

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trafficking, Smuggling, and Use for Criminality by Terrorists and Insurgents: A Brief Historical Overview



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Introduction

This report provides a brief historical overview of small arms and light weapons (SALW) trafficking, smuggling, and use for criminality by terrorists and insurgents. It is the fourth report in the series, with the first three reports offering a snapshot of this phenomenon across different regions. The first report focused on SALW in the Middle East and North Africa;¹ the second analysed SALW in South and Southeast Asia;² and the third examined SALW in West Africa and the Horn of Africa.³

A watershed moment in SALW possession and acquisition by terrorist organisations occurred at the end of the Cold War, when many developing nations—accustomed to the largesse from their superpower patrons—were attenuated. The destabilisation that followed was due in part to terrorist and insurgent groups who previously received external funding, but now felt compelled to turn to small-scale acts of criminal violence and banditry in order to survive. With this came a proliferation of cheap weapons that flooded the global arms market, making it easier for criminals to perpetrate consistent acts of violence.⁴ Soviet stockpiles were sold on the black market and weapons caches were looted, mostly peddled by those with connections to the Soviet military. This included Viktor Bout, the elusive Tajik arms dealer who supplied weapons to insurgents in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia in the 1990s and 2000s.⁵

At the same time, the end of superpower subsidies to insurgents forced non-state actors to resort to crime and illicit activities in order to obtain resources and finance their organisations. This was enabled by the new influx of readily accessible SALW. AK-47s and other SALW were relatively inexpensive because they were being sold illicitly, by arms traffickers that needed quick cash and had to unload their products quickly. The withdrawal of superpower sponsorship also degraded the ideological coherence of many movements.⁶ In conflicts in places like West Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus—where at times, violence bordered on anomie—the groups operating on the ground more closely resembled a hybrid of terrorist and criminal.⁷ In practice, this meant that groups sought SALW to both help them commit murder, robbery, and extortion, but also,

¹ See: Méryl Demuyck, Tanya Mehra LL.M, Reinier Bergema, *ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in the Middle East and North Africa*. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). May 2020, <https://icct.nl/publication/icct-situation-report-the-use-of-small-arms-light-weapons-by-terrorist-organisations-as-a-source-of-finance-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/>

² See: Méryl Demuyck, Tanya Mehra LL.M, Reinier Bergema, *ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in South and Southeast Asia*. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). May 2020, <https://icct.nl/publication/icct-situation-report-the-use-of-small-arms-light-weapons-by-terrorist-organisations-as-a-source-of-finance-in-south-and-southeast-asia/>

³ See: Méryl Demuyck, Tanya Mehra LL.M, Reinier Bergema, *ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in West Africa and the Horn of Africa*. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). July 2020, <https://icct.nl/publication/icct-situation-report-the-use-of-small-arms-light-weapons-by-terrorist-organisations-as-a-source-of-finance-in-west-africa-and-the-horn-of-africa/>

⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, Issue 3, August 2010, pp.414-429.

⁵ Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, “Merchant of Death,” *Foreign Policy*, Iss.157, Nov/Dec 2006, pp.53-61.

⁶ Colin Clarke, *Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*, RAND Corporation, 2015

⁷ Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” *Global Crime*, Vol.6, No.1, February 2004, pp.129-145.

in some cases, to smuggle and traffic to fund other aspects of their respective organisations.

Following the cessation of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union, weaponry flooded the global arms market at an unprecedented scale. A range of SALW, including AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and even mines were purchased and sold illicitly.⁸ In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Eastern Bloc countries flooded the market with leftover stockpiles of small arms and ammunition. And, as globalisation accelerated, open air arms and weapons bazaars became more accessible to external actors.⁹ These weapons bazaars sold a combination of artisanal weaponry as well as weaponry from older stockpiles and looted from depots and warehouses. For example, the Bakara Market in Mogadishu, Somalia has been one of the world's busiest bazaars for the exchange in arms, weapons, and ammunition for more than two decades.¹⁰ In a nation where conflict has raged unabated, "the abundance of readily available modern weaponry exacerbated the violence".¹¹ As discussed in the Situation Report on the Horn of Africa, SALW were also diverted by terrorist organisations following attacks on both national armies and peacekeeping missions.¹²

Other cities' reputations for a source of SALW date back even further and include Bangkok, Thailand and Peshawar, Pakistan, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s.¹³ As referenced in the ICCT Situation Report on South and Southeast Asia, in Darra Adam Khel in Pakistan, 20,000 weapons are produced annually, including approximately one hundred AK-47s per day, which cost less than \$150 apiece.¹⁴ Violent non-state actors sought out failed states and ungoverned spaces where they could establish training camps and build up their arsenals, as evidenced by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.¹⁵ Other regions of the world are primary conduits for weapons trafficking and smuggling, although the illicit trade is dominated primarily by violent drug cartels and narco-gangs, with terrorists playing a secondary role. In Central America's Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—there is still a wide availability of weapons and firearms leftover from the contemporary history of the region's wars.¹⁶

⁸ Jay S. Albanese, *Transnational Crime and the 21st Century: Criminal Enterprise, Corruption, and Opportunity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 27–28.

