

National Workshop on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005)

Nairobi, 7-9 May 2014

Workshop Report

A three-day workshop took place from 7 to 9 May 2014 at the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) that was devoted to the development of an effective and comprehensive strategy in Kenya to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The workshop, co-organized by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), with the assistance of the Human Security Collective (HSC), brought together representatives of Kenyan government security agencies, national civil society and faith-based organizations, and international experts. The event was also partly aimed at promoting effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005). The main objective of the workshop was to secure the commitment of both Government and civil society representatives to address the problem of violent extremism in Kenya in a cooperative manner based on a shared analysis and understanding of the problem and on the basis of continuous dialogue.

Background information

In November 2011, CTED organized the first regional workshop on the implementation of SC Resolution 1624, for East African States in Nairobi, providing an opportunity for government representatives and civil society to engage with international experts and others on this topic. The national workshop of 7 to 9 May 2014 was a follow-up meeting, allowing participants to focus specifically on the circumstances and challenges that Kenya faces in dealing with incitement to terrorism and advocacy of violent extremism.

This recent workshop is expected to be followed by a second national workshop in the second half of 2014 to continue facilitating the engagement between workshop participants in their efforts to work towards an effective and comprehensive strategy to deal with incitement to terrorism and advocacy of violent extremism.

Meeting Overview

The Workshop took place over the course of three days and was divided into ten sessions (including opening and closing remarks). It was opened on Wednesday, 7 May by the Under Secretary-Security of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of the Government of Kenya, the CTED Deputy Executive Director, and the Director of the ICCT. The Under Secretary stressed that the workshop came at the right time and highlighted the design of the national counter-terrorism strategy, and new anti-terrorism legislation that has been implemented, and the fact that Al Shabaab has been designated as a criminal organization. He also pointed out that the objective of the government was to mitigate the threat and to improve interagency cooperation, including with respect to engagement with civil society.

Presentations were given by experts of the Sahar Research group, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), a representative of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, and several representatives of local civil society organizations, including women's leadership organizations, faith-based organizations, community-based organizations and media. The representative of the National Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (NCTC) offered a presentation on the national counter-terrorism strategy.

Key points on the security challenges in Kenya

During presentations on this topic, several key points were raised:

- Sentiments of revenge and humiliation are felt by parts of the Somali population, allowing Al Shabaab to feed on these sentiments and turn them into driving factors for violent extremism.
- The strong response by the Government as a reaction to the increased security threat ran the risk of serving as a possible driving factor exploited by Al Shabaab to recruit young people for their organization.
- One reason that Al Shabaab has become more focused on targeting Kenya can be found in the fact that the organization is under pressure in Somalia, and is currently reinventing itself.
- Al Shabaab is becoming smaller, but is investing in its relations with other Al Qaida franchises.

Participants emphasized the need to organize a "society controlled security" - not only state security. Furthermore, it was stressed that it is necessary to move from a "need to know" paradigm to a "need to share" information paradigm.

Elements identified as important components of a national strategy for countering terrorism and incitement motivated by extremism and intolerance

Presenters highlighted various elements on which greater attention could be paid to help offset terrorism and incitement. These included:

- The effects of lack of education, development and economic opportunities. This was especially true for pupils from remote areas, with girls and poor youngsters disproportionately affected by the lack of quality education. The importance of improving access to quality education was therefore stressed, as a way of addressing the conditions conducive to the process of radicalization towards violent extremism.
- The view that counter-terrorism measures should be taken within the frameworks that protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The international frameworks sometimes

allow for limited exceptions to be made on human rights if the circumstances call for necessary government action.

