

To Help Defeat Boko Haram, the EU Should Push for Good Governance and Accountability

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Boko Haram remains a major security challenge for Nigeria and its Lake Chad basin neighbours, and the conflict in the north east has triggered a tragic humanitarian crisis affecting more than seven million people in the region. The EU has commendably increased its humanitarian support to the affected population, but wisely refrained from becoming too involved in the direct counter-terrorism response. Although Boko Haram has links to the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Africa, the main drivers of its insurgency are internal and should be addressed by the country's federal and state-level governments. These drivers include: governance failures in the North East in particular, and Nigeria in general; a poorly coordinated, mainly military, response; multiple security challenges that stretch the army to the breaking point; and elite unwillingness to address the unsustainable status quo. This policy brief argues that the EU could do more to address these drivers, but notes that it only has limited influence. In this context, the paper provides some recommendations to the EU on how it can help Nigeria more effectively address the Boko Haram insurgency.

Introduction

The Boko Haram insurgency remains a huge security challenge for Nigeria and its Lake Chad basin neighbours, and a major African foreign policy priority for the European Union (EU) and its members. The conflict, which broke out in 2009, has triggered a tragic humanitarian crisis affecting more than seventeen million people in the region. In September 2018, donors pledged another \$2.17 billion in humanitarian and development assistance, including approximately \$275 million directly from the EU. But the European Union has wisely refrained from becoming too involved in the direct counter-terrorism response.

The EU has commendably provided consistent short-term humanitarian support, but this paper argues it could do more to push Nigeria to addressing the drivers of the insurgency. These drivers include: governance failures in the North East in particular, and Nigeria in general; a poorly coordinated, mainly military, response; multiple security challenges that stretch the army to the breaking point; and elite unwillingness to address the unsustainable status quo. It then provides some recommendations to the EU on how it can help Nigeria more effectively address the Boko Haram insurgency.

Although Boko Haram has links to the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Africa, the main drivers of its insurgency are internal and should be addressed by the country's federal and state-level governments. Nigeria is a middle-income country, with a large if sometimes dysfunctional government. Therefore, the EU has only limited influence and should carefully calibrate its assistance to support organizations and institutions promoting accountability and good governance. It should also pursue a discrete if sophisticated advocacy strategy with the Nigerian elite to create the political will for better governance and to tackle systemic corruption, which are the root causes of the insurgency and the country's wider instability.

Governance Failures in the North East

Politics, governance, corruption, poverty and violence are linked in Nigeria.¹ With massive oil reserves, Nigeria is a potentially wealthy country, but 63 per cent of its estimated 193 million people are classified as absolutely poor.² Patronage and corruption drives the country's political economy, and leaves many destitute and marginalised.³ The resulting frustration and alienation felt by many have bred the emergence of numerous militant groups based mainly on ethnic and religious identities.

Boko Haram is one of these groups. It grew out of a group of radicalised Islamist youth in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in the north east, in the 1990s.⁴ Its charismatic and popular leader, Abu Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf, advocated a literal interpretation of the Quran. He criticised the ruling elite, denounced corruption, impunity, and the

¹ For background, see International Crisis Group Reports, *Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty*, 19 July 2006, p. 26; *Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict*, 20 December 2010.

² Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, "National Poverty Rates for Nigeria: 2003-04 (Revised) and 2009-10 (Abridged Report)", 20 April 2017. [http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries\[search\]=poverty](http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries[search]=poverty).

³ President Muhammadu Buhari launched an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, but it is still a major problem. Nigeria ranks 148 out of 180 in Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017", 21 February 2018. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017.

