Throughout the last two months, Poland has been hit by a string of mass casualty events. Some of these are considered terrorist incidents. These include at least one of the early October knife attacks in schools (there were four attempted stabbings and three were successfully conducted), and the Kakow mass casualty shooting of 7 November, which resulted in ten deaths and a further fifteen wounded. This is a significant development for a country which had not witnessed a successful terrorist attack on its soil since 1989 and the transition to democracy. In spite of the country’s involvement in the Global War on Terror, which often motivated jihadi radicalisation in other places, and despite the presence of a robust far-right extremist scene, Poland had remained fairly immune to ideologically-driven terrorism.
This Polish exception was becoming almost astonishing as such terrorist violence started to spread outside of Western Europe and percolated into Central Europe via, for example, a Terrorgram inspired terrorist who targeted an LGBTQI+ bar in Bratislava, Slovakia, in 2022, and an active shooter who executed a mass shooting at Charles University in Prague in 2023. Arguably, security services proactively contributed to this reality, as the Polish security service Agencja Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego (ABW) reportedly foiled some attacks over the years. This included “Breivik style” plots, and other planned knife attacks in 2025 and2026. Moreover, on 16 November - nine days after the Krakow attack - ABW foiled a planned terrorist plot which involved three neo-Nazi/fascist oriented youths.
The events of 7 November have already been referred to as the end of Poland’s innocence by terrorism experts from other European countries, supposedly marking a turning point in the country’s history in general, and in its attitude towards political violence in particular. This attack effectively “stunned” Poland and shattered the image as one of the, if not the, safest country in Europe. A country which has successfully utilised the pros of EU membership to thoroughly transform itself into a modern entity with growing economic and political clout. Poland’s “innocence”, some surmised, was only made more alluring by the fact that it allegedly developed against the backdrop of a growing polarisation and an internal political conflict.
Such emotive language is, arguably, an exaggeration but it is true that the Krakow attack finally exposed a threat of domestic terrorism that was effectively long in the making. As it stands, it also underscores the fact that the country faces threats on multiple fronts, including Russian state terrorism – as documented by ICCT. With ABW and the police already engaged in countering the latter and dismantling other terrorist plots at home, there now comes a time to urgently put in place a prevention system aimed at limiting the supply of potential attackers prior to their embarking on violent attacks.
The events, the shooter and his motives
The shooter, Michal Oksinski first murdered his parents and his sister (most probably, as the investigation is still ongoing) at the family home in the town of Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski in south-eastern Poland. He then proceeded 190 kilometres to conduct a mass casualty attack in Krakow. Driving, he fired an AR-15 carbine killingsix and wounding fifteen passersby in Krakow’s Old Town , one of Europe’s most iconic tourist destinations. Shortly after commencement of his attack in Krakow, he was shot by two pursuing policemen who both were wounded in the process. Their bravery while neutralising the attacker with was recorded. Oksinski died in hospital of sustained injuries on 9 November.
As of 19 November, investigators are still attempting to piece together his full motivations. Despite the chatter in some of the online spaces frequented by extremist individuals on the alleged existence of a manifesto, the prosecutors have so far ruled out the existence of such a document or a letter akin to a suicide note. It is now acknowledged that prior to the attack “he at all times talked about serial killers” and sought information on Anders Breivik (the 2011 Norwegian terrorist who killed 77 people in two terrorist attacks conducted on the same day), Eliott Rodger (the 2014 mass murderer of six, motivated by Incel ideology), Ted Kaczynski (“Unabomber”, one of the most infamous domestic terrorists in the US), or Charles Mason (a cult leader and a mass murderer). Despite findings on his alleged presence in the online spaces associated with TCC – True Crime Community – and suspicion of his devising and playing computer games which simulated terrorist attacks, there is still some uncertainty whether the described accounts truly belonged to him.
Much has also been made from photos included on his now removed social media accounts in which he, for example, posed with a rainbow flag while wearing a gas mask. This “controversy” has already sparked a debate on his political allegiance – with some concluding that this would be proof of him either endorsing the LGBTQI+ or finding it distasteful. More controversies arose when the public, often reacting to AI-enhanced or effectively outright fake images, discussed the shooter’s badges visible on his clothes/uniform (for example, the Territorial Defence Force’s brigade of which he was not a member), or his t-shirt allegedly portraying a logo of Falanga, Poland’s pre-war far-right organisation, whereas in reality it was a graphic “joke” on allegedly escaping from a psychiatric hospital in Morawica – where he had however not been consigned.
Elements of Oksinski’s modus operandi situate him amongst the copycats of Brenton Tarrant, a “saint” glorified by the Terrorgram collective and an extreme right terrorist who shot 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019. Military style fatigues, utilisation of semi-automatic weapons – he had access to these through his father but also held two guns himself – and training in tactical shooting (as evident in the videos from the attack when he engages the two policemen) all point to an extreme-right attack methodology. Some of his internet searches point to at least his fascination with mass shootings and attempts to learn from the aforementioned terrorists and shooters.