- Education for young people and the importance of dialogue to promote tolerance and acceptance of diversity.
- The need to invest in different forms of education and strengthen the role of religious leaders in order to speak out against intolerance, and raise awareness in society to strengthen the resilience against violent extremist elements.
- Empowerment of Muslim women could allow them to express themselves more effectively, improve their economic opportunities and thus render them less dependent, which can lead to them speaking out against recruitment, both within their communities as well as to the authorities.
- Recognition of the important role of women. Women play a crucial role in the family, and are thus well positioned to notice changes with, for instance, their children if they start to radicalize. Women also play an important role in the social support systems that must be in place to organize rehabilitation and reintegration of former fighters back in the communities. So opportunities to help women should be identified and implemented.
- There is need to empower the credible voices and youth role models, since they are in the best position to mentor youth and intervene when a young person is going to different stages of radicalization. Once young people start carrying arms, it may be too late.
- Capacities to counter violent extremism already exist at grassroots level, often in informal or traditional community structures. These capacities can serve as points of departure but need to be strengthened further.

Measures undertaken by the Kenyan Government

The National Counter-Terrorism Center, NCTC, elaborated on the different pillars of the national counter-terrorism strategy. An important aspect of the strategy deals with prevention, with a focus on root causes, counter- and de-radicalization and prevention of discrimination and incitement. Another aspect focuses on disruption and information collection, involving the population, detecting and disrupting terrorist activities and destroying terrorist networks. The NCTC representative stressed the importance of partnerships between different stakeholders for the effective implementation of the national strategy. He also emphasized the challenges that exist, such as budgetary and legal constraints, and the lack of sectoral ownership of both state and non-state actors and the coordination of activities.

Measures undertaken by Kenyan Civil Society

Various civil society representatives raised the importance of building on already existing mechanisms and initiatives in the area of countering violent extremism (CVE). The *CVE Accountability and Advocacy Charter* that had recently been drafted, upon the initiative of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), provides an especially good framework, listing the different elements of a comprehensive CVE strategy, and the various responsibilities of different stakeholders in implementing this strategy. The existing outreach and constituency of SUPKEM adds to the potential of this Charter.

The CVE specific programs that have been implemented by civil society organizations were also elaborated upon, addressing conditions conducive on the grassroots level, through awareness raising with youth, women and elders, via dialogues between and within the groups on issues of ideologies and grievances, but also by bridging the gap between communities and government levels. In these programs, civil society organizations also made use of the (social) media for sending messages, especially when events happen. Civil society representatives elaborated on the trauma healing programs they have been running. In these programs, they also deal with victims of police abuse, and

offer collaborative leadership programs to mitigate the tensions after elections especially targeting those that have lost elections.

The problems in Kenya identified

The Workshop participants listed some of the main issues, problems, challenges, and possible ways to deal with the problem of violent extremism, incitement and recruitment. These can be categorized in three broad categories:

Key topics

- Education (quality at Madrassas and education curriculum including peace education)
- Awareness raising, including on the dangers of violent extremism, incitement and recruitment
- Counter-narratives to incitement to terrorism as well as recruitment
- Returnees from Al Shabaab or affiliated groups
- Rehabilitation of returnees
- Employment and economic opportunities
- Communication, including online
- Trust building
- Resilience
- Identity issues of both individuals and groups
- Fear due to intimidation
- Disconnect between national and regional (grassroots) level
- National CVE strategy

Players (both as drivers and as natural allies)

- Family
- Women
- Faith-based organizations
- Religious leaders
- Community based organizations
- “Who do you address?”; “What is the definition of a community?”
- Government both on a national and on county and local level
- Focal point(s) within government

Processes/values/conditions

- Avoid the war paradigm
- Mentorship/role family/women
- Empowering voices of reasons
- Shared responsibility
- Partnership and cooperation
- Sharing of information
- Implementation of the CVE Advocacy Charter
- Trust building
- Anchoring CVE interventions in existing structures
- Community engagement
- Creating resilience

- Setting up a Centre of Excellence for training and documentation
- Financial resources
- Long-term commitments
- Focal point(s) within government

Outcomes of the debates in the breakout sessions and plenary meetings

Several topics, as identified above, were looked at in greater depth in “break-out” sessions.

Breakout Sessions

1. Quality Education

A key theme which was identified was the importance of quality education as a preventative measure for CVE. It was emphasized that education should be aimed at all actors involved and should include research and mapping of the problem. The overall objective for quality education is, according to the participants, to understand the target population or “orientation group” and to develop quality education mechanisms.

