This chapter focuses more on the practical than the theoretical. Much of the chapter will focus on how to identify inmates (and staff) at risk of becoming radicalized and how to work with them. In addition to looking at potential radical inmates, the chapter also deals with violent extremist offenders, who prison professionals often include when dealing with radical inmates. Why and how individuals become radicalized in prisons is explored. Many news articles, political presentations, and common knowledge indicate that prisons are “hotbeds for the recruitment of radicals” and that this is a big problem. Whether that is true is examined. The current emphasis on developing prison programs dealing with radicals are reviewed and summarized. The issue of whether radicalization in prisons is worthy of special programs or whether normal good prison practice would be just as effective is explored. Issues of dealing with inmates who enter the prison system already radicalized and who are possibly members of radical or terrorist organizations are explored, and the types of classification tools used to identify them are discussed. The chapter also looks at differing concepts as to how and where potential radicals should be housed. A major section of the chapter deals with the training of prison staff to identify and work with potential radicals. The use of “Dynamic Security” as a tool to help in the fight against prison radicalization is explained. Examples of various treatment models used in the rehabilitation of terrorists are presented. In its final section, the chapter offers general observations and recommendations for working with radicals, convicted terrorists and violent extremist prisoners.

Keywords: prisoners, corrections, radicalization, violent extremist, human rights, dynamic security, terrorist
“The terrorist enemy that threatens civilization today is unlike any we have ever known.”

“Prisons in Europe are becoming ‘breeding grounds’ for jihadist groups, with some criminals seeing violent extremism as a form of redemption for their crimes….”

“Ripe for radicalization: Federal prisons are ‘breeding ground’ for terrorists, say experts.”

Headlines, politicians, and pundits issue dire warnings – like those cited above - that appear to make a chapter on the prevention of radicalization to terrorism in prisons one of the most important criminal justice issues of our time. However, reality paints a different picture. First, terrorism, in all its forms, is not new. Groups with names like Viet Minh, Irgun and Stern Gang, National Liberation Front of Algeria, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Irish Republican Army (IRA), West Germany’s Red Army Faction, Japan’s Red Army, Italy’s Red Brigades, and Ku Klux Klan indicate that terrorism has a long history all over the world.

The size of the problem of terrorists in prisons varies from country to country. In some places it is substantial: Israel has almost 6,500 terrorists in prison - but this is exceptionally high. In most countries, the numbers are small. Great Britain, for example, has nearly 150 terrorism-related inmates - out of a prison population of 85,000 convicted offenders. The US has under 450 individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes - out of a total prison population of 1.5 million. By contrast about 200,000 gang members reside in US prisons.

In other words, in terms of the types of inmates that are of significant concern to prison officials, terrorist-related offenders are not a major factor. However, because of the vast damage a single terrorist can cause, recidivist terrorists are a major concern after release from prison. The notoriety of prisoners convicted of terrorist acts, especially where violence was involved, often forces prison officials to treat them as high security risks even when they are not. The problem of radicalization in prison needs to be seen in relation to wider incarceration problems. Security, programming, rehabilitation, humane treatment when dealing with radical and violent extremist inmates are not issues which have new meanings for most prison professionals.

Much of what follows comes from work began by this author in late 2016 while working with several national prison systems, organizations, and individual experts in attempting to develop training programs for staff who have to deal with radical, terrorist, and violent extremist inmates. A draft paper, entitled “Staff Training on Radicalization and Violent Extremist Inmates” was

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1 Ashcroft, John, Attorney General of the United States, Testimony before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 6 December 2001.
2 Davis, Gareth and Steph Cockroft, ‘Europe’s jails are ‘breeding grounds’ for jihadists because ISIS see criminals as ideal recruits and one in five UK maximum security prisoners are already Muslim,’ Daily Mail.com, 12 October 2016. Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3833926/Europe-s-jails-breeding-grounds-jihadists-ISIS-criminals-ideal-recruits-one-five-UK-maximum-security-prisoners-Muslim.html
prepared by the author of this chapter and widely circulated to prison, security, and terrorism professionals. Their feedback was used to modify that draft and has led to the chapter presented here. Those who provided input are too numerous to list, but their contributions to this chapter are truly appreciated.

To ask why people become radicals or violent extremists is like asking why people become criminals. Though there is much research and even more theorizing, the important issue for those working in corrections - especially those on the front line who are in daily contact with inmates - is how to identify potential radicals and extremist violent offenders. Four issues stand out:

1. How can prison officials work with ideological offenders in such a way that corrections systems do not lose their ethical standards of humane treatment?
2. What can prison officials do to help divert such politically motivated inmates from engaging in acts of violence?
3. Can radicalized inmates be trusted in prison programs and can some of them be de-radicalized or at least disengaged from violent extremism once they are released?
4. Does the presence of radicalized inmates in prisons, on parole, or in community treatment centers, make the job of correction personnel more difficult and more dangerous?

Of major importance to all working in, or with, corrections, is to understand the offenders in their care and to treat them with dignity and respect. The task at hand is to ensure the safety of fellow staff, the inmates, and the public while the offenders are in the care of the correctional system. The job is also to ensure that staff actions do not make the offenders more dangerous. In addition to being the keepers of security within correctional institutions, staff are also responsible to help with inmate programming and preparation for release.

**Definition of Terms**

The editor of this Handbook, Alex P. Schmid, in this *Handbook* and other publications, has written extensively on the topic of defining terrorism and related terms. However, for purposes of this chapter, the following definitions are being used. These definitions might not be the most appropriate ones for all discussions on the topic. However, they are the ones used by those who reviewed and contributed to the work on which this chapter is based. In other words, these conceptualizations have proven useful for the purpose at hand.

*Radicalization* represents a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic, or personal.

*Violent extremism* consists of promoting, supporting, or committing acts of violence that may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic, or religious supremacy and/or opposing core democratic principles and values. *Terrorism* is defined in this chapter as conceptualized by the US’ Library of Congress Federal Research Division:
“Definitions of terrorism vary widely and are usually inadequate. Even terrorism researchers often neglect to define the term other than by citing the basic U.S. Department of State (1998) definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Although an act of violence that is generally regarded in the United States as an act of terrorism may not be viewed so in another country, the type of violence that distinguishes terrorism from other types of violence, such as ordinary crime or a wartime military action, can still be defined in terms that might qualify as reasonably objective. Social science research defines a terrorist action as the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets, perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.”