⁴ Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram?" United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, June 2012, 3. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf>.

government failures. Boko Haram's followers believe a strict Islamic state would address the ills of Nigerian society, including corruption and bad governance.⁵

Mohammed Yusuf was always political, in that he wanted an Islamic government, but initially not violent. In the early 2000s, he formed a political alliance with Ali Modu Sheriff, a politician and wealthy businessman from Maiduguri. Yusuf agreed to help Sheriff if he would implement Sharia and give the sect some senior government appointments. However, after he was elected Sheriff reneged on his promise to fully implement Sharia in the state and Yusuf turned his sermons against the governor and his government.⁶

Over the years, tensions rose between the group and the government and a series of clashes in the summer of 2009 escalated into an armed insurrection. The ensuing brutal military crackdown killed over 800, mostly Boko Haram members. Mohammed Yusuf was extra-judiciously executed while in police custody.⁷

A Slow and Poorly Coordinated Response

In the wake of the 2009 crackdown, Boko Haram went underground. It re-surfaced, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau (one of Yusuf's lieutenants), in 2010 in a series of violent attacks on police officers, police stations and military barracks to avenge the killings of Mohammed Yusuf and other comrades. The group publicly demanded the prosecution of Yusuf's murderers, the release of their colleagues in detention, the restoration of their mosque destroyed in the crackdown and payment of compensation for sect members killed by troops.⁸

The government of President Goodluck Jonathan did not take the insurgency seriously and the group slowly grew in strength. By 2013, it controlled a number of areas in northern Borno state, imposing their strict version of the Islamic law. Faced with this embarrassing loss of territory, on 14 May President Jonathan declared a state of emergency, sent more troops to the region and ordered them to "take all necessary action [to] put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists".⁹

The Nigerian security forces were ineffective and used excessive force, including extra-judicial killings, unlawful detention, beatings, extortion and burning of homes.¹⁰ The abuses only increased support for Boko Haram and the group continued to seize territory in northern Nigeria and parts of neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In August 2014, it declared a caliphate, centred on the town of Gwoza, Borno state, and in March 2015 it pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State's leader.

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⁵ International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency," 3 April 2014, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/curbing-violence-nigeria-ii-boko-haram-insurgency>; Alex Thurston, "The disease is unbelief: Boko Haram's religious and political worldview," The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2016; Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria* (Leiden: Leiden University African Studies Center, 2014).

⁶ Ibid. see also Alex Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency," 3 April 2014, p. 14.

⁹ "President declares state of emergency...Fighter jets, troops move to Borno, Yobe, Adamawa," *Daily Trust*, 15 May, 2013; Joe Brock and Felix Onuah, "Nigeria declares emergency in areas hit by Islamists," *Reuters*, 14 May, 2013.

¹⁰ One of the worst cases was in Baga town on the shores of Lake Chad, when they went on indiscriminate shooting and burning of homes following a four-hour shootout with BH gunmen. 2,128 homes were reportedly burnt. "Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Deaths From Military Raid", Human Rights Watch, 1 May 2013.

The Region and a New Nigerian President Responds

In order to respond to the insurgents' ability to conduct quick and mobile cross-border incursions, the affected countries were compelled to step up their military cooperation through the formation of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Chad's own cross-border interventions began to push back the group in early 2015, and Niger's and Cameroon's armies' readiness to cooperate in the fight boosted efforts to create a formal framework. The election of President Muhammadu Buhari (a former head of state, in the early 1980s, during a period of military rule) in Nigeria in April 2015 also gave fresh impetus to increased military cooperation.¹¹

The regional campaign dramatically changed the balance of power and was able to push Boko Haram out of most of its bases in Niger and Cameroon (with the exception of some difficult to access islands in Lake Chad). The Nigerian army also was able, with some MNJTF support, to force the group out of its known strongholds, but then suffered from strategic overstretch: the army is not large enough to control all of the vast north east.¹² Furthermore, the MNJTF is more a coordinating body than an integrated mission. Each country's troops are deployed and operate mainly in their own territory. The force operates under the direct political command of regional heads of states and government. The African Union has been managing the administrative aspects, especially donor assistance, while the UN also provides some administrative support. The military command is in Chad's capital, N'Djamena. The financial needs of the MNJTF were initially estimated at 655 million euro, to cover costs related to logistics, human resources and equipment, excluding weapons. However, the money pledged subsequently fell significantly short of this sum.¹³ In June 2016, the EU gave the MNJTF 50 million euro through the AU.¹⁴

