groups makes individuals less likely to support violent extremism, victims' voices should be amplified. A victim-centric approach, that would allow them to share their experiences first-hand in order to promote peace and delegitimize justifications for terrorist violence, would be one way to counter extremist narratives and efforts to recruit new bases of support.

→ **Finally, stronger identification with one's ethnic group is linked to an in-**

creased likelihood of defending the ethnic group, especially with non-violent means: such a link opens up the debate on the possible avenues for promoting activism as an alternative to radicalization, with the former being considered as engagement in legal and non-violent actions and the latter as engagement in violent and illegal actions.⁹⁶ Moreover, given that knowing victims of violence reduces the likelihood of engagement in violence, amplifying the voices of victims and highlighting their experiences may be another path to counter violent extremism.

Understanding and countering the drivers that lead to either support for violent extremism or direct engagement in violent acts is the first step to tackling the problem. The myriad ways that various factors interact and ultimately result in violent extremism are inherently complex and no one solution will be sufficient to tackle them. But, understanding youth perceptions and experiences will strengthen the ability to support youths as agents of change, both among their peers and their communities. In doing so, Mali and its international partners will be better able to contribute to the development of a more stable and peaceful context within which new generations can build their future.

96 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, 'Measuring political mobilization: The distinction between activism and radicalism', *Terrorism and political violence*, 21:2 (2009), p. 257.

CHAPTER 5

ANNEXES

Annex 1

Socio-demographics

Criteria	Questionnaires
Age	Between 19 to 28
Region	Menaka (99), Bamako (95), Mopti (95)
Gender	Male (186), Female (103)
Religion	Muslim (289)
Ethnicity	Arab (6), Bambara (70), Bobo (1), Bozo (5), Dogon (20), Fulani (49), Haoussa (2), Malinke (1), Mossi (2), Sarakole (14), Songhay (34), Soninke (2), Tamasheq (82), No answer (1)
Family situation	Married (99), In a relationship (13), Single (175), No answer (2)
Education	None (100), Primary (45), Secondary (100), University (35), Merdersa (6), Koranic school (3)
Job	Employed (53), Unemployed (236)
TOTAL	289

Annex 2 – Questionnaire

1. What is your gender?	Yes	No	Other
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2. In what year were you born?	
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3. In what region of Mali do you live?	
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4. Which of the following best describes the community in which you live?	Rural	Small city/town	Large city	Suburb of a large city
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5. What is your relationship status?	Single	In a relationship (not married)	Married
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
6. What was the last grade/year of education you completed?	
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7. Are you currently employed?	Yes	No
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8. If you are not employed, which of the following best describes the reason?				
Student	Homemaker	Retired	Disabled	Other (please explain)

9. To the right is a ladder that has 10 rungs representing where people stand in Mali. The people at the top of the ladder (10) are those who are the best off, have the most education, most money, and most respected jobs. The people at the bottom of the ladder (1) are those who are the worst off, have the least education, least money, and least respected jobs or no job.

Please circle the number on the ladder that best reflects your position in society.



The following are questions about **the way you personally feel**. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I feel valued.	1	2	3	4	5
2	I feel insignificant.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I feel like nobody cares about me.	1	2	3	4	5
4	I feel humiliated.	1	2	3	4	5
5	I feel like I am treated with dignity.	1	2	3	4	5
6	I feel like an outsider.	1	2	3	4	5

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I have witnessed violence where I live.	1	2	3	4	5
2	I feel unsafe where I live.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I have sufficient access to food and water.	1	2	3	4	5
4	I have sufficient access to appropriate clothing and footwear.	1	2	3	4	5
5	I am satisfied with my housing arrangements.	1	2	3	4	5
6	I am satisfied with my access to medical treatment.	1	2	3	4	5
7	I am satisfied with the opportunities I have for employment.	1	2	3	4	5
8	I am satisfied with the opportunities I have to further my education.	1	2	3	4	5
9	I am able to achieve financial security.	1	2	3	4	5