⁹ John M. Martin and Anne T. Romano, *Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drug & Arms Trafficking*, Los Angeles: Sage, 1992, pp. 67–68.

¹⁰ Colin P. Clarke, "The Financing of Terrorism and Insurgency through Drug Trafficking," in Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa, eds., *Transnational Crime and Global Security, Volume Two: Security Implications of Transnational Crime*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Praeger Security International, 2018, p.151.

¹¹ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andrea J. Dew. *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, p.74.

¹² Meryl Demuynck, Tanya Mehra, and Reinier Bergema, "ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in West Africa and the Horn of Africa," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, June 2020. <https://icct.nl/publication/icct-situation-report-the-use-of-small-arms-light-weapons-by-terrorist-organisations-as-a-source-of-finance-in-west-africa-and-the-horn-of-africa/>

¹³ Colin P. Clarke, "Organized Crime and Trafficking: Mapping Out the Threats and Actors to Find Solutions," in Michel Gueldry et al., *Understanding New Security Threats*, London: Routledge, 2019, p.147. See also, Meryl Demuynck, Tanya Mehra, and Reinier Bergema, "ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in South and Southeast Asia," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, June 2020.

¹⁴ Kimberly L. Thachuk, "The Haqqani Network: Gangster Jihadists," in Kimberly L. Thachuk and Rollie Lal, eds., *Terrorist Criminal Enterprises: Financing Terrorism Through Organized Crime*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO/Praeger Security International, 2018, p.125.

¹⁵ Angel Rabasa et al., *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2007.

¹⁶ "Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge," World Bank Sustainable Development Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, 2011, pp.11-21.

Throughout the civil wars that ravaged West Africa in the 1990s, international arms traffickers from South Africa, Israel, and the former Soviet Union made connections with warlords, diamond merchants, and mercenaries. As a result of ineffective arms embargoes and regulations—combined with overlapping civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone—a significant percentage of the population in this region has been heavily armed. As discussed in the situation report covering West Africa, the region remains awash with weaponry and a number of groups have exploited the high availability of SALW, including the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Jama'at nusrat al-islam wal-muslimin (JNIM). The illicit economy in Angola was built around criminal networks that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Many of these networks were attached to both the formal and informal economy and as such, were both willing and able to facilitate the diamonds-cash-weapons trade with mercenaries that helped prolong the conflict and lead to both crime and violence.¹⁸ In what could be considered a useful example of indirect financing, insurgents acquired hard currency in exchange for diamonds and this currency was exchanged for weaponry, while middlemen established accounts at banks in Switzerland, Portugal, South Africa, Morocco, Ivory Coast, and the Channel Islands and regional states served as suppliers, transit points, and service providers.¹⁹ Eastern bloc countries, especially Ukraine and Bulgaria, supplied weapons and munitions for the insurgents, including significant number of 155-m G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns, medium and long-range D-130 guns, and MB-21 Multiple Rocket Launchers.²⁰

Meanwhile, the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and emerging conflicts drove demand on the global arms market. Reverting to its role as a clearinghouse for trafficked weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Balkans once again became a crossroads for smuggled weaponry, including assault rifles, machineguns, small-arms rounds, antitank weapons, antitank rounds, mortar rounds, grenades, landmines, and an array of equipment, from boots to medical supplies and flak jackets.²¹ In an effort to meet demand, old arms smuggling networks were resuscitated.²² Weapons and ammunition were smuggled into the region using both traditional means, such as tunnels, and more ingenious methods, including empty metal cylinders of oxygen and in false bottoms of humanitarian aid containers.²³ The Caucasus was another region awash with small arms after the collapse of the Soviet Union and larger and more capable weapons systems were later made available for purchase.²⁴

¹⁷ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Chad C. Serena, *Mexico is not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations*, Supporting Case Studies, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 167-182

¹⁸ Ian S. Spears, *Civil War in African States: The Search for Security*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010, p.219.

¹⁹ Jakkie Potgieter, "'Taking Aid from the Devil Himself': UNITA's Support Structures," in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000, p.264.

²⁰ Assis Malaquias, "UNITA's Insurgency Life Cycle in Angola," in Klejda Mulaj, ed., *Violent Nonstate Actors in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.315.

²¹ Alissa J. Rubin, "U.S. Patrols Smuggling Routes to Macedonia: Balkans: American peacekeepers in Kosovo intercept weapons on way to rebels," *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 2001.

²² Esther Bacon, "Balkan Trafficking in Historical Perspective," in Kimberley L. Thachuk, *Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 80.

²³ Peter Andreas, *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 54–55.

²⁴ Kenneth Yalowitz and Svante E. Cornell. "The Critical and Perilous Caucasus." *Orbis* 48, number 1 (Winter 2004): 105-116, 107.