**Terrorism Inmates** are incarcerated persons who, as a result of being radicalized either prior to, or during, imprisonment, engage in some or all of the following activities:

- recruiting other prisoners;
- supporting extremist groups from prison;
- getting support from extremist groups outside prison;
- preparing for violent extremist/ideologically-inspired illegal acts after release;
- manifesting terrorist ideology-inspired hostility to other groups of prisoners and/or staff;
- increasing their radicalization level because of grievances/frustrations/anger related to being in prison

**Rehabilitation** in this chapter is defined as the process where individuals or groups cease their involvement in organized violence and/or terrorism. The process can involve *de-radicalization* and/or *disengagement*. While *de-radicalization* aims for substantive changes in an individual’s ideology and attitude, *disengagement* concentrates on facilitating behavioral change. The disengaged terrorist may not be “de-radicalized” or repent at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support.

**Prisons and Corrections** are used interchangeably in this chapter and mean one and the same. That is also true for the terms *correctional staff* and *prison staff*. Though most national governments, professionals, and research organizations have adopted the use of the term *corrections*, the laws of some states use the term *prisons*.

**Prisoner Radicalization** is defined by the US Department of Justice as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes.” According to the same source, a distinction needs to be made between prisoner radicalization and terrorist recruitment, which means that inmates are solicited to engage in terrorist behaviour or commit terrorist acts -
“the term prison radicalization usually refers to individuals being radicalised in prison, not that terrorist plots are being formulated in prison.”

Radicalization in Prisons

How Radical and Violent Extremist Offenders might Differ from “Normal” Inmates

While “ordinary” criminals commit crimes in pursuit of selfish and/or personal goals, politically motivated offenders believe that they are acting on behalf of a certain group, (a segment of) society, or humanity as a whole. Politically motivated offenders commonly distinguish between “legality” and “legitimacy,” arguing that breaking the law is justified when a particular policy or the entire political or legal system are illegitimate.

Potential Impact of Prison Experience on Radicalization

It is helpful to understand how the prison experience can contribute to certain inmates becoming radicalized. One also needs to realize that the prison experience can also affect staff. Here are three examples:

First, Dr. John Cacioppo, the late Director of the University of Chicago Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, studied what he called “perceived social isolation.”4 One can feel isolated in a crowd. One can also choose to be alone and feel blissful solitude. When people feel others around them are threats rather than sources of cooperation and compassion, they feel socially isolated and lonely. Lonely people are often completely unaware that their brain has gone on alert. Lonely people are often hypersensitive to social threats. Lonely people, focused on self-preservation, take other people’s dire circumstances less seriously.

Second, Australian researchers, Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington, and Peter Bell5 described inmate vulnerability and its impact on radicalization as follows:

“When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment a recruiter can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt) and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear, sadness). This unbalanced emotional state is ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate

the minds of the vulnerable and impressionable… There are instances where an incarcerated person can lose their grip on their individual identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are incarcerated in another country and who do not speak the language.”

Third, the UK’s Prison Reform Trust, in assessing the potential for mental health damage a stay in prison can inflict, found that for the majority of prisoners, imprisonment was likely to have the following effects:

- isolation from families and social networks;
- austere surroundings, loss of privacy; poor physical and hygienic conditions;
- aggression, bullying, fear, suspicion and the attitudes of unsympathetic and uninformed staff;
- lack of purposeful activity, personal control, power to act and loss of identity;
- pressure to escape or to take drugs;
- shame and stigmatization;
- uncertainty, particularly among remand prisoners, and concern about re-integration into the outside world.

Radicalization Occurs for Many Reasons and From Many Different Causes

Root causes of radicalism are almost as varied as there are differing views among individuals on political, social, cultural, moral, religious or economic precepts. Religiously motivated terrorism accounts for only a part of all terrorism – at least in the West. According to the US Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), between 1970 and 2011, 32 percent of the perpetrator groups were motivated by ethnonationalist/separatist agendas, 28 percent were motivated by single issues (such as animal rights or opposition to a war), and only seven percent were motivated by religious beliefs.

Reasons for Joining a Terrorist Cause

Lisa Andrews, writing in the Developmental Psychology Student Newsletter from Mesa Community College’s Psychology Department, concluded, “…. that every terrorist act has a specific, premeditated goal, with a predicted outcome.” The categories she identified were:

- Change: These acts of terrorism are motivated by the achievement of a goal. This goal may be related to social, religious, or political change;

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6 Ibid. p. 7.
• Religious: This group believes it is justified because of religious commands found in the Bible, Torah, Quran; they use these same religious beliefs to recruit more followers;

• Social: Other groups are motivated by purely social causes. Its object will be to overthrow not just governments, but the very economic and technological basis of contemporary societies;

• Political: The leaders of a given idea or social movement come together, in the form of a militia or rebel group, and bring about political change in order to rid society of an undesired ruling power;

• Revenge: There have been many instances where terrorism has been used as a means to avenge what is considered an unjust or offensive act;

• Attention: Terrorism has been used as an effective means of gaining the attention of the public, using fear.

• Symbolism: One thing that is important to acknowledge when speaking of terrorism is the importance of symbolism. Every terrorist act is designed to convey a specific message. Even randomly seeming terrorist acts seek to convey a basic message of fear: "We can get you anywhere, at any time. There is no one to protect you”.

Lisa Andrews further concluded that “most terrorists have several motives for committing terrorist acts and several, if not all, of those mentioned above can be used in order to try to explain their motives. The only true way to determine their motives is to ask the terrorists themselves.”

Anneli Botha, a researcher from the South African Institute for Security Studies, who studied radicalization, interviewed members of radical organizations in a number of countries. Using the results of one of her studies, it became clear that all did not join a violent group for the same reasons. She identified ten different motivational factors:

• Economic reasons;
• Religious and economic reasons;
• Religious reasons;
• Forced to join;
• Personal reasons;
• Religious and ethnic reasons;
• Religious reasons and forced to join;
• Religious and personal reasons;
• Economic reasons and desire for adventure;
• Desire for adventure.