Boko Haram is proving resilient and capable of striking back. Although it has lost much territory and split into two factions, one still loyal to Abubakar Shekau and another lead by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (also known as Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP). It continues its asymmetric war, regularly perpetrating suicide bombings, attacks on villages and occasionally on cities, camps for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and even army bases. Large areas of Borno state are still insecure and many IDPs are still unwilling to return to their villages.

A Major Humanitarian Crisis

The fighting and displacement has triggered a huge and costly humanitarian crisis. Security constraints, lack of sufficient funding and corruption hamper aid

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¹¹ One of the first things he did was to travel to the neighboring states to increase coordination with the MNJTF countries. William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A Abatan and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, "Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram", Institute for Security Studies, September 2016. Realising that his inaction on the Boko Haram insurgency would cost him politically in the 2015 general elections, then-President Goodluck Jonathan increased military resources for the campaign against the group in late 2014, but he lost the election nonetheless.

¹² The army has been increasingly involved in internal security operations across the country, and according to the army chief of staff is now deployed "virtually in all the 36 states of the federation". "Poor funding, security operations crippling Army – Buratai," *The Punch*, 2 February 2018.

¹³ Ionel Zamfir, "Regional efforts to fight Boko Haram," European Parliamentary Research Service, February 2017.

¹⁴ "Joint Communiqué by Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission; Neven Mimica, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development; and Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security," European Commission – Statement, 1 August 2016. Most of the cost of the operation is born by the participating countries.

organizations.¹⁵ More than 2.4 million people are displaced across the region. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

Nine years into the conflict, the humanitarian emergency in the Lake Chad region is among the most severe in the world. The crisis is unfolding in a region already affected by severe underdevelopment, poverty and climate change. The impact on the lives of around 17 million people is devastating, with women, youth and children bearing the brunt. In 2018, more than 10 million people require humanitarian assistance and protection. (...) Five million people are acutely food insecure and require sustained and heightened food and livelihood assistance. In 2017, only massively scaled-up aid delivery helped avert a famine.¹⁶

In June 2017, the EU pledged an additional 143 million euro in assistance for the humanitarian crisis in North East Nigeria,¹⁷ and in September 2018 another 138 million in combined humanitarian and development assistance for the Lake Chad region.¹⁸

Nigeria's Multiple Security Challenges

Boko Haram is but one of several major security challenges in Nigeria. In addition to the Islamist insurgency in the north east, there is widespread violence between herders and farmers in the country's Middle Belt, the re-emergence of armed militant groups in the Niger Delta, and growing pro-Biafra unrest in Igbo-majority southeast.¹⁹ The federal police force is dysfunctional, and unable to keep the peace.²⁰ Thus, the military is often deployed to address internal security challenges. At present it is deployed in virtually all of Nigeria's 36 states.²¹

Reforming the security services or the government as a whole has proven to be an almost impossible task politically. Over the years the government has established at least three

¹⁵ "Nigerian president sacks senior official amid claims of corruption", *The Guardian*, 8 November 2017; International Crisis Group, "Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nigeria", 18 May 2017; "What Change? An \$8 million refugee fund scandal shows Buhari's anti-corruption drive in Nigeria is not going to plan", Quartz, last modified 9 December 2016, www.qz.com.

¹⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Lake Chad Basin Emergency: Revised requirement and response priorities (September 2018)", 29 August 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/lake-chad-basin-emergency-revised-requirement-and-response-priorities-september-2018>.

¹⁷ "EU announces €143 million support package for the crisis in North East Nigeria", European Commission – Press Release, 15 June 2017.