SALW as Both a Source of Terrorist Financing and Tools of the Trade

In order to understand how SALW served as a source of terrorist financing, not only in terms of trafficking but also with respect to armed robberies, extortion, and other revenue-generating activities, it is critical to comprehensively examine not only terrorist and insurgent groups themselves, but also their operating environments. According to Moses Naim, of the roughly 80 million AK-47s in circulation today, most reside in the arsenals of terrorists, criminals, and insurgent groups. Naim cites a United Nations statistic that only 18 million (or about 3 percent) of the 550 million small arms and light weapons in circulation today are used by government, military, or police forces. Illicit trade accounts for almost 20 percent of the total small arms trade and generates more than \$1 billion a year.²⁵ Some have suggested it could be two or three times that amount, estimated at between \$2 and \$3 billion annually.²⁶ Weak states simultaneously serve as the source, transition, and destination countries for the illegal arms trade.²⁷

Historical Vignettes

Provisional Irish Republican Army

Throughout the conflict in Northern Ireland, which lasted from 1969 to 1998, both licit and illicit goods were smuggled along transportation and distribution networks that doubled as arms smuggling routes. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA's) smuggling operations were global in scale, extending from Europe to Asia and everywhere in between.²⁸ Identifying new sources of weaponry, acquiring SALW, and amassing stockpiles remained a top priority of the PIRA throughout the nearly three-decade conflict. At various points, the British security services, occasionally working in concert with police forces in the Republic of Ireland (known as the *Gardaí*) intercepted large weapons shipments and successfully executed several high-profile arms recovery operations, yielding substantial amounts of weaponry, including a weapons shipment of more than 100 tonnes from Libya in 1987.²⁹ Despite setbacks, however, the PIRA always remained active. The insurgents maintained at least five bomb-making factories in the Republic at all times. Most of these facilities were extremely secure and could be used to hide large caches of weapons—some were constructed as fortified bunkers.³⁰

The group acquired high-tech weaponry including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and SAM launchers, Russian-made rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, machine guns, assault and sniper rifles, and Barrett Light-50 calibre heavy machine guns.³¹ The group also developed its own take on already-existing weapons, including the improvised

²⁵ Moises Naim, "Five Wars of Globalization," *Foreign Policy*, November 3, 2009.

²⁶ Timothy Gildea and Glenn Pierce, "Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking: Creating an Assessment Framework from the U.S. Experience," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol.14, No.1, March 2007.

²⁷ Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:2, Spring 2006, p. 37.

²⁸ James Dingley, *The IRA: The Irish Republican Army*, Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2012, p. 196.

²⁹ Colin P. Clarke, "Countering PIRA Financing and Combating the Ability of Insurgents to Raise Funds through Crime in Northern Ireland During 'The Troubles,'" in Lawrence E. Cline and Paul Shemella, eds., *The Future of Counterinsurgency: Contemporary Debates in Internal Security Strategy*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO/Praeger Security International, 2015.

³⁰ John Horgan and Max Taylor, "Playing the 'Green Card'—Financing the Provisional IRA, Part 1," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.11, Iss.2, 1999, p. 5.

³¹ Horgan and Taylor, " 'Green Card'—Part 1," p. 4.

projected grenade (IPG) and the projected recoilless improvised grenade (PRIG).³² The insurgents stockpiled weapons, hoarded explosives, and relentlessly searched for ways to acquire the most modern and lethal technology. If the PIRA did engage in arms trafficking for profit, the cases were limited, since there are few documented sources of this occurring. For the majority of the ‘The Troubles’, the PIRA was concerned with acquiring enough weapons to effectively wage an insurgency and so was rarely in the position to traffic arms to other groups. The PIRA focused primarily on acquiring, and when they weren’t being used, transporting and storing weapons in safe houses to avoid having them confiscated by the authorities.³³

In many ways, the reliance on SALW was functional. Certain active service units (ASUs) specialised specifically in armed robbery and the funds were used to reinforce the group’s overall operating budget. In addition to stealing cars and antiques, the PIRA focused on banks, post offices, and building societies, as robbery remained “one of the PIRA’s main ‘outwardly’ sources of funding, if not the single main source” during various periods of the group’s existence.³⁴ Armed robberies provided a consistent flow of money to the insurgents, especially in the 1980s. In 1983, 359 robberies brought in approximately \$6 million; the following year, there were 622 armed robberies in Northern Ireland where an estimated \$1.2 million was pilfered.³⁵

The PIRA maintained a well-balanced and robust funding portfolio that included diaspora support, charities, various types of fraud, money earned from legal businesses, and money laundering. To generate the income necessary to operate the organisation on a day-to-day basis, the group engaged in a wide array of illegal activities, including kidnapping for ransom (KFR), armed robbery, smuggling, extortion and protection, and external state support. Less lucrative, but still valuable activities included film piracy (including pornography) and automobile theft.³⁶ From the late-1960s until the mid-1980s, financial support from the United States flowed largely unabated, with the Irish-American diaspora and numerous charities, chief among them the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAI), playing an indispensable role.³⁷ The FBI and British intelligence estimated that NORAI declared only approximately one-quarter to one-fifth of the funds it raised. Undeclared funds were siphoned off to purchase arms or covertly sent to Dublin and Belfast. As previously mentioned, although weapons were used to help support other illicit activities such as extortion and armed robberies, in and of itself, SALW trafficking was not a primary revenue source for the PIRA.