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I personally know people who have been hurt by violence in the region.	1	2	3	4	5
2	I personally know people who have been hurt by the illegal drug trade in Mali.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I personally know people who have been hurt by jihadist groups in Mali.	1	2	3	4	5
4	I personally know people who have been hurt by the actions of the Malian government	1	2	3	4	5

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	The West should do more to help my people.	1	2	3	4	5
2	My people were abandoned by the West when they needed the help.	1	2	3	4	5
3	The West is indifferent to our suffering.	1	2	3	4	5

For the following statements, please do not think about yourself, but about how people who live around you in your community feel.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	People in my community identify with the ideology of the jihadist groups in Mali.	1	2	3	4	5
2	People in my community sympathize with the goals of jihadist groups.	1	2	3	4	5
3	People in my community believe jihadist groups want to protect our people.	1	2	3	4	5

4	People in my community think the jihadist groups in Mali have our best interests in mind.	1	2	3	4	5
5	People in my community have joined the fight alongside jihadist groups.	1	2	3	4	5
6	People in my community trust the jihadist groups more than the Malian government.	1	2	3	4	5
7	People in my community believe the violence perpetrated by jihadist groups is justified.	1	2	3	4	5

Mali has experienced a great deal of violence in recent years. Below is a list of possible contributors to this violence. Please indicate the extent to which you believe each one of them is responsible for the violence.

		Not at all to blame				Very much to blame
1	Jihadist groups	1	2	3	4	5
2	Drug trafficking	1	2	3	4	5
3	Feuds between ethnic groups	1	2	3	4	5
4	The Malian government	1	2	3	4	5
5	Western influence/presence	1	2	3	4	5
6	The economy	1	2	3	4	5
7	Divide between youth and elders	1	2	3	4	5

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	The use of illegal drugs is a problem in Mali.	1	2	3	4	5
2	People working in the drug trade are not bad people.	1	2	3	4	5
3	People working in the drug trade are just trying to make a decent living.	1	2	3	4	5

The following set of items all pertain to the ethnic group to which you belong.

1	What is your ethnicity?	
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Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I identify strongly with my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5
2	My ethnicity is an important part of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I feel a strong sense of solidarity with other members of my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5

The following questions are about **the way you think all members of your ethnic group feel**. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	Members of my ethnic group are valued in society.	1	2	3	4	5
2	Members of my ethnic group feel insignificant.	1	2	3	4	5
3	Members of my ethnic group feel like nobody cares about them in society.	1	2	3	4	5
4	Members of my ethnic group feel humiliated.	1	2	3	4	5
5	Members of my ethnic group are treated with dignity.	1	2	3	4	5
6	Members of my ethnic group feel like outsiders in society.	1	2	3	4	5

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5
2	I would be willing to endure intense suffering to defend my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I would be willing to give my life to defend my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5
4	I would support protests to defend my ethnic group, even if those protests turn violent.	1	2	3	4	5
5	I would be willing to attack police or security forces to defend my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5
6	I would be willing to use violence to defend my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5

The following set of items all pertain to your religion.

1 What is your religion?

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I identify strongly with my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
2	My religion is an important part of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I feel a strong sense of solidarity with other followers of my religion.	1	2	3	4	5

The following questions are about **the way you think all followers of your religion feel**.

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	Followers of my religion are valued in society.	1	2	3	4	5
2	Followers of my religion feel insignificant.	1	2	3	4	5
3	Followers of my religion feel like nobody cares about them in society.	1	2	3	4	5
4	Followers of my religion feel humiliated.	1	2	3	4	5
5	Followers of my religion are treated with dignity.	1	2	3	4	5
6	Followers of my religion feel like outsiders in society.	1	2	3	4	5

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1	I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
2	I would be willing to endure intense suffering to defend my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
3	I would be willing to give my life to defend my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
4	I would support protests to defend religion, even if those protests turn violent.	1	2	3	4	5
5	I would be willing to attack police or security forces to defend my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
6	I would be willing to use violence to defend my religion.	1	2	3	4	5