9 The Center for Mental Health Services, 1996.

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Prison Considerations Specific to Radicalization and Violent Extremist Inmates

The information above provides some general background but needs to be modified or expanded for particular countries. It is good enough for a general understanding of radicalization, though far from comprehensive. It provides some information that educators, policy makers, and correctional administrators may find of interest and useful. Our concern in this chapter is for correction staff who are in direct contact with inmates: how can they identify inmates who might be vulnerable to, or are already engaged in, radical or violent extremist activities? And how can prison staff best interact with those inmates?

A. Inmate Classification (Risk and Needs Assessments)

Better managed prison systems utilize evidenced-based security classification instruments. Frank Porporino, a clinical psychologist and researcher with more than forty years of experience as a front-line practitioner, noted:

“What a Security Classification instrument allows you to do is capture both, some of the research informed factors related to potential for escape and/ or violence (e.g., age, history of violence) and then marry those with some important ‘correctional policy’ factors where some level of caution is needed in inmate classification even if the research doesn’t suggest that these factors are clearly predictive (e.g., sentence length, severity of the offence, time left to serve, and even history of prior escapes).”

If correctional staff are going to work with inmates who may be violent extremist inmates or radical inmates, or in danger of being radicalized, the more information they have about the inmates in their care, the better they can do their job. At the same time, staff should know the factors that are included in evidenced-based risk and needs assessment instruments so they can provide feedback to the classification staff. The classification process is not a one-shot operation. It is a continuing process that is constantly reviewed and updated to reflect changes in the inmates. Thus, constant and consistent input from line staff is very important.

According to the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)’s Prison & Probation Working Group, the following recommendations should be considered for a radicalization-focused risk assessment:

1. Invest in, develop, and offer general awareness training to all staff;
2. Develop a two-step risk assessment procedure in cases of potential radicalization;
3. Base assessments on multiple sources of information to increase reliability;
4. Give peer and management support to practitioners carrying out risk assessments;
5. Avoid labelling by having continuous cycles of risk assessment;
6. Run a well-organised, orderly prison is a key prerequisite to avoiding further criminalisation as well as radicalization;


DOI: 10.19156/2020.6.018
7. Choose among different prison regime: [prisoner] concentration, dispersal or combinations.

**B. Should Persons Convicted of Acts of Violent Extremism be Placed in the General Prison Population or kept Separately?**

The following table contains a short analysis of the advantages and disadvantages concerning three types of prison regimes. It is important to emphasize that more extensive knowledge about these regimes and how they are organized is necessary to further inform the debate on prison regimes.12

**Table 1: Housing of Radical - Dispersed, Concentrated, Combination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Choice</th>
<th>Potential Advantages</th>
<th>Potential Disadvantages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Dispersed</strong></td>
<td>• Prisoners are less likely to regard themselves as marginalized because of their beliefs. They will, to some extent, be treated as ordinary prisoners; • Prisoners might be positively influenced by being around different groups of prisoners with different mindsets.</td>
<td>• Handled by generalist staff members instead of specialists; • Risk of radicalizing other prisoners; • Both the prisoner and their environment require close monitoring to identify any negative influences; • Risk of extremists mingling with criminal networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts are placed among “ordinary” prisoners and fall under the same general regime. This does not mean that offenders are placed in an ordinary unit; placement is based on a risk assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Concentrated/ Placed Together</strong></td>
<td>• All the prisoners on a terrorist wing can be fully monitored by their contacts within the wing; • Limited opportunity to influence other prisoners; • Individual and group work with prisoners on deradicalization/disengagement and other interventions; • Staff on a terrorist wing become experts because they work with radicalized prisoners on a daily basis; only a small group of staff members must be trained; • This approach may reassure the public that real and powerful measures are being taken to safeguard society.</td>
<td>• The terrorist wing can facilitate further radicalization/extremist acts. New bonds between extremist prisoners can be formed and this can increase the risk of plotting attacks when they leave prison; • Lack of contact can cause difficulties when socialising someone after their release; • Perceptions of unfairness could lead to further radicalization of the prisoner, but also of supporters outside the prison; • Such facilities are expensive and need capacity for urgent situations; • Prisoners might feel stigmatized by being in a separate wing, yet</td>
</tr>
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others see it as a sign of raised status or credibility as an extremist. It could therefore lead to greater cohesion within the group.  
- Deradicalization/ disengagement interventions could be hampered; 
- The approach risks establishing a group with great symbolic power.

3. Combination  
Based on a risk assessment, it is decided whether to place a person suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts in a separate or an ordinary regime.  
- Tailor-made approach that fits the risk and needs of the prisoner;  
- After screening and assessment, the detainee can be placed in the most appropriate regime.  
- Both regimes need to be available;  
- Need for robust assessment tools.

4. Individual Separation or Transfer to Another Institution  
This is not part of the RAN P&P but worthy of consideration when appropriate.  
- Housing in a special housing unit for limited amounts of time to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation can be a helpful security tool.  
- But note: its use must be carefully monitored and allow for frequent human contact on a daily basis.  
- Transfer to another facility should be tied to the needs and risk assessment along with consultation from security staff.  
- Does not help inmates in terms of programming and, if not handled in a fair and consistent manner, can be harmful to the institutional mission and give an inappropriate message to staff in terms of working with inmates.

Human Rights Considerations in the Incarceration of Radical and Violent Extremist Offenders

Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

While terrorists usually violate both humanitarian law (their acts are akin to war crimes) and human rights law (e.g. the right to life), they still ought to be treated with respect, based on the laws of the land. In particular, three points need to be kept in mind.

First, preventing and tackling radicalization and violent extremism shall always be based on the rule of law and shall comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalization effort. Failure to comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalization.

Second, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion shall be respected. Prison officers ought to review the lessons they have received in their basic training on international standards. They all apply to radical and violent extremist offenders as well.

Third, it is possible that some extra restrictions may be placed on some radical and violent extremist offenders, based on their behavior, risk assessment, and classification. Therefore, punitive measures, use of force, and means of restraint shall be proportionate to the direct and serious threats of disruption of good order, safety, and security in a given prison in order to preserve, to the extent possible, relations of trust and support in helping the reintegration of offenders.

By treating terrorists and those attracted to terrorism on the basis of more humane standards than terrorists treat their prisoners and adversaries, the good example might, hopefully, rub off – at least to some extent. Treating unkind persons with kindness generally produces better results than treating them likewise or worse.