After the cessation of violence, most of the PIRA’s weaponry was decommissioned—although it is widely believed that dissident groups still maintain access to arms from the conflict.³⁸ Indeed, even after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was signed, formally ending the conflict, several high-profile PIRA members were arrested in Colombia, where they were allegedly providing weapons training to members of the Revolutionary Armed

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³² Brian Jackson et al., *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2005, p. 107.

³³ Paul Gill et al., “Lethal Connections: The Determinants of Network Connections in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1970-1998,” *International Interactions*, Vol.40, No.1, 2014, p.58.

³⁴ Horgan and Taylor, “‘Green Card’—Part 1,” p. 13.

³⁵ James Adams, *The Financing of Terror: How the Groups That Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It*, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1986, p. 179.

³⁶ Colin Clarke, *Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*, RAND Corporation, 2015

³⁷ According to Adams, although sources of financial support from the Irish-American diaspora once accounted for over half of the PIRA’s budget in the early 1970s, by the mid-1980s these funds comprised no more than £135,000 (\$200,000). Adams, *The Financing of Terror*, p. 136.

³⁸ Allison Morris, “Seized Arms Were Stolen From Provos by Dissidents,” *Irish Times*, December 2, 2015.

Forces of Colombia (FARC). By training FARC insurgents, the PIRA members would be paid, presumably with profits from the FARC's narcotics trafficking revenues. In addition, travelling to Colombia also offered the opportunity to experiment with new weaponry—in case the Good Friday Agreement collapsed and the PIRA went back to war.³⁹

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were an ethno-nationalist organisation advocating for an independent Tamil homeland. Over time, the LTTE grew into one of the most capable terrorist groups ever known and diversified its funding portfolio by establishing a global network of illicit revenue streams, including the smuggling and trafficking of SALW. The LTTE developed contacts abroad, and soon engaged in procurement activities in Northeastern and Southeastern Asia (especially China, North Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Burma), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), former Soviet Republics (primarily Ukraine), Southeast Europe and the Balkans (Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus), the Middle East (Turkey, Lebanon), and Africa (Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and South Africa).⁴⁰ The South African connection proved particularly fruitful for the Tigers. Situated between the active arms markets of Mozambique and Angola, weapons dealers in South Africa provided the LTTE with consistent access to a steady supply of small arms. From the post-Cold War arms bazaars in Beirut and Peshawar, and especially those in Cambodia, Burma, and Afghanistan, the insurgents acquired rapid-fire pistols, assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and surface-to-air missiles. Ammunition needs were met through intermediaries in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and North Korea, which supplied mortar, artillery, and 12.7 mm machine gun rounds.⁴¹ Occasionally, the LTTE would raid Sri Lankan military bases and pilfer all available weapons. Some raids proved extremely bountiful, with insurgents able to acquire multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs), T69-1 RPG launchers, artillery batteries (122mm, 130 mm, 152mm), various mortars (120 mm, 106mm, 81mm, and 60mm) and an array of anti-armour and anti-aircraft systems, to include W-85 anti-aircraft guns.⁴² The group was able to consistently procure explosives from suppliers in the Ukraine and Croatia.⁴³

The LTTE's global arms procurement network was assessed to be the "most secretive" of the group's numerous global operations.⁴⁴ Front companies could help mask illicit shipments of weapons and explosives. Deals were brokered through an LTTE front company known as Carlton Trading, which was based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and facilitated through the use of false end-user certificates.⁴⁵ Other front companies were set up in Chittagong, Yangon, and Kuala Lumpur.⁴⁶ LTTE insurgents became experts in the illicit movement of people, arms, and equipment, all of which requires specialised skills and access, including access to (or the ability to produce) fraudulent international documents, including visas, passports, end-user certificates, business regulations,

³⁹ Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, "The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe," Library of Congress Federal Research Division, December 2002, p.6.

⁴⁰ Cecile Van de Voorde, "Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Police Practice and Research*, Volume 6, Issue 2, 2005, pp.181-199.

⁴¹ Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp, 2001, "Appendix B: The LTTE's Military-Related Procurement," p. 120.

⁴² IHS Jane's World Terrorism and Insurgency, "Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam."

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Byman, *Outside Support*, "Appendix B: The LTTE's Military-Related Procurement," p. 117.

⁴⁵ Peter Chalk, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Insurgency in Sri Lanka," in Rajat Ganguly and Ian MacDuff, *Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia*, London: Sage, 2003.p. 144.