¹⁸ The humanitarian assistance will go to Nigeria (€47 million), Niger (€15 million), Chad (€11.8 million), and Cameroon (€15.1 million). The development assistance will go to Nigeria (€74.5 million), Niger (€32.2 million), Chad (€33.2 million), and Cameroon (€2.7 million). "EU releases €138 million in humanitarian and development funding for Africa's Lake Chad region", European Commission - Press Release, 3 September 2018.

https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria/50036/eu-releases-%E2%82%AC138-million-humanitarian-and-development-funding-africas-lake-chad-region_en.

¹⁹ "Nigeria: Growing Insecurity on Multiple Fronts", Crisis Group Commentary, 20 July 2017. In 1967 the Igbo people, who dominate south-east Nigeria, tried to secede and create the Republic of Biafra. It was defeated by the Nigerian army in 1970.

²⁰ John Campbell, *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, updated edition* (Maryland, 2014), 141. According to Oluwakemi Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability and Security in Nigeria", Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 21 June 2016:

- Low levels of trust in the Nigerian police limit public cooperation critical to combatting internal security threats from irregular forces such as insurgents, criminal gangs, and extremists.
- Allegations of corruption, heavy-handedness, and politicization have dogged the Nigeria Police Force for years. However, a lack of political will has perpetuated a culture of impunity, weak oversight, and an unwillingness to absorb lessons learned from previous efforts at police reform.
- Improving the effectiveness of the Nigerian police depends on governance reforms. Depoliticizing the appointment and promotion processes for senior police officers and genuinely empowering oversight bodies are critical steps to opening a sustainable path to reform and rebuilding trust with local communities.

²¹ "Poor funding, security operations crippling Army – Buratai", *The Punch*, 2 February 2018; "Analysis: Scrutinising the Boko Haram resurgence", *SBM Intelligence*, 22 August 2017. See also "Former Army Chief Dambazzau laments use of military for police duties", *Leadership*, 1 July 2014.

eminent panels to recommend police reform, with few if any of the recommendations implemented.²² Similarly, the efforts to reform the military have also faltered for lack of political will.²³

Nigeria's Collective Action Problem

Most Nigerians, including officials and politicians, admit that rampant corruption and bad governance are denying most citizens even basic services, including security. In addition, the related lack of development and opportunities provide a ready pool of young and frustrated recruits for militant groups. Moreover, most Nigerians have lost faith in the police and the army's ability to pacify the 153,000sq km north east, let alone the rest of the country. Officials call for a more holistic approach, including a "Marshall Plan" for the north, but the challenge remains finding the resources and political will to implement and carry out the necessary programs and reforms – which is where Nigeria's collective action problem arises.

The collective action problem refers to a common challenge, whenever a group is faced with a problem that cannot be solved without some bearing the brunt of the burden while only retaining a portion of the benefit. In Nigeria, the problem basically boils down to pervasive corruption.²⁴ Many people "benefit" from it, including those who rely on assistance and hand-outs from corrupt leaders in exchange for their continued political support (in large part because the state no longer prioritizes public services). Corrupt individuals realize it is a major problem for the country, with many negative consequences, but their incentive is to continue their own corrupt practices while getting others to end theirs. Absent some kind of arrangement to ensure most people don't "cheat", the status quo – massive corruption that is undermining the country – appears to remain an individual's best choice.

The security services also are being hollowed-out by the same individual-corruption-logic as the state. What's more, those officials and politicians who benefit the most from public malfeasance have the means, and property, to live comfortably abroad if things get too bad.

Despite President Buhari's reformist platform, the government has not done enough to combat corruption. Public theft continues unabated, and unknown billions are lost that could be used to provide basic services, reform the security services and develop the north, as well as other desperately poor parts of the country. A major drain is the unaccounted "security vote" allocated to senior officials, ostensibly for funding security services operations. A recent May 2018 Transparency International report estimates these officials are spending N241.8 billion (\$670 million) annually, without audit or oversight.²⁵

²² "Motions Without Movement' Report of Presidential Committees On Police Reforms in Nigeria", *CLEEN Foundation*, 2008.