The orientation group consists of returnees and youth in general, women, religious leaders and imams who also fall into the category of a population at risk (for intimidation).

Actors to be involved

As the government is responsible for quality standards and policy frameworks, including on peace education, participants agreed that the government should take the lead with the assistance of research institutions to map the problem of violent extremism.

Activities should include:

- An in-depth survey should be conducted on the situation and conditions of youth at risk in selected areas. This research should be evidence-based. This should lead to a mapping, or overview, indicating where the problems are the most imminent.
- The setting up of a database collecting information about returnees in order to get a better understanding and profile, allowing more tailor-made responses
- Better curriculum development and the integration of CVE understanding in the educational curricula, and the development of skills to counter potential recruitment and incitement . In order to promote a culture of peace and non-violence, it is important to identify and mobilize traditional values and practices emphasizing community cohesion and peaceful resolution of conflicts.
- It is also necessary to develop and implement comprehensive awareness-raising campaigns to counter extremist narratives through education, advocacy and media.
- Capacity building activities should also target grassroots structures. Civil society and faith-based organizations can however also document and share information for instance when they function in the capacity as peace monitors in the communities. They can share good practices, experiences, practices with the government and influence the curriculum through existing mechanisms of consultation.
- Meanwhile, it is also important to improve the access to quality education in general and in particular for young people disproportionately affected by disparities related to location, gender and income.

There are both short-term and long-term activities that need to be developed. Some activities should be started immediately, first by organizing a multi-stakeholder consultation for the design process of the curriculum. The group also identified several challenges, such as the risk that, for instance,

externally funded capacity building projects are looking for short term results, while long term investments are needed. Other challenges identified are the need for community ownership of the programs implemented and, thus, trust and partnership are conditions as well.

CT and CVE Strategy: Prevention measure, quality education	
Different roles: who and what?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government (Ministries of Youth and Education) responsible for peace education program; quality of secular and religious education programs; organizing survey to better understand challenges • FBOs and CBOs can share experiences, good practices, and offer ideas for design of curriculum • Family, women • Religious leaders
Conditions and principles; legal frameworks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitution places the responsibility for peace education on the government • Trust among stakeholders • Partnership, cooperation, and information exchange
Objectives, tasks and activities	<p>Objective: to understand the target population and to develop quality education mechanisms.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To improve evidence-based knowledge and data to better understand the multiple challenges confronting youth at risk • Conduct in-depth survey on the situation and conditions of youth in selected areas • Identify/or develop appropriate strategies to address key challenges • Curriculum building • Setting up Centre of Excellence • To promote a culture of peace and non-violence • Identify and mobilize traditional values and practices emphasizing community cohesion and peaceful resolution of conflicts, especially involving women and young people • Develop and implement a comprehensive awareness-raising campaign to counter extremist narratives through education, advocacy, and media, including ICTs and social networks • Improve access to quality education and employment opportunities for young people disproportionately affected by disparities related to location, gender and income • Development of skills to improve economic development and employment • Identify the major barriers that limit access to lower secondary and develop effective and sustainable strategies aimed at addressing term
Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long term commitment • Financial resources • Mainstream CVE activities in regular and irregular education programs • Ownership on the programs to be implemented • Trust and partnership
Timeframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organize Multi-stakeholder consultation for curriculum design • Research on the profile of the orientation group and map the regional hot spots • Start this month

2. Rehabilitation and reintegration of former fighters

The need for effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former fighters was identified by the participants as one of the important challenges that needed a multi-stakeholder approach and immediate attention. The objective in dealing with this issue was to facilitate through quality programs and strategies a comprehensive/constructive rehabilitation and reintegration of allegedly accused violent extremist participants. These programs needed to be based on different levels of responsibility and thus a chain of engagement.