⁴⁶ Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War & Reconciliation*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005, p.33.

shipping licenses, and so on.⁴⁷ In addition to the arms and equipment listed above, the LTTE's arsenal also included Russian-made Strela-3 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

Guns and other firearms were also critical to LTTE criminal activities such as armed robbery, piracy, extortion, and protection. Its initial designs were modest. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Tamil groups embarked on a bank robbing spree in Jaffna.⁴⁸ Armed robbery of banks was employed by the Tigers early in their tenure, but as the group's capabilities matured, its members would go on to engage in a range of more remunerative criminal acts. As the organisation developed its maritime capabilities, it was able to take advantage of robbing ships and vessels on the high seas. To be sure, piracy and maritime crimes were a lucrative form of armed robbery for the LTTE.⁴⁹ LTTE fighters assumed some mafia-like functions including providing armed protection. Its members were paid to protect from theft and armed robbery—militants were compensating for “riding shotgun” and providing the “muscle” for international drug shipments.⁵⁰ Extortion often involved coercion, with direct threats of implied violence to those who failed to ‘donate’ to the Tigers’ war chest.⁵¹ The majority of the LTTE's involvement with arms was for procurement, however, the group's maritime wing allegedly served as an intermediary between insurgent groups and transported arms to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on behalf of Harakat-al Mujahideen, a Pakistani militant group linked to al-Qaeda.⁵² Though the LTTE grew wary of associating with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliated groups following the attacks of September 11th, the LTTE continued to train divisional commanders of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M).⁵³

The LTTE's efforts to procure weapons and establish a global arms network brought it in contact with several other insurgent and terrorist groups. In addition to Khalistan-oriented Sikh insurgents, Kashmiri *mujahedin*, and Middle Eastern militants, the Tigers forged links with over 20 separate Tamil Nadu separatist groups.⁵⁴ Technological exchange occurred with Indian insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War, also known as the Andhara Peoples War Group, or PWG.⁵⁵ Other insurgent groups known to commiserate with the LTTE at various times during its existence include the FARC, the

⁴⁷ John Rollins and Liana Sun-Wyler, “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), October 19, 2012, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Janine Lilja, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 2009, p. 313.

⁴⁹ Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict and Instability,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aal, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 97–112.

⁵⁰ Steven Hutchinson and Pat O'Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking Some on the Links Between Terrorism and Criminality,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 12, p. 1104.

⁵¹ Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability*, United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC SSI, 2012, p.50.

⁵² Gordon Weiss, *The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers*, London: Bodley Head, 2011, p. 88.

⁵³ IHS Jane's World Terrorism and Insurgency, “Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam.”

⁵⁴ These groups include The Tamil National Retrieval Force, People's War Group, Liberation Cuckoos, Peasants and People Party, MGF Anna Dravida Munethra Kalaham of Thirunavakararu, Tamil National Movement of Nedumaran, Indian People's Party, Center for the Campaign of Tamil Education, Thaliai Nagar Tamil Society, Movement of the Educated Front, Tamil Nadu People's Movement, Thileepan Society, People's Education Center, Tamil Nadu Socialist Party, Republic Party of India, People's Democratic Youth Front, Liberation Organization of the Oppressed People, World People's Progressive Front, Human Rights Organization, Organization for Social History, and the Marxist Periyar Socialist Party. Van de Voorde, “Sri Lankan Terrorism,” p. 192.

⁵⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” AABC for International Studies, December 2, 1998.

African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), MILF, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in Afghanistan, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).⁵⁶

LTTE members engaged in almost every form of organised crime possible, from drug trafficking to extortion and arms smuggling. The LTTE's vast criminal enterprise also enabled weapons procurement by putting the group's members in touch with a wide range of nefarious individuals, including arms dealers, weapons brokers, and intermediaries. According to Peter Chalk, the Tigers acquired US Stinger-class missiles from the PKK in 1996 and used these weapons to shoot down a Sri Lankan civilian Lion Air jet in 1998.⁵⁷ Several years earlier, in April 1995, the LTTE shot down two Avro transport aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air Force, killing everyone on board. This was the first known use of missiles by the insurgents and observers argue that the introduction of missiles changed the dynamics of the conflict from that point forward.⁵⁸ Money donated from abroad or earned through legally owned Tamil businesses was used for more than just purchasing arms. Through its vast financial architecture, the LTTE was able to pay for the exorbitant legal fees of the group and its members.⁵⁹

Some estimates suggest that there are at least 2.3 million small arms in Sri Lanka, of which the vast majority (approximately 1.9 million) are illegal weapons owned by civilians.⁶⁰ Even though the conflict was officially terminated in 2009, a series of raids following the Easter 2019 attack in Sri Lanka by National Tawheed Jamaath (NTJ) is evidence that SALW are still easy to acquire, and demonstrates the legacy of civil wars often last far beyond their actual end.⁶¹ Longstanding arms smuggling networks stretching from Sri Lanka to India are still in place and continue to facilitate the flow of weapons back and forth between these two countries. Moreover, because the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-LTTE fighters was handled in such a haphazard manner by the Sri Lankan government, with international observers banned from entering the conflict zone, it remains unknown to what extent weapons were ever put beyond use.⁶²

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) launched its insurgency in 1963 and this on-again, off-again fight against the government of Colombia continues to the present day. FARC has relied on SALW to engage in a range of criminal activities, including kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail of multinational, national, and local commercial activities.⁶³ FARC's ability to acquire SALW received a major boost between 1999-2002

⁵⁶ Manoj Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1996, p.33.

⁵⁷ Peter Chalk, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Insurgency in Sri Lanka," in Rajat Ganguly and Ian MacDuff, *Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia*, London: Sage, 2003, p. 144.