Annex 3

Statistical Analyses Results

Table 1: Regression Results of Baseline Estimation Models

	Support for Jihadist groups	Ethnic non-violent act	Ethnic violent act	Religious non-violent act	Religious violent act
Location					
Mopti	0.195 (0.1439)	0.515* (0.2079)	-0.380 (0.2513)	1.150*** (0.1891)	-0.366 (0.2488)
Menaka	0.830*** (0.2147)	0.682** (0.3101)	1.731*** (0.3749)	0.686* (0.2821)	1.455*** (0.3713)
Year of Birth	-0.005 (0.0222)	-0.025 (0.0321)	0.050 (0.0388)	-0.005 (0.0292)	0.042 (0.0384)
Gender (Ref.: Male)					
Female	0.008 (0.0905)	-0.205 (0.1308)	-0.386* (0.1581)	-0.327** (0.1190)	-0.380* (0.1566)
Marital Status (Ref.: Married/In a relationship)					
Single	0.059 (0.0903)	-0.128 (0.1305)	0.065 (0.1578)	-0.168 (0.1187)	0.048f (0.1562)
Occupation (Ref.: Unemployed)					
Employed	0.098 (0.1128)	0.129 (0.1629)	-0.049 (0.1969)	0.056 (0.1482)	0.033 (0.1950)
SES	0.037 (0.0537)	-0.011 (0.0776)	0.195* (0.0938)	-0.032 (0.0706)	0.217* (0.0929)
Education (Ref.: No education)					
Medersa/Ecole coranique	0.631** (0.2349)	0.260 (0.3393)	0.690 (0.4102)	0.755** (0.3086)	0.389 (0.4062)
Premier Cycle	-0.041 (0.1248)	-0.226 (0.1803)	-0.361 (0.2180)	0.221 (0.1640)	-0.167 (0.2159)
Second Cycle	0.124 (0.1476)	-0.077 (0.2132)	-0.288 (0.2577)	0.240 (0.1939)	0.121 (0.2552)

	Support for Jihadist groups	Ethnic non-violent act	Ethnic violent act	Religious non-violent act	Religious violent act
Lycee	0.107 (0.1310)	0.138 (0.1892)	-0.405 (0.2287)	0.359* (0.1721)	-0.112 (0.2265)
Universite	-0.099 (0.1569)	-0.118 (0.2266)	-0.147 (0.2740)	0.370 (0.2062)	0.388 (0.2713)
Fulfilment of basic needs	0.200** (0.0596)	-0.056 (0.0861)	0.033 (0.1041)	-0.134 (0.0783)	-0.167 (0.1031)
Fulfilment of aspirations	-0.008 (0.0592)	0.261** (0.0856)	0.019 (0.1035)	-0.005 (0.0779)	0.004 (0.1025)
Ethnic identification	-0.078 (0.0603)	0.526*** (0.0871)	0.379*** (0.1053)	0.059 (0.0793)	-0.043 (0.1043)
Religious identification	0.094 (0.0527)	0.232** (0.0761)	0.248** (0.1053)	0.892*** (0.0693)	0.817*** (0.0912)
Feelings of personal insignificance	0.149** (0.0508)	0.095 (0.0734)	0.083 (0.0887)	-0.004 (0.0667)	0.062 (0.0878)
Feelings of ethnic insignificance	-0.001 (0.0524)	-0.082 (0.0757)	-0.040 (0.0915)	-0.014 (0.0689)	0.031 (0.0906)
Feelings of religious insignificance	0.161** (0.0575)	-0.182* (0.0831)	-0.003 (0.1005)	0.001 (0.0756)	0.002 (0.0995)
Having witnessed violence	0.118** (0.0348)	-0.097 (0.0503)	0.066 (0.0608)	-0.049 (0.0458)	0.020 (0.0602)
Knowing victims of violence	-0.057 (0.0392)	-0.047 (0.0566)	-0.057 (0.402)	-0.064 (0.0515)	-0.001 (0.0678)
Knowing victims of drug trade	0.064 (0.0372)	-0.055 (0.0537)	-0.010 (0.0649)	-0.008 (0.0489)	-0.017 (0.0643)
Knowing victims of jihadism	-0.019 (0.0429)	0.004 (0.0619)	-0.144 (0.0748)	-0.008 (0.0563)	-0.180* (0.0741)