The steps that need to be taken, as identified by the participants, include an immediate further development of the mechanisms already existing on county-level, and to adapt them in a way to make engagement with civil society on this topic possible. “Bottom-up” approaches should intensify, while ensuring their coordination. On the national level, the executive directive focusing on the amnesty mechanism needs to be reviewed and a consultation mechanism will have to be designed to ensure engagement with civil society actors on the further development of a national CVE strategy and its effective implementation. Recently a NCTC consultation process has been established. Henceforth, it is important to tune into that process and intensify civil society participation. The same model also needs to be exported to other regions. Participants stressed the importance of using advocacy mechanisms that already exist and further engaging with the NCTC, in order to discuss the various elements of the CT and CVE strategy. Civil society would then be able to endorse the CT and CVE strategy.

Actors to be involved

On the government level, these players should ideally include the ministries of education, interior, justice, and treasury responsible for the executive directive dealing with measures on amnesty that might be taken the prisons and responsibilities of probation officers, the ‘Borstol’ school centers and juvenile detention centers, education programs and sufficient funds to set up effective rehab programs.

On the county level, county policy boards can be set up, which would allow for engagement between government and civil society. This mechanism should be set up and organized in various counties in order to coordinate the different activities undertaken by different stakeholders. On a local and community level, chiefs and assistant chiefs, as well as police officers in community policing programs should be involved.

Other actors that need to play an important role in setting up effective rehab programs include family members, women and human rights (HR) NGOs. The last would monitor the programs and engage with the judiciary in order to bridge the gap of differences in the interpretation of legislation by the prosecution office and the police. The HR NGOs can also play a role in setting up training programs to overcome this lacuna. More credible voices need to be identified to find the role models in communities, ensuring a peer-based connection. These credible voices can especially play a role in stopping the returnees from joining criminal gangs. The criminal gangs often form a substitute for the comradeship and group protection that returnees have given up by leaving Al Shabaab or affiliated groups. Credible voices include religious leaders, former fighters and victims. They can all play a part in the de-radicalization process and the tailor-made programs, that are preferably also linked to education programs. A possibility is to make use of the already existing informal “maskon” discussions (organized or spontaneous debate activities in people’s homes) taking place in communities.

Activities need to include:

- The mechanisms that need to be set up, or the existing mechanisms that need to be adapted to implement these activities, including improvement of the ‘vetting procedure’ or “clearing

house” construction that needs to allow distinction between those who committed international crimes and those who may be eligible for amnesty.

- Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs and programs targeted on social and economic development and training programs to develop skills and mentorship in jobs.
- Counselling programs dealing with trauma healing, religious counselling and reconciliation programs with the community. During this process there needs to be a chance for the former fighters to grieve over losing their comradeship. This should therefore be replaced by a process of socialization back into their communities and to ensure that stigmatization is avoided.

The EU Radicalization Awareness Network has also been working on these issues; it would be a possibility to learn from the good practices collected in that context. The activities need to be tailor-made, and although a multi-stakeholder approach is needed, a one-on-one approach is essential. The various stakeholders should ensure coordination in the activities developed and implemented. Hence information sharing is essential, but without violating the right to privacy of the returnees. For rehabilitation and reintegration to be successful, there need to be different levels of engagement, and multiple partners playing a role.

Challenges

One of the challenges will be to identify the orientation group. This group will probably entail different levels of extremist engagement prior to returning to society, and will all need to be targeted with tailor-made programs. The different categories of people belonging to this orientation group include the group of mostly young people who became involved or vulnerable for recruitment because of their direct circumstances and economic grievances. There is also a group who had been approached by recruiters, but who did not yield. And there are those who were acting as the facilitators of extremist organizations by doing some tasks, or worked as recruiters, actual fighters, or those that were in leadership positions. Part of the activities could also be targeted towards convicted violent extremists in prison to ensure rehabilitation and a good reintegration into society upon their release. It will be important to get a solid understanding of those who belong to this orientation group, for which evidence-based research is needed, to identify the profiles, and background information of why people joined.

Further challenges identified by the participants included the fear of returnees to talk to the authorities, with the result that not enough relevant information is shared. Trust-building and clarity on the amnesty arrangements is therefore important. The reintegration process needs to be accessible and well rooted in society and local communities. The challenge is thus also to formulate a new common language which can stimulate the buy-in from different stakeholders on these programs, and hence better coordination.