In addition to this, this author was able to clarify independently some elements about the shooter’s background. This was done via conversations with anonymous Polish terrorism experts who interviewed Oksinski’s colleague, and individuals who attended primary school and gymnasium with him in Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski. These findings situate Oksinski more firmly in the far-right milieu: he voted for and sympathised with the libertarian far-right parties, openly professed anti-EU, anti-LGBTQI+, anti-immigrant, and racist views. According to a schoolmate, Oksinski was not a loner nor suffered from bullying at school and had friends on his housing estate in Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski. Apparently, he found it hard to deal with criticism and was prone to crying at school if in any way reprimanded by the teachers. At that stage, he had no fascination with guns but admitted to carrying a knife around with him almost at all times. His family is said to have been ordinary with his dad working as an electrician and providing for the family whereas his mother was said to have been more disciplinarian. His sister, who studied and lived in Krakow, was a promising queer artist and prior to moving to Krakow held exhibitions in Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski. Oksinski had allegedly an uncomfortable attitude towards women.
As it stands, one can call Oksinski almost a classic case of a modern day mass casualty terrorist displaying blurred ideological motives – in this case a mix of extreme-right ideas and TCC-linked fascination with violence, as well as potentially also incel beliefs, as illustrated by his online researcher on Eliott Rodger. Oksinski’s target choice – one of the most touristic places in Poland and, at the same time, the place where his queer sister was enjoying a relatively successful life, also points to the possibility that the shooter was in fact on a revenge spree, fuelled by personal grievances interacting with his extremist beliefs.
The aftermath – how does Poland move on from the “end of innocence”?
Most of the reactions to the October knife attacks in schools and the Krakow attack centred on the security response. While praising the policemen who neutralised the attacker, the country debated purchases of better bulletproof vests for patrolling policemen or whether it makes sense to install metal detectors in schools. Some also brought to the fore the warnings expressed in open access publications by ABW on the threat of Krakow-like attacks which predated this incident or reemphasised its earlier calls related to “youth radicalisation.”
It is now becoming clear, however, that neither the media nor the public have been prepared for the seemingly sudden outbreak of terrorist events in Poland and are sometimes at a loss to perceive these as cases of political violence. Moreover, there is relatively little public knowledge on the extremist nature of the online spaces which co-produced, for example, Terrorgram and the Saints and/or Siege Culture, Incels, or nihilistic violent extremism. Simultaneously, and as is the case in comparable situations in the broader West, right leaning sections of the public reject any association between their views and these of latest mass casualty attackers. The fact that the radical right’s embrace of nativist, xenophobic, and homophobic language effectively enables violence against the “out” groups. This was evident when the words of the interior minister who, shortly after the attack, speculated that Oksinski was “fascinated by far-right ideologies,” resulted with a widespread repudiation and ridicule that he deliberately attempted to score political points on the back of this tragic event. For some stalwarts of the Polish right, including the radical right, Michal Oksinski was, at worst, a suffering loner who fell into the rabbit hole of “nihilism” and had nothing to do with notions such as patriotism or nationalism.
All of this distracts the country from initiating the debate on the introduction of the prevention system related to extremism and terrorism. Poland and other Central European member states of the EU have not developed any programme on the prevention of radicalisation similar to what has been developed in Western Europe. The fact that Poland was largely spared by Islamist terrorism over the past decade limited the incentives to invest in prevention efforts. The growing threat from far-right extremism in Central Europe, resulting in terrorist attacks, did not appear sufficient to change this approach.
In short and with a benefit of hindsight, the non-operationalisation of prevention systems can now be seen as a mistake. Their introduction could have limited the supply of individuals fascinated with extreme ideologies and violence. Of course, introduction of such a system does not completely eradicate the threat of terrorism from a given country – as is evident in Western European countries which now have around 20 years of experience of running these and remain threatened by different types of terrorism. However, prevention programmes address the conducive causes of radicalisation, facilitate cooperation between relevant public services, and provide a given country with a string of other benefits related to countering and preventing other harms than radicalisation or extremism (such as delinquency or crime). More broadly, they can contribute to the promotion of the well-being of children and adolescents, to social cohesion and democratic resilience. Focusing on countering such harms, and not necessarily purely on the deradicalisation of individuals likely to proceed into terrorist violence, disarms far right’s politically minded critique of prevention as a tool aimed at policing actions of thoughts of the country’s citizens. Potentially, this last argument might be useful if Poland opts for a serious and systematic foray into prevention of violent extremism.
Security services and the police should be the first to welcome such a system in Poland. Currently, they are effectively responsible for intercepting terrorists at planning stage but are not assisted by systemic earlier interventions which could have stopped one’s radicalisation into terrorism. Thus, a system modelled after, for example, the Finnish ANCHOR could have been of great support here as it would be focused on reducing the supply of wannabe attackers, shooters, terrorists etc. Organisations such as ABW would have more resources to counter, for example, the threat from Russian hybrid warfare and espionage, and the police would not have to be involved in close protection of country’ schools – as was the case in the aftermath of the October knife attacks.
Photo Credit: MKavalenkau on Shutterstock