⁵⁸ Manoj Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1996, p. 37.

⁵⁹ Colin Clarke, *Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*, RAND Corporation, 2015, pp

⁶⁰ Yolanda Foster and Hashitha Abeywardana, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Challenges in Sri Lanka and Options for the Future," May 2006,

<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/25825/Sri%20Lanka%20SALW%20report.pdf>

⁶¹ Amarnath Amarasingam, "Terrorism on the Teardrop Island: Understanding the Easter 2019 Attacks in Sri Lanka," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol.12, Issue 5, May/June 2019.

⁶² Angel Rabasa, *From Insurgency to Stability, Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2011, p.65

⁶³ Marc Chernick, "Economic Resources and Internal Armed Conflicts: Lessons from the Colombian Case," in Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman, *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need,*

when, in an effort to demonstrate to the insurgents that the Colombian government was serious about ending the conflict through negotiations, the FARC was granted near complete autonomy to operate in the demilitarised zone (“*zona de despeje*”) which consisted of five municipalities in Meta and Caqueta departments.⁶⁴ This zone spanned 16,266 square miles—approximately the size of Switzerland.⁶⁵ FARC insurgents were able to use this zone to grow their influence, cultivate illegal narcotics, and establish sophisticated training bases.⁶⁶ This also accelerated FARC’s transformation from an ideologically-driven insurgent group to a criminal organisation fuelled by profits.⁶⁷ SALW are instrumental to how the group operates since it functions as part-terrorist group and part-narcotics trafficking organisation.⁶⁸ There was less of an incentive for FARC to engage in arms trafficking for a revenue stream since the group made so much money from narcotics.

The FARC’s arsenal includes an impressive array of SALW: Russian AK-47 rifles, Hungarian AKM, former East German MPIKM, the Swiss FAL rifle, American semi-automatic Ruger Mini-14 and COLT AR-15, M-16, and Match Target rifles.⁶⁹ In Colombia stockpiles of small arms stockpiles contributed directly to the destabilisation of the country in the 1990s as drug cartels and terrorist groups challenged the state. Post-Cold War arms stockpiles, demilitarised zones during the late 1990s/early 2000s, and state interference, have all contributed to the influx of arms into Colombia.⁷⁰

FARC also collaborated with other insurgent groups including ETA and the Provisional IRA. After the Colombian government forced the insurgents to switch from mobile warfare back to guerrilla tactics, FARC sought the expertise of over two dozen training teams comprised of PIRA insurgents.⁷¹ PIRA trainers worked with FARC on building more effective mortars, operating in urban terrain, and constructing improvised explosive devices.⁷²

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Creed, and Greed, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005, p.180. For more on how group goals, the political environment, and membership influence the types of criminal activities a given armed group undertakes, see Bilal Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol.32, Iss.6, 2009, pp.455-475.

⁶⁴ Michael J. LaRosa and German R. Mejia, *Colombia: A Concise Contemporary History*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, p.92. See also, Peter DeShazo et al., “Back from the Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007,” A Report of the Americas Program for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 2007, p.8.

⁶⁵ Harvey F. Kline, “Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking, and Carving Up the State,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2003, p.173.

⁶⁶ The FARC controlled many of the areas where coca was cultivated, including the zones of Guaviare, Caqueta and Putumayo, in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

⁶⁷ See Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24:2, 2012, p.250. One of the most comprehensive analyses of how FARC’s motivation has been affected by the group’s involvement in the drug trade can be found in James J. Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia; The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*, New York: Pluto Press, 2010, pp.89-114.

⁶⁸ Nazih Richani, “Fragmentation of Sovereignty and Violent Non-State Actors in Colombia,” in Klejda Mulaj, ed., *Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.37.

⁶⁹ Sandro Calvani and Stefan Liller, “Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), December 2006, p.26, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf

⁷⁰ Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, *Arms Trafficking and Colombia*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2003, pp.10-11.

⁷¹ Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002-2006) vs. FARC,” *Military Review*, March/April 2007, p.52.

⁷² Kim Cragin et al., *Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2007, pp.83-86.

In Colombia, there has been a formal, United Nations-led disarmament program that has contributed to a significant reduction in weaponry in that country.⁷³ But because of Colombia's centrality to transnational drug trafficking syndicates, as well as its proximity to Venezuela, a country on the verge of collapse, it remains likely that terrorists, insurgents, and other violent non-state actors will be able to acquire weapons with relative ease for the foreseeable future.

Contemporary Vignettes

When used in furtherance of terrorist and insurgent group objectives or as an illicit product to be smuggled or trafficked, SALW have continued to be an important tool for violent non-state actors. This section briefly examines several more contemporary groups, still active and using weapons, in terrorist attacks, but also as a commodity (e.g. trafficking) or to facilitate malicious activities (e.g. to intimidate, extort, kidnap, rob, and steal). The Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network (HQN), al-Qaeda (AQ), and the Islamic State all rely on SALW as part of their weapons procurement activities and as a mean of maintaining their respective criminal enterprises, even as political objectives remain paramount.