²³ "Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform", International Crisis Group, 6 June 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-challenge-military-reform>

²⁴ Nigerian Bureau of Statistics and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Corruption in Nigeria; Bribery: Public Experience and Response", 2017. "Nine out of 10 Nigerians say at least 'some' public officials are corrupt. The police are seen as most corrupt; 69% of citizens say "most" or "all" police officials are corrupt, followed by members of the National Assembly (60%) and local government councillors (55%). High perceptions of corruption are matched by high public mistrust". Oluwole Ojewale and Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye, "In Nigeria, perceived corruption remains high despite praise for president's anti-graft fight", *Afrobarometer Dispatch* no. 187, 8 February 2018.

²⁵ Mathew Page, "Camouflaged Cash: How 'Security Votes' Fuel Corruption in Nigeria", *Transparency International and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC)*, May 2018.

Some Nigerians are even asking for more international development assistance. However, not surprisingly, most donors (already stretched by their own budget woes and other commitments) are leery if it is likely much of their assistance will be pocketed by officials.

Development cannot occur over-night, but most radical groups prey on a loss of hope, not poverty.²⁶ They would have much less support if the government were to implement reforms and programs to give people confidence in a better future. This, more than a security crackdown, can help bring Nigeria back from the precipice. It can be done. One example is Lagos, which two decades ago naysayers painted as “dystopian” but since then has made significant, if qualified progress.²⁷

The EU Conundrum and Recommendations for Change

The challenge for the EU is that Nigeria, with a population close to 200 million, is much too large to change with development assistance alone. In addition, the main drivers of the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as other security challenges, are internal and should be addressed by the country’s federal and state governments. Therefore, the EU and other donors, particularly European member states, must help in such a way as to promote policy reforms and create the political will to end the status quo. The EU should carefully calibrate its assistance and use its limited political influence to support organizations pushing for good governance and accountability, and pursue a sophisticated advocacy strategy with the Nigerian elite to create the political will for better governance and a genuine attempt to tackle systemic corruption, which are the main causes of the country’s instability. This should include pushing the Nigerian government to be more forthcoming about its challenges and more transparent about implementing lessons learned.

The government is frequently unwilling to admit mistakes or failures. For example, more than two years ago, President Buhari had declared the insurgents “technically defeated”; more recently he claimed they had been degraded to no more than “desperate criminal gangs” and their operations reduced to “the last kicks of a dying horse”.²⁸ This is far from the truth. Yes, the Nigerian army has made large gains since 2015, but the insurgency remains resilient and can still launch almost daily attacks.²⁹ If ignored, it can adapt and rebuild.

While downplaying the threat makes sense politically, it undermines the already weak consensus that the country needs to make sacrifices to defeat the Boko Haram. This is particularly the case for elites in Abuja and Lagos, who live far-removed from the troubles in the North East.

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²⁶ “Research makes clear that a sense of grievance towards, and limited confidence in, government is widespread in the regions of Africa associated with the highest incidence of violent extremism. This may be an inevitable corollary of the life experience of growing up in the context of acute and relative multidimensional poverty, neglect and political marginalization affecting these areas”. United Nations Development Program, *Journey to Extremism in Africa*, 2017, p. 5.

²⁷ Diane de Gramont, “Governing Lagos: Unlocking the Politics of Reform”, Carnegie Paper, 12 January 2015; Muyiwa Elijah Agunbiade and Oluwafemi Ayodeji Olajide, “Urban Governance and Turning African Cities Around: Lagos Case Study”, Partnership for African Social and Governance Research Working Paper no. 19, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2016.

²⁸ “Boko Haram technically defeated – Buhari”, *The Nation*, 24 December 2015; “B/Haram bombings last kicks of dying horse – Buhari”, *Daily Trust*, 27 November 2017.

²⁹ “Nigerian soldiers protest as Boko Haram attacks surge”, *Vanguard*, 15 August 2018.