**Behavioral Factors that may Indicate an Individual is Becoming Radicalized**

Indicators are meant as potential warning signs and should be communicated to intelligence and supervisory staff. If deemed important by supervisory staff, the correctional officer(s) may be asked to look for specific behaviors when interacting with the inmate in question. However, it should be noted that many of the following signs are the same a correctional officer should look for to identify an inmate’s potential vulnerability to escape, violence, mental health issues, and suicide. Thus, normal staff training on these subjects ought to include early warning indicators of terrorism and radicalization as well.

**Indicators of Radicalization in Inmates**

- The individual abruptly abandons friends and family members;
- On those increasingly rare occasions where such inmates do see their family, they berate them for their supposedly impious behavior;
- They stop participating in activities that used to occupy a lot of their time - such as sports or group activities/associations;
- They believe they have found the true path to religious enlightenment and anyone else who does not follow it is of less worth;
- They often exhibit growing hatred and intolerance towards others who do not adhere to their beliefs (these can be of a political, social, cultural, or religious nature);
- In terms of hatred and intolerance of beliefs of a religious nature, this includes rejecting fellow Muslims, Jewish, or Christians of different denominations, as well as religious leaders who repudiate violence;
- They refuse to engage with, or debate, ideas that counter their own;
- They turn their back on their life as it was before radicalization;
- Individual changes in appearance include: beard, clothing, gang signs;
• They develop obsessive patterns of behavior and they look out for martyrdom and the apocalypse;
• They avoid other inmates;
• They speak in admiration of terrorists or terrorist acts;
• They participate with members of terrorist or radical groups;
• They begin physical training such as body building;
• They avoid contact with staff;
• They donate money to groups with radical beliefs or leaders;
• They request transfer to another wing;
• They request special food;
• They increase the number of appeals and legal filings;
• They increase contact with human rights groups and other NGOs.

Indicators of a group of inmates possibly forming an organization (formal or informal):

• The group seeks self-government or control of its members;
• The group starts a joint canteen account (either formally or informally);
• The group establishes strict discipline for its members (regarding talking to staff without permission of the group leaders, assigning punishments for violation of group protocol, etc.);
• The group accepts leadership and direction from outside organizations or individuals;
• The group tries to control the work assignments of their members;
• The group appoints a speaker for the group (individuals are no longer allowed to talk to staff on their own);
• The group organizes classes on ideology, languages, “how to” on skills that could be useful to terrorists;
• The group establishes joint prayer sessions;
• The group attempts to communicate with inmates of other prisons;
• The group begins to contact non-group inmates to increase group appeal, resources, or influence;
• The group increases contact with NGOs, lawyers, legislators, or others.

Again, one should remember that none of these signs are by themselves firm proof of radicalization. They are, however, potential signs and should be considered in conjunction with other behaviors. Nevertheless, from a correction officer’s standpoint, if one is not sure, the best rule is “if you see something, say something.” Correction officers should let the prison intelligence team know and also make sure the staff coming on to the next shift are informed about their observations of suspicious behaviour and reasons for concern.
Special Security\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Personal Safety}

Safety is a top priority for corrections. While at work, staff are taught procedures and approaches that are designed to keep them safe while they manage offenders, including radical and violent extremist offenders. Treating everyone, including offenders, with dignity and respect will go a long way to ensuring everyone will stay safe. Most corrections staff go about life without fear or concern. Most staff will never have any problems. However, the fact remains that some offenders may be threatening or dangerous. They, or their associates, may threaten staff, or may try to get personal information – such as home addresses – for criminal purposes. All staff must be taught, it is not ok for anyone to threaten them. If they are threatened, they must report it to their supervisor – even if they do not believe the person will carry out the threat. Not all staff will want or need to take all the steps listed below. It is about assessing the risk and taking what action is sensible.

Correction guidelines recommend that staff who work directly with offenders keep their information as private as possible as a precautionary measure. What follows will help staff to safeguard their personal information; think about ‘common sense’ security of themselves and their family; and take the right action if threatened.

\textbf{Protecting Personal Information}

- Private information should stay private. Remind staff in training that when they are at work, offenders may be present. They should not discuss anything private about themselves or others if an offender could be listening. If they must discuss something private, close the door;
- Think about written information as well – could an offender see anything in a staff’s private bag or on their computer screen? Lock private files away and lock the computer screen when away from the duty station. Be careful what is put in the rubbish bin;
- Don’t give any information to an offender or member of the public who asks for private details or those of a colleague (things like cell phone number or home address).

Staff should always know who they are talking to on the phone. Officers should check that the person they are talking to really is who they say they are – especially if they are asking for private information about another staff member or offender. For example, if they receive a call from a person claiming to be a police officer, rather than give them the information directly, the staff person should call the police station and ask to be put through to the person who called them.

\textit{Social Media – A Sample Personal Checklist}:

- Do not post anything that shows you work for corrections;

\textsuperscript{14} Much of the text in this section is derived from materials developed by the New Zealand Department of Corrections, however, it is augmented following advice from other services.
Do not post personal information such as date of birth, maiden names, names, and details of children;

Think carefully before accepting friend requests; Use privacy controls on sites like Facebook so that only approved users can view your page. You can usually restrict who can share information and photos you have posted to your page so other users cannot forward your information;

Think carefully before disclosing information on your social media account(s). There is no guarantee of privacy, even with tight security settings. Anything you put on a social media platform can be cut, pasted, and sent simply by taking a screenshot.

Avoid tagging people in photos you have uploaded. Photos are often tagged so that the names of the people in the photo are visible;

Avoid checking in at locations on your social media account(s). When using social networking on smart devices such as iPhones or iPads, users can check in at locations, which simply shows where they are. This information could be used to track down that user by criminals;

Consider the implications of uploading photos to your social media account(s). Photos taken on smart devices are often geo-tagged (geographical data is imprinted into the photo properties which shows where the photo was taken). When these photos are uploaded to social networking sites, this data often remains. If a user has uploaded a photo of their house or vegetable garden, for example, others could potentially use the geo-data embedded in the photo to obtain the user’s home address;

Talk to your family – especially children – about ways to stay safe online.