	Support for Jihadist groups	Ethnic non- violent act	Ethnic violent act	Religious non-violent act	Religious violent act
Knowing victims of the Malian government	-0.003 (0.0332)	-0.004 (0.0480)	0.165** (0.0580)	-0.012 (0.0436)	0.169** (0.0574)
Feeling unsafe	0.012 (0.0326)	-0.036 (0.0471)	-0.211*** (0.0569)	0.003 (0.0428)	-0.151** (0.0564)
“The West should do more to help”	-0.100* (0.0470)	0.010 (0.0678)	0.022 (0.0820)	-0.027 (0.0617)	-0.013 (0.0812)
Feeling abandoned by the West	0.121** (0.0414)	0.019 (0.0599)	0.098 (0.0724)	0.102 (0.0545)	0.146* (0.0717)
Perceiving the West as indifferent to one’s problems	-0.080* (0.0391)	-0.023 (0.0565)	0.005 (0.0683)	-0.084 (0.0514)	-0.039 (0.0676)
Constant	9.758 (44.3231)	50.792 (64.0281)	-99.963 (77.3999)	10.825 (58.2441)	-84.705 (76.6520)
Observations	287	287	287	287	287
AIC	621.865	832.992	941.124	778.645	936.285

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table 2: MANOVA I Between-subject Results and Post-hoc Results

	Between-subject results			F	Post-hoc results		
	Mopti	Menaka	Bamako		Mopti vs. Menaka	Mopti vs. Bamako	Menaka vs. Bamako
Support for Jihadist groups	1.5414 (0.64155)	2.1962 (0.80181)	1.6692 (0.78198)	21.120***	***	<i>ns</i>	***
Ethnic non-violent act	4.2877 (0.81738)	3.7677 (1.21448)	3.8982 (1.34311)	5.347**	**	<i>ns</i>	<i>ns</i>
Ethnic violent act	2.0474 (1.08902)	3.4242 (1.31261)	2.9404 (1.50254)	27.354***	***	***	*
Religious non-violent act	4.4211 (0.58993)	3.0303 (1.35031)	3.2877 (1.44121)	36.999***	***	***	<i>ns</i>
Religious violent act	1.9474 (1.11440)	2.8148 (1.49468)	2.7649 (1.55352)	11.858***	***	***	<i>ns</i>

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table 3: MANOVA II Between-subject Results and Post-hoc results

	Between-subject results			F	Post-hoc results		
	Mopti	Menaka	Bamako		Mopti vs. Menaka	Mopti vs. Bamako	Menaka vs. Bamako
Fulfilment of basic needs	2.3360 (0.8870)	1.6313 (0.68544)	2.6579 (1.11270)	32.477***	***	*	***
Fulfilment of aspirations	1.7660 (0.71145)	1.6094 (0.72694)	2.1263 (1.07428)	9.308***	<i>ns</i>	*	***
Ethnic identification	4.6560 (0.51606)	3.6313 (0.92957)	4.5298 (0.71541)	54.978***	***	<i>ns</i>	***
Religious identification	4.4823 (0.44699)	3.3401 (1.05192)	4.3439 (0.84698)	55.441***	***	<i>ns</i>	***
Feelings of personal insignificance	2.2199 (0.94951)	2.5320 (1.14476)	1.9158 (0.77026)	9.790***	<i>ns</i>	***	***
Feelings of ethnic insignificance	2.3103 (1.00108)	2.4074 (0.97189)	1.6246 (0.63066)	22.285***	<i>ns</i>	***	***
Feelings of religious insignificance	1.6454 (0.87826)	2.2020 (0.8435)7	1.5368 (0.5332)8	21.032***	***	<i>ns</i>	***
Having witnessed violence	2.60 (1.281)	3.44 (1.592)	3.55 (1.700)	10.953***	***	***	<i>ns</i>
Knowing victims of violence	4.35 (1.095)	3.66 (1.513)	3.80 (1.513)	6.640**	**	*	<i>ns</i>
Knowing victims of drug trade	2.62 (1.146)	2.41 (1.436)	3.11 (1.685)	5.862**	<i>ns</i>	<i>ns</i>	**
Knowing victims of jihadism	4.30 (1.076)	2.68 (1.564)	3.35 (1.623)	30.571***	***	***	**