Related to these issues, is a reluctance to release and implement lessons from non-partisan investigations into security failures and lapses that have benefitted the insurgents. The latest such investigation was a twelve-man committee created on 1 March 2018 to investigate the abductions of 113 schoolchildren from Dapchi in north east Nigeria in February. It followed in the footsteps of a long line of similar committees, all established to report on various aspects of the Boko Haram insurgency. The findings of the previous inquiries have been classified, however, and their recommendations rarely appear to have been followed.³⁰ The present committee, set up by the national security adviser, is comprised largely of representatives of the military, intelligence services and other agencies with a culture of secrecy. Its report risks being classified as well, inaccessible to other actors who could help actually make sure the committee's recommendations are implemented. The government should pledge to implement this committee's recommendations. The government should also publish the findings of the 2014 Ibrahim Sabo committee, which investigated the Chibok girls' abduction.

The EU delegation to Nigeria has been on the right track. The outgoing head said last year, "[w]e are not offering more financial support, we are proposing more political and policy dialogue, technical assistance, capacity building, training, transfer of technology". He also called for improving tax collection to finance development.³¹ It tried to focus its development efforts on a few key states and pilot programs with the hope they would be scaled up by the government.³² Critics, however, contend that politically and diplomatically the EU and member states were too focused on Abuja and not the states in crises.³³

To be effective at addressing the root causes of Islamist militancy and the humanitarian crisis it created in the north east, the EU delegation will need to prioritize the need for governance reforms, including key state governments. Maintaining this focus can be tricky for the EU, which must represent the interests and priorities of its different agencies³⁴ as well as its 28 member states (and with the most influential individual member on Nigeria, the UK, leaving the union), but it should be its policy priority in Nigeria.³⁵ If it does not, groups like Boko Haram will remain very difficult to defeat and could spread, and much of the EU's assistance for Nigeria and the region will continue to

³⁰ These include the 2011 Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North East, the 2013 Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, the 2013 Presidential Taskforce on Negotiations with Boko Haram, the 2014 Presidential Fact-finding Committee on Abduction of Chibok Girls and the 2017 Presidential Investigative Panel to Review Compliance of the Armed Forces with Human Rights Obligations and Rules of Engagement. A member of one of these committees publicly complained that if their recommendations had been implemented, the insurgency could have been defused long ago. Crisis Group Report, "Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria," 12 April 2018.

³¹ "EU says no more financial support for Nigeria- Envoy ", *Vanguard* (Lagos), 29 June 2017.

³² Telephone interview, senior UN official who worked in Nigeria, 14 September 2017.

³³ Telephone interview, counter-terrorism expert, 8 September 2017.

³⁴ The European Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and the EU delegation to Nigeria, as well as a number of coordinators, e.g. for counterterrorism, and special representatives, e.g. for the Sahel, are the main EU institutions involved in developing and implementing the organizations policy for Nigeria. The main instrument for EU assistance is the European Development Fund. The three priority sectors for the 11th EDF (2014-2020) 512 million euro allocation are: 1, social sector, improving access to quality primary health care, the fight against malnutrition and measures to strengthen resilience and promote social protection; 2, economic sector, increasing access to sustainable electricity, supporting efforts to improve conditions for economic growth with a focus on improving competitiveness and diversification, development of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures and strengthening public finance systems at state and federal levels, to create a stable environment for trade and investment activities; 3, governance sector, continued support to strengthen democracy, fight corruption, trafficking of human beings, drugs and small arms, justice system reform, measures to manage migration more efficiently and effectively, and capacity building for civil society organizations. Other EU funding include: the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP); the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), and the 1-billion-euro allocation for the Sahel/Lake Chad region. Humanitarian assistance is provided by ECHO. Member states also have their own bilateral assistance programs.

³⁵ Governance reform was a major priority of EU policy in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

have to be allocated to the humanitarian response to violent insurgencies and important trading partners will not develop.

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