Security at Work – A Sample Personal Checklist:

Know your colleagues. It is important to ensure that any strangers who gains access to a corrections site can easily be identified;

Beware of “ghosting” – when a person follows behind a staff member and gains access to secure areas by slipping through gates or doors before they close;

On a large site, it is impossible to know everyone, so stay alert and if you see someone unfamiliar check that he/she has a visible and valid ID card. All staff are allowed to challenge an unknown person and ask to see proof that they are allowed to be there – but make sure it’s safe to do so. If you are alone you should call for back-up or find a colleague before you challenge someone.

Security Outside of work – A Sample Personal Checklist:

Tell someone where you are going and when you will be back;

If you are walking at night, stay on brightly lit, well-used streets as much as possible;

If you must take a poorly lit route, walk near the curb or well away from shrubbery, dark doorways and other places allowing concealment. Be alert and avoid ‘short cuts’ through dark alleys or deserted parks;

If taking your car, do not leave anything on view that could associate you with corrections;

Park in well-lit areas and always close your car windows and lock the doors.
Security at Home – A Sample Personal Checklist:

All families should have a safety plan, which specifies what everyone will do in an emergency. This is also good to have in case of a natural disaster, such as an earthquake. Every plan will be unique to the circumstances, but the following are some of the things to include or consider:

- What will each of you do in the event of an emergency?
- How and where will you meet up in the event that home is no longer safe?
- How will you contact each other in cases of an emergency? If you cannot contact someone, who or where will you leave a message?
- What will you need to do for members of the household with a disability or special requirements?
- What needs to be done for pets, domestic animals, or livestock if the home is no longer safe?
- Who will be responsible for collecting children from school if you need to relocate in haste?
- Who could help you or where could you go if you need to relocate in a short amount of time?

Home Security

- Always check who is at the door before opening it – consider having a door chain or security peep-hole installed and never open the door if you are suspicious in any way;
- After dark, close the curtains so people cannot look into the house;
- Check all doors and windows are secure before going to bed, or leaving the house (even if you are only leaving for a few minutes) or going to a different part of the house;
- Keep a strong “courtesy” light by the front and back door on at night – it could be operated by a motion sensor;
- If you go out at night, prepare your return by turning on outside lights. Some inside lights should also be left on;
- Keep track of your house keys and never leave one outside in an obvious place (such as under a mat or in a mailbox);
- Arrange for fixed times for workmen to call – check their identity and never leave them in the house on their own;
- Check parcels/deliveries before accepting them;
- Trim bushes or trees that are close to the house;
- Talk to children and teenagers about staying safe (e.g., how to open the door or answer the phone).

If You See Something You Think is Suspicious:

- Report to police any suspicious vehicle or people loitering near your home. Before you do so, get as much information as possible, such as:
• Description of the individual and what they are doing;
• Description of the car including make, color and registration number;
• If you see something, if you hear something, if you suspect something - say something.

Telephone Security – A Sample Personal Checklist:

• Be wary about giving personal information out on the phone, especially if you do not know the caller. It is better to take a name and number and call back if you are suspicious in any way.
• Make sure children and other family members know how to be careful when answering the phone.
• Anonymous calls and telephone threats are usually intended to lower your morale. Your natural reaction when hearing a hostile voice is one of anger/fear and to cut off the conversation. However, the caller may provide clues to their intentions or specific threats and, if possible, you should try to keep them talking:
  • Try to identify the voice by age, sex, accent, peculiarities, etc.
  • Listen for background noise, which may provide valuable information, e.g., music, machinery, animals, industrial noises, railway station sounds, etc.
  • Write down the details of the call immediately.
• Contact the police without delay.

Institutional Security in and Around Prison

Tower, Gate, Perimeter and Transportation Security Personnel should constantly ask themselves “are people watching the facility or posing a threat to facility personnel?”

• They must watch not only visitors, inmates, and vendors but also others who are outside the facility.
• Surveillance of your facility or activities.
  − If you see more than one unexplained/suspicious sighting: ask yourself if it is a coincidence or a potential problem.
  − If you note three or more unexplained/suspicious sighting: assume hostile surveillance until otherwise explained
• Note especially individuals taking pictures, sketching, or note-taking.

Inmate Work and Recreation Areas (especially if there are suspected radical and/or violent extremist offenders involved):

• Be especially vigilant in searches of individuals, equipment, tools, and products. Follow procedures without variation;
• Follow the tool control protocol rigidly to ensure no tools or work items are taken outside of the prisoners’ work area;
• Be close enough to inmates to observe them and hear conversations, but position yourself to be prepared in case of an unprovoked attack. Remember the motivation of potential radicals and violent extremist inmates. In addition to being a potential danger to staff and other inmates if they are provoked or frightened or upset, some may launch an unprovoked attack as a part of their radical ideology;
• Be aware of signs indicating a possible organized attack. Changes in normal habits or dress may provide clues. Any abnormal behavior by a group of inmates should be assumed to be hostile until proven otherwise. Examples might be inmates wrapping their bodies with newspapers or magazines under their shirts to serve as homemade body armor or inmates who normally wear sandals in the yard switching to wearing shoes for better protection or mobility.

Dynamic Security

The best weapon in the fight against radicalization of prisoners and violent extremist inmates is well trained staff – especially staff using Dynamic Security.15 Dynamic Security is a concept and a working method by which staff prioritize the start and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners, based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security, and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release. This concept should be understood within a broader notion of security which also comprises structural, organizational and static security (walls, barriers, locks, lighting, and equipment used to restrain prisoners if necessary). The concept of Dynamic Security is based on:

- positive relationships, communication, and interaction between the staff and prisoners;
- professionalism;
- collecting relevant information;
- insight into, and improving social climate of, the penal institution;
- firmness and fairness;
- understanding of the personal situation of the prisoner;
- communication, positive relations, and exchange of information among all employees.

Dynamic Security involves knowing what is going on in a prison, in addition to providing a safe and secure background against which the whole range of activity making up the life of a prison takes place. The concept of Dynamic Security has the benefit of engaging prisoners individually and gaining both material and intuitive insights into the operation of the prison. When implemented effectively, Dynamic Security allows prisoners to feel comfortable when approaching prison staff before problems escalate. It is important, therefore, that staff take every opportunity to interact directly with prisoners and avoid retreating behind doors, into corridors or offices and stations unless required to do so.