	Between-subject results			F	Post-hoc results		
	Mopti	Menaka	Bamako		Mopti vs. Menaka	Mopti vs. Bamako	Menaka vs. Bamako
Knowing victims of the Malian government	3.07 (1.280)	2.34 (1.356)	2.52 (1.536)	7.174**	**	**	ns
Feeling unsafe	3.76 (1.427)	3.61 (1.511)	1.97 (1.134)	49.991***	ns	***	***
“The West should do more to help”	4.63 (0.639)	3.69 (1.307)	4.52 (0.784)	27.865***	***	ns	***
Feeling abandoned by the West	3.53 (1.207)	2.77 (1.159)	3.78 (1.281)	18.314***	***	ns	***
Perceiving the West as indifferent to one's problems	3.54 (1.206)	2.99 (1.064)	2.66 (1.373)	12.561***	**	***	ns

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; Analysis based on 287 participants due to two missing responses to question 50 “I strongly identify with my ethnic group”.

Table 4: Interaction effects for ‘Support for Jihadist Groups Models’

	Support for Jihadist groups	Support for Jihadist groups
	Location	
Mopti	-0.017 (0.3032)	0.145 (0.2688)
Menaka	-0.232 (0.3188)	0.581* (0.2910)
Year of Birth	0.008 (0.0216)	-0.007 (0.0222)

	Support for Jihadist groups	Support for Jihadist groups
Gender (Ref.: Male)		
Female	0.001 (0.0874)	0.015 (0.0904)
Marital Status (Ref.: Married/In a relationship)		
Single	0.050 (0.0871)	0.063 (0.0901)
Occupation (Ref.: Unemployed)		
Employed	0.158 (0.1094)	0.072 (0.1157)
SES	0.035 (0.0526)	0.053 (0.0550)
Education (Ref.: No education)		
Medersa/Ecole coranique	0.670** (0.2266)	0.631** (0.2346)
Premier Cycle	-0.027 (0.1203)	-0.044 (0.1245)
Second Cycle	0.113 (0.1445)	0.125 (0.1473)
Lycee	0.158 (0.1296)	0.086 (0.1316)
Universite	0.018 (0.1532)	-0.103 (0.1565)
Fulfillment of basic needs	0.073 (0.0794)	0.188** (0.0602)
Fulfillment of aspirations	-0.057 (0.0584)	-0.017 (0.0597)
Ethnic identification	-0.033 (0.0589)	-0.069 (0.0605)
Religious Identification	0.063 (0.0513)	0.102 (0.0530)
Feelings of personal insignificance	0.187*** (0.0496)	0.139** (0.0512)
Feelings of ethnic insignificance	-0.032 (0.0510)	0.000 (0.0524)

	Support for Jihadist groups	Support for Jihadist groups
Feelings of religious insignificance	0.177** (0.0555)	0.149* (0.0581)
Having witnessed violence	0.094** (0.0340)	0.088 (0.0513)
Knowing victims of violence	-0.053 (0.0379)	-0.067 (0.0408)
Knowing victims of drug trade	0.050 (0.0361)	0.070 (0.0374)
Knowing victims of jihadism	-0.017 (0.0416)	-0.020 (0.0429)
Knowing victims of the Malian government	-0.011 (0.0321)	-0.003 (0.0331)
Feeling unsafe	0.003 (0.0314)	-0.001 (0.0339)
“The West should do more to help”	-0.055 (0.0462)	-0.111* (0.0475)
Feeling abandoned by the West	0.094* (0.0405)	0.127** (0.0416)
Perceiving the West as indifferent to one's problems	-0.064 (0.0381)	-0.084* (0.0391)
Interaction:		
Mopti*Basic Needs	0.064 (0.1053)	
Menaka*Basic Needs	0.575*** (0.1251)	
Mopti*Having witnessed violence		0.022 (0.0731)
Menaka* Having witnessed violence		0.091 (0.0709)
Constant	-15.186 (43.0227)	14.762 (44.3584)
Observations	287	287
AIC	604.330	624.139