Another challenge has to do with the security of those that return. They might fear retaliation from Al Shabaab, but also from the community which they re-enter. Meanwhile, all should be wary of not making the rehab and reintegration programs too attractive, thereby becoming an incentive on its own in joining Al Shabaab, and next returning and becoming eligible for reintegration programs with mentoring and job opportunities.

CT /CVE Strategy: Prevent/Respond measure: Rehabilitation and reintegration of former fighters	
Different roles: who and what?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government: Ministries of Education, Interior, Justice, NCTC, Treasury; County government; Local government; Prisons and juvenile centers; local police • FBOs, CBOs, HR NGOs; religious leaders; role models, families
Conditions and principles; Legal frameworks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures on amnesty that might be taken • Regulation to deal with witness protection? • County level consultation mechanism NCTC consultation level
Objectives, Tasks and activities	<p>Objective: to facilitate through quality programs and strategy a comprehensive/constructive rehabilitation and reintegration of allegedly accused violent extremist participants. These programs needed to be based on different levels of responsibility, and thus a chain of engagement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clearing house construction • DDR • Counseling • Mentorship programs, role for role models/credible voices • Education and job mentorship
Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long term commitment • Financial resources • Multi-level and multi-stakeholder Coordination, information sharing, • Trust and partnership • Ownership on the programs to be implemented • Not to be too attractive and become an incentive to join VE organization and next return for rehab programs
Timeframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organize Multi-stakeholder consultation to engage with NCTC, county government • Research on the profile of the orientation group and map the regional hot spots • Start this month

Other proposals

Other proposals and issues discussed in the breakout sessions included the challenge of dealing with fear, which hampers CVE work, and the expression of counter-narratives by, for instance religious leaders. Human rights workers are also hindered in their advocacy work by fear. There is thus a need to protect those who work in the CVE business. One proposal that has been deemed worthy of further exploration is the possibility of improving (witness) protection programs.

Another activity highlighted by the participants is the need to devolve the CVE Advocacy Charter to the communities. Participants expressed the wish to have that done by the end of the year. Participants stressed the importance of disseminating the ideas behind the CVE Charter to the communities and to be able to discuss it. It was agreed that SUPKEM and the Ministry of Interior should be in the lead of organizing this.

Participants also highlighted the important role played by the media. A lot of criticism had spurred after the Westgate attacks, especially towards local media. Their messaging sometimes contributes to incitement. All agree that social media is currently the battleground. Participants thus stressed the need to design a media strategy, which includes training programs on “conflict sensitive reporting”,

and more awareness of CVE issues. So far, three counties have been chosen to start a pilot project, initiated by SUPKEM. Media and other forms of messaging could be used to raise awareness of the problems, share information, and counter the violent extremist and messages of fear sent around.

Conclusions

The national workshop on implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) concluded with the commitment of all present to pursue an action-oriented plan to reduce the threat of violent extremism, incitement and terrorism in Kenya. It was agreed that such a plan required full cooperation and partnership between the Government and civil society. Participants noted the already-existing mechanisms for communication and coordination between the stakeholders to work in partnership, but highlighted that there is an urgent need to strengthen these mechanisms and avoid duplications. The National Steering committee for Peace and Conflict Transformation (NSC) was particularly mentioned as an important structure with which to work.

Although the trust deficit between stakeholders was acknowledged, participants showed a spirit of constructive and cooperative engagement and agreed that it was essential to organize a follow-up consultative meeting to discuss the agenda and need for a task force to ensure regular engagement in the months ahead in order to keep momentum. Participants requested that SUPKEM, as the current secretariat of the recently adopted Accountability and Advocacy Charter on Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya, take the lead in organizing the follow-up meeting. Participants called upon the donor community to consider making available financial resources and to coordinate the funding of long-term projects targeted at countering violent extremism. Participants also called upon the international community to facilitate the exchange of experiences and assist in coordinating initiatives that are developed.