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Dynamic Security occurs when corrections officers interact and engage with prisoners while regularly walking through the area in which they are posted:

- Talking to prisoners, gaining their trust, and building rapport;
- Checking prisoners’ physical welfare during musters and head checks;
- Maintaining a consistent approach to inappropriate behaviour;
- Encouraging positive behaviour and addressing negative behaviour;
- Engaging in case management process;
- Following up on requests in a timely manner; and
- Remaining calm during incidents.

**Self-Assessment for Staff on the use of Dynamic Security**

- Competence: You’re good at what you do and you have the skills and knowledge that enable you to do your job well;
- Reliability: People can depend on you to show up on time, submit your work when it is due, and follow through on promises;
- Honesty: You tell the truth and are upfront about how things are;
- Integrity: You are known for your principles;
- Respect for others: Treating all people so that they feel that they really matter to you is part of your approach.
- Self-upgrading: Rather than letting your skills or knowledge become outdated, you seek out ways of staying up-to-date;
- Being positive. Having an upbeat attitude and trying to be a problem-solver makes a big difference to you;
- Supporting others: You share the spotlight with colleagues, take time to show others how to do things properly, and lend them an ear when necessary. You do not criticize colleagues in front of inmates;
- Staying work-focused: You do not let your private life needlessly impact on your job, and you do not spend time at work attending to personal matters;
- Listening carefully: People want to be heard, so you give people a chance to explain their thoughts and feelings properly.

Placing the emphasis on the need for prison staff to establish positive relationships with prisoners is key to Dynamic Security. This concept rests on the notion that engaging with prisoners and getting to know them can enable staff to anticipate and better prepare themselves to respond effectively to any incident that may threaten the security of the prison and the safety of staff and prisoners.

**Correctional Officers’ Role in the use of Dynamic Security:**

- Guide and support, not push and demand.
- Let inmates be as independent as security allows.
• Remember inmates are always watching.
• Never be mean, spiteful, or belittle inmates (or fellow staff).
• Show inmates you care about them every day.
• Acknowledge when you make mistakes and apologize.
• Discipline, not punish.
• Look at what the inmate needs, not at what you want them to be.
• Know what the inmates are doing and with whom.
• Connect with the inmates every day.
• Talk and listen.

The nature of relations between staff and prisoners is also key to the concept of Dynamic Security. For example, the way in which prison staff address prisoners, how searches are carried out and their frequency, whether prisoners’ privacy is respected when they are required to remove clothing, whether restraints are used unnecessarily and in a way which is humiliating, whether privacy in toilets and showers is respected, whether prisoners are required to wear specially marked uniforms – these are all ways in which prisoners’ humanity and dignity may or may not be respected. Using disrespectful language, or subjecting prisoners to humiliating routines or practices without any security justification, constitute breaches of their fundamental right to be treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity.

Unit Management

For unit management, a prison is broken down into defined units, each of which may contain a number of prisoner accommodation sections and static posts. Multi-disciplinary teams consist of disciplinary officials, educationalists, social workers, psychologists, religious care workers, and nurses who all deliver services in each defined unit. Individual team members have a responsibility for both security and prisoner development outcomes and are expected to develop constructive relationships with prisoners.

Benefits Associated with Direct Supervision and Unit Management

A member of staff (case officer) is assigned to specific prisoners and serves as the primary contact point between prisoners and the administration. This is done to:

• Increase the quality of relationships between prisoners and staff.
• Better communication and program planning;
• Increase program flexibility;
• Make decisions about prisoners being made more quickly by people on lower levels – those who really know them;
• Conduct more effective observation of prisoner activities resulting in early detection of problems for timely intervention;
• Ensure good quality information is received from, and about, prisoners which can be used to prevent escapes and control problems;
Ensure development of correctional and managerial skills of staff;
Utilize a multidisciplinary team to improve cooperation between staff from various disciplines;
Develop an improved and more coordinated approach to rehabilitation and development programs.

Direct supervision and unit management are inextricably connected. Unit management staff members serve important and dual roles in security and programs. They “walk and talk” to prisoners and familiarize themselves with their personalities and identify their concerns.

**Prison Intelligence = Information + Analysis**

Intelligence within the prison context can be defined as follows:

The prison intelligence function seeks, through objective strategic and operationally driven planned information and data collection, to identify those prisoners, visitors, staff and organizations planning to engage in activity, or who are engaged in an activity that may be a threat to the good order, safety and security of a prison before a negative/harmful/destructive event occurs.

The purpose of intelligence gathering on prisoners while in custody is not for the state to “spy” on them or to infringe on their basic human rights, but to ensure that they do not continue to commit criminal offences while in custody. By developing prison intelligence, the prison administration is endeavoring to make the custodial environment as safe and secure as possible for staff, the prisoners themselves, and ultimately the wider community. Due to the sensitive nature of prison information and intelligence (especially with regard to possible staff corruption), those chosen to work in this area need to have higher credentials in terms of integrity than in some other prison roles. Staff working in intelligence units are therefore sometimes subjected to enhanced security vetting that investigates their background and assesses the risk that they may pose.

It is important to remember that prison intelligence should be part of a broader law enforcement intelligence system. The volume and quality of information exchanged, and the speed with which requests are answered, will be indicative of the level of cooperation. Prison intelligence can also be vital to law enforcement operations outside prison. Similarly, intelligence from outside law enforcement agencies can be very important to understand what is happening in prison.

**The Use of Informants or Human Sources for Gathering Intelligence**

While informants may provide information that may not otherwise be available to prison management, the use of informants in prison is particularly dangerous for the informant and is also open to possible abuse. Informants may have many different motivations. They may, on the one

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hand, be prisoners seeking rewards (financial or early release), or, on the other, hardened criminals seeking to oust their opponents.

**Importance of Prison Staff in Information Collection**

Prison staff should gather information by always being vigilant and by reporting anything out of the ordinary by:

- Overhearing a conversation;
- Watching what prisoners do;
- Observing whom prisoners talk to - patterns of association;
- Looking out for patterns of behaviour and frequent actions;
- Identifying unusual activity or predictors of disruptive behaviour;
- Watching for physical changes (obscured views due to placing of physical objects in the line of sight);
- Observations during searching - hoarding of goods and clothes;
- Unusual requests or incidents.

Reporting should be done with the help of a Security/Intelligence Reporting Form (for a sample, see Appendix I).