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table 5: Interaction Effects for Non-violent Forms of Extremism Models

	Ethnic non-violent act	Ethnic non-violent act	Religious non-violent act	Religious non-violent act
Location				
Mopti	0.368 (0.4518)	0.363 (0.3879)	0.927* (0.4100)	0.909* (0.3537)
Menaka	0.206 (0.4750)	0.441 (0.4200)	-0.023 (0.4311)	0.493 (0.3830)
Year of Birth	-0.017 (0.0321)	-0.029 (0.0321)	0.003 (0.0292)	-0.007 (0.0292)
Gender (Ref.: Male)				
Female	-0.208 (0.1302)	-0.194 (0.1305)	-0.330** (0.1182)	-0.325** (0.1190)
Marital Status (Ref.: Married/In a relationship)				
Single	-0.134 (0.1298)	-0.121 (0.1301)	-0.175 (0.1178)	-0.165 (0.1186)
Occupation (Ref.: Unemployed)				
Employed	0.165 (0.1630)	0.081 (0.1670)	0.095 (0.1479)	0.024 (0.1523)
SES	-0.011 (0.0784)	0.014 (0.0794)	-0.030 (0.0711)	-0.026 (0.0724)
Education (Ref.: No education)				
Medersa/Ecole coranique	0.283 (0.3376)	0.255 (0.3387)	0.778* (0.3064)	0.741* (0.3088)
Premier Cycle	-0.217 (0.1792)	-0.232 (0.1797)	0.231 (0.1627)	0.216 (0.1639)
Second Cycle	-0.086 (0.2153)	-0.074 (0.2126)	0.224 (0.1954)	0.247 (0.1939)
Lycee	0.167 (0.1931)	0.105 (0.1900)	0.383* (0.1752)	0.350* (0.1732)
Universite	-0.047 (0.2283)	-0.125 (0.2259)	0.443* (0.2027)	0.370 (0.2060)
Fulfillment of basic needs	-0.137 (0.1183)	-0.076 (0.0869)	-0.231* (0.1074)	-0.140 (0.0792)

	Ethnic non-violent act	Ethnic non-violent act	Religious non-violent act	Religious non-violent act
Fulfillment of aspirations	0.232** (0.0870)	0.245** (0.0861)	-0.034 (0.0789)	-0.015 (0.0785)
Ethnic identification	0.553*** (0.0877)	0.539*** (0.0873)	0.088 (0.0796)	0.063 (0.0796)
Religious Identification	0.213** (0.0764)	0.246** (0.0765)	0.871*** (0.0693)	0.900*** (0.0698)
Feelings of personal insignificance	0.119 (0.0739)	0.079 (0.0739)	0.020 (0.0671)	-0.009 (0.0674)
Feelings of ethnic insignificance	-0.101 (0.0760)	-0.081 (0.0756)	-0.033 (0.0690)	-0.017 (0.0690)
Feelings of religious insignificance	-0.172* (0.0827)	-0.200* (0.0838)	0.011 (0.0751)	-0.004 (0.0764)
Having witnessed violence	-0.112* (0.0506)	-0.155* (0.0741)	-0.065 (0.0460)	-0.094 (0.0676)
Knowing victims of violence	-0.045 (0.0565)	-0.061 (0.0589)	-0.060 (0.0513)	-0.062 (0.0537)
Knowing victims of drug trade	0.064 (0.0537)	-0.045 (0.0540)	-0.019 (0.0488)	-0.002 (0.0492)
Knowing victims of jihadism	0.005 (0.0620)	0.002 (0.0619)	-0.009 (0.0563)	-0.005 (0.0565)
Knowing victims of the Malian government	-0.008 (0.0478)	-0.003 (0.0478)	-0.016 (0.0434)	-0.011 (0.0436)
Feeling unsafe	-0.042 (0.0469)	-0.056 (0.0489)	-0.003 (0.0425)	-0.004 (0.0446)
"The West should do more to help"	0.037 (0.0689)	-0.007 (0.0686)	0.002 (0.0625)	-0.032 (0.0625)
Feeling abandoned by the West	0.002 (0.0603)	0.029 (0.0600)	0.084 (0.0547)	0.107 (0.0547)
Perceiving the West as indifferent to one's problems	-0.013 (0.0568)	-0.030 (0.0565)	-0.072 (0.0516)	-0.087 (0.0515)