The Afghan Taliban relies extensively on SALW to perpetrate criminal activities. Often working in concert with other violent non-state actors like the Haqqani Network, the Taliban engages in extortion, drug trafficking, forced taxation, and armed robbery, among other activities.⁷⁴ Both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network function similar to some organised crime syndicates, as outlined in the ICCT Situation Report on SALW in South and Southeast Asia.⁷⁵ The Taliban has extorted truck convoys through the imposition of transit taxes, while the Haqqani Network "collects regular security payments from local, regional, and international businesses that operate in its zone of influence, effectively selling insurance against itself."⁷⁶ The latter is highly opportunistic, forcibly extorting money from a range of local and regional actors, from small shopkeepers to larger contracting and logistics firms.⁷⁷ None of this would be possible without SALW. Throughout the nearly two-decade long insurgency, Taliban fighters have maintained consistent access to Soviet calibres, including AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, BM-1 field rockets, and machine guns.

Some reports have indicated that the Taliban has engaged in heroin-for-arms trades with members of Russian organised crime.⁷⁸ The Taliban also target Afghanistan's

⁷³ Nicholas Casey and Joe Parkin Daniels, "Goodbye, Weapons! FARC Disarmament in Colombia Signals New Era," *New York Times*, June 27, 2017.

⁷⁴ Tuesday Reitano et al., "Examining the Nexus Between Organised Crime and Terrorism and its Implications for EU Programming," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)- The Hague, April 2017, <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/OC-Terror-Nexus-Final.pdf>

⁷⁵ Gretchen Peters, "Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry," *Combating Terrorism Center*, West Point, NY: Harmony Program, August 2012, p. 2. See also, Meryl Demuyneck, Tanya Mehra, and Reinier Bergema, "ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in South and Southeast Asia," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, June 2020.

⁷⁶ Gretchen Peters, *Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry*, (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Program, 2012) p. 40; For more on the Haqqani Network, see Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, *Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

⁷⁷ Peters, p. 39

⁷⁸ Phil Williams, "Insurgencies and Organized Crime," in Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012, p. 45.

telecommunications firms, receiving payments in exchange for not attacking cell phone towers and kidnapping the firms' employees.⁷⁹ In general, kidnapping for ransom (KFR) has been a fruitful fundraising venture for both the Taliban and the Haqqanis. Some estimates suggest that the Taliban makes more than \$10 million a year from kidnappings.⁸⁰

AQ relies on a range of weapons to execute its attacks, from small arms to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The East Africa embassy attacks of 1998, in Kenya and Tanzania, were executed using truck bombs, pistols, and stun grenades. Throughout the late 1990s and the early half of the 2000s, AQ was able to acquire weapons from the Taliban, which originated with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Proximity to arms bazaars in Peshawar and leftover weapons from Soviet-Afghan War, as well as extensive use of the worldwide black market in arms and munitions, also resupplied AQ's arsenal. The group's affiliates and franchises—across the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahel, and Southeast Asia—seek sanctuary and safe haven in failed states and ungoverned territories, many awash in weaponry, from SALW to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. As described in detail in the situation report on Southeast Asia, al-Qaeda linked networks have managed to gain a foothold across the region and have, through their decentralisation strategy, established links and taken advantage of opportunities with smaller groups focused on parochial grievances, which can nevertheless act as a force multiplier. AQ militants attach themselves to local groups, exploiting illicit networks, and ingratiating fighters into long-running supply chains that trade in weapons, drugs, and gemstones. AQ has proven particularly adept at linking up with warlords and other violent non-state actors to acquire the weaponry needed for its own fighters.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is not only one of the most well-funded terrorist groups in history, it is also one of the most well-equipped. And unlike many terrorist and insurgent groups that operated during the Cold War, ISIS never relied upon external states to provide it with weaponry.⁸¹ Rather, its fighters forcibly looted hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons and equipment from Iraqi and Syrian military installations.⁸² As outlined in the ICCT Situation Report on the Middle East and North Africa, ISIS has diversified its weapon sources, which include weapons acquired from other insurgents in Syria who have defected to ISIS, weapons purchased from other insurgents that receive them from foreign donors, weapons captured from vanquished enemies, and weapons purchased or traded for with corrupt members of the security forces in both Syria and Iraq.⁸³ In addition to armoured vehicles purchased on the black market or acquired when the Iraqi security forces retreated from the battlefield,⁸⁴ ISIS militants also have M79 antitank rockets made in the former Yugoslavia, American made

⁷⁹ Anuj Chopra, "Afghan Taliban Flexes Muscles With New Telecom 'Tax,'" *AFP*, January 18, 2016.

⁸⁰ Sami Yousafzai, "For the Taliban, A Crime that Pays," *The Daily Beast*, September 5, 2008.

⁸¹ An analysis of ISIS's weaponry reveals that China, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and the United States are the top three manufacturing states represented in the sample of ammunition used by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. "Islamic State Ammunition in Iraq and Syria: Analysis of Small-Calibre Ammunition Recovered from Islamic State Forces in Iraq and Syria," London: Conflict Armament Research, October 2014, p. 5.