**Inmate Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programming for Radical and Violent Extremist Offenders**

Programs to rehabilitate and de-radicalize terrorists are in operation in many countries, including Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US, and Yemen. Such programs vary in terms of methods, support, and funding. For example, some countries (e.g., Egypt, Algeria, Israel) look at terrorists as a group whereas other countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Afghanistan) work with imprisoned terrorists on an individual basis. Another difference between correctional systems is whether to separate violent extremists from other inmates or to integrate them. Israel has separate prisons or wings designated for “security prisoners”. The Netherlands has a “terrorism wing” in its Vught high security prison for a small number of inmates classified as terrorists, whereas the UK and Spain disperse their terrorist prisoners and place them in any of their high security prisons (see for four examples: Appendix II). 

**Final Observations and Conclusions**

While approaches in various countries differ, the program presented here provides a general approach which has gained a following in the prison systems of those countries this author worked

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17 The Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), Kings College, London, UK.
with. New programs and variations of these continue to emerge as new evidence-based findings are published and are positively received.

Based on this author’s experience as well as the research of others, what follows are some generally accepted conclusions:\(^{18}\)

- Prisons matter. Prisons have played an enormous role in the narratives of nearly every extremist and militant movement in recent years. Prisons are “places of vulnerability” in which radicalization can and does take place. Yet - and this should not be forgotten – some prison systems have also served as incubators for rehabilitation and peaceful transformations.
- Much of the current discourse about prisons and radicalization is negative. Yet prisons are not just risky places – they can play a positive role in tackling problems of radicalization and terrorism in society as a whole. Prisons can and should become net contributors to the fight against terrorism.
- Terrorists are not “ordinary” offenders. They often use their time in prison to radicalize other prisoners and mobilize outside support, and – when given the opportunity – will attempt to (re-) establish operational command structures.
- There are no hard and fast rules about whether terrorist prisoners should be concentrated together or separated from the rest of the prison population. Most of the countries practice a policy of dispersal and (partial) concentration, which distributes terrorists among a small number of high security prisons. Even within such mixed regimes, however, it is rarely a good idea to bring together leaders with followers and mix ideologues with hangers-on.
- The “security first” approach of many countries results in missed opportunities to promote reform. Many prison services seem to believe that the imperatives of security and reform are incompatible. In many cases, however, demands for security and reform are more likely to complement rather than contradict each other.
- Dynamic Security is an important and effective tool assisting prison staff to recognize inmates who are vulnerable to radicalization. It can contribute to keep them from becoming violent extremist inmates or from them joining terrorist organizations while still in prison or upon release.

Only with practice and experience will a prison officer gain the ability to be proficient in working with inmates in a respectful and effective way. The ability to spot signs of potential radicalization in an inmate is not easy nor is detecting the relevant cues an exact science. It takes full-time observation, good listening skills, communications with fellow prison staff and, last but not least, consistent adherence to good prison practice.

Gary Hill is the chief executive officer of CEGA Services in Lincoln, Nebraska (USA) and president of Contact Center, Inc., a private, nonprofit, international information and referral clearinghouse working in the areas of human services, criminal justice and illiteracy. Hill has been working in the field of corrections since 1964 and is the recipient of the American Correctional Association’s

highest award. On special assignment to United Nations organizations, he has drafted more than forty training manuals in support of formal training programs for prison workers. Gary is the Staff Training and Development Director of the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) and works with several Institutes of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program. He served on the United Nations Committee of Experts which prepared the update of the United Nations Standards for the Treatment of Offenders (the Mandela Rules) and the development of the standards for female offenders (the Bangkok Rules). For the Best Practices Unit of the United Nations Office of Peacekeeping Operations, Gary reviewed the corrections activities associated with UN Peacekeeping and prepared a “Lessons Learned” document and a Guidebook for use in future missions. He serves as an expert on three Council of Europe projects dealing with prison radicalization. In January 2017 Gary was appointed as one of 18 commissioners of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections.
Appendix I: Sample Security/Intelligence Information Reporting Forms

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Prison:</th>
<th>SIR number/year</th>
<th>Security Classification</th>
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**SECTION 1. Content of report**

(Continue on a separate piece of paper if required)

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**SECTION 2. SIR received in Intelligence Office by:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Signature:</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation (completed by Intelligence Office)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Handling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Completely reliable</td>
<td>1. Report confirmed</td>
<td>1. Dissemination permitted within law enforcement agencies in the country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Usually reliable</td>
<td>1. Probably true report</td>
<td>2. Dissemination permitted to other national agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Not usually reliable</td>
<td>1. Doubtful true report</td>
<td>4. Dissemination within originating agency only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Unreliable</td>
<td>5. Improbable report</td>
<td>5. Permits dissemination, but receiving agency to observe the conditions specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Reliability unknown</td>
<td>6. Truth cannot be judged</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Summary of supporting intelligence and recommendations (completed by intelligence Office)

<table>
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**Previously linked SIRs**

1) ..........
2) ..........
3) ..........
4) ..........

### SECTION 3. Actions set by security/intelligence manager

- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ 24 hours
- ☐ 72 hours

<table>
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<th>Name (Print):</th>
<th>Signature:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time:</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION 4. Head of Intelligence/Security
(to agree or set alternative/additional action)

| Action (s) approved (Tick if approved) |☐ |
| If not approved then write alternative or additional action to be taken. |

Name (Print):  
Signature:  
Date:  
Time:  

### SECTION 5. Prison Director (Officer-in-Charge)
(Final decision or comments)
(Specify if Headquarters was informed and what information was reported.)