	Ethnic non-violent act	Ethnic non-violent act	Religious non-violent act	Religious non-violent act
Interaction:				
Mopti*Basic Needs	0.046 (0.1569)		0.075 (0.1424)	
Menaka*Basic Needs	0.353 (0.1865)		0.3787* (0.1693)	
Mopti*Having witnessed violence		0.057 (0.1055)		0.080 (0.0962)
Menaka*Having witnessed violence		0.152 (0.1023)		0.066 (0.0933)
Constant	35.490 (64.1060)	59.103 (64.0242)	-5.395 (58.1851)	14.307 (58.3804)
Observations	287	287	287	287
AIC	833.248	834.775	777.622	781.805

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table 6: Interaction Effects for Violent Forms of Extremism Models

	Ethnic violent sacrifice	Ethnic violent sacrifice	Religious violent sacrifice	Religious violent sacrifice
Location				
Mopti	0.220 (0.5439)	0.547 (0.4659)	-0.016 (0.5416)	-0.045 (0.4630)
Menaka	1.222* (0.5718)	2.277*** (0.5045)	1.052 (0.5694)	2.133*** (0.5013)
Year of Birth	0.058 (0.0387)	0.054 (0.0385)	0.048 (0.0385)	0.048 (0.0383)
Gender (Ref.: Male)				
Female	-0.406* (0.1567)	-0.389* (0.1568)	-0.393* (0.1561)	-0.396* (0.1558)
Marital Status (Ref.: Married/In a relationship)				
Single	0.070 (0.1563)	0.060 (0.1563)	0.051 (0.1557)	0.038 (0.1553)

	Ethnic violent sacrifice	Ethnic violent sacrifice	Religious violent sacrifice	Religious violent sacrifice
Occupation (Ref.: Unemployed)				
Employed	-0.004 (0.1962)	0.060 (0.2006)	0.065 (0.1954)	0.114 (0.1993)
SES	0.166 (0.0944)	0.186 (0.0953)	0.199* (0.0940)	0.180 (0.0947)
Education (Ref.: No education)				
Medersa/Ecole coranique	0.744 (0.4064)	0.747 (0.4068)	0.426 (0.4047)	0.403 (0.4042)
Premier Cycle	-0.356 (0.2158)	-0.342 (0.2159)	-0.162 (0.2149)	-0.155 (0.2145)
Second Cycle	-0.223 (0.2592)	-0.317 (0.2554)	0.160 (0.2581)	0.112 (0.2538)
Lycee	-0.290 (0.2325)	-0.390 (0.2282)	-0.036 (0.2315)	-0.061 (0.2267)
Universite	-0.050 (0.2748)	-0.154 (0.2713)	0.457 (0.2737)	0.396 (0.2696)
Fulfillment of basic needs	0.077 (0.1424)	0.044 (0.1044)	-0.150 (0.1418)	-0.136 (0.1037)
Fulfillment of aspirations	-0.035 (0.1047)	0.050 (0.1035)	-0.034 (0.1043)	0.031 (0.1028)
Ethnic identification	0.409*** (0.1056)	0.368*** (0.1048)	-0.020 (0.1052)	-0.063 (0.1042)
Religious Identification	0.234* (0.0920)	0.224* (0.0919)	0.805*** (0.0916)	0.794*** (0.0913)
Feelings of personal insignificance	0.116 (0.0890)	0.096 (0.0888)	0.085 (0.0886)	0.087 (0.0883)
Feelings of ethnic insignificance	-0.072 (0.0915)	-0.026 (0.0909)	0.008 (0.0912)	0.031 (0.0903)
Feelings of religious insignificance	0.011 (0.0996)	0.005 (0.1007)	0.012 (0.0992)	0.029 (0.1000)
Having witnessed violence	0.053 (0.0610)	0.222* (0.0890)	0.010 (0.0607)	0.122 (0.0884)