⁸² "How ISIS Works," *New York Times*, September 16, 2014.

⁸³ C. J. Chivers, "ISIS Ammunition is Shown to Have Origins in U.S. and China," *The New York Times*, October 5, 2014. See also, Julia Harte and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Where Does the Islamic State Get Its Weapons?" *Foreign Policy*, October 6, 2014. See also, Meryl Demuyneck, Tanya Mehra, and Reinier Bergema, "ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in the Middle East and North Africa," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, May 2020.

⁸⁴ Many of the Iraqi soldiers who refused to fight blamed their failure to stand their ground on officers, saying they were deliberately denied the resupply of basic necessities like food and water. C. J. Chivers, "After Retreat, Iraqi Soldiers Fault Officers," *New York Times*, July 1, 2014.

M16 and M14 rifles, small arms, and ammunition.⁸⁵ The weapons and equipment that ISIS militants came to possess was initially intended to give the Iraqi Army both a significant edge over its adversaries.⁸⁶ In October 2014, reports suggested that US planes dropped weapons in ISIS territory that were intended for Kurdish fighters near Kobani, but were instead commandeered by the militants.⁸⁷

Conclusion

Both historically and today, terrorist groups have been involved with acquiring, smuggling, and trafficking SAL. Although most cases have been on the demand side, there are some examples of involvement on the supply side. The lion's share of arms trafficking networks involve criminal syndicates, some of which have close cooperation with terrorist and insurgent groups. Accordingly, involvement with arms trafficking very often leads to longer-term connections with criminal organisations that have access to, and profit from, the illicit trade in other areas, especially narcotics.⁸⁸ Terrorists and criminal groups are most likely to operate in states where government cannot effectively police their populations, which then become more likely to foster criminal violence as a result of limited state capacity. In these countries, corrupt and weak law enforcement provides a "low risk environment" and socio-political conditions fertile for large-scale criminal activity.⁸⁹

Ending conflicts can also have unintended consequences or second and third-order effects. For example, in post-conflict settings where disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) is the focus, demobilised soldiers have frequently engaged in criminality, especially the trafficking of weapons and the use of weapons to commit robbery and theft.⁹⁰ For DDR to effectively put weapons beyond use, there needs to be sustained and comprehensive involvement from impartial international organisations that can verify the decommissioning of arms stockpiles. State collapse can also lead to the looting of national arsenals.⁹¹ The more recent case of Libya is instructive in this regard, when vast sums of SALW (in addition to more concerning weaponry such as MANPADS), flooded the black market after Qaddafi was overthrown and Libya plunged into chaos.⁹² According to Rachel Stohl, each year approximately 1 million light weapons are stolen or lost around the world.⁹³ Still, even with DDR programs, there will always be the desire for violent non-state actors to hoard weapons, concerned that conflict proclaimed over will flare back up and require arms and ammunition.

Economic decline can foster the growth of the illicit economy and a black market trade in weapons, drugs, or people. As the coronavirus pandemic continues to sweep the

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⁸⁵ Gina Harkins, "5 Things to Know About Islamic State's Military Capabilities," *Army Times*, September 16, 2014.

⁸⁶ "Arms Windfall for Insurgents as Iraq City Falls," *The New York Times*, June 10, 2014.

⁸⁷ Josh Rogin, "ISIS Video: America's Air Dropped Weapons Now in Our Hands," *Daily Beast*, October 21, 2014.

⁸⁸ Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, "The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe," Library of Congress Federal Research Division, December 2002.

⁸⁹ Phil Williams and Stephen Black, "Transnational Threats: Drug Trafficking and Weapons Proliferation," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 15:1, 1994, pp.127-151.

⁹⁰ Michael T. Klare, "The New Arms Race: Light Weapons and International Security," *Current History*, April 1997, pp.173-178.

⁹¹ Rachel Stohl, "The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking," Center for American Progress, 2004.

⁹² Andrew Feinstein, "Where is Gaddafi's Vast Arms Stockpile?" *The Guardian*, October 26, 2011.

⁹³ Rachel J. Stohl, "Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms," *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, Vol.25, No.1, Winter-Spring 2005, pp.59-68.

globe, many experts are predicting a worldwide recession, or even depression. As social safety nets are squeezed and unemployment rises, there will be new entrants into the illicit economy, some portion of whom will become involved in the smuggling and trafficking of SALW. Moreover, as emerging technologies like 3D printing demonstrate, new promises for producing weapons and ammunition could result in an increase in “do-it-yourself” (DIY) weapons productions, focusing primarily on handguns and other small arms.⁹⁴ It is difficult to predict what effect this will have on SALW trafficking. On the one hand, it may exponentially increase trafficking as criminal organisations streamline the process in an effort to make money. Conversely, if anyone with a 3D printer can produce a firearm, this could obviate the relevance of organised SALW trafficking networks.

⁹⁴ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

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Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trafficking, Smuggling, and Use for Criminality by Terrorists and Insurgents: A Brief Historical Overview

Colin P. Clarke

15 July 2020

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