Name (Print):  
Signature:  
Date:  
Time:
Appendix II: Sample of Countries with De-Radicalization Programs

Saudi Arabia

A comprehensive counseling/education program is the heart of the Saudi program “designed to combat the intellectual and ideological justification for violent extremism”. The program uses intensive religious debates and psychological counseling. It is based on the belief that those recruited by terrorist groups often have little formal religious education. While they are in prison, they are encouraged to discuss and debate Islamic law with sheiks and scholars. This type of religious counseling seeks to correct the detainees’ interpretation of Islam through open dialogue.\(^{20}\)

While the program begins in prison, it continues at the Care Rehabilitation Center, located in a former resort, just outside the capital city of Riyadh. A stay at the Center lasts up to six months and the prisoners participate in a wide variety of activities from Qu’ranic studies to art therapy. There is a swimming pool on the grounds and there are also opportunities for other recreational activities. The correctional staff do not wear uniforms and inmates have 24-hour access to telephones. After leaving the Care Rehabilitation Center, the Saudi government monitors the progress of the inmates and offers support. Christopher Boucek wrote in a study for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noting that “once an individual satisfactorily renounced his previous beliefs, assistance is provided in locating a job, and receiving other benefits, including additional government stipends, a car, and an apartment. Success of the program . . . is based in part on the recognition that being a radical is not inherently a bad thing. Acting on radical beliefs with violence, however, is, and that it is the behavior that needs to be modified.”\(^{21}\)

The Saudi government initially claimed de-radicalization success rates of 80%. However, there were also many failures. One case that made the news was Mohamed al-Awfi who, after six years of detention in Guantanamo Bay by the US, was released to Saudi Arabia, and entered the Center’s program, taking classes in anger management, Islamic law, history and art therapy. Awfi claimed that he was tortured and mistreated during his time in Guantanamo. Shortly after his release from the Center, Awfi decided to take revenge on the United States and fled to Yemen. Saudi officials visited Awfi’s family and instead of threatening them, the officials told the family that they did not hate Awfi, only his behavior and though he made a mistake by running to Yemen, if he came back he would receive help. The family began to call Awfi in Yemen and not long after Awfi turned himself in. The Saudi’s “soft” approach to the rehabilitation of terrorists has been copied by other countries, but few have equaled the Saudi’s in terms of investment of time, manpower and money.


Egypt

Unlike the Saudi program that was initiated by the government after 9/11, Egypt’s program of terrorist rehabilitation began already in May 1997. At that time, the leadership of a-Gama’a al-Islamiya\(^{22}\) took the initiative to denounce the use of violence in jihad (except for self-defense). In November 2007, al-Jihad al-Islamiya\(^{23}\) adopted the de-radicalization model established by a-Gama’a al-Islamiya. Although the Egyptian security authorities were initially skeptical and hesitant to support the inmate-initiated program, they later came to accept and support it. The leadership of a-Gama’a al-Islamiya, after consulting with Islamic scholars from Al-Azhar University, released 25 volumes of revisions to their initial doctrines, entitled \textit{Tashih al-Mafahim} [Corrections of Concepts]. The revisions included the recognition that Islam does not permit killing or terrorizing non-Muslim civilians and discussed the dangers that Al-Qaeda poses to Muslims worldwide.\(^{24}\)

Iraq

The Munasaha\(^{25}\) program began on 9 March 2011, with the aim to rehabilitate prisoners in Anbar and Baghdad. Much like the Saudi program, it was designed to educate inmates about the damage terrorism caused to Iraqi society and was meant to make them realize that terrorism violates the law and is considered a sin by all religions. Previously, Task Force 134, the US unit charged with overseeing coalition detainee operations in Iraq, utilized an approach of segregating extremists, nurturing moderates and ensuring good care and custody for each detainee. Beginning with a classification process\(^{26}\) to separate recruiters\(^{27}\) from other inmates, the program included religious discussions conducted by US-vetted Iraqi imams, basic literacy education, and work programs. According to US authorities, the education component was particularly effective.\(^{28}\)

Singapore

With 16% of its prison inmates being Muslims, Singapore established the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) to de-radicalize jihadi terrorists.\(^{29}\) Nearly 40 Islamic scholars and religious leaders make up a group dedicated to “deprogramming” detainees. By approaching the jihadists on religious terms, the RRG seeks to treat the problem at its root. As one security officer explained, “once you take an oath to God, it will take another man of God to undo it.”\(^{30}\) Singapore is also

\(^{22}\) One of the largest and most violent extremist Islamic movements in Egypt.

\(^{23}\) The second most important Egyptian Islamist Jihadi movement, whose former leader was Ayman al-Zawahiri, since 2011 leader of Al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden was killed by US Special Forces.

\(^{24}\) Available at: https://islamonline.net/; 9 July 2007.

\(^{25}\) \textit{Munasaha} [Advisory Committee] is also the name of the Saudi terrorist de-radicalization initiative, established in 2004.

\(^{26}\) The classification involves background check, psychological evaluation, analysis of education, skills, motivation and religiosity.

\(^{27}\) Recruiters are inmates who seek to radicalize other prisoners.


\(^{29}\) In 2001-02, more than 30 members of the Southeast Asian branch of \textit{Jemaah Islamiyah} [Islamic Community] were arrested for plotting attacks on diplomatic missions in Singapore.


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home to the Behavioural Sciences Unit’s (BSU), Home Team Academy, which conducts research into terrorism and develops programs to counter violent extremism. The BSU, in addition to its own research, holds conferences and publishes books, newsletters, and practical guides for academics and practitioners.

31 Training Institute, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, for the Singapore Police, Civil Defense Force, Central Narcotics Bureau, Prisons Service, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority and the Internal Security Department.
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Davis, Gareth and Steph Cockroft, ‘Europe’s jails are ‘breeding grounds’ for jihadists because ISIS see criminals as ideal recruits and one in five UK maximum security prisoners are already Muslims,’ Daily Mail Online, 12 October 2016. Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3833926/Europe-s-jails-breeding-grounds-jihadists-ISIS-criminals-ideal-recruits-one-five-UK-maximum-security-prisoners-Muslim.html.


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Web Resources

Confederation of European Probation (CEP)
   https://www.cep-probation.org/knowledgebases/radicalisation/
   Works with probation agencies in raising awareness of radicalization by organizing meetings and events
EUROPRIS - https://www.europris.org/
   European organization of prison and correctional services. Provides information exchange, research, publications, workshops and expert groups
INTEGRA - http://www.integra-project.org/
   Radicalization prevention approach for community corrections, probation and prison services.
International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) - https://icpa.org/home/
   International corrections association promoting professional and humane corrections. Has publications, working groups, training, research, and conferences.
R2Pris - http://www.r2pris.org/
   Radicalization prevention in prisons. Site includes online training and radicalization risk assessment tools.
Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN)
   European Union project. Website has videos, publications, references and links to useful organizations.
RAND Corporation National Security and Terrorism
   Conducts, inter alia, research for U.S. Department of Defense and allied ministries of defense.
R4JUST – https://www.r4just.org/
   Radicalization prevention competencies’ development program for justice professionals