	Ethnic violent sacrifice	Ethnic violent sacrifice	Religious violent sacrifice	Religious violent sacrifice
Knowing victims of violence	-0.065 (0.0681)	-0.076 (0.0707)	-0.006 (0.0678)	0.018 (0.0703)
Knowing victims of drug trade	-0.012 (0.0647)	-0.029 (0.0649)	-0.020 (0.0644)	-0.034 (0.0645)
Knowing victims of jihadism	-0.127 (0.0746)	-0.156* (0.0744)	-0.170* (0.0743)	-0.178* (0.0739)
Knowing victims of the Malian government	0.155** (0.0575)	0.161** (0.0574)	0.162** (0.0573)	0.168** (0.0571)
Feeling unsafe	-0.216*** (0.0564)	-0.197** (0.0587)	-0.155** (0.0562)	-0.120* (0.0583)
“The West should do more to help”	0.052 (0.0830)	0.032 (0.0824)	0.009 (0.0826)	0.013 (0.0818)
Feeling abandoned by the West	0.088 (0.0726)	0.084 (0.0721)	0.138 (0.0723)	0.130 (0.0717)
Perceiving the West as indifferent to one’s problems	0.002 (0.0684)	0.013 (0.0678)	-0.040 (0.0681)	-0.028 (0.0674)
Interaction:				
Mopti*Basic Needs	-0.249 (0.1890)		-0.148 (0.1882)	
Menaka*Basic Needs	0.332 (0.2245)		0.253 (0.2236)	
Mopti*Exposure to violence		-0.302* (0.1268)		-0.116 (0.1260)
Menaka*Exposure to violence		-0.180 (0.1229)		-0.243* (0.1221)
Constant	-115.814 (77.1810)	-109.345 (76.9009)	-96.582 (76.8570)	-97.930 (76.4159)
Observations	287	287	287	287
AIC	939.791	939.964	937.376	936.332

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

**Table 7: Frequency Table
 Exposure to violence**

“I have witnessed violence where I live”:

Response	Frequency	Percentage
1: Strongly Disagree	63	21.8%
2: Disagree	58	20.1%
3: Neutral	14	4.8%
4: Agree	62	21.5%
5: Strongly Agree	92	31.8%

**Table 8: Frequency Table
 Highest Level of Education**

Response	Region	Frequency	Percentage
Aucun	Mopti	24	25.3%
	Menaka	65	65.7%
	Bamako	11	11.6%
Premier Cycle	Mopti	26	27.4%
	Menaka	14	14.1%
	Bamako	5	5.3%
Second Cycle	Mopti	8	8.4%
	Menaka	10	10.1%
	Bamako	10	10.5%
Lycee	Mopti	30	31.6%
	Menaka	1	1%
	Bamako	41	43.2%

Response	Region	Frequency	Percentage
Universite	Mopti	3	3.2%
	Menaka	7	7.1%
	Bamako	25	26.3%
Ecole Coranique/Medersa	Mopti	4	4.2%
	Menaka	2	2%
	Bamako	3	3.2%
Total Respondents	Mopti	95	100%
	Menaka	99	100%
	Bamako	95	100%

**Table 9: Frequency Table
Self-perceived Socio-economic Status**

Socio-economic Status	Mopti		Menaka		Bamako	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
1	0	0%	86	86.9%	0	0%
2	5	5.3%	5	5.1%	6	6.3%
3	27	28.4%	4	4%	16	16.8%
4	52	54.7%	4	4%	36	37.9%
5	11	11.6%	0	0%	29	30.5%
6	0	0%	0	0%	7	7.4%
7	0	0%	0	0%	1	1.1%
8	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
9	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
10	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	95	100%	99	100%	